# LawFoyer

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A daily dose for inquisitors

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## Posts

- [Blog](https://lawfoyer.in/blog/)
- [LawFoyer: Important Links](https://lawfoyer.in/links/): LawFoyer is a comprehensive platform designed to empower law students, researchers, and professionals through accessible legal knowledge, opportunities, and skill development resources. Connect With Us LinkedIn (Real-time updates):https://www.linkedin.com/company/lawfoyer/ Instagram (Engaging legal content):https://www.instagram.com/lawfoyer/?hl=en Official Website (Daily updates & opportunities):https://lawfoyer.in LawFoyer Connect (Jobs & Internships):https://news.lawfoyer.in Research Publication (LIJDLR Journal):https://lijdlr.com LawFoyer Academy (Courses & Certifications):https://academy.lawfoyer.in YouTube Channel:https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJzzEjObEIwcFpizucmj4LA Our
- [VCPRF - International Moot Court Workshop, 2026 | Organized by Veritas Centre for Policy Research Foundation (VCPRF) | Register by 30 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/vcprf-international-moot-court-workshop-2026-organized-by-veritas-centre-for-policy-research-foundation-vcprf-register-by-30-september-2026/): VCPRF - International Moot Court Workshop, 2026 | Organized by Veritas Centre for Policy Research Foundation (VCPRF) | Register by 30 September 2026
- [Two-Day International Conference on “Forensic Sciences for Advancing Justice: Integrating Law, Medical Science and Technology” | Organized by Integral University, India in collaboration with MenoufiyaUniversity AL Minufiyah, Egypt | Submit Abstract by 20th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/integral-university-india-in-collaboration-with-menoufiyauniversity-al-minufiyah-egypt-organized-by-integral-university-lucknow-submit-abstract-by-20th-october-2026/): Integral University, India in collaboration with MenoufiyaUniversity AL Minufiyah, Egypt | Organized by Integral University, Lucknow | Submit Abstract by 20th October 2026
- [10th SGTU Moot Court Competition,2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, School of Law, SGT University | Register by 5th October, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/10th-sgtu-moot-court-competition2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-school-of-law-sgt-university-register-by-5th-october-2026/): 10th SGTU Moot Court Competition,2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, School of Law, SGT University | Register by 5th October, 2026
- [National Legal Hackathon | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) | Register by 24 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-legal-hackathon-organized-by-school-of-law-forensic-justice-and-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-nfsu-register-by-24-september-2026/): National Legal Hackathon | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) | Register by 24 September 2026
- [CALL FOR ABSTRACTS — CCADR JOURNAL FOR ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION | Organized by Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR), CNLU | Register by 15th October 2026 | 11:59 p.m.](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-abstracts-ccadr-journal-for-alternate-dispute-resolution-organized-by-chanakya-centre-for-alternative-dispute-resolution-ccadr-cnlu-register-by-15th-october-2026-1159-p-m/): CALL FOR ABSTRACTS — CCADR JOURNAL FOR ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION | Organized by Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR), CNLU | Register by 15th October 2026 | 11:59 p.m.
- [How to Register a Trademark and Secure Your Brand Name](https://lawfoyer.in/how-to-register-a-trademark-and-secure-your-brand-name/): Introduction A brand name helps customers identify a business, product, or service and distinguish it from competitors. Registering the name as a trademark can provide stronger legal protection and help the owner establish enforceable rights over the mark. In India, trademark registration is administered by the Trade Marks Registry under the Trade Marks Act, 1999
- [11th Justice Murtaza Husain Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Unity Moot Court Committee, Unity P.G. College, Lucknow | Register by 30th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/11th-justice-murtaza-husain-memorial-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-unity-moot-court-committee-unity-p-g-college-lucknow-register-by-30th-september-2026/): 11th Justice Murtaza Husain Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Unity Moot Court Committee, Unity P.G. College, Lucknow | Register by 30th September 2026
- [Sibgathullah Khan Subaan of Osmania University Receives Commendation Certificate at Telangana Minorities Excellence Summit](https://lawfoyer.in/sibgathullah-khan-subaan-of-osmania-university-receives-commendation-certificate-at-telangana-minorities-excellence-summit/): Achievements become truly meaningful when they reflect dedication, patience, and the courage to keep moving forward despite challenges. Adding another proud milestone to the journey is Sibgathullah Khan Subaan, an LLB student at Osmania University, who has been recognised with a Commendation Certificate at the Telangana Minorities Excellence Summit. The recognition was presented by the
- [VIDHIKA – Volume 2 Issue 3 | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit by 20th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/vidhika-volume-2-issue-3-organized-by-nyaya-shastra-submit-by-20th-september-2026/): VIDHIKA – Volume 2 Issue 3 | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit by 20th September 2026
- [MEDEXON INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Dexon Global | Register by 20 October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/medexon-international-mediation-competition-2026-organized-by-dexon-global-register-by-20-october-2026/): MEDEXON INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Dexon Global | Register by 20 October 2026
- [K.M. Bashir Memorial Student Constitutional Forum 2026 | Organized by Vakkom Moulavi Foundation Trust (VMFT) | Event on 24 & 25 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/k-m-bashir-memorial-student-constitutional-forum-2026-organized-by-vakkom-moulavi-foundation-trust-vmft-event-on-24-25-september-2026/): K.M. Bashir Memorial Student Constitutional Forum 2026 | Organized by Vakkom Moulavi Foundation Trust (VMFT) | Event on 24 & 25 September 2026
- [Call for Abstracts: International Conference on International Arbitration | Organized by School of Law, Mahindra University, Hyderabad, in collaboration with Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit Abstract by 15 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-abstracts-international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-school-of-law-mahindra-university-hyderabad-in-collaboration-with-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu/): Call for Abstracts: International Conference on International Arbitration | Organized by School of Law, Mahindra University, Hyderabad, in collaboration with Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit Abstract by 15 September 2026
- [SYNERGY: WHERE LAW MEETS SOCIETY – CASE STUDY COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Vivekananda School of Law and Legal Studies (VSLLS), Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus (VIPS-TC), through the Centre for Social Sciences | Register by 20th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/synergy-where-law-meets-society-case-study-competition-2026-organized-by-vivekananda-school-of-law-and-legal-studies-vslls-vivekananda-institute-of-professional-studies-techn/): SYNERGY: WHERE LAW MEETS SOCIETY – CASE STUDY COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Vivekananda School of Law and Legal Studies (VSLLS), Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus (VIPS-TC), through the Centre for Social Sciences | Register by 20th October 2026
- [Blackberry Limited v. Controller of Patents and Designs, 2026:DHC:3668](https://lawfoyer.in/blackberry-limited-v-controller-of-patents-and-designs-2026dhc3668/): A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE Blackberry Limited v. Controller of Patents and Designs, 2026:DHC:3668 concerns the refusal of Patent Application No. 1976/DEL/2008. The application claimed an invention titled “Colour Differentiating a Portion of a Text Message Shown in a Listing on a Handheld Communication Device.” The Delhi High Court examined whether colour coding recipients in outgoing
- [R.G. Anand v. M/s Delux Films & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1613; (1978) 4 SCC 118; 1979 SCR (1) 218 ](https://lawfoyer.in/r-g-anand-v-m-s-delux-films-ors-air-1978-sc-1613-1978-4-scc-118-1979-scr-1-218/): A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE R.G. Anand v. M/s Delux Films & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1613; (1978) 4 SCC 118; 1979 SCR (1) 218 is a landmark Supreme Court decision on copyright infringement, idea-expression distinction, substantial copying, and cinematic adaptation of dramatic works. The appellant, R.G. Anand, a playwright and dramatist, alleged that the respondents’ film “New Delhi” copied his
- [Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr., CS (OS) No. 894/2008, Delhi High Court](https://lawfoyer.in/banyan-tree-holding-p-limited-v-a-murali-krishna-reddy-anr-cs-os-no-894-2008-delhi-high-court/): A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr., CS (OS) No. 894/2008, Delhi High Court, decided on 23 November 2009 is a leading Indian judgment on territorial jurisdiction in internet-based passing off and infringement disputes. The Division Bench, speaking through Dr. Justice S. Muralidhar, examined whether a Delhi court
- [Neetu Singh & Anr. v. Telegram FZ LLC & Ors., CS (COMM) 282/2020, Delhi High Court](https://lawfoyer.in/neetu-singh-anr-v-telegram-fz-llc-ors-cs-comm-282-2020-delhi-high-court/): A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE Neetu Singh & Anr. v. Telegram FZ LLC & Ors., CS (COMM) 282/2020, Delhi High Court, decided on 30 August 2022 is a significant Indian decision on copyright enforcement against digital intermediaries. The judgment was delivered by Justice Prathiba M. Singh. The dispute arose from unauthorised circulation of educational videos, lectures, books, notes,
- [State through CBI v. S.J. Choudhary, 1996(1) BLJR 563](https://lawfoyer.in/state-through-cbi-v-s-j-choudhary-19961-bljr-563/): A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE State through CBI v. S.J. Choudhary, 1996(1) BLJR 563 is a significant Constitution Bench ruling on expert evidence under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Supreme Court decided one narrow but important issue. It examined whether a typewriter expert’s opinion is legally admissible. The case arose during a criminal trial involving Section 302
- [Lt. Col. Pooja Pal and Others v. Union of India and Others, 2026 INSC 281](https://lawfoyer.in/lt-col-pooja-pal-and-others-v-union-of-india-and-others-2026-insc-281/): A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE Lt. Col. Pooja Pal and Others v. Union of India and Others, 2026 INSC 281 is a vital judgment on gender equality in the Indian Army. The Supreme Court examined the denial of Permanent Commission to women Short Service Commission Officers. The appellants belonged mainly to early women officer batches commissioned between September 2010 and March
- [Padam Mehta and Another v. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2026 INSC 476](https://lawfoyer.in/padam-mehta-and-another-v-state-of-rajasthan-and-others-2026-insc-476/): A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE Padam Mehta and Another v. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2026 INSC 476 is a significant Supreme Court judgment on mother tongue-based education, linguistic dignity, and constitutional access to meaningful learning. The appeal arose from a dismissed public interest litigation before the Rajasthan High Court. The appellants sought inclusion of Rajasthani language in the REET-2021 syllabus and directions for
- [6th RFMLR – TT&A Demystifying Series: Certificate Course on Cross Border M&A and Foreign Investment | Organized by RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Event on 9th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/6th-rfmlr-tta-demystifying-series-certificate-course-on-cross-border-ma-and-foreign-investment-organized-by-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-rajiv-gandhi-natio/): 6th RFMLR – TT&A Demystifying Series: Certificate Course on Cross Border M&A and Foreign Investment | Organized by RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Event on 3 September 2026
- [28th LawFoyer Quiz on Indian Contract Act, 1872: Prizes worth Rs. 15K + | Cash Prizes, Smart Watch, Earbuds and much more | Register by 3rd October, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/28th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-indian-contract-act-1872/): Test your understanding of the contract with the 28th LawFoyer Quiz on Indian Contract Act 1872. Win prizes and register by Oct 3, 2026.
- [INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-by-20-september-2026/): INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 September 2026
- [CALL FOR PAPERS – CAPITAL LAW REVIEW | Organized by Capital Law Review | Submit by 4 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-capital-law-review-organized-by-capital-law-review-submit-by-4-september-2026/): CALL FOR PAPERS – CAPITAL LAW REVIEW | Organized by Capital Law Review | Submit by 4 September 2026
- [Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India & Ors., 2026 INSC 97 ](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-jaya-thakur-v-government-of-india-ors-2026-insc-97/): A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE is a landmark constitutional judgment on menstrual dignity, school infrastructure, adolescent girls’ education, and substantive equality. The petitioner invoked Article 32 of the Constitution of India and sought directions for free sanitary pads for girl children studying in Classes VI to XII, separate toilets for girls in government, aided, and residential schools, cleaners, menstrual health
- [The Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)](https://lawfoyer.in/the-associated-press-v-meltwater-u-s-holdings-inc-931-f-supp-2d-537-s-d-n-y-2013/): A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) is a significant copyright judgment on digital news monitoring, online scraping, search-engine analogies, and fair use. The plaintiff, The Associated Press, alleged that Meltwater copied protected expression from AP news stories and delivered excerpts to paying subscribers through its media
- [Bartz et al. v. Anthropic PBC, No. C 24-05417 WHA](https://lawfoyer.in/bartz-et-al-v-anthropic-pbc-no-c-24-05417-wha/): A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE Bartz et al. v. Anthropic PBC, No. C 24-05417 WHA concerns a copyright class action against Anthropic PBC arising from alleged copying of books from pirate libraries for artificial intelligence inputs. The order is not a final merits judgment on copyright infringement. It is a Memorandum Opinion on Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement. The
- [Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015)](https://lawfoyer.in/authors-guild-v-google-inc-804-f-3d-202-2d-cir-2015/): A) ABSTRACT Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) is a leading United States fair use judgment. It concerned Google’s mass digitisation of books through the Google Books and Library Project programmes. Google scanned millions of books from major libraries. It created searchable digital text. It also displayed limited snippets to users. The plaintiff authors alleged
- [Advance Local Media LLC et al. v. Cohere Inc., 25-cv-1305 (CM)](https://lawfoyer.in/advance-local-media-llc-et-al-v-cohere-inc-25-cv-1305-cm/): A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE Advance Local Media LLC et al. v. Cohere Inc., 25-cv-1305 (CM) concerns a major artificial intelligence copyright and trademark dispute. The plaintiffs are prominent news and digital publishers. They alleged that Cohere Inc. copied copyrighted articles for training and retrieval-based outputs. They also alleged that Cohere’s AI product, Command, generated full copies, substantial excerpts, and
- [2nd International Conference on Human Rights | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Abstract Submission Deadline by15th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-international-conference-on-human-rights-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-abstract-submission-deadline-by15th-september-2026/): 2nd International Conference on Human Rights | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Abstract Submission Deadline by15th September 2026
- [ALL INDIA 1ST MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by SCHOOL OF LAW, IILM UNIVERSITY, GREATER NOIDA | Register by 20th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/all-india-1st-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-iilm-university-greater-noida-register-by-20th-september-2026/): ALL INDIA 1ST MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by SCHOOL OF LAW, IILM UNIVERSITY, GREATER NOIDA | Register by 20th September 2026
- [Eastern Book Company & Ors. v. D.B. Modak & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 809; (2008) 1 SCC 1; 2008 AIR SCW 49 ](https://lawfoyer.in/eastern-book-company-ors-v-d-b-modak-anr-air-2008-sc-809-2008-1-scc-1-2008-air-scw-49/): A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE Eastern Book Company & Ors. v. D.B. Modak & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 809; (2008) 1 SCC 1; 2008 AIR SCW 49 is a leading Supreme Court decision on copyright in law reports, derivative works, originality, public domain material, and copy-edited judgments. The appellants, publishers of Supreme Court Cases, claimed copyright in their copy-edited
- [Syndicate of the Press of the University of Cambridge v. B.D. Bhandari & Anr., RFA (OS) No. 21 of 2009 with FAO (OS) No. 458 of 2008, Delhi High Court](https://lawfoyer.in/syndicate-of-the-press-of-the-university-of-cambridge-v-b-d-bhandari-anr-rfa-os-no-21-of-2009-with-fao-os-no-458-of-2008-delhi-high-court/): A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE Syndicate of the Press of the University of Cambridge v. B.D. Bhandari & Anr., RFA (OS) No. 21 of 2009 with FAO (OS) No. 458 of 2008, Delhi High Court, decided on 3 August 2011, is a leading Indian copyright judgment on educational guidebooks. The Division Bench examined whether grammar exercises
- [INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH: TRANSFORMING LAW, MANAGEMENT, COMMERCE AND SOCIETY” | Organized by Geeta Institute of Law (GIL), Panipat, Delhi NCR, India | Submit Abstract by 15th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-seminar-on-artificial-intelligence-for-inclusive-growth-transforming-law-management-commerce-and-society-organized-by-geeta-institute-of-law-gil-panipat-delhi/): INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH: TRANSFORMING LAW, MANAGEMENT, COMMERCE AND SOCIETY” | Organized by Geeta Institute of Law (GIL), Panipat, Delhi NCR, India | Submit Abstract by 15th October 2026
- [Online Certificate Course on Competition Law, Digital Markets & Artificial Intelligence: 4-Week Executive Certificate Programme | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Event Scheduled on 22nd August - 12th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/online-certificate-course-on-competition-law-digital-markets-artificial-intelligence-4-week-executive-certificate-programme-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-event-scheduled-on-22/): Online Certificate Course on Competition Law, Digital Markets & Artificial Intelligence: 4-Week Executive Certificate Programme | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Event Scheduled on 22nd August - 12th September 2026
- [POSH Trainer Certification Programme: Empowering Workplaces, Ensuring Dignity, Building Safe Environments | Organized by Faculty of Law, Manipal University Jaipur, in collaboration with Manipal University Jaipur Teachers Empowerment Center (MUJ TEC) | Event Scheduled on 18th & 19th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/posh-trainer-certification-programme-empowering-workplaces-ensuring-dignity-building-safe-environments-organized-by-faculty-of-law-manipal-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-manipal-univer/): POSH Trainer Certification Programme: Empowering Workplaces. Ensuring Dignity. Building Safe Environments | Organized by Faculty of Law, Manipal University Jaipur, in collaboration with Manipal University Jaipur Teachers Empowerment Center (MUJ TEC) | Event Scheduled on 18th & 19th September 2026
- [Call for Papers: RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR) Volume XIV Issue I | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Submit by September 15, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-volume-xiv-issue-i-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-punjab-rgnul-submit-by-september-15-2026/): Call for Papers: RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR) Volume XIV Issue I | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Submit by September 15, 2026
- [Crucial case: ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Open AI Opco LLC CS(COMM) 1028/2024](https://lawfoyer.in/crucial-case-ani-media-pvt-ltd-v-open-ai-opco-llc-cscomm-1028-2024/): This Indian copyright case weighs whether open ai stored ANI's news for ChatGPT training under Section 52(1)(a), balancing fair dealing with innovation.
- [10th Inter-University Moot Court Competition (10th IMCC) | Organized by Moot Court Society, Law College Dehradun, Uttaranchal University | Pre-Memorial Registration by 10 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/10th-inter-university-moot-court-competition-10th-imcc-organized-by-moot-court-society-law-college-dehradun-uttaranchal-university-pre-memorial-registration-by-10-september-2026/): 10th Inter-University Moot Court Competition (10th IMCC) | Organized by Moot Court Society, Law College Dehradun, Uttaranchal University | Pre-Memorial Registration by 10 September 2026
- [Harshita Singh Patel Secures Second Prize in National-Level Research Paper Writing Competition on Vision for Viksit Bharat](https://lawfoyer.in/harshita-singh-patel-secures-second-prize-in-national-level-research-paper-writing-competition-on-vision-for-viksit-bharat/): Academic excellence is not only about marks and degrees. It is also about the courage to explore new ideas, question existing perspectives, conduct meaningful research, and present thoughts with clarity. Demonstrating this spirit of academic curiosity, Harshita Singh Patel, a fifth-year LL.B. (Hons.) student at the Faculty of Law, University of Lucknow, has secured the
- [How Legal Assistance Simplifies Property Registration and Ownership Transfer](https://lawfoyer.in/how-legal-assistance-simplifies-property-registration-and-ownership-transfer/): Learn how legal assistance simplifies property registration and ownership transfer while reducing legal risks and documentation errors.
- [Dr. A.C.S. 1st National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Faculty of Law, Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute (Deemed to be University), Chennai | Register by 15th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-a-c-s-1st-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-faculty-of-law-dr-m-g-r-educational-and-research-institute-deemed-to-be-university-chennai-register-by-1/): Dr. A.C.S. 1st National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Faculty of Law, Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute (Deemed to be University), Chennai | Register by 15th August 2026
- [Jus Novum - AU Nationwide Law Fest, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Apex School of Law, Apex University, Jaipur In Collaboration With District Legal Services Authority, Jaipur (District) | Register by 8th August 2026, 2026 for Hybrid & Online Competitions and 2nd September, 2026 for one day (Offline) Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/jus-novum-au-nationwide-law-fest-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-apex-school-of-law-apex-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-district-legal-services-authority-jaipur-district-reg/): Jus Novum - AU Nationwide Law Fest, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Apex School of Law, Apex University, Jaipur In Collaboration With District Legal Services Authority, Jaipur (District) | Register by 31st July, 2026 for Hybrid & Online Competitions and 2nd September, 2026 for one day (Offline) Competitions
- [30-Hour Certificate Programme on the Consumer Protection Laws in India and the United Kingdom | Organized by Chair on Consumer Research and Policy (CCRP), National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi | Register by 13th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-chair-on-consumer-research-and-policy-ccrp-national-university-of-study/): National Workshop on Code.Court.Future: The Nuances, Applications, and Legal Literacy Surrounding AI in India | Organized by Chair on Consumer Research and Policy (CCRP), National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi | Register by 13th August 2026
- [CALL FOR BLOGS | NITISARA BLOGSPACE | Organized by Kautilya Society, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-nitisara-blogspace-organized-by-kautilya-society-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur/): CALL FOR BLOGS | NITISARA BLOGSPACE | Organized by Kautilya Society, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur
- [Nyaya Setu – The AI & Justice Policy Convention (3rd Edition) | Organized by SVKM’s Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies (NMIMS), Indore | 25th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-setu-the-ai-justice-policy-convention-3rd-edition-organized-by-svkms-narsee-monjee-institute-of-management-studies-nmims-indore-25th-august-2026/): Nyaya Setu – The AI & Justice Policy Convention (3rd Edition) | Organized by SVKM’s Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies (NMIMS), Indore | 25th August 2026
- [National Workshop on Code.Court.Future: The Nuances, Applications, and Legal Literacy Surrounding AI in India | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier's University, Kolkata, in association with the Technology Counsel Foundation (TECOF) | Register by 15th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-in-association-with-t/): National Workshop on Code.Court.Future: The Nuances, Applications, and Legal Literacy Surrounding AI in India | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier's University, Kolkata, in association with the Technology Counsel Foundation (TECOF) | Register by 15th August 2026
- [TNLRC ESSAY WRITING COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) under WICCI | Register by 26 June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/tnlrc-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-under-wicci-register-by-26-june-2026/): TNLRC ESSAY WRITING COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) under WICCI | Register by 26 June 2026
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- [P.Suresh v. D.Kalaivani & Ors., 2026 INSC 121](https://lawfoyer.in/p-suresh-v-d-kalaivani-ors-2026-insc-121/): P.Suresh v. D.Kalaivani & Ors., 2026 INSC 121
- [Savithri Naidu v. M/s The Cotton Corporation of India Ltd, 2026 INSC 150](https://lawfoyer.in/savithri-naidu-v-m-s-the-cotton-corporation-of-india-ltd-2026-insc-150/): Savithri Naidu v. M/s The Cotton Corporation of India Ltd, 2026 INSC 150
- [UILS STUDENT LAW REVIEW – CALL FOR PAPERS (VOL. III, ISSUE II) | Organized by University Institute of Legal Studies (UILS), Panjab University, Chandigarh](https://lawfoyer.in/uils-student-law-review-call-for-papers-vol-iii-issue-ii-organized-by-university-institute-of-legal-studies-uils-panjab-university-chandigarh/): UILS STUDENT LAW REVIEW – CALL FOR PAPERS (VOL. III, ISSUE II) | Organized by University Institute of Legal Studies (UILS), Panjab University, Chandigarh
- [NLUJ-CIPS One Day National Workshop on Intellectual Property and Sports, 2026 (Virtual) | Organized by Centre for Intellectual Property Studies (CIPS), National Law University, Jodhpur | Register by 25 April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nluj-cips-one-day-national-workshop-on-intellectual-property-and-sports-2026-virtual-organized-by-centre-for-intellectual-property-studies-cips-national-law-university-jodhpur-register-by-2/): NLUJ-CIPS One Day National Workshop on Intellectual Property and Sports, 2026 (Virtual) | Organized by Centre for Intellectual Property Studies (CIPS), National Law University, Jodhpur | Register by 25 April 2026
- [From Inclusion to Impact: Women Entrepreneurship, Digital Rights, ESG Accountability & Corporate Governance Reforms | Organized by KIIT School of Law | Register by 30 April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/from-inclusion-to-impact-women-entrepreneurship-digital-rights-esg-accountability-corporate-governance-reforms-organized-by-kiit-school-of-law-register-by-30-april-2026/): From Inclusion to Impact: Women Entrepreneurship, Digital Rights, ESG Accountability & Corporate Governance Reforms | Organized by KIIT School of Law | Register by 30 April 2026
- [The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 836: 2025 INSC 261](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-v-balveer-singh-2025-2-s-c-r-836-2025-insc-261-2/): The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 836: 2025 INSC 261
- [Adrija Bhattacharya and Sejal Joshi of Vivekanand Education Society’s College of Law, Mumbai University Triumph at LJ School of Law Client Counselling Competition 2026, Securing Winner Title with Best Counsel Honour](https://lawfoyer.in/adrija-bhattacharya-and-sejal-joshi-of-vivekanand-education-societys-college-of-law-mumbai-university-triumph-at-lj-school-of-law-client-counselling-competition-2026-securing-winner-title-w/): Excellence, dedication, and composure under pressure define true legal talent, and this spirit shines brightly in the remarkable achievement of Adrija Bhattacharya and teammate Sejal Joshi from Vivekanand Education Society’s College of Law, Mumbai University. The team secured the Winner position at the prestigious Client Counselling Competition 2026 organized by LJ School of Law, Ahmedabad.
- [Centre for Financial Markets and Regulatory Systems, NLIU Bhopal Successfully Hosts 1st National Symposium on Securities Law and Capital Markets 2026; Khushi Kalyani Gautam & Suhana, Yash Arjariya & Ayush Tiwari, and Kyra Mehra & Ananya Rakheja Shine as Top Achievers](https://lawfoyer.in/centre-for-financial-markets-and-regulatory-systems-nliu-bhopal-successfully-hosts-1st-national-symposium-on-securities-law-and-capital-markets-2026-khushi-kalyani-gautam-suhana-yash-arjariya-a/): The Centre for Financial Markets and Regulatory Systems (CFMRS) at National Law Institute University, Bhopal, has set a remarkable benchmark with the successful organisation of the 1st NLIU National Symposium on Securities Law and Capital Markets, 2026, held on 4th and 5th April 2026. This flagship initiative stands as a testament to the institution’s commitment
- [HNLU Team Secures Runner-Up Position at the 23rd Willem C. Vis East International Commercial Arbitration Moot, Hong Kong](https://lawfoyer.in/hnlu-team-secures-runner-up-position-at-the-23rd-willem-c-vis-east-international-commercial-arbitration-moot-hong-kong/): Raipur, — The Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur, proudly announces the exceptional achievement of its student team at the prestigious 23rd Willem C. Vis East International Commercial Arbitration Moot, held in Hong Kong. Competing against leading law schools from across the globe, the HNLU team emerged as the 1st Runner-Up, marking a significant milestone
- [Adrija Bhattacharya, Sejal Joshi, and Taanya Dash of Vivekanand Education Society’s College of Law Secure 2nd Runners-Up Position at LJ School of Law Ahmedabad National Parliamentary Debate Competition, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/adrija-bhattacharya-sejal-joshi-and-taanya-dash-of-vivekanand-education-societys-college-of-law-secure-2nd-runners-up-position-at-lj-school-of-law-ahmedabad-national-parliamentary-debate-co/): Achievement shines brightest when courage meets opportunity, and this is beautifully reflected in the remarkable accomplishment of Adrija Bhattacharya, along with teammates Sejal Joshi and Taanya Dash from Vivekanand Education Society’s College of Law, Mumbai. The team secured the prestigious position of 2nd Runners-Up at the LJ School of Law Ahmedabad National Parliamentary Debate Competition,
- [ONE DAY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERDISCIPLINARY LEADERSHIP | Organized by Academic and Research Wing (ARW), Kindsouls Welfare Foundation | Early Bird Registration: 20th April 2026 | Late Registration: 25th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/one-day-international-conference-on-interdisciplinary-leadership-organized-by-academic-and-research-wing-arw-kindsouls-welfare-foundation-early-bird-registration-20th-april-2026-late-registr/): ONE DAY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERDISCIPLINARY LEADERSHIP | Organized by Academic and Research Wing (ARW), Kindsouls Welfare Foundation | Early Bird Registration: 20th April 2026 | Late Registration: 25th April 2026
- [Admissions Open: Master of Cyber Law and Information Security (MCLIS) Program 2026 | National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal | Register by 30 April 2026 | Written Test: 10 May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/admissions-open-master-of-cyber-law-and-information-security-mclis-program-2026-national-law-institute-university-nliu-bhopal-register-by-30-april-2026-written-test-10-may-2026/): Admissions Open: Master of Cyber Law and Information Security (MCLIS) Program 2026 | National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal | Register by 30 April 2026 | Written Test: 10 May 2026
- [RUAS, SOL Moot Court Competition 2.0 | Organized by School of Law, M. S. Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences](https://lawfoyer.in/ruas-sol-moot-court-competition-2-0-organized-by-school-of-law-m-s-ramaiah-university-of-applied-sciences/): RUAS, SOL Moot Court Competition 2.0 | Organized by School of Law, M. S. Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences
- [25th LawFoyer Quiz on (Constitutional Law & Indian Polity): Prizes worth Rs. 25K + | Cash Prizes, Smart Watch, Earbuds and much more | Bonuses for All Participants worth Rs. 5K+ | Register by 28th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/25th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-constitutional-law-indian-polity-prizes-worth-rs-15k/): -------------------------------------------- Download Answer Key -------------------------------------------- 25th LawFoyer's Quiz Competition Winners and Top Rankers -------------------------------------------- Check Results Download Certificate of Participation -------------------------------------------- Dates Date of Quiz:- 29th March 2026 ( Sunday 7 Pm) Last Date to Apply:- 28th March 2026, 11:00 pm Result Declaration:- 5th April 2026 Prizes 1st Prize- Cash Prize Rs. 3,000/- + Smart Watch worth Rs.
- [NYAYA SETU – THE AI & JUSTICE POLICY CONVENTION (3rd EDITION) | Organized by SAMATVA – The Legal Aid & Awareness Cell, NMIMS Indore | Register by 12th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-setu-the-ai-justice-policy-convention-3rd-edition-organized-by-samatva-the-legal-aid-awareness-cell-nmims-indore-register-by-12th-april-2026/): NYAYA SETU – THE AI & JUSTICE POLICY CONVENTION (3rd EDITION) | Organized by SAMATVA – The Legal Aid & Awareness Cell, NMIMS Indore | Register by 12th April 2026
- [INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EXPANDING HORIZONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Submit Abstract by 12th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-expanding-horizons-of-human-rights-fundamental-freedoms-and-fundamental-rights-in-the-age-of-globalisation-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-rgnul/): INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EXPANDING HORIZONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Submit Abstract by 12th April 2026
- [National Law University Delhi Enters QS World University Rankings by Subject 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-law-university-delhi-enters-qs-world-university-rankings-by-subject-2026/): In a significant milestone for Indian legal education, National Law University Delhi (NLU Delhi) has made its debut in the prestigious QS World University Rankings by Subject 2026 for Law & Legal Studies, securing a position in the 201–250 global band, with an overall subject rank of 223. This achievement marks a decisive step in
- [CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION COMPETITION (VIL’s 1st Inter-University Event) | Organized by Vignan Institute of Law, under Vignan's Foundation for Science, Technology & Research (Deemed to be University) | Register by April 20, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/crime-scene-investigation-competition-vils-1st-inter-university-event-organized-by-vignan-institute-of-law-under-vignans-foundation-for-science-technology-research-deemed-to-be/): CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION COMPETITION (VIL’s 1st Inter-University Event) | Organized by Vignan Institute of Law, under Vignan's Foundation for Science, Technology & Research (Deemed to be University) | Register by April 20, 2026
- [6th ADAMAS MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by ADAMAS UNIVERSITY | Register by 4th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/6th-adamas-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-adamas-university-register-by-26-march-2026/): 6th ADAMAS MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by ADAMAS UNIVERSITY | Register by 26 March 2026
- [5-DAY CERTIFICATION COURSE ON TECHNOLOGY LAWS](https://lawfoyer.in/5-day-certification-course-on-technology-laws/): If you want to understand cyber law, data protection, AI regulation, and digital evidence in a clear, practical, and career focused way, this 5 day certificat..
- [TEN-DAY NATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM ON EMERGING IP JURISPRUDENCE AND EVOLVING TRENDS OF IP TEACHING & RESEARCH | Organized by DPIIT-IPR Chair at Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | 6TH APRIL – 16TH APRIL, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/ten-day-national-faculty-development-program-on-emerging-ip-jurisprudence-and-evolving-trends-of-ip-teaching-research-organized-by-dpiit-ipr-chair-at-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu/): TEN-DAY NATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM ON EMERGING IP JURISPRUDENCE AND EVOLVING TRENDS OF IP TEACHING & RESEARCH | Organized by DPIIT-IPR Chair at Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | 6TH APRIL – 16TH APRIL, 2026
- [1st NLUJ-CCLRP National Essay Writing Competition, 2026 | Organized by Centre for Consumer Law Research & Practice, National Law University, Jodhpur | Submission Deadline: 15th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nluj-cclrp-national-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-centre-for-consumer-law-research-practice-national-law-university-jodhpur-submission-deadline-15th-april-2026/): 1st NLUJ-CCLRP National Essay Writing Competition, 2026 | Organized by Centre for Consumer Law Research & Practice, National Law University, Jodhpur | Submission Deadline: 15th April 2026
- [समग्र’26 – Annual Inter-College Sports Meet | Organized by DME Sports Society, Delhi Metropolitan Education | Event Dates: 25th – 30th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/समग्र26-annual-inter-college-sports-meet-organized-by-dme-sports-society-delhi-metropolitan-education-event-dates-25th-30th-m/): समग्र’26 – Annual Inter-College Sports Meet | Organized by DME Sports Society, Delhi Metropolitan Education | Event Dates: 25th – 30th March 2026
- [Smt. Shakuntala Devi 3rd International Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized Moot Court Society, School of Law, Galgotias University | Register by 26th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/smt-shakuntala-devi-3rd-international-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-moot-court-society-school-of-law-galgotias-university-register-by-26th-march-2026/): Smt. Shakuntala Devi 3rd International Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized Moot Court Society, School of Law, Galgotias University | Register by 26th March, 2026
- [INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERSECTIONS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND THE FUTURE: LAW, CULTURE, SUSTAINABILITY, AND COLLECTIVE WELL-BEING | Organized by DME Law School, Noida | Register by 20th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-intersections-of-traditional-knowledge-systems-and-the-future-law-culture-sustainability-and-collective-well-being-organized-by-dme-law-school-noida-register-by-20/): INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERSECTIONS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND THE FUTURE: LAW, CULTURE, SUSTAINABILITY, AND COLLECTIVE WELL-BEING | Organized by DME Law School, Noida | Register by 20th April 2026
- [1ST NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY DELHI – KHAITAN & CO CERTIFICATE COURSE ON TAXATION LAWS | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Register by 29th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-national-law-university-delhi-khaitan-co-certificate-course-on-taxation-laws-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-29th-march-2026/): 1ST NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY DELHI – KHAITAN & CO CERTIFICATE COURSE ON TAXATION LAWS | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Register by 29th March, 2026
- [Institute of Law, Nirma University Lifts the 3rd Justice Hidayatullah International Moot Court Trophy with a cash prize of Rs 2 lakhs](https://lawfoyer.in/institute-of-law-nirma-university-lifts-the-3rd-justice-hidayatullah-international-moot-court-trophy-with-a-cash-prize-of-rs-2-lakhs/): Raipur, March 15, 2026 The Institute of Law, Nirma University, Gandhinagar emerged as the Winner of the 3rd Justice Hidayatullah International Moot Court Competition (HIMCC) 2026, securing the championship trophy along with a cash prize of ₹2,00,000. National Law University, Odisha was declared the Runner-Up, receiving a cash prize of ₹1,50,000. The competition also recognised
- [International Conference on “Blockchain Technology: Transforming Law, Governance, and the Digital Economy” | Organized by The Department of Cyberspace Law and Justice, School of Excellence in Law, The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University (TNDALU) | Register by 30 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-blockchain-technology-transforming-law-governance-and-the-digital-economy-organized-by-the-department-of-cyberspace-law-and-justice-school-of-excell/): International Conference on “Blockchain Technology: Transforming Law, Governance, and the Digital Economy” | Organized by The Department of Cyberspace Law and Justice, School of Excellence in Law, The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University (TNDALU) | Register by 30 March 2026
- [The 4th Xavier Mediation Competition 2026 (XMC’26) | Organized by The Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ), Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Register by 21st March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/the-4th-xavier-mediation-competition-2026-xmc26-organized-by-the-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-register-by-18-ma/): The 4th Xavier Mediation Competition 2026 (XMC’26) | Organized by The Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ), Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Register by 21st March 2026
- [2ND JUDEXIS MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Lex Gazette Academy | Register by 12th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-judexis-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-lex-gazette-academy-register-by-12th-april-2026/): 2ND JUDEXIS MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Lex Gazette Academy | Register by 12th April 2026
- [IPC and BNS Basics Explained: Structure, Application, Definitions and Key Differences](https://lawfoyer.in/ipc-and-bns-basics-explained-structure-application-definitions-and-key-differences/): IPC and BNS Basics Explained: Structure, Application, Definitions and Key Differences
- [HNLU crowned as National Champions of the India Qualifying Rounds to compete at the World Rounds of 67th Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition, 2026 at Washington DC](https://lawfoyer.in/hnlu-crowned-as-national-champions-of-the-india-qualifying-rounds-to-compete-at-the-the-world-moot-court-competition-at-washington-dc-2026/): Raipur, Chhattisgarh Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur, proudly announces the exceptional achievement of its mooting team in being crowned Champions of the India Qualifying Rounds of the 67th Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition, 2026, held at Jindal Global Law School. Competing in a highly competitive field featuring 65 premier law schools
- [3rd Case Analysis Competition, 2026 | Organized by Environmental Law Society (ELS), Faculty of Law, Integral University, Lucknow | Register by 20th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-case-analysis-competition-2026-organized-by-environmental-law-society-els-faculty-of-law-integral-university-lucknow-register-by-20th-march-2026/): 3rd Case Analysis Competition, 2026 | Organized by Environmental Law Society (ELS), Faculty of Law, Integral University, Lucknow | Register by 20th March 2026
- [Legal Startup Online Pitching Competition, 2026 – 2.0 [Be the Next Founder] | Organized by LegalWiki | Register by 15 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-startup-online-pitching-competition-2026-2-0-be-the-next-founder-organized-by-legalwiki-register-by-15-march-2026/): Legal Startup Online Pitching Competition, 2026 – 2.0 [Be the Next Founder] | Organized by LegalWiki | Register by 15 March 2026
- [Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, 2025 INSC 605.](https://lawfoyer.in/gayatri-balasamy-v-m-s-isg-novasoft-technologies-limited-2025-insc-605/): The decision in Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited represents a landmark clarification in Indian arbitration jurisprudence regarding judicial powers under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The central controversy concerned whether Indian courts possess authority to modify an arbitral award while adjudicating challenges to such awards. Prior to this ruling, judicial opinions of the Supreme Court showed divergence. Certain judgments permitted limited modification in specific circumstances. Others insisted that courts could only set aside an arbitral award, not alter it. The dispute therefore required authoritative resolution by a Constitution Bench. The Court examined the statutory scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 alongside the UNCITRAL Model Law, comparative international practices, and established principles governing arbitration. The Bench analyzed earlier precedents including Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem (2021) 9 SCC 1, McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181, and Vedanta Ltd. v. Shenzhen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co. Ltd. (2019) 11 SCC 465. These decisions illustrated conflicting interpretations of judicial power in arbitration matters. The Court ultimately held that Indian courts possess a limited power to modify arbitral awards. This power is not equivalent to appellate review and must remain confined within the statutory structure of Section 34. The judgment recognized certain narrow situations where modification is permissible, such as severable awards, clerical or computational errors, modification of post-award interest, or exercise of Article 142 powers by the Supreme Court. This ruling significantly balances two competing objectives. On one side lies the principle of minimal judicial intervention in arbitration. On the other side lies the need to avoid prolonged litigation and unnecessary re-arbitration. The judgment therefore introduces a pragmatic interpretation that allows courts to correct limited defects without undermining the autonomy of arbitral tribunals.
- [1st NLIU National Symposium on Securities Law & Capital Markets, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 23rd March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nliu-national-symposium-on-securities-law-capital-markets-2026-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal-register-by-23rd-march-2026/): 1st NLIU National Symposium on Securities Law & Capital Markets, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 23rd March 2026
- [1st Smt. Krishna Neotia Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by School of Legal Studies, The Neotia University | Register by 21st March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-smt-krishna-neotia-memorial-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-legal-studies-the-neotia-university-register-by-21st-march-2026/): 1st Smt. Krishna Neotia Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by School of Legal Studies, The Neotia University | Register by 21st March, 2026
- [Webinar on “The 15 Founding Mothers of the Constitution” | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Register by 27 March 2026 at 11:59 PM](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-on-the-15-founding-mothers-of-the-constitution-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-register-by-27-march-2026-at-1159-pm/): Webinar on “The 15 Founding Mothers of the Constitution” | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Register by 27 March 2026 at 11:59 PM
- [International Conference on Political, Economic, & Social Issues of 2025 | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Chhattisgarh | Submit Complete Paper by 19 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-political-economic-social-issues-of-2025-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-chhattisgarh-submit-complete-paper-by-19-march-2026/): International Conference on Political, Economic, & Social Issues of 2025 | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Chhattisgarh | Submit Complete Paper by 19 March 2026
- [Intellectus 2026 – Minds in Motion | Organized by School of Law (Debate Society), Graphic Era Hill University | Register by 17 March 2026 [06:00 PM (IST)]](https://lawfoyer.in/intellectus-2026-minds-in-motion-organized-by-school-of-law-debate-society-graphic-era-hill-university-register-by-17-march-2026-0600-pm-ist/): Intellectus 2026 – Minds in Motion | Organized by School of Law (Debate Society), Graphic Era Hill University | Register by 17 March 2026 [06:00 PM (IST)]
- [INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW SUMMIT 2026 “The WTO@30: Reimagining Multilateralism in International Trade Law” | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 July 2026 (till 11:59 PM IST)](https://lawfoyer.in/international-trade-law-summit-2026-the-wto30-reimagining-multilateralism-in-international-trade-law-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-b/): INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW SUMMIT 2026 “The WTO@30: Reimagining Multilateralism in International Trade Law” | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 July 2026 (till 11:59 PM IST)
- [RUAS School of Law Moot Court Competition 2.0, 2026 | Organized by School of Law, M. S. Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences (MSRUAS), Bengaluru | Register by 30 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/ruas-school-of-law-moot-court-competition-2-0-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-m-s-ramaiah-university-of-applied-sciences-msruas-bengaluru-register-by-30-march-2026/): RUAS School of Law Moot Court Competition 2.0, 2026 | Organized by School of Law, M. S. Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences (MSRUAS), Bengaluru | Register by 30 March 2026
- [The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr, 2026 INSC 47](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-v-anurudh-anr-2026-insc-47/): The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr, 2026 INSC 47. The Supreme Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 INSC 47 examined the scope of bail jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the context of offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The appeal arose from a judgment of the Allahabad High Court, which granted bail to the accused and issued broad judicial directions mandating medical age determination of the victim at the commencement of investigation in all POCSO cases. The High Court had reasoned that inconsistencies in documentary evidence regarding the victim’s age justified mandatory medical testing to prevent misuse of the POCSO Act. The Supreme Court addressed two major questions. First, whether the High Court, while exercising statutory bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC, could issue directions of a legislative or policy-making nature regarding investigation procedures. Second, whether medical age determination of a victim is mandatory at the initial stage of investigation under the statutory framework of the CrPC, POCSO Act, and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing sweeping directions unrelated to the limited question of bail. The Court reiterated that bail courts cannot conduct mini-trials or resolve complex evidentiary issues such as final determination of age. The Court further clarified that age determination must follow the evidentiary hierarchy under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, where documentary evidence such as birth certificates or school records takes precedence over medical tests. Medical examination is only a residual method when documentary evidence is unavailable. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s directions while reiterating that bail adjudication must remain confined to established parameters such as prima facie case, gravity of offence, likelihood of tampering with evidence, and risk of absconding.
- [1st State Level Vidhi-संग्राम 2026– A Two-Day Law Fest | Organized by Dr. D Y PATIL LAW COLLEGE, PIMPRI, PUNE | Register by 22nd March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-state-level-vidhi-संग्राम-2026-a-two-day-law-fest-organized-by-dr-d-y-patil-law-college-pimpri-pune-register-by-22nd-march-2/): 1st State Level Vidhi-संग्राम 2026– A Two-Day Law Fest | Organized by Dr. D Y PATIL LAW COLLEGE, PIMPRI, PUNE | Register by 22nd March 2026
- [TAMIL NADU LEGAL RIGHTS CONSORTIUM (TNLRC) – BROCHURE-MAKING COMPETITION | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Register by 4 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-brochure-making-competition-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-register-by-4-march-2026/): TAMIL NADU LEGAL RIGHTS CONSORTIUM (TNLRC) – BROCHURE-MAKING COMPETITION | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Register by March 4, 2026
- [Aaditya Bajpai of Maharashtra National Law University Nagpur Receives University Gold Medal for Best Student in Overall Excellence](https://lawfoyer.in/aaditya-bajpai-of-maharashtra-national-law-university-nagpur-receives-university-gold-medal-for-best-student-in-overall-excellence/): The journey of legal education is often defined by perseverance, discipline, and a deep commitment to excellence. Celebrating such dedication, LawFoyer proudly features the remarkable achievement of Aaditya Bajpai, a student of Maharashtra National Law University, Nagpur, who has been awarded the University Gold Medal for Best Student in Overall Excellence. This prestigious recognition was
- [Divyanshi Rathour, Shikhar Mishra, and Samriddhi Mishra of City Law College, Lucknow Secure Runner-Up Position at Lex Empathia 2.0 – National Level Client Counselling Competition](https://lawfoyer.in/divyanshi-rathour-shikhar-mishra-and-samriddhi-mishra-of-city-law-college-lucknow-secure-runner-up-position-at-lex-empathia-2-0-national-level-client-counselling-competition/): LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of Divyanshi Rathour, Shikhar Mishra, and Samriddhi Mishra, students of City Law College, Jankipuram, Lucknow, who secured the Runner-Up position at the Lex Empathia 2.0 National Level Client Counselling Competition organized by Central Law College, Jankipuram, Lucknow on 22 February 2026. This accomplishment highlights the team’s dedication, strong legal
- [Anirudh Soni, Hiral Jain, and Unnati Chhangani of Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur Win the 1st FIAT Justitia National Moot Court Competition 2026; Anirudh Soni Honored as ‘Best Student Advocate’](https://lawfoyer.in/anirudh-soni-hiral-jain-and-unnati-chhangani-of-jai-narain-vyas-university-jodhpur-win-the-1st-fiat-justitia-national-moot-court-competition-2026-anirudh-soni-honored-as-best-student-advo/): The journey of legal education is filled with opportunities to learn, grow, and test one's abilities. Among these opportunities, moot court competitions stand out as one of the most enriching experiences for law students. Demonstrating exceptional advocacy skills, legal research, and teamwork, Anirudh Soni, Hiral Jain, and Unnati Chhangani from the Faculty of Law, Jai
- [3rd International Conference on Social Sciences Research in the Age of AI (SSRAAI2026) – Part of the ETLTC 2026 Conference Series | Organized by ETLTC Organizing Committee, Japan & USA | Register by 1 June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-international-conference-on-social-sciences-research-in-the-age-of-ai-ssraai2026-part-of-the-etltc-2026-conference-series-organized-by-etltc-organizing-committee-japan-usa-r/): 3rd International Conference on Social Sciences Research in the Age of AI (SSRAAI2026) – Part of the ETLTC 2026 Conference Series | Organized by ETLTC Organizing Committee, Japan & USA | Register by 1 June 2026
- [Nyaya Samvardhan: North-Western Region Pro Bono Conclave | Organized by Pro Bono Club, School of Law, Forensic Justice & Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University, Delhi Campus | Register by 15 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-samvardhan-north-western-region-pro-bono-conclave-organized-by-pro-bono-club-school-of-law-forensic-justice-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-delhi-campus-regis/): Nyaya Samvardhan: North-Western Region Pro Bono Conclave | Organized by Pro Bono Club, School of Law, Forensic Justice & Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University, Delhi Campus | Register by 15 March 2026
- [NLIU LAW REVIEW – CALL FOR PAPERS [Volume XV, Issue II] | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal](https://lawfoyer.in/nliu-law-review-call-for-papers-volume-xv-issue-ii-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal/): NLIU LAW REVIEW – CALL FOR PAPERS [Volume XV, Issue II] | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal
- [DME MUN’26 (Model United Nations 2026) Under JusCosmos 2.0 – Competition Contours of Law, Nexus of Justice | Organized by Abhivyakti – The Literary & Debating Society, Delhi Metropolitan Education (DME) | Register by 10th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/dme-mun26-model-united-nations-2026-under-juscosmos-2-0-competition-contours-of-law-nexus-of-justice-organized-by-delhi-metropolitan-education-dme-register-by-28th-february/): DME MUN’26 (Model United Nations 2026) Under JusCosmos 2.0 – Competition Contours of Law, Nexus of Justice | Organized by Delhi Metropolitan Education (DME) | Register by 28th February 2026
- [4th Deo Mangal Memorial Nationwide Moot Court Competition, 2026 (Online Mode) | Organized by Narayan School of Law, Gopal Narayan Singh University | Cash Prize Pool of Rs. 73,000 | Additional Benefits for all Participants | Register by 6th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/4th-deo-mangal-memorial-nationwide-moot-court-competition-2026-online-mode-organized-by-narayan-school-of-law-gopal-narayan-singh-university-register-by-28th-february-2026/): 4th Deo Mangal Memorial Nationwide Moot Court Competition, 2026 (Online Mode) | Organized by Narayan School of Law, Gopal Narayan Singh University | Register by 28th February, 2026
- [SESSION: The Future of Law: AI, ODR & Legal Technology | Organized by Law Firm Ready | Event on 28th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/session-the-future-of-law-ai-odr-legal-technology-organized-by-law-firm-ready-event-on-28th-february-2026/): SESSION: The Future of Law: AI, ODR & Legal Technology | Organized by Law Firm Ready | Event on 28th February 2026
- [MASTER DAYANAND 1ST NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by School of Law & Legal Studies, Sanskaram University | Register by 20th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/master-dayanand-1st-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-legal-studies-sanskaram-university-register-by-20th-march-2026/): MASTER DAYANAND 1ST NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by School of Law & Legal Studies, Sanskaram University | Register by 20th March 2026
- [NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON “THE NEW LABOUR CODES: PROSPECTIVE CONCERNS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS" | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab | Register by 2nd March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-conference-on-the-new-labour-codes-prospective-concerns-for-human-rights-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-punjab-register-by-25th-february-2026/): NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON “THE NEW LABOUR CODES: PROSPECTIVE CONCERNS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS" | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab | Register by 25th February, 2026
- [12th Professor V.S. Mani Memorial International Law Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by Seedling School of Law and Governance, Jaipur National University, Jaipur | Register by 7th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/12th-professor-v-s-mani-memorial-international-law-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-seedling-school-of-law-and-governance-register-by-7th-march-2026/): 12th Professor V.S. Mani Memorial International Law Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by Seedling School of Law and Governance | Register by 7th March 2026
- [जनादेश विमर्श – Article Writing Competition | Organized by the Panjab University Students’ Liberty Union | Register by 26 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/जनादेश-विमर्श-article-writing-competition-organized-by-the-panjab-university-students/): जनादेश विमर्श – Article Writing Competition | Organized by the Panjab University Students’ Liberty Union | Register by 26 February 2026
- [Manan Grover of Maharaja Surajmal Institute, Janakpuri Secures Rank 2 with 9.21 CGPA and Receives Academic Excellence Award](https://lawfoyer.in/manan-grover-of-maharaja-surajmal-institute-janakpuri-secures-rank-2-with-9-21-cgpa-and-receives-academic-excellence-award/): Success in law school is never accidental. It is built on patience, discipline, and a strong mindset. Today, LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable academic achievement of Manan Grover, a second year BBA LLB student from Maharaja Surajmal Institute, affiliated to Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University. On 14 February 2026, Manan secured Rank 2 in her
- [Dhanvi Kadian of GD Goenka University Secures Runner Up Position at Second GD Goenka International IP Essay Writing Competition 2025 and Gets Published in IJLRA](https://lawfoyer.in/dhanvi-kadian-of-gd-goenka-university-secures-runner-up-position-at-second-gd-goenka-international-ip-essay-writing-competition-2025-and-gets-published-in-ijlra/): LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of Dhanvi Kadian, a Final Year BBA LL.B. (Hons.) student from GD Goenka University, Gurugram, Haryana, who secured the Runner Up position at the Second GD Goenka International IP Essay Writing Competition, 2025. Organized by GD Goenka University at the University Level, this prestigious competition witnessed enthusiastic participation from
- [Madhura Vedang, Pragya Mehta, and Himanshu Gove of Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai Shine as Semi Finalists at the 9th GNLU Securities and Investment Law Moot, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/madhura-vedang-pragya-mehta-and-himanshu-gove-of-maharashtra-national-law-university-mumbai-shine-as-semi-finalists-at-the-9th-gnlu-securities-and-investment-law-moot-2026/): LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of Madhura Vedang, Pragya Mehta, and Himanshu Gove, students of Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai, for securing the position of Semi Finalists and ranking 3rd overall at the prestigious 9th GNLU Securities and Investment Law Moot, 2026 organised by Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar. Competing at a national level
- [4th NATIONAL CLIENT COUNSELLING COMPETITION | Organized by Chanakya National Law University, Patna | Register by 22 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/4th-national-client-counselling-competition-organized-by-chanakya-national-law-university-patna-register-by-22-march-2026/): 4th NATIONAL CLIENT COUNSELLING COMPETITION | Organized by Chanakya National Law University, Patna | Register by 22 March 2026
- [Workshop on Real Estate Litigation: Navigating the Evolving World and Emerging Trends 2026 | Organized by CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bangalore | Register by 25th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/workshop-on-real-estate-litigation-navigating-the-evolving-world-and-emerging-trends-2026-organized-by-christ-deemed-to-be-university-bangalore-register-by-25th-february-2026/): Workshop on Real Estate Litigation: Navigating the Evolving World and Emerging Trends 2026 | Organized by CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bangalore | Register by 25th February, 2026
- [XI NCU National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, School of Law, The NorthCap University, Gurugram | Register by 23rd March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/xi-ncu-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-school-of-law-the-northcap-university-gurugram-register-by-23rd-march-2026/): XI NCU National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, School of Law, The NorthCap University, Gurugram | Register by 23rd March, 2026
- [Call for Papers – Journal of the Faculty of Law (Issue 11), Year 2026 (Vol. 11, ISSN No. 2347-758X) | Organized by School of Law, Mody University of Science and Technology | Register by 30th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-journal-of-the-faculty-of-law-issue-11-year-2026-vol-11-issn-no-2347-758x-organized-by-school-of-law-mody-university-of-science-and-technology-register-by-30th-a/): Call for Papers – Journal of the Faculty of Law (Issue 11), Year 2026 (Vol. 11, ISSN No. 2347-758X) | Organized by School of Law, Mody University of Science and Technology | Register by 30th April 2026
- [3rd National Pro Bono and Legal Aid Conclave – “The Justice Synergy” | Organized by National Forensic Sciences University | Register by 25th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-national-pro-bono-and-legal-aid-conclave-the-justice-synergy-organized-by-national-forensic-sciences-university-register-by-15th-february-2026/): 3rd National Pro Bono and Legal Aid Conclave – “The Justice Synergy” | Organized by National Forensic Sciences University | Register by 15th February, 2026
- [International Conference on "Intersections of Traditional Knowledge Systems and the Future: Law, Culture, Sustainability, and Collective Well-Being" | Organized by DME Law School, Noida from 8th to 9th May, 2026 | Submit Abstract by 30 March, 2026 | Register by 10th April, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-intersections-of-traditional-knowledge-systems-and-the-future-law-culture-sustainability-and-collective-well-being-organized-by-dme-law-school-noida-register-by-10t/): INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE "Intersections of Traditional Knowledge Systems and the Future: Law, Culture, Sustainability, and Collective Well-Being" | Organized by DME Law School, Noida | Register by 10th April 2026
- [3rd Case Analysis Competition, 2026 | Organized by Environmental Law Society (ELS), Faculty of Law, Integral University, Lucknow | Register by 20th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-case-analysis-competition-2026-environmental-law-society-els-faculty-of-law-integral-university-lucknow-register-by-20th-march-2026/): 3rd Case Analysis Competition, 2026 | Environmental Law Society (ELS), Faculty of Law, Integral University, Lucknow | Register by 20th March, 2026
- [YUVA SANSAD 1.0 | Organized by PRESTIGE INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH, GWALIOR | Register by 30 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/yuva-sansad-1-0-organized-by-prestige-institute-of-management-and-research-gwalior-register-by-30-march-2026/): YUVA SANSAD 1.0 | Organized by PRESTIGE INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH, GWALIOR | Register by 30 March 2026
- [Online International Faculty Development Programme (IFDP) "Law, Technology and Governance in Digital Space" | Organized by Bennett University, Noida | Register by 12 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/online-international-faculty-development-programme-ifdp-law-technology-and-governance-in-digital-space-organized-by-bennett-university-noida-register-by-12-march-2026/): Online International Faculty Development Programme (IFDP) "Law, Technology and Governance in Digital Space" | Organized by Bennett University, Noida | Register by 12 March 2026
- [INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, & SOCIAL ISSUES OF 2025 | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Chhattisgarh | Submit Abstract by 28 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-political-economic-social-issues-of-2025-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-chhattisgarh-submit-abstract-by-28-february-2026/): INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, & SOCIAL ISSUES OF 2025 | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Chhattisgarh | Submit Abstract by 28 February 2026
- [NYAYA ABHYUDAY 2.0 – TECHNO LEGAL FEST | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies (SLFJPS), National Forensic Sciences University | Register by 11th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-abhyuday-2-0-techno-legal-fest-organized-by-school-of-law-forensic-justice-and-policy-studies-slfjps-national-forensic-sciences-university-register-by-11th-march-2026/): NYAYA ABHYUDAY 2.0 – TECHNO LEGAL FEST | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies (SLFJPS), National Forensic Sciences University | Register by 11th March, 2026
- [National Article Writing Competition | Organized by Centre for Human Rights and Disability Studies (CHRDS), Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla | Register by 28 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-article-writing-competition-organized-by-centre-for-human-rights-and-disability-studies-chrds-himachal-pradesh-national-law-university-shimla-register-by-15-february-2026/): National Article Writing Competition | Organized by Centre for Human Rights and Disability Studies (CHRDS), Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla | Register by 15 February 2026
- [ASPIRE COHORT 2 | Organized by LawFirmReady | Register by 26th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/aspire-cohort-2-organized-by-lawfirmready-register-by-26th-february-2026/): ASPIRE COHORT 2 | Organized by LawFirmReady | Register by 26th February 2026
- [HPNLU JOURNAL OF DISABILITY STUDIES (A Peer-Reviewed Journal) – VOL. III, 2026 (ISSN: 3108-110X) | Organized by Centre for Human Rights and Disability Studies, Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla | Register by July 15, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/hpnlu-journal-of-disability-studies-a-peer-reviewed-journal-vol-iii-2026-issn-3108-110x-organized-by-centre-for-human-rights-and-disability-studies-himachal-pradesh-national-law-un/): HPNLU JOURNAL OF DISABILITY STUDIES (A Peer-Reviewed Journal) – VOL. III, 2026 (ISSN: 3108-110X) | Organized by Centre for Human Rights and Disability Studies, Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla | Register by July 15, 2026
- [1ST NLIU – R.K. DEWAN PAPER PRESENTATION CONFERENCE | Organized by Cell for Studies in Intellectual Property Rights (CSIPR), National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal | Register by 24 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nliu-r-k-dewan-paper-presentation-conference-organized-by-cell-for-studies-in-intellectual-property-rights-csipr-national-law-institute-university-nliu-bhopal-register-by-24-f/): 1ST NLIU – R.K. DEWAN PAPER PRESENTATION CONFERENCE | Organized by Cell for Studies in Intellectual Property Rights (CSIPR), National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal | Register by 24 February 2026
- [INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW SUMMIT 2026: “The WTO@30: Reimagining Multilateralism in International Trade Law” | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-trade-law-summit-2026-the-wto30-reimagining-multilateralism-in-international-trade-law-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register/): INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW SUMMIT 2026: “The WTO@30: Reimagining Multilateralism in International Trade Law” | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 July 2026
- [2nd Nyaya Shastra Virtual Moot Court Competition | Organized by Nyaya Shashtra | Register by 20th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-nyaya-shastra-virtual-moot-court-competition-organized-by-nyaya-shashtra-register-by-20th-march-2026/): 2nd Nyaya Shastra Virtual Moot Court Competition | Organized by Nyaya Shashtra | Register by 20th March 2026
- [CAREERS IN LAW FOR WOMEN: STRATEGIES, SKILLS & PROFESSIONAL GROWTH | Organized by CanonSphere | 13 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/careers-in-law-for-women-strategies-skills-professional-growth-organized-by-canonsphere-13-february-2026/): CAREERS IN LAW FOR WOMEN: STRATEGIES, SKILLS & PROFESSIONAL GROWTH | Organized by CanonSphere | 13 February 2026
- [1st L.P. Shahi Memorial National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College, Muzaffarpur, Bihar | Register by 28th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-l-p-shahi-memorial-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-sri-krishna-jubilee-law-college-register-by-28th-february-2026/): 1st L.P. Shahi Memorial National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College | Register by 28th February, 2026
- [Sooraj KR of Government Law College Thrissur Honoured Among Top Five Papers at National Conference on Constitutional Assembly Debates](https://lawfoyer.in/sooraj-kr-of-government-law-college-thrissur-honoured-among-top-five-papers-at-national-conference-on-constitutional-assembly-debates/): LawFoyer proudly celebrates the academic excellence of Sooraj KR, a fourth-year BBA LL.B. (Hons.) student from Government Law College Thrissur, for securing recognition as one among the best five research papers at a prestigious National Conference on Constitutional Assembly Debates, conducted by the Dr B. R. Ambedkar Chair of Kerala University on 26 November 2025.
- [3rd SHRI O.P.TANDON MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITON 2026 | PRIZE POOL OF ₹54,000 | Organized by TRINITY INSTITUTE OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES (TIPS) | Register by 10th FEBRUARY 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-shri-o-p-tandon-memorial-moot-court-competiton-2026-organized-by-trinity-institute-of-professional-studies-tips-register-by-10th-february-2026/): 3rd SHRI O.P.TANDON MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITON 2026 | Organized by TRINITY INSTITUTE OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES (TIPS) | Register by 10th FEBRUARY 2026
- [THEMISIA 4.0 | Organized by Deccan Education Society’s Shri Navalmal Firodia Law College, Pune | Register by 10th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/themisia-4-0-organized-by-deccan-education-societys-shri-navalmal-firodia-law-college-pune-register-by-4th-february-2026/): THEMISIA 4.0 | Organized by Deccan Education Society’s Shri Navalmal Firodia Law College, Pune | Register by 4th February, 2026
- [Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. v. Manjit Kaur & Ors., [2020] 8 SCR 1138](https://lawfoyer.in/ravinder-kaur-grewal-ors-v-manjit-kaur-ors-2020-8-scr-1138/): The present judgment settles a recurring controversy surrounding family settlements, their evidentiary value, and the requirement of compulsory registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. The Supreme Court examined whether a document styled as a memorandum of family settlement creates rights in immovable property for the first time or merely records a pre-existing oral settlement already acted upon by the parties. The dispute arose between real brothers concerning ownership and possession of ancestral and self-acquired properties, where long-standing possession, construction, and mutual exchange of properties had taken place within the family.
- [Sukh Sagar Medical College & Hospital v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 397](https://lawfoyer.in/sukh-sagar-medical-college-hospital-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-ors-2020-11-scr-397/): The judgment examines the scope and limits of the State Government’s power to withdraw an Essentiality Certificate granted for the establishment of a medical college under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and the Medical Council of India Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999. The appellant Trust was granted an Essentiality Certificate in 2014 to establish a medical college at Jabalpur. Despite issuance of a conditional Letter of Permission for the academic year 2016–17, the college consistently failed to meet mandatory infrastructural, faculty, and clinical requirements prescribed by the Medical Council of India. Renewal permissions were denied for three consecutive academic years due to gross deficiencies, resulting in academic dislocation of the first batch of students.
- [The Chairman, Board of Trustees, Cochin Port Trust v. M/s Arebee Star Maritime Agencies Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 706](https://lawfoyer.in/the-chairman-board-of-trustees-cochin-port-trust-v-m-s-arebee-star-maritime-agencies-pvt-ltd-ors-2020-11-scr-706/): The judgment resolves long-standing inconsistencies in Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning liability for storage charges, demurrage, and ground rent payable to Major Port Trusts when imported goods remain uncleared by consignees. The dispute arose from the practice of Port Trusts imposing liability on shipping or steamer agents for prolonged periods, particularly beyond tariff-prescribed limits, where consignees abandoned goods. The Court undertook a comprehensive statutory interpretation of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, read harmoniously with the Customs Act, 1962 and principles of bailment under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
- [Gangadhar Alias Gangaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2020] 7 S.C.R. 173](https://lawfoyer.in/gangadhar-alias-gangaram-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2020-7-s-c-r-173/): The decision examines the foundational requirement of conscious possession under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and reiterates that statutory presumptions under Sections 35 and 54 do not dispense with the prosecution’s primary burden to establish possession beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant was convicted solely on the basis of ownership inferred from an outdated voters’ list, despite the recovery of 48 kg 200 gms of ganja from a locked house allegedly sold prior to the seizure.
- [M/s EXL Careers and Another v. Frankfinn Aviation Services Private Limited, [2020] 6 SCR 289](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-exl-careers-and-another-v-frankfinn-aviation-services-private-limited-2020-6-scr-289/): The judgment in M/s EXL Careers and Another v. Frankfinn Aviation Services Private Limited authoritatively settles the legal position concerning the procedural consequence of the return of a plaint under Order VII Rules 10 and 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Supreme Court examined whether a civil suit, upon return of the plaint for want of territorial jurisdiction, must recommence de novo or could continue from the stage at which it stood prior to such return.
- [Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 7 S.C.R. 158](https://lawfoyer.in/janhit-abhiyan-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-7-s-c-r-158/): The present writ proceedings arise from a constitutional challenge to the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, which introduced Articles 15(6) and 16(6) into the Constitution of India. The amendment empowered the State to provide up to ten per cent reservation in educational institutions and public employment for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) of citizens, excluding classes already covered under Articles 15(4), 15(5), and 16(4).
- [Rama Nand and Others v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Another, [2020] 6 SCR 19](https://lawfoyer.in/rama-nand-and-others-v-chief-secretary-govt-of-nct-of-delhi-and-another-2020-6-scr-19/): The present judgment examines the jurisprudential distinction between promotion and mere cadre reorganisation within the framework of service law, particularly in the context of the Assured Career Progression Scheme. The controversy arose when Telephone Operators employed under the Delhi Fire Service were deployed as Radio Telephone Operators pursuant to a reorganisation of the wireless communication system. The appellants claimed entitlement to financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme, asserting that the deployment amounted to a mere re-description of posts rather than a promotion. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of the factual matrix, service conditions, eligibility criteria, and governing policy instruments.
- [Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra and Others, [2020] 13 SCR 318](https://lawfoyer.in/hari-krishna-mandir-trust-v-state-of-maharashtra-and-others-2020-13-scr-318/): The judgment in Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra and Others represents a significant reaffirmation of the constitutional protection accorded to property rights under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, even after the deletion of the right to property as a fundamental right. The Supreme Court examined the legality of an erroneous vesting of a privately owned internal road in favour of a municipal corporation under a Town Planning Scheme framed under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. The case arose from a long-standing factual dispute where a strip of land recorded as a private internal road, never acquired through statutory means, was mistakenly shown as vested in the Pune Municipal Corporation.
- [Brahampal @ Sammay and Another v. National Insurance Company, [2020] 9 SCR 504](https://lawfoyer.in/brahampal-sammay-and-another-v-national-insurance-company-2020-9-scr-504/): The judgment examines the scope and contours of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, particularly the discretionary power of High Courts to condone delay in filing appeals against awards passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunals. The Supreme Court addressed whether dismissal of an appeal solely on the ground of a short delay of forty-five days defeats the beneficial object of the statute. The Court emphasised that Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act constitutes a self-contained and beneficial legislative framework intended to protect victims of road accidents and their dependents. The interpretation of limitation provisions within such welfare legislation must therefore be remedial and purposive rather than rigid and technical.
- [Government of India & Ors. v. ISRO Drivers Association, [2020] 7 SCR 941](https://lawfoyer.in/government-of-india-ors-v-isro-drivers-association-2020-7-scr-941/): The judgment examines the scope and interpretation of Rule 5(c) of the Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Associations) Rules, 1993, particularly the meaning of the expression “distinct category of Government servants”. The dispute arose when an association formed exclusively by drivers employed at the Satish Dhawan Space Centre, SHAR, sought recognition as a service association under the 1993 Rules. The competent authority rejected the claim on the ground that an association based purely on job description did not qualify as a “distinct category”.
- [2nd Pan-India Essay Writing Competition, 2026 | Organized by Avantika University | Register by 20 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-pan-india-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-avantika-university-register-by-20-february-2026/): 2nd Pan-India Essay Writing Competition, 2026 | Organized by Avantika University | Register by 20 February 2026
- [XVII AMITY MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by The Moot Court Committee of Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 7th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/xvii-amity-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-the-moot-court-committee-of-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-31st-january-2026/): XVII AMITY MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by The Moot Court Committee of Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 31st January 2026
- [Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Ors., [2020] 10 SCR 135](https://lawfoyer.in/vineeta-sharma-v-rakesh-sharma-ors-2020-10-scr-135/): The Constitution Bench decision in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Ors. finally authoritatively settles the long-standing judicial conflict concerning the scope, temporal operation, and constitutional intent of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as substituted by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. The judgment resolves divergent interpretations rendered in Prakash v. Phulavati and Danamma v. Amar, clarifying whether a daughter’s right as a coparcener is contingent upon the father being alive on 09.09.2005.
- [In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr. [2020] 8 SCR 443](https://lawfoyer.in/in-re-prashant-bhushan-and-anr-2020-8-scr-443/): The judgment in In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr. represents a significant constitutional exposition on the contours of criminal contempt in the context of digital speech and public criticism of the judiciary. The Supreme Court initiated suo motu criminal contempt proceedings against a senior advocate for two tweets that allegedly scandalised the institution of the judiciary and undermined public confidence in the office of the Chief Justice of India.
- [Preet Pal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2020] 6 SCR 967](https://lawfoyer.in/preet-pal-singh-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2020-6-scr-967/): The judgment examines the scope and limits of Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, particularly the judicial standards governing suspension of sentence and grant of bail after conviction. The appeal arose from an order of the Allahabad High Court which had suspended the sentence of a convict husband found guilty under Sections 498A, 304B, and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and released him on bail during pendency of appeal. The Supreme Court scrutinized whether such suspension was legally sustainable when the conviction involved dowry death punishable with life imprisonment.
- [M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 10 S.C.R. 718](https://lawfoyer.in/m-c-mehta-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-10-s-c-r-718/): The judgment examines the jurisdictional limits of the Monitoring Committee constituted by the Supreme Court in the long-running M.C. Mehta environmental litigation. The central issue concerns whether the Monitoring Committee possessed authority to seal purely residential premises situated on private land when such premises were not being used for commercial purposes. The controversy arose from Report No.149, pursuant to which several residential properties in Vasant Kunj and Rajokari were sealed on the basis of a letter issued by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mehrauli.
- [Union of India & Anr. v. M/s K.C. Sharma & Co. & Ors., [2020] 6 S.C.R. 854](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-anr-v-m-s-k-c-sharma-co-ors-2020-6-s-c-r-854/): The decision examines the permissibility of challenging a finalized decree passed in reference proceedings under Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on the ground of alleged fraud. The dispute arose from the acquisition of large tracts of land belonging to Gaon Sabha Luhar Heri, including banjar land containing shora. The respondents claimed entitlement to compensation as lessees who had invested substantial resources in reclaiming the land. The reference court, by judgment dated 28.09.1989, apportioned 87% compensation to the respondents and 13% to the Gaon Sabha. This decree attained finality as it was never appealed.
- [Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 368](https://lawfoyer.in/babulal-vardharji-gurjar-v-veer-gurjar-aluminium-industries-pvt-ltd-anr-2020-13-s-c-r-368/): The Supreme Court in Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. authoritatively examined the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings initiated under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The judgment resolves a recurring controversy on whether the commencement of the IBC or the existence of secured assets such as mortgages can extend or alter the statutory limitation period for initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process.
- [Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, [2020] 11 S.C.R. 425](https://lawfoyer.in/centre-for-public-interest-litigation-v-union-of-india-2020-11-s-c-r-425/): The judgment addresses the scope, interpretation, and operational sufficiency of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 in the context of the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic. The petition questioned the constitutional and statutory obligation of the Union of India to frame a fresh National Disaster Management Plan exclusively for COVID-19 under Section 11, to prescribe new minimum standards of relief under Section 12, and to mandate exclusive utilisation of the National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) under Section 46 instead of the PM CARES Fund. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed statutory interpretation of the Act, examining the legislative intent, scheme, and functional architecture of disaster governance in India.
- [Ghanshyam Upadhyay v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 6 S.C.R. 983](https://lawfoyer.in/ghanshyam-upadhyay-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2020-6-s-c-r-983/): The judgment in Ghanshyam Upadhyay v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others examines the contours of judicial scrutiny over allegations of bias and conflict of interest raised against members of a Commission of Inquiry constituted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. The petitioner, a practicing advocate, invoked Article 32 of the Constitution of India in public interest, seeking the scrapping of a judicial commission constituted to inquire into the alleged police encounter killing of Vikas Dubey. The challenge was founded exclusively on a newspaper article alleging political and relational proximity of commission members to the ruling establishment.
- [Mohd. Anwar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 7 SCR 150](https://lawfoyer.in/mohd-anwar-v-state-nct-of-delhi-2020-7-scr-150/): The judgment in Mohd. Anwar v. State (NCT of Delhi) addresses critical issues relating to the evidentiary value of witness testimony, refusal to participate in Test Identification Parade, and belated claims of juvenility and mental unsoundness under criminal law. The Supreme Court examined whether such defences, raised for the first time at the appellate stage, could undermine concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court. The Court reaffirmed that robbery with hurt under Section 394 IPC stands established when ocular testimony is consistent, credible, and corroborated by surrounding circumstances.
- [Deccan Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. Regency Mahavir Properties & Ors., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 427](https://lawfoyer.in/deccan-paper-mills-co-ltd-v-regency-mahavir-properties-ors-2020-13-s-c-r-427/): The judgment in Deccan Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. Regency Mahavir Properties & Ors. addresses the evolving jurisprudence on arbitrability of disputes involving allegations of fraud and cancellation of written instruments under section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Supreme Court examined whether a civil suit seeking declaration and cancellation of development agreements on the ground of fraud could bypass a valid arbitration clause contained in a subsequent assignment agreement.
- [Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited, [2020] 10 SCR 791](https://lawfoyer.in/avitel-post-studioz-limited-ors-v-hsbc-pi-holdings-mauritius-limited-2020-10-scr-791/): The decision in Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited constitutes a significant exposition on the arbitrability of disputes involving allegations of fraud under Indian arbitration law, particularly in the context of enforcement-related interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The controversy arose from a foreign-seated arbitration governed by Singapore law, where the claimant investor alleged that it was fraudulently induced to invest USD 60 million based on false representations relating to a non-existent BBC contract. The arbitral tribunal rendered a detailed foreign final award holding the appellants liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and tort of deceit, awarding restitutionary damages equivalent to the entire investment amount with interest and costs.
- [The Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, Calicut v. M/s. Cera Boards and Doors, Kannur Kerala & Ors., [2020] 11 S.C.R. 471](https://lawfoyer.in/the-commissioner-of-central-excise-customs-and-service-tax-calicut-v-m-s-cera-boards-and-doors-kannur-kerala-ors-2020-11-s-c-r-471/): The judgment in The Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, Calicut v. M/s. Cera Boards and Doors, Kannur Kerala & Ors. examines the core principles governing valuation of excisable goods under Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, particularly in the context of alleged undervaluation and evasion of duty. The controversy arose from multiple batches of appeals involving plywood and board manufacturers accused of systematically under-invoicing goods and collecting consideration in cash beyond invoice values. The adjudicating authorities confirmed undervaluation, while the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld such findings but remanded matters for re-quantification of duty.
- [Sardar Bahginder Singh v. Sardar Manjieeth Singh Jagan Singh & Ors., [2020] 14 S.C.R. 349](https://lawfoyer.in/sardar-bahginder-singh-v-sardar-manjieeth-singh-jagan-singh-ors-2020-14-s-c-r-349/): The judgment adjudicates the statutory conflict concerning the authority to nominate four members to the statutory Board constituted under the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib Act, 1956. The controversy arose from conflicting factional claims within the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded, a public trust registered under the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950. The State Government of Maharashtra assumed the power to nominate four members under Section 6(1)(viii) due to internal disputes in the Diwan and issued a notification dated 21 June 2019.
- [Sri V.N. Krishna Murthy & Anr. v. Sri Ravikumar & Ors, [2020] 7 S.C.R. 1148](https://lawfoyer.in/sri-v-n-krishna-murthy-anr-v-sri-ravikumar-ors-2020-7-s-c-r-1148/): The judgment examines the scope of the expression “person aggrieved” under Sections 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and determines whether purchasers claiming title through sale deeds executed under a General Power of Attorney possess locus standi to challenge a decree cancelling an agreement to sell to which they were not parties. The Supreme Court clarifies that appellate rights are not automatic and accrue only where a decree prejudicially affects legal rights.
- [Wg. Cdr. Arifur Rahman Khan & Aleya Sultana & Ors. v. DLF Southern Homes Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., [2020] 9 SCR 136](https://lawfoyer.in/wg-cdr-arifur-rahman-khan-aleya-sultana-ors-v-dlf-southern-homes-pvt-ltd-ors-2020-9-scr-136/): The judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India in Wg. Cdr. Arifur Rahman Khan and Aleya Sultana & Ors. v. DLF Southern Homes Pvt. Ltd. constitutes a decisive exposition on the scope of deficiency of service under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 in cases involving delayed delivery of residential flats. The dispute arose from substantial delays, ranging between two to four years, in handing over possession of apartments despite contractual stipulations mandating completion within thirty-six months. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission dismissed the buyers’ complaint by confining compensation to a contractual clause providing a nominal fixed rate.
- [,Raj Pal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Haryana, Rohtak, [2020] 9 SCR 185](https://lawfoyer.in/raj-pal-singh-v-commissioner-of-income-tax-haryana-rohtak-2020-9-scr-185/): The judgment examines the precise point of accrual of capital gains under Section 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in cases of compulsory acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The dispute arose from the acquisition of land belonging to the assessee, which was already in possession of a college as a lessee whose lease had expired prior to acquisition. The controversy centered on whether capital gains accrued on the date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or on the date of passing of the award under Section 11.
- [Narasamma & Ors. v. A. Krishnappa (Dead) Through LRs, [2020] 7 SCR 528](https://lawfoyer.in/narasamma-ors-v-a-krishnappa-dead-through-lrs-2020-7-scr-528/): The judgment adjudicates a long-standing civil dispute concerning title, possession, and adverse possession over an urban immovable property in Bengaluru. The dispute arose when the original plaintiff sought vacant possession of a revenue site, asserting absolute ownership derived from ancestral property and joint family management. The defendant resisted the claim by setting up a competing narrative of ownership through an unregistered agreement of sale, a General Power of Attorney, and alternatively, perfection of title by adverse possession commencing from the same date.
- [,Union of India and Others v. Agricus LLP and Others [2020] 14 SCR 372](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-and-others-v-agricus-llp-and-others-2020-14-scr-372/): The judgment adjudicates the constitutional and statutory validity of multiple notifications and trade notices issued by the Union of India under the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, whereby imports of certain pulses, including peas, moong, urad and tur, were shifted from the free to the restricted category and made subject to quantitative ceilings and prior authorisation. The principal controversy arose from the challenge mounted by importers asserting that such restrictions amounted to quantitative restrictions under Section 9A of the Act, necessitating compliance with the safeguard investigation mechanism and procedural safeguards prescribed under the Safeguard Measures (Quantitative Restrictions) Rules, 2012.
- [V. Sukumaran v. State of Kerala & Anr., [2020] 6 SCR 991](https://lawfoyer.in/v-sukumaran-v-state-of-kerala-anr-2020-6-scr-991/): The decision in V. Sukumaran v. State of Kerala & Anr. constitutes a significant exposition of pension jurisprudence under Indian service law, particularly in relation to the treatment of Casual Labour Roll (CLR) service for pensionary benefits. The Supreme Court examined whether the appellant, who initially served as a CLR worker in the Fisheries Department and was later appointed through Kerala Public Service Commission recruitment and subsequently transferred back to the same department, could claim the benefit of his earlier casual service for pension computation. The State denied such benefit on the technical ground that the appellant was not directly absorbed from CLR to Seasonal Labour Roll (SLR) posts but entered regular service through a distinct recruitment channel.
- [State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Rakesh Sethi & Anr., (2020) 7 SCR 734](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-madhya-pradesh-ors-v-rakesh-sethi-anr-2020-7-scr-734/): The judgment examines the constitutional and statutory validity of Rule 55A of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994, which authorises the State Government to levy fees for reservation and allotment of specific or “fancy” registration numbers for motor vehicles. The controversy arose when the High Court of Madhya Pradesh struck down Rule 55A as ultra vires the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, holding that the power to prescribe fees for vehicle registration vested exclusively with the Central Government. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine the scope of Sections 41, 65, and 211 of the Act, and to determine whether the State could, through delegated legislation, impose fees for services connected with registration marks.
- [State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors., [2020] 10 S.C.R. 857](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-punjab-ors-v-davinder-singh-ors-2020-10-s-c-r-857/): The judgment in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. addresses a foundational constitutional question concerning the permissibility of sub-classification within Scheduled Castes for the purpose of reservation in public employment. The case arose from a challenge to Section 4(5) of the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006, which earmarked 50% of Scheduled Caste reserved vacancies for Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs, identified as the most backward among Scheduled Castes in Punjab. The Punjab and Haryana High Court invalidated the provision by relying on E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, which held that Scheduled Castes constitute a homogenous class and cannot be further classified by States.
- [Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Others, [2020] 7 SCR 763](https://lawfoyer.in/nazir-mohamed-v-j-kamala-and-others-2020-7-scr-763/): The judgment in Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Others is a significant exposition on the scope and limits of second appeals under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the interplay between declaration of title, recovery of possession, adverse possession, and limitation. The Supreme Court decisively reaffirmed that a second appeal is a statutory and restricted remedy, maintainable only when a substantial question of law arises. The Court held that the High Court gravely erred in interfering with concurrent and well-reasoned findings of the First Appellate Court without formulating or answering any genuine substantial question of law.
- [M/s. Radha Exports (India) Pvt. Limited v. K.P. Jayaram & Anr. [2020] 8 S.C.R. 272](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-radha-exports-india-pvt-limited-v-k-p-jayaram-anr-2020-8-s-c-r-272/): The decision in M/s. Radha Exports (India) Pvt. Limited v. K.P. Jayaram & Anr. authoritatively clarifies the intersection between limitation law and the initiation of insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Supreme Court examined whether a creditor invoking the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process must demonstrate the existence of a legally recoverable financial debt on the date of filing. The controversy arose from advances made between 2002 and 2005 to a proprietorship concern, later taken over by the appellant company, where substantial repayments were pleaded, and a portion of the outstanding amount was converted into share application money. After more than a decade, insolvency proceedings were initiated, alleging subsisting financial debt.
- [State of Madhya Pradesh v. Centre for Environment Protection Research and Development & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 1139](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-madhya-pradesh-v-centre-for-environment-protection-research-and-development-ors-2020-12-scr-1139/): The judgment examines the statutory limits of powers exercised by the National Green Tribunal under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 in enforcing vehicular pollution norms. The dispute arose from blanket directions issued by the Central Zonal Bench of the NGT, Bhopal, mandating denial of fuel supply to motor vehicles lacking a valid Pollution Under Control Certificate and directing the State of Madhya Pradesh to deposit ₹25 crores as security to ensure compliance. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether such coercive measures were legally sustainable under the existing statutory framework governing motor vehicles and environmental protection.
- [Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma and Others, [2020] 10 SCR 923](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-v-ashok-kumar-sharma-and-others-2020-10-scr-923/): The judgment authoritatively settles the long-standing conflict concerning the procedural competence of police authorities in relation to offences under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The Court undertook an extensive statutory and constitutional analysis to determine whether police officers can register FIRs, investigate, and prosecute offences which are declared cognizable and non-bailable under Section 36AC of the Act. The Court held that despite the cognizable nature of such offences, Section 32 of the Act creates a complete code for prosecution, thereby excluding police officers from instituting prosecutions or registering FIRs under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- [Women, Children & the New Criminal Laws: Understanding Protection, Rights and Reforms | Organized by SAGE Winter School - SAGE University | Register by 22 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/women-children-the-new-criminal-laws-understanding-protection-rights-and-reforms-organized-by-sage-winter-school-sage-university-register-by-22-february-2026/): Women, Children & the New Criminal Laws: Understanding Protection, Rights and Reforms | Organized by SAGE Winter School - SAGE University | Register by 22 February 2026
- [5th FIMT Moot Court Competition (All India Participation) 2026 | Organized by Fairfield School of Law, Fairfield Institute of Management & Technology (FIMT) | Register by 15th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/5th-fimt-moot-court-competition-all-india-participation-2026-organized-by-fairfield-school-of-law-fairfield-institute-of-management-technology-fimt-register-by-15th-february-2026/): 5th FIMT Moot Court Competition (All India Participation) 2026 | Organized by Fairfield School of Law, Fairfield Institute of Management & Technology (FIMT) | Register by 15th February, 2026
- [Manwee Arya, Shivang Kumar and Gyan Prakash of Central University of South Bihar Shines on the National Mooting Stage as Best Student Advocate (Petitioner) at Shri I.M. Nanavati Memorial Moot Court Competition 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/manwee-arya-shivang-kumar-and-gyan-prakash-of-central-university-of-south-bihar-shines-on-the-national-mooting-stage-as-best-student-advocate-petitioner-at-shri-i-m-nanavati-memorial-moot-court-co/): LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of Manwee Arya, a fourth-year B.A. LL.B student from Central University of South Bihar, who has been honored with the prestigious title of Best Student Advocate (Petitioner) at the Shri I.M. Nanavati Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026. This recognition reflects not only her individual excellence but also
- [Arush Kalsotra of Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla Wins Upcoming Mediator Award at International Mediation Competition](https://lawfoyer.in/arush-kalsotra-of-himachal-pradesh-national-law-university-shimla-wins-upcoming-mediator-award-at-international-mediation-competition/): LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of Arush Kalsotra, a dedicated law student from Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla, who has been honoured with the Upcoming Mediator Award at the Lex Infinitum VMSCL International Dispute Resolution Competition. The competition was organized by V.M. Salgaocar College of Law, Goa and witnessed participation from talented teams
- [24th LawFoyer Quiz on (Contract Law + Law of Torts): Prizes worth Rs. 15K + | Cash Prizes, Smart Watch, Earbuds and much more | Bonuses for All Participants worth Rs. 5K+ | Register by 24th January, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/24th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-contract-law-law-of-torts-prizes-worth-rs-25k-cash-prizes-smart-watch-earbuds-and-much-more/): 24th LawFoyer Contract and Torts Quiz for law students. Prizes worth Rs 15K, cash, gadgets and bonuses for all. Register by 24th January 2026.
- [IILM Law Journal – Call for Papers (Vol. IV, Issue 1) | Organized by IILM Law Journal, School of Law, IILM University | Register by 24th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/iilm-law-journal-call-for-papers-vol-iv-issue-1-organized-by-iilm-law-journal-school-of-law-iilm-university-register-by-24th-april-2026/): IILM Law Journal – Call for Papers (Vol. IV, Issue 1) | Organized by IILM Law Journal, School of Law, IILM University | Register by 24th April 2026
- [V AUAP–JLU International Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Jagran Lakecity University, Bhopal (M.P.) | Register by 31st January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/v-auap-jlu-international-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-jagran-lakecity-university-bhopal-m-p-register-by-28th-january-2026/): V AUAP–JLU International Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Jagran Lakecity University, Bhopal (M.P.) | Register by 28th January 2026
- [NLST National Virtual Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by Noida Legal Service Trust (NLST) | Register by 10th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nlst-national-virtual-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-noida-legal-service-trust-nlst-register-by-noida-legal-service-trust-nlst/): NLST National Virtual Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by Noida Legal Service Trust (NLST) | Register by Noida Legal Service Trust (NLST)
- [ESG 2.0 – Law, Policy and Practice (Value Added Course) | Organized by Vivekananda School of Law and Legal Studies (VSLLS), Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus (VIPS-TC) | Register by 28th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/esg-2-0-law-policy-and-practice-value-added-course-organized-by-vivekananda-school-of-law-and-legal-studies-vslls-vivekananda-institute-of-professional-studies-technical-ca/): ESG 2.0 – Law, Policy and Practice (Value Added Course) | Organized by Vivekananda School of Law and Legal Studies (VSLLS), Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus (VIPS-TC) | Register by 28th February 2026
- [Anushka Sharma and Aryansingh Bagga of GLS University Shine as Winners at Client Counselling Competition 2025–26](https://lawfoyer.in/anushka-sharma-and-aryansingh-bagga-of-gls-university-shine-as-winners-at-client-counselling-competition-2025-26/): At LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive, we take immense pride in celebrating young legal minds who exemplify dedication, skill, and a deep understanding of the law in practice. One such inspiring achievement comes from Anushka Sharma and Aryansingh Bagga, students of the Faculty of Law, GLS University, Ahmedabad, who emerged as Winners at the Client Counselling Competition
- [V AUAP–JLU International Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Jagran Lakecity University, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh | Register by 28 January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/v-auap-jlu-international-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-jagran-lakecity-university-bhopal-madhya-pradesh-register-by-28-january-2026/): V AUAP–JLU International Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Jagran Lakecity University, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh | Register by 28 January 2026
- [Prajjwal Tiwari Secures 3rd Position in Legal Essay Competition at City Law College, Lucknow](https://lawfoyer.in/prajjwal-tiwari-secures-3rd-position-in-legal-essay-competition-at-city-law-college-lucknow/): LawFoyer proudly celebrates the academic success of Prajjwal Tiwari, a dedicated law student from City Law College, who secured 3rd Position in the Legal Essay Competition organized by his institution. This achievement stands as a reflection of his growing command over legal research, analytical thinking, and structured legal writing. Prajjwal is currently pursuing LL.B (Integrated),
- [Prajjwal Tiwari Secures Second Position in Essay Competition and Constitutional Quiz at City Academy Law College, Lucknow](https://lawfoyer.in/prajjwal-tiwari-secures-second-position-in-essay-competition-and-constitutional-quiz-at-city-academy-law-college-lucknow/): LawFoyer proudly celebrates the academic achievement of Prajjwal Tiwari, a passionate law student from City Law College, affiliated to the University of Lucknow, who secured Second Position in both the Essay Competition and the Constitutional Quiz Competition organized by City Academy Law College, Lucknow, in December 2024. This remarkable accomplishment reflects Prajjwal’s early dedication to
- [Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad v. M/s Adani Gas Ltd., [2020] 8 SCR 875](https://lawfoyer.in/commissioner-of-service-tax-ahmedabad-v-m-s-adani-gas-ltd-2020-8-scr-875/): The judgment examines the scope and interpretation of Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994, which levies service tax on the supply of tangible goods for use without transfer of possession and effective control. The controversy arose from service tax demands on gas connection charges collected by M/s Adani Gas Ltd. from industrial, commercial, and domestic consumers for installation of pipelines and SKID measurement equipment. The Tribunal had set aside the demand by holding that such equipment was not used by the consumer. The Supreme Court reversed this finding and upheld the levy.
- [Praneeth K. & Ors. v. University Grants Commission (UGC) & Ors., [2020] 8 SCR 917](https://lawfoyer.in/praneeth-k-ors-v-university-grants-commission-ugc-ors-2020-8-scr-917/): The judgment examines the constitutional validity and statutory force of the UGC Revised Guidelines dated 06.07.2020 mandating conduct of final year/terminal semester examinations during the COVID-19 pandemic. The petitions raised an intense conflict between academic standardisation under central law and public health decisions taken by States under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. The Supreme Court was required to adjudicate whether the University Grants Commission acted within its statutory mandate under Section 12 of the UGC Act, 1956, whether the impugned guidelines violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, and whether State decisions cancelling final examinations could override UGC directions.
- [Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Limited & Anr., [2020] 12 SCR 301](https://lawfoyer.in/jaipur-vidyut-vitran-nigam-ltd-ors-v-adani-power-rajasthan-limited-anr-2020-12-scr-301/): The decision in Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Limited & Anr. constitutes an authoritative exposition on the interpretation of “Change in Law” clauses in tariff-based competitive bidding power purchase agreements executed under Section 63 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The Supreme Court examined whether the shortfall and restructuring of domestic coal supply under the New Coal Distribution Policy, 2013 amounted to a compensable change in law when the bid and tariff were premised on domestic coal.
- [Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi), [2020] 9 SCR 245](https://lawfoyer.in/mukesh-singh-v-state-narcotic-branch-of-delhi-2020-9-scr-245/): The Constitution Bench judgment in Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) resolves a long-standing judicial conflict on whether a criminal trial under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 stands vitiated when the informant/complainant police officer himself conducts the investigation. The reference arose due to divergent judicial opinions, culminating in the decision of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018), which had held that such a course automatically vitiates the trial.
- [Dr. Vijay Mallya v. State Bank of India and Ors., [2020] 13 SCR 658](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-vijay-mallya-v-state-bank-of-india-and-ors-2020-13-scr-658/): The decision in Dr. Vijay Mallya v. State Bank of India and Others concerns the limited and well-settled scope of the review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, particularly when invoked in proceedings arising out of civil contempt. The review petitions were filed by Dr. Vijay Mallya against the judgment dated 09.05.2017, by which he was held guilty of contempt of court for non-disclosure of assets and violation of restraint orders passed by the High Court of Karnataka. The principal ground urged in review was that the Court had proceeded on an erroneous factual assumption that no reply had been filed by the contemnor to the response of the banks, whereas a reply dated 30.01.2017 was in fact on record.
- [In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr., [2020] 8 S.C.R. 510](https://lawfoyer.in/in-re-prashant-bhushan-and-anr-2020-8-s-c-r-510/): The judgment in In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr. represents one of the most significant contemporary decisions on the law of criminal contempt of court, particularly in the context of social media speech by members of the legal profession. The Supreme Court was seized of suo motu contempt proceedings arising out of two tweets published by a senior advocate, which were found to scandalize the institution of judiciary and undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. The Court examined the constitutional balance between freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) and the inherent contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 129.
- [Tamil Nadu Medical Officers Association & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 8 SCR 583](https://lawfoyer.in/tamil-nadu-medical-officers-association-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-8-scr-583/): The judgment adjudicates the constitutional and statutory competence of State Governments to provide a separate source of admission or reservation for in-service medical officers in postgraduate medical degree courses, vis-à-vis the regulatory framework under the Post Graduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000 framed by the Medical Council of India.
- [M/s. L. R. Brothers Indo Flora Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, [2020] 10 SCR 1043](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-l-r-brothers-indo-flora-ltd-v-commissioner-of-central-excise-2020-10-scr-1043/): The judgment addresses the fiscal consequences arising from contravention of Export-Import Policy conditions by a 100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU) engaged in floriculture. The appellant had availed customs duty exemption on imported inputs under Notification No. 126/94-Cus dated 03.06.1994 but effected Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) sales of cut flowers without prior approval of the Development Commissioner and without achieving the prescribed positive Net Foreign Exchange Earnings (NFE) under the EXIM Policy 1997–2002.
- [Sarika v. Administrator, Shri Mahakaleshwar Mandir Committee, Ujjain (M.P.) & Ors., [2020] 9 SCR 303](https://lawfoyer.in/sarika-v-administrator-shri-mahakaleshwar-mandir-committee-ujjain-m-p-ors-2020-9-scr-303/): The present judgment arises from the Supreme Court’s continued supervisory jurisdiction in matters concerning the preservation of religious and cultural heritage, specifically addressing the progressive erosion of the Jyotirlinga at Shri Mahakaleshwar Temple, Ujjain. The case reflects the Court’s constitutional responsibility to balance religious practices, heritage conservation, and scientific preservation.
- [Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India & Ors., [2019] 16 SCR 672; [2020] 11 SCR 541](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-v-association-of-unified-telecom-service-providers-of-india-2020-11-scr-541/): The judgment addresses the continuing ramifications of the Supreme Court’s authoritative interpretation of Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, particularly concerning the enforceability, payment structure, and insolvency-related implications of AGR dues owed by Telecom Service Providers. The Court examined representations made by telecom operators and financial institutions seeking staggered payment of AGR liabilities and considered the broader economic impact on the telecom sector and banking system.
- [The Designated Authority & Ors. v. M/s. Andhra Petrochemicals Limited, [2020] 7 SCR 1158](https://lawfoyer.in/the-designated-authority-ors-v-m-s-andhra-petrochemicals-limited-2020-7-scr-1158/): The judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India addresses the limits of judicial review over anti-dumping investigations conducted by the Designated Authority under Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and the Anti-Dumping Rules, 1995. The dispute arose from repeated writ petitions filed by M/s. Andhra Petrochemicals Limited challenging the refusal of the Designated Authority to impose anti-dumping duty on imports of certain alcohols from Saudi Arabia and other countries. The High Court not only interfered with the investigation process but also initiated contempt proceedings and directed replacement of the Designated Authority.
- [Shridhar C. Shetty (Deceased) Through LRs v. The Additional Collector and Competent Authority & Ors., [2020] 6 S.C.R. 1002](https://lawfoyer.in/shridhar-c-shetty-deceased-through-lrs-v-the-additional-collector-and-competent-authority-ors-2020-6-s-c-r-1002/): The judgment in Shridhar C. Shetty (Deceased) Through LRs v. The Additional Collector and Competent Authority & Ors. examines the scope and limits of statutory power exercised by authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The dispute arose from the failure of the landholder to comply with the conditions attached to an exemption granted under Sections 20 and 21 of the Act, specifically the obligation to surrender a stipulated number of residential tenements to Government nominees. Upon breach, instead of withdrawing the exemption as statutorily envisaged, the competent authority issued a demand for recovery of the market value of seven tenements along with interest and penalties, treating the amount as arrears of land revenue.
- [M/s Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni & Ors., [2020] 10 SCR 1075](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-bandekar-brothers-pvt-ltd-anr-v-prasad-vassudev-keni-ors-2020-10-scr-1075/): The decision in M/s Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni constitutes a definitive exposition on the scope and mandatory nature of Section 195 read with Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in cases alleging false evidence and fabrication of evidence under Sections 191 and 192 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Supreme Court was confronted with the recurring misuse of private complaints to bypass the statutory safeguards embedded in Section 195 CrPC, particularly where allegations relate to acts committed in or in relation to judicial proceedings. The Court undertook a meticulous doctrinal distinction between offences under Section 195(1)(b)(i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC, clarifying that the latter applies exclusively to cases of forgery of documents while in custodia legis, whereas the former governs offences affecting the administration of justice itself.
- [Ilangovan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2020] 6 SCR 1132](https://lawfoyer.in/ilangovan-v-state-of-tamil-nadu-2020-6-scr-1132/): The judgment examines the criminal liability of an accused convicted for causing death during a sudden altercation arising out of prior enmity between two families. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the High Court correctly modified the conviction from murder under Section 302 IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC by invoking Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.
- [The Karad Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Swapnil Bhingardevay & Ors., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 465](https://lawfoyer.in/the-karad-urban-cooperative-bank-ltd-v-swapnil-bhingardevay-ors-2020-13-s-c-r-465/): The present judgment examines the scope of judicial interference with the commercial wisdom exercised by the Committee of Creditors under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside an approved resolution plan on grounds of alleged lack of viability, breach of confidentiality, defective advertisement, and non-consideration of disputed assets.
- [LEX CARNIVAL 2026 (5th Amity Law Fest – Juris Trek) | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 31st January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/lex-carnival-2026-5th-amity-law-fest-juris-trek-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-31st-january-2026/): LEX CARNIVAL 2026 (5th Amity Law Fest – Juris Trek) | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 31st January 2026
- [3rd ALL INDIA IILM MOOT COURT COMPETITION | Organized by School of Law, IILM University, Greater Noida | Register by 14th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-all-india-iilm-moot-court-competition-oragnized-by-school-of-law-iilm-university-greater-noida-register-by-14th-march-2026/): 3rd ALL INDIA IILM MOOT COURT COMPETITION | Oragnized by School of Law, IILM University, Greater Noida | Register by 14th March 2026
- [CALL FOR PAPERS: Two-Day International Conference on “Law, Rights & Indigenous Futures” (Online) | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit Abstract by 15th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-two-day-international-conference-on-law-rights-indigenous-futures-online-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-submit-abstract-by/): CALL FOR PAPERS: Two-Day International Conference on “Law, Rights & Indigenous Futures” (Online) | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit Abstract by 15th February 2026
- [Essay Writing Competition | Organized by The Cyber Blog India | Register by 10 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/essay-writing-competition-organized-by-the-cyber-blog-india-register-by-10-february-2026/): ESSAY WRITING COMPETITION | Organized by The Cyber Blog India | Register by 10 February 2026
- [R. Poornima and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [2020] 8 SCR 89](https://lawfoyer.in/r-poornima-and-ors-v-union-of-india-and-ors-2020-8-scr-89/): The judgment in R. Poornima and Others v. Union of India and Others resolves a constitutional challenge concerning the interpretation of Article 217(2) of the Constitution of India, particularly Explanation (a) and (aa), governing eligibility for appointment as Judges of a High Court. The petitioners, directly recruited District Judges of the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service, asserted that their prior experience at the Bar should be clubbed with their subsequent judicial service to satisfy the mandatory ten-year eligibility requirement for elevation to the High Court. Despite being senior in the District Judge cadre, they were excluded from consideration as they had not completed ten years of judicial service on the relevant date. The petitioners alleged discrimination under Article 14 and argued that the constitutional scheme permits cumulative reckoning of experience regardless of sequence.
- [The New India Assurance Company Limited v. Smt. Somwati and Others, [2020] 10 SCR 1132](https://lawfoyer.in/the-new-india-assurance-company-limited-v-smt-somwati-and-others-2020-10-scr-1132/): The present judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India resolves a recurring conflict in motor accident compensation jurisprudence concerning the scope and limits of non-pecuniary damages under conventional heads. The core controversy pertained to whether compensation could be simultaneously awarded under the heads of loss of consortium and loss of love and affection, and whether the concept of consortium was confined exclusively to spousal relationships. The appeals were instituted by multiple insurance companies challenging the legality of High Court judgments which had granted compensation to each claimant under both heads. The Supreme Court undertook a doctrinal examination of earlier precedents, including the Constitution Bench ruling in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, and subsequent clarificatory judgments.
- [M/s Bangalore Club v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax & Anr., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 488](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-bangalore-club-v-commissioner-of-wealth-tax-anr-2020-13-s-c-r-488/): The judgment examines the scope and applicability of Section 21AA of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 in determining whether a social members’ club, namely M/s Bangalore Club, can be subjected to wealth tax as an association of persons. The controversy arose from assessment years 1981–82 and 1984–85 to 1990–91, where the revenue authorities treated the Club as a taxable association holding assets with indeterminate shares. The Supreme Court undertook an extensive interpretative exercise to determine the legislative intent behind Section 21AA, emphasizing that the provision was enacted as an anti-avoidance measure and not as an expansion of the charging section under Section 3.
- [Shreyas Sinha v. The West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences & Ors., [2020] 9 S.C.R. 869](https://lawfoyer.in/shreyas-sinha-v-the-west-bengal-national-university-of-juridical-sciences-ors-2020-9-s-c-r-869/): The Supreme Court examined whether the National University of Juridical Sciences (Amendment) Act, 2018, which introduced mandatory reservation of at least thirty percent seats for candidates domiciled in West Bengal, could be applied to an ongoing admission process for the academic session 2019–2020 conducted through Common Law Admission Test (CLAT). The appellant, having participated in CLAT after the amendment came into force, claimed entitlement to domicile reservation for the same academic year. The University declined such benefit, contending that the admission process had commenced prior to the amendment and that applying the new reservation would disturb the settled selection framework.
- [Stalin v. State represented by the Inspector of Police, [2020] 7 S.C.R. 283](https://lawfoyer.in/stalin-v-state-represented-by-the-inspector-of-police-2020-7-s-c-r-283/): The judgment addresses the recurring doctrinal issue in Indian criminal law concerning whether a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 can be sustained when the death of the victim results from a single injury. The Supreme Court revisits and clarifies the legal position that no rigid or mechanical rule exists excluding murder liability merely because only one blow was inflicted. The determination must depend on the cumulative assessment of attendant circumstances, including the nature of the weapon, the part of the body targeted, the force applied, and the contextual sequence of events preceding the act.
- [Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. v. Goverdhan Lal Soni & Anr., [2020] 10 SCR 238](https://lawfoyer.in/rajasthan-state-road-transport-corporation-ors-v-goverdhan-lal-soni-anr-2020-10-scr-238/): The judgment examines the legal entitlement of surplus employees absorbed from a defunct State Public Enterprise into another State Corporation to receive pensionary benefits under the absorbing organisation’s pension regulations. The dispute arose after employees of the Rajasthan State Agro Industries Corporation Limited, which followed only a Contributory Provident Fund scheme, were absorbed into the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, which was governed by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Employees’ Pension Regulations, 1989.
- [Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2020] 7 SCR 546](https://lawfoyer.in/rizwan-khan-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-2020-7-scr-546/): The judgment in Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh examines critical procedural and evidentiary dimensions under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, particularly concerning recovery, proof of possession, and reliance on police testimony in the absence of independent witnesses. The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the NDPS Act on multiple grounds including alleged non-compliance with Sections 42, 50, and 55, discrepancies in sample marking, non-examination of independent witnesses, and failure to establish ownership and recovery of the vehicle from which contraband was seized.
- [Pravin Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 7 SCR 1078](https://lawfoyer.in/pravin-kumar-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-7-scr-1078/): The judgment in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. examines the contours of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings involving members of an armed force of the Union, particularly in cases alleging corruption, fabrication of official records, and intimidation of subordinates. The appellant, a Sub-Inspector in the Central Industrial Security Force, challenged his dismissal from service arising out of a departmental enquiry conducted under the CISF Rules, 1969. The enquiry followed recovery of unaccounted cash from a subordinate constable, which ultimately revealed a structured mechanism of illegal collection of bribes from contractors operating within the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited refinery premises.
- [National Co-operative Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi-V, [2020] 13 SCR 517](https://lawfoyer.in/national-co-operative-development-corporation-v-commissioner-of-income-tax-delhi-v-2020-13-scr-517/): The judgment examines the deductibility of non-refundable grants disbursed by a statutory corporation from interest income earned on temporarily parked government funds, within the framework of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the National Cooperative Development Corporation Act, 1962. The controversy arose from the Revenue’s disallowance of deduction claimed by the National Co-operative Development Corporation for grants released to cooperative societies, contending that such outgo constituted capital expenditure or mere application of income.
- [,Jeet Ram v. The Narcotics Control Bureau, Chandigarh, [2020] 7 SCR 558](https://lawfoyer.in/jeet-ram-v-the-narcotics-control-bureau-chandigarh-2020-7-scr-558/): The Supreme Court in Jeet Ram v. Narcotics Control Bureau, Chandigarh examined the legality of the High Court’s interference with an order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The trial court had acquitted the accused on grounds of alleged non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act, absence of independent witnesses, doubts regarding conscious possession, and apprehension of sample tampering. The High Court reversed the acquittal, convicted the accused, and imposed a sentence of fifteen years’ rigorous imprisonment.
- [Abhilasha v. Parkash & Ors., [2020] 11 S.C.R. 244](https://lawfoyer.in/abhilasha-v-parkash-ors-2020-11-s-c-r-244/): The judgment in Abhilasha v. Parkash & Ors. authoritatively settles the legal position concerning the entitlement of an unmarried Hindu daughter to claim maintenance from her father after attaining majority. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and clarified the distinct scope, nature, and jurisdictional limits of these two provisions. The Court held that Section 125 Cr.P.C. provides a summary and immediate remedy confined to minor children, with an exception only in cases where a major child suffers from physical or mental abnormality or injury rendering her unable to maintain herself. In contrast, Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 recognises a broader and substantive personal law right of an unmarried Hindu daughter to seek maintenance till marriage, subject to proof of inability to maintain herself.
- [Jugut Ram v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2020] 6 SCR 1140](https://lawfoyer.in/jugut-ram-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-2020-6-scr-1140/): The judgment in Jugut Ram v. State of Chhattisgarh examines the fine doctrinal distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder in the context of a village altercation arising out of a land dispute. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether an assault with a lathi on the head, resulting in death on the following day, disclosed the intention necessary for conviction under Section 302 IPC or merely knowledge sufficient to attract Section 304 Part II IPC. The Courts below had convicted the appellant for murder, despite concurrent findings that the incident was not premeditated and occurred in the heat of passion.
- [Balasore Alloys Limited v. Medima LLC, [2020] 6 S.C.R. 1036](https://lawfoyer.in/balasore-alloys-limited-v-medima-llc-2020-6-s-c-r-1036/): The judgment addresses the legal complexity arising from the coexistence of multiple arbitration clauses contained in distinct contractual instruments governing a single commercial transaction. The dispute originated between Balasore Alloys Limited, a manufacturer of High Carbon Ferro Chrome, and Medima LLC, its overseas distributor, following disagreements concerning pricing mechanisms, deductions, and payment reconciliation under a series of purchase orders and a subsequent long-term agreement. The petitioner sought appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by relying on arbitration clauses embedded in 37 individual purchase orders. The respondent resisted this attempt by asserting that the overarching contractual relationship was governed by an “Umbrella Agreement” dated 31.03.2018, which contained a distinct arbitration clause referring disputes to ICC arbitration seated in London.
- [Neetu Kumar Nagaich v. State of Rajasthan & Others, [2020] 6 SCR 1015](https://lawfoyer.in/neetu-kumar-nagaich-v-state-of-rajasthan-others-2020-6-scr-1015/): The judgment addresses the constitutional scope of judicial intervention in criminal investigations where the process itself stands compromised. The Supreme Court was confronted with a prolonged, inconsistent, and demonstrably deficient investigation into the homicidal death of a young law student. The State Police, despite overwhelming circumstantial indicators of homicide, attempted to portray the death as accidental or suicidal for nearly three years. The belated registration of the FIR under Section 302 IPC, failure to secure the crime scene, non-examination of critical witnesses, and disregard for technological evidence such as CCTV footage, mobile location data, and digital trails collectively undermined the credibility of the investigation.
- [Government of India v. Vedanta Limited (formerly Cairn India Ltd.) & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 1](https://lawfoyer.in/government-of-india-v-vedanta-limited-formerly-cairn-india-ltd-ors-2020-12-scr-1/): The judgment examines the legal framework governing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in India under Part II, Chapter I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court authoritatively settles the issue of limitation applicable to enforcement of foreign awards, holding that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 governs applications filed under Sections 47 and 49 of the 1996 Act. The Court clarifies that foreign awards are not decrees of Indian civil courts and only become deemed decrees upon recognition by the enforcing court. The decision also elaborates the conceptual distinction between supervisory jurisdiction of seat courts and secondary jurisdiction of enforcement courts. It reiterates the limited scope of judicial intervention at the enforcement stage and rejects any review on merits under the guise of public policy.
- [Iti Gupta Shines as Gold Medalist in BA LLB at Vivekananda Global University](https://lawfoyer.in/iti-gupta-shines-as-gold-medalist-in-ba-llb-at-vivekananda-global-university/): Academic excellence is never accidental. It is the result of dedication, discipline, and an unwavering commitment to growth. At LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive, we take immense pride in celebrating such stories that inspire countless young legal minds. One such remarkable achievement is that of Ms. Iti Gupta, who has been awarded the Gold Medal in BA
- [Yash Sharma, Aseem Simlote & Muskan’s Remarkable Four-Peat Victory in Intra-College Moot Court Competitions Reflects Consistency, Skill, and Legal Excellence](https://lawfoyer.in/yash-sharmas-remarkable-four-peat-victory-in-intra-college-moot-court-competitions-reflects-consistency-skill-and-legal-excellence/): Achievements in law are not built overnight. They are the result of consistent effort, disciplined preparation, and a genuine passion for learning and advocacy. One such inspiring journey is that of Yash Sharma, Aseem Simlote & Muskan, final-year B.A. LL.B. students from S.S. Jain Subodh Law College, Jaipur, whose repeated success in moot court competitions
- [Trustees of H.C. Dhanda Trust v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 268](https://lawfoyer.in/trustees-of-h-c-dhanda-trust-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-ors-2020-11-scr-268/): The judgment addresses the scope and limits of discretionary power vested in the Collector of Stamps under Section 40(1)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, particularly concerning the imposition of penalty up to ten times the deficient stamp duty. The dispute arose from the execution of a Deed of Assent by trustees of a private trust in favour of beneficiaries pursuant to a testamentary trust. The revenue authorities classified the instrument as a gift deed, determined substantial deficit stamp duty, and imposed the maximum statutory penalty of ten times the deficiency. The orders of the Collector and the Board of Revenue were upheld by the High Court.
- [Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar and Others, [2020] 7 SCR 968](https://lawfoyer.in/pappu-deo-yadav-v-naresh-kumar-and-others-2020-7-scr-968/): The decision in Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar and Others is a significant pronouncement on the assessment of compensation for permanent disability under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Supreme Court revisited the rigid and mechanical approach often adopted by tribunals and High Courts while evaluating loss of earning capacity in cases involving grievous injuries. The appellant, a young data entry operator/typist, suffered amputation of his right upper limb, resulting in 89% permanent disability as medically certified.
- [M/s. MSD Real Estate LLP v. The Collector of Stamps & Anr., [2020] 6 SCR 1027](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-msd-real-estate-llp-v-the-collector-of-stamps-anr-2020-6-scr-1027/): The present judgment examines the liability of a subsequent purchaser to discharge outstanding stamp duty penalties attached to immovable property, and the legality of recovery proceedings initiated by revenue authorities when such penalties remain unpaid. The Supreme Court considered whether the acceptance of post-dated cheques towards penalty amounts could be treated as valid compliance under stamp law, and whether municipal authorities were justified in denying building permission on account of unpaid statutory dues.
- [B. Santoshamma & Anr. v. D. Sarala & Anr., [2020] 11 S.C.R. 1](https://lawfoyer.in/b-santoshamma-anr-v-d-sarala-anr-2020-11-s-c-r-1/): The judgment examines the contours of specific performance of contracts relating to immovable property, particularly where the vendor creates third-party interests after executing an agreement for sale. The dispute arose from an agreement dated 21 March 1984 for sale of 300 square yards of land for a total consideration of Rs. 75,000, out of which a substantial portion had already been paid. Subsequently, the vendor executed a registered sale deed in favour of a third party for 100 square yards of the same land. The vendee sought specific performance of the agreement.
- [Sagufta Ahmed & Ors. v. Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., [2020] 9 SCR 472](https://lawfoyer.in/sagufta-ahmed-ors-v-upper-assam-plywood-products-pvt-ltd-ors-2020-9-scr-472/): The Supreme Court in Sagufta Ahmed & Ors. v. Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. examined the statutory contours of limitation under Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 and clarified the legal distinction between “period of limitation” and “period up to which delay may be condoned”. The appellants challenged the order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal dismissing their appeal as time-barred and refusing condonation of delay beyond the statutorily permissible period. The central issue concerned whether the benefit of the Supreme Court’s suo motu order dated 23.03.2020, extending limitation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, could enlarge the maximum condonable period prescribed under a special statute.
- [Rakesh Kumar Agarwalla & Anr. v. National Law School of India University, Bengaluru & Ors., [2020] 10 SCR 299](https://lawfoyer.in/rakesh-kumar-agarwalla-anr-v-national-law-school-of-india-university-bengaluru-ors-2020-10-scr-299/): The judgment examines the legality of a unilateral decision taken by National Law School of India University, Bengaluru to conduct a separate entrance examination named National Law Aptitude Test (NLAT) for admissions to its five-year integrated B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) programme for the academic year 2020–2021. The decision was taken during the COVID-19 pandemic, citing delay in the Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) conducted by the Consortium of National Law Universities.
- [,National Alliance for People’s Movements & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2020] 8 SCR 997](https://lawfoyer.in/national-alliance-for-peoples-movements-ors-v-state-of-maharashtra-ors-2020-8-scr-997/): The judgment in National Alliance for People’s Movements & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. examines the constitutional validity of the classification adopted by the High Powered Committee constituted pursuant to the directions of the Supreme Court for decongestion of prisons during the Covid-19 pandemic. The case arose from a public interest challenge to the guidelines framed by the High Powered Committee of Maharashtra, which excluded certain categories of prisoners, particularly those charged under special statutes and those convicted of offences punishable above seven years, from the benefit of interim bail or parole. The petitioners contended that such categorisation was discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
- [State of Kerala & Anr. v. M/s RDS Project Limited & Ors., [2020] 6 S.C.R. 837](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-kerala-anr-v-m-s-rds-project-limited-ors-2020-6-s-c-r-837/): The judgment examines the limits of judicial review under Article 226 in matters involving technical and administrative decision-making based on expert opinion. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the High Court of Kerala exceeded its jurisdiction by directing a load test on the Palarivattom Flyover despite the State Government having accepted the recommendation of a High-Level Expert Committee. The flyover, constructed on a National Highway and inaugurated in 2016, developed structural cracks within a year. Divergent expert opinions emerged. IIT Madras recommended rehabilitation using carbon fibre composite treatment, while Dr. E. Sreedharan proposed demolition and reconstruction with a guarantee of a 100-year service life.
- [Union of India & Ors. v. M/s G.S. Chatha Rice Mills & Anr., [2020] 14 SCR 571](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-ors-v-m-s-g-s-chatha-rice-mills-anr-2020-14-scr-571/): The judgment examines the legal effect and enforceability of an electronically published customs notification enhancing import duty under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether Notification No. 5/2019, enhancing customs duty to 200% on goods originating from Pakistan, could be applied to import consignments for which bills of entry had already been electronically filed and self-assessed prior to the time of publication of the notification on the e-Gazette.
- [Sri Nilanjan Bhattacharya v. State of Karnataka and Others, [2020] 14 SCR 445](https://lawfoyer.in/sri-nilanjan-bhattacharya-v-state-of-karnataka-and-others-2020-14-scr-445/): The judgment concerns the exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction by the Supreme Court of India in an international child custody dispute arising from a petition for habeas corpus. The appellant-father sought repatriation of his minor son, a US citizen by birth, from India to the United States after the respondent-mother unilaterally decided not to return to the US following a temporary visit to India. The Karnataka High Court allowed repatriation but imposed conditional restrictions linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, requiring certificates from Indian and US authorities. The Supreme Court examined not only the validity of those conditions but also reassessed the entire custodial arrangement in light of the welfare of the child.
- [Beli Ram v. Rajinder Kumar & Anr., [2020] 11 SCR 31](https://lawfoyer.in/beli-ram-v-rajinder-kumar-anr-2020-11-scr-31/): The decision in Beli Ram v. Rajinder Kumar & Anr. addresses a recurring and unsettled question at the intersection of motor vehicle insurance law and workmen’s compensation jurisprudence, namely whether an employer can escape liability when a workman-driver suffers injury while driving with an expired but otherwise genuine driving licence. The Supreme Court examined the scope of employer diligence under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the employer’s statutory obligation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. The Court clarified that the duty of an employer does not end at initial verification of a driving licence but extends to ensuring its continued validity.
- [Anwar Ali and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [2020] 9 S.C.R. 878](https://lawfoyer.in/anwar-ali-and-another-v-state-of-himachal-pradesh-2020-9-s-c-r-878/): The judgment in Anwar Ali and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh constitutes a significant reaffirmation of settled principles governing appeals against acquittal, particularly in cases founded entirely on circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court was seized of a challenge to the reversal of acquittal by the High Court, where the trial court had acquitted the accused after finding serious infirmities in the prosecution’s case. The prosecution alleged that the accused had committed murder, robbery, cheating and destruction of evidence, and relied exclusively on circumstantial links such as recoveries, disclosure statements and alleged conduct of the accused.
- [Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand, [2020] 9 S.C.R. 482](https://lawfoyer.in/maheshwar-tigga-v-state-of-jharkhand-2020-9-s-c-r-482/): The decision in Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand constitutes a significant judicial exposition on the contours of consent, misconception of fact, and promise of marriage under Sections 375 and 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, while simultaneously reinforcing the procedural sanctity of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Court was confronted with a prosecution narrative alleging rape on the pretext of marriage spanning over four years, initiated by a complaint lodged shortly before the accused’s marriage to another woman. The Court undertook a meticulous scrutiny of evidentiary inconsistencies, particularly relating to the age of the prosecutrix, the delay in lodging the FIR, and the nature of the interpersonal relationship between the parties.
- [State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Amit Shrivas, [2020] 11 SCR 46](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-madhya-pradesh-ors-v-amit-shrivas-2020-11-scr-46/): The judgment examines the legal contours of compassionate appointment in the context of work-charged and contingency-paid employees under the service jurisprudence of Madhya Pradesh. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the dependent of a deceased employee, who had attained the status of a permanent employee under the Madhya Pradesh (Work Charged and Contingency Paid Employees) Pension Rules, 1979, could be treated as a regular government servant for the purpose of compassionate appointment.
- [Subed Ali and Others v. State of Assam, [2020] 8 SCR 731](https://lawfoyer.in/subed-ali-and-others-v-state-of-assam-2020-8-scr-731/): The decision in Subed Ali and Others v. State of Assam authoritatively revisits the doctrinal contours of common intention under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, particularly in situations where one accused has not inflicted any overt physical injury. The Supreme Court examined whether the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC could be sustained when two co-accused had already been acquitted on the benefit of doubt on the same evidentiary record. The Court undertook a meticulous appraisal of eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, and surrounding circumstances to assess the existence of a shared mental element among the accused.
- [Satish @ Sabbe v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [2020] 9 SCR 21](https://lawfoyer.in/satish-sabbe-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-2020-9-scr-21/): The judgment in Satish @ Sabbe v. State of Uttar Pradesh is a significant reaffirmation of reformative penology within Indian criminal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine the legality of repeated executive refusals to grant premature release on probation to life convicts despite long incarceration, clean antecedents, and satisfactory prison conduct. The Court scrutinised the manner in which the State authorities exercised discretion under Section 2 of the Uttar Pradesh Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938 and found a consistent pattern of mechanical rejection grounded in extraneous considerations such as the gravity of offence, age of prisoners, and speculative apprehensions of victims.
- [M/s. Magma Fincorp Ltd. v. Rajesh Kumar Tiwari, [2020] 11 SCR 59](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-magma-fincorp-ltd-v-rajesh-kumar-tiwari-2020-11-scr-59/): The judgment examines the legal character of a hire-purchase agreement and the scope of consumer protection remedies in disputes arising from repossession of financed vehicles. The Supreme Court clarified that under a hire-purchase arrangement, ownership of the vehicle remains with the financier until all instalments are paid and the option to purchase is exercised. The Court decisively held that repossession of a vehicle by the financier upon default, when carried out in accordance with the contractual terms, does not amount to deficiency in service or unfair trade practice under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
- [Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., [2020] 11 SCR 117](https://lawfoyer.in/parvez-noordin-lokhandwalla-v-state-of-maharashtra-anr-2020-11-scr-117/): The judgment examines the constitutional and procedural limits on judicial discretion while imposing conditions of bail, particularly where such conditions interfere with the fundamental right to travel abroad. The appeal arose from an order of the Bombay High Court refusing to relax interim bail conditions to allow the appellant, an Indian citizen and long-term US resident, to travel abroad for revalidation of his Green Card. The appellant was facing criminal proceedings arising from allegations of forgery under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, based on a private complaint filed in 2014.
- [Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha & Anr. v. State of Gujarat, [2020] 13 SCR 886](https://lawfoyer.in/gujarat-mazdoor-sabha-anr-v-state-of-gujarat-2020-13-scr-886/): The judgment in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha & Anr. v. State of Gujarat examines the constitutional and statutory limits of emergency powers exercised by a State Government under Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948. The Supreme Court was called upon to scrutinize the legality of two notifications issued by the State of Gujarat during the COVID-19 pandemic, which exempted all registered factories from compliance with statutory safeguards relating to working hours, rest intervals, and overtime wages. The core controversy revolved around whether the economic downturn caused by the pandemic constituted a “public emergency” within the meaning of Section 5, justifying a blanket suspension of labour welfare protections.
- [Pravasi Legal Cell & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 12 S.C.R. 102](https://lawfoyer.in/pravasi-legal-cell-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-12-s-c-r-102/): The judgment in Pravasi Legal Cell & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. addresses the legality of airline refund practices during the unprecedented nationwide lockdown imposed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Multiple public interest litigations were instituted under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the refusal of domestic and international airlines to provide cash refunds for cancelled flights, instead offering credit shells. The petitioners contended that such practices violated the binding Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) framed under the Aircraft Act, 1934 and Aircraft Rules, 1937.
- [Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, [2020] 8 SCR 741](https://lawfoyer.in/gurcharan-singh-v-state-of-punjab-2020-8-scr-741/): The Supreme Court of India in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab examined the scope and evidentiary threshold required for sustaining a conviction for abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Section 107 IPC. The case arose from the suicide of a young married woman, Shinder Kaur, who left behind two minor children. The Trial Court acquitted the accused husband and his parents of charges under Sections 304B and 498A IPC but nevertheless convicted the husband under Section 306 IPC, despite no charge being framed for abetment. The High Court affirmed this conviction primarily on conjectural reasoning that a woman with two small children would not ordinarily commit suicide unless compelled by adverse matrimonial circumstances.
- [T. K. David v. Kuruppampady Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Ors. [2020] 13 SCR 663](https://lawfoyer.in/t-k-david-v-kuruppampady-service-co-operative-bank-ltd-ors-2020-13-scr-663/): The judgment in T. K. David v. Kuruppampady Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Ors. authoritatively settles the question of maintainability of a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution when filed solely against an order rejecting a review petition, after the dismissal of an earlier SLP against the main judgment. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine of finality of litigation and clarified the contours of the doctrine of merger in the context of review proceedings.
- [Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 151](https://lawfoyer.in/amit-sahni-v-commissioner-of-police-ors-2020-12-scr-151/): The judgment in Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police & Ors. addresses the constitutional contours of the right to protest under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India in the context of prolonged public road blockades during protests against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019. The dispute arose from the indefinite occupation of the Kalindi Kunj–Shaheen Bagh stretch in Delhi, which resulted in severe disruption of public movement and civic life. The Supreme Court was called upon to balance the fundamental right to peaceful dissent with competing public rights, particularly the right of commuters to free movement.
- [Commissioner of Police and Another v. Umesh Kumar [2020] 11 S.C.R. 583](https://lawfoyer.in/commissioner-of-police-and-another-v-umesh-kumar-2020-11-s-c-r-583/): The judgment examines the scope of vested rights in public employment and the limits of judicial intervention in recruitment processes when results are revised prior to appointment. The Supreme Court addressed whether candidates whose names appeared in a provisional select list, and who had completed medical and character verification, could claim an enforceable right to appointment after being excluded in a subsequently revised merit list. The controversy arose from a recruitment process initiated in 2013 for the post of Constable (Executive) – Male in the Delhi Police, which witnessed multiple cancellations, revisions, and re-evaluations owing to administrative lapses, including failure to award bonus marks for height and errors in answer keys.
- [Satya Deo @ Bhoorey v. State of Uttar Pradesh[2020] 12 S.C.R. 128](https://lawfoyer.in/satya-deo-bhoorey-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh2020-12-s-c-r-128/): The present judgment examines the retrospective and continuing applicability of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 to criminal proceedings that arose prior to its enforcement, where the accused was below eighteen years of age on the date of commission of the offence. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the appellant, convicted for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, could claim the benefit of juvenility at the appellate stage, despite the offence having been committed in 1981 and despite the appellant having crossed the age threshold under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986.
- [Ankita Kailash Khandelwal and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. [2020] 8 S.C.R. 1007](https://lawfoyer.in/ankita-kailash-khandelwal-and-ors-v-state-of-maharashtra-and-ors-2020-8-s-c-r-1007/): The judgment examines the legality of continued academic exclusion of postgraduate medical students arising from bail conditions imposed during pendency of a criminal prosecution. The appellants, three postgraduate residents in M.D. Gynaecology and Obstetrics, were implicated in a criminal case involving allegations of ragging and abetment to suicide following the death of a junior resident. Though bail was granted by the High Court, stringent conditions effectively barred the appellants from entering their college and hospital, thereby preventing continuation of their medical education and residency training.
- [Miss ‘A’ v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, [2020] 11 SCR 515](https://lawfoyer.in/miss-a-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-another-2020-11-scr-515/): The judgment in Miss ‘A’ v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another authoritatively settles the procedural law governing the right of an accused to obtain a copy of a victim’s statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Court examined whether an accused is entitled to such a copy immediately upon filing of the charge-sheet or only after the court takes cognizance and reaches the statutory stage contemplated under Sections 207 and 208 CrPC. The case arose from allegations of sexual exploitation involving a powerful accused, triggering suo motu intervention by the Supreme Court and the constitution of a Special Investigation Team.
- [Karulal & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2020] 9 SCR 494](https://lawfoyer.in/karulal-ors-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2020-9-scr-494/): The judgment in Karulal & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh represents a reaffirmation of settled principles governing appreciation of evidence in criminal trials, particularly concerning related witnesses, hostile witnesses, and the plea of false implication due to prior enmity. The Supreme Court examined whether conviction under Sections 148 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 could be sustained when the prosecution case substantially rested upon the testimony of three eyewitnesses, two of whom were closely related to the deceased, while several other witnesses had turned hostile.
- [Ashish Seth v. Sumit Mittal and Others, [2020] 11 SCR 525](https://lawfoyer.in/ashish-seth-v-sumit-mittal-and-others-2020-11-scr-525/): The judgment concerns prolonged non-compliance with a Memorandum of Settlement dated 04.05.2015 entered into between two rival groups, namely the Seth Group and the Mittal Group, arising out of disputes in a Joint Venture real estate project. The settlement had been judicially recognized and incorporated into an order of the Supreme Court disposing of connected writ petitions. Persistent defaults by the Mittal Group in fulfilling their contractual and court-mandated obligations led to contempt proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
- [Nilay Gupta v. Chairman NEET PG Medical & Dental Admission/Counselling Board 2020 & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 161](https://lawfoyer.in/nilay-gupta-v-chairman-neet-pg-medical-dental-admission-counselling-board-2020-ors-2020-12-scr-161/): The judgment examines the legality of deletion of the Non-Resident Indian (NRI) quota in postgraduate medical and dental admissions for the academic year 2020–2021 in Rajasthan. The dispute arose when private medical colleges, after initially indicating a 15% NRI quota and initiating verification of NRI candidates, eliminated the quota at a late stage and merged the seats with the management quota. Two NRI candidates challenged this action before the Rajasthan High Court. The Single Judge held the deletion arbitrary and directed their admission under the NRI quota. The Division Bench reversed this decision, leading to appeals before the Supreme Court.
- [Ferrodous Estates (Pvt.) Ltd. v. P. Gopirathnam (Dead) & Ors., [2020] 13 SCR 673](https://lawfoyer.in/ferrodous-estates-pvt-ltd-v-p-gopirathnam-dead-ors-2020-13-scr-673/): The judgment adjudicates a prolonged dispute concerning specific performance of an agreement to sell executed in 1980 and its enforceability in light of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 and its subsequent repeal in 1999. The litigation trajectory reflects repeated judicial reconsideration across Single Judge, Division Bench, Full Bench, and finally the Supreme Court. The central controversy revolved around whether an agreement to sell, which required statutory permission under the ceiling law, stood rendered void ab initio due to statutory prohibition, or whether such an agreement remained enforceable when the obligation to obtain permission rested upon the vendor.
- [Anand Yadav & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 925](https://lawfoyer.in/anand-yadav-ors-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2020-13-s-c-r-925/): The judgment addresses a persistent controversy concerning eligibility qualifications for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor (Education) in government-aided colleges in Uttar Pradesh. The dispute arose from conflicting interpretations of whether M.Ed. degree holders could be treated as eligible and equivalent to M.A. (Education) degree holders for the purposes of recruitment. The Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Service Selection Commission issued an advertisement in 2014 which led to rejection of candidates possessing M.Ed. degrees. A subsequent advertisement in 2016 adopted a broader criterion of “post-graduate degree in the relevant subject,” triggering expert review and issuance of a corrigendum permitting M.Ed. candidates.
- [Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab [2020] 12 S.C.R. 875](https://lawfoyer.in/bikramjit-singh-v-state-of-punjab-2020-12-s-c-r-875/): The judgment in Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab authoritatively settles the law concerning default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as modified by Section 43-D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The Supreme Court examined the interplay between the CrPC, the UAPA, and the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, particularly on the question of jurisdiction to extend the statutory period of investigation from ninety days to one hundred eighty days. The case arose from a terrorist attack involving a hand grenade at a religious congregation, resulting in multiple deaths and serious injuries. The appellant sought default bail upon expiry of ninety days, which was rejected by the Magistrate on the basis of an extension order passed without jurisdiction.
- [Amar Singh v. The State (NCT of Delhi), [2020] 8 SCR 751](https://lawfoyer.in/amar-singh-v-the-state-nct-of-delhi-2020-8-scr-751/): The judgment examines the evidentiary limits of criminal conviction resting upon the sole testimony of a related eye-witness in a prosecution for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether the concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court could be sustained when the prosecution case suffered from serious inconsistencies, hostile witnesses, and conduct of the alleged eye-witness that was incompatible with normal human behaviour. The Court undertook a detailed evaluation of the ocular testimony of PW-1, the sole remaining eye-witness, in light of medical evidence, surrounding circumstances, and procedural lapses in investigation.
- [Raghunath (D) by LRs v. Radha Mohan (D) through LRs & Ors. [2020] 14 S.C.R. 462](https://lawfoyer.in/raghunath-d-by-lrs-v-radha-mohan-d-through-lrs-ors-2020-14-s-c-r-462/): The judgment in Raghunath (D) by LRs v. Radha Mohan (D) through LRs & Ors. authoritatively settles the controversy concerning the temporal scope and limitation of the right of pre-emption under the Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the limitation period prescribed under Section 21 of the Act read with Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963 commences afresh upon every subsequent sale of the same immovable property, or whether such right is confined to the first post-statute transfer where the pre-emptor consciously refrains from exercising it.
- [Small Voices: Big Rights: 1st National Essay Competition | Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Register by 1st March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/small-voices-big-rights-1st-national-essay-competition-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-1st-march-2026/): Small Voices: Big Rights: 1st National Essay Competition | Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Register by 1st March, 2026
- [SGTU–RANKA INTERNATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY COMPETITION 3.0 | Organized by SGT University, Gurugram | Register by 15th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/sgtu-ranka-international-trial-advocacy-competition-3-0-organized-by-sgt-university-gurugram-register-by-15th-february-2026/): SGTU–RANKA INTERNATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY COMPETITION 3.0 | Organized by SGT University, Gurugram | Register by 15th February, 2026
- [Call for Blogs | NLIU Labour & Employment Law Blog | Rolling Submission Academic Year 2025-26 | Submission on Rolling Basis](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-nliu-labour-employment-law-blog-rolling-submission-academic-year-2025-26-submission-on-rolling-basis/): Call for Blogs | NLIU Labour & Employment Law Blog | Rolling Submission Academic Year 2025-26 | Submission on Rolling Basis
- [Call for Applications: The Capital Tank: 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 20 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-applications-the-capital-tank-1st-nliu-cfmrs-investment-challenge-2026-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal-register-by-20-february-2026/): Call for Applications: The Capital Tank: 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 20 February 2026
- [Call for Applications: The Capital Tank: 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 20 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-applications-the-capital-tank-1st-nliu-cfmrs-investment-challenge-2026-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal-register-by-20-february-2026-2/): Call for Applications: The Capital Tank: 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 20 February 2026
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- [CALL FOR PAPERS – RGNUL FINANCIAL AND MERCANTILE LAW REVIEW (RFMLR), VOLUME XIII, ISSUE II | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Register by 15th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-volume-xiii-issue-ii-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-rgnul-punjab-register-by-15th-february-20/): CALL FOR PAPERS – RGNUL FINANCIAL AND MERCANTILE LAW REVIEW (RFMLR), VOLUME XIII, ISSUE II | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Register by 15th February 2026
- [VERDICTUS 2.0 – Annual Law Fest | Organized by Navrachana University, School of Business and Law | Register by 12th January, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/verdictus-2-0-annual-law-fest-organized-by-navrachana-university-school-of-business-and-law-register-by-12th-january-2026/): VERDICTUS 2.0 – Annual Law Fest | Organized by Navrachana University, School of Business and Law | Register by 12th January, 2026
- [Two-Credit Certificate Course on Labour Codes | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Register by 16th January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/two-credit-certificate-course-on-labour-codes-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-rgnul-punjab-register-by-16th-january-2026/): Two-Credit Certificate Course on Labour Codes | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Register by 16th January 2026
- [CALL FOR BLOGS | Centre for Law and Urban Development (CLUD), National Law University Delhi](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-centre-for-law-and-urban-development-clud-national-law-university-delhi/): CALL FOR BLOGS | Centre for Law and Urban Development (CLUD), National Law University Delhi
- [Global Trade Careers, The WTO’s 30-Year Legacy, and Future Pathways | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 28 January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/global-trade-careers-the-wtos-30-year-legacy-and-future-pathways-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-by-28-january-2026/): Global Trade Careers, The WTO’s 30-Year Legacy, and Future Pathways | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 28 January 2026
- [Call for Chapters | Organized by Department of Law, Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies (MAIMS) | Submit Abstract by 5th January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-chapters-organized-by-department-of-law-maharaja-agrasen-institute-of-management-studies-maims-submit-abstract-by-5th-january-2026/): Call for Chapters | Organized by Department of Law, Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies (MAIMS) | Submit Abstract by 5th January 2026
- [Anil Bhardwaj v. The Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 9 SCR 442](https://lawfoyer.in/anil-bhardwaj-v-the-honble-high-court-of-madhya-pradesh-ors-2020-9-scr-442/): The judgment examines the limits of judicial review over decisions taken by High Court Selection Committees concerning suitability for appointment to judicial service. The appellant, selected for the post of District Judge (Entry Level), had disclosed the pendency of a criminal case under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 IPC arising from a matrimonial dispute. Despite provisional selection, his candidature was cancelled following adverse character verification. The appellant was subsequently acquitted and sought reconsideration of his candidature on that basis.
- [Hospitality Association of Mudumalai v. In Defence of Environment and Animals & Ors., [2020] 10 S.C.R. 273](https://lawfoyer.in/hospitality-association-of-mudumalai-v-in-defence-of-environment-and-animals-ors-2020-10-s-c-r-273/): The judgment addresses the legality and constitutional validity of the notification issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu declaring an elephant corridor in the Sigur Plateau of the Nilgiris District and directing resort owners and private landholders to vacate lands falling within the notified corridor. The dispute arose from resistance by resort owners and landholders who challenged the scientific basis, statutory competence, and procedural fairness of the notification. The Supreme Court examined the ecological significance of elephant corridors, the doctrine of sustainable development, and the applicability of the precautionary principle in environmental governance. The Court emphasized that elephants constitute a keystone species whose migratory movement is essential to maintaining ecological balance, biodiversity, and genetic diversity. The judgment reconciles property rights with environmental obligations by affirming the State’s authority under Entries 17A and 17B of the Concurrent List, read with the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, and constitutional mandates under Articles 21, 48A, and 51A(g). While upholding the validity of the corridor notification and restrictions on commercial activity, the Court acknowledged grievances relating to factual discrepancies in acreage and implementation. Consequently, it constituted an independent Inquiry Committee to examine allegations of arbitrariness by district authorities. The decision reinforces the primacy of ecological preservation over commercial exploitation and strengthens environmental jurisprudence by operationalizing constitutional duties through executive action.
- [Ganesan v. State represented by its Inspector of Police, [2020] 8 S.C.R. 768](https://lawfoyer.in/ganesan-v-state-represented-by-its-inspector-of-police-2020-8-s-c-r-768/): The judgment in Ganesan v. State represented by its Inspector of Police examines the evidentiary value of the sole testimony of a child victim under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The Supreme Court was called upon to consider whether conviction under Section 7 read with Section 8 of the POCSO Act could be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, particularly when one of the material witnesses, namely the mother of the victim, had turned hostile. The appellant further questioned the fairness of appellate proceedings before the High Court on the ground that the legal aid counsel was appointed only a few days prior to disposal of the appeal, allegedly rendering the hearing illusory.
- [Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, [2020] 12 SCR 189](https://lawfoyer.in/satish-chander-ahuja-v-sneha-ahuja-2020-12-scr-189/): The judgment in Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja marks a seminal shift in the judicial understanding of shared household under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Supreme Court undertook an exhaustive interpretative exercise of Sections 2(s), 17, 19, and 26 of the Act while examining the maintainability of a civil suit for injunction filed by a father-in-law against his daughter-in-law. The controversy arose in the backdrop of matrimonial discord where the daughter-in-law asserted a statutory right of residence in the suit property by invoking the DV Act, while the father-in-law claimed exclusive ownership and sought her eviction through civil proceedings.
- [,State of U.P. v. Gayatri Prasad Prajapati, [2020] 7 S.C.R. 959](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-u-p-v-gayatri-prasad-prajapati-2020-7-s-c-r-959/): The judgment in State of U.P. v. Gayatri Prasad Prajapati addresses the legal permissibility and judicial discipline required while granting interim bail on medical grounds to an accused charged with serious sexual offences under the Indian Penal Code and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in granting interim bail solely on medical considerations when adequate and continuous medical treatment was already being provided under State supervision in premier government hospitals. The Court scrutinised the medical records, medical board report, and treatment history of the respondent, a former minister, and found that the High Court failed to consider material evidence on record, including the findings of a duly constituted medical board and reports from a super-speciality hospital. The judgment reiterates that humane treatment of prisoners is a constitutional obligation, yet emphasises that medical bail cannot be granted mechanically or sympathetically without recording satisfaction that continued custody would jeopardise the life or health of the accused. The decision underscores the principle that judicial discretion in bail matters must be exercised with due application of mind to the complete factual matrix, particularly when allegations involve grave offences and when the accused is already receiving specialised treatment under State care.
- [Saravanan v. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police, [2020] 8 SCR 1035](https://lawfoyer.in/saravanan-v-state-rep-by-the-inspector-of-police-2020-8-scr-1035/): The judgment in Saravanan v. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police constitutes a significant reaffirmation of the constitutional and statutory character of default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Court examined the legality of conditions imposed by the High Court while granting statutory bail, particularly a monetary deposit linked to alleged amounts involved in the offence and an onerous daily reporting requirement. The Court categorically held that default bail is not discretionary but an indefeasible statutory right, accruing to the accused upon failure of the investigating agency to file a charge-sheet within the prescribed period. The Court clarified that conditions ordinarily relevant to regular bail under Section 437 Cr.P.C. cannot be transplanted into the statutory framework of default bail. Any such condition, especially one compelling deposit of disputed amounts, defeats the legislative intent of Section 167(2) and dilutes the protection of personal liberty under criminal procedure. The judgment draws a clear doctrinal distinction between punitive pre-trial detention and procedural safeguards against investigative delay. By quashing the financial condition and modifying the reporting requirement, the Court reinforced that statutory bail cannot be converted into a tool of coercive recovery or indirect punishment. This ruling consolidates prior jurisprudence, particularly the principle of “indefeasible right” articulated earlier, and serves as a binding precedent restraining courts from imposing extraneous conditions that frustrate statutory mandates.
- [Navin Chandra Dhoundiyal v. State of Uttarakhand and Others, [2020] 7 SCR 572](https://lawfoyer.in/navin-chandra-dhoundiyal-v-state-of-uttarakhand-and-others-2020-7-scr-572/): The decision in Navin Chandra Dhoundiyal v. State of Uttarakhand and Others settles an important question relating to service jurisprudence in university administration, namely the interpretation of statutory provisions governing the date of superannuation and continuation in service of university teachers. The Supreme Court was concerned with the correct construction of Statute No. 16.24 of Kumaun University, particularly its proviso which permits continuation of teachers beyond the date of superannuation until 30 June following, treating such continuation as re-employment. The appellants, all professors, challenged an office order fixing their retirement on the last day of the month in which they attained the age of 65 years, contending that such action disregarded the statutory protection intended to preserve continuity in academic sessions. The Court undertook a plain, purposive, and contextual interpretation of the statute, harmonising the main provision with its proviso. It emphasised that while no teacher has a vested right to re-employment after superannuation, the proviso creates a statutory exception designed to prevent disruption of teaching mid-session and to protect students’ academic interests. The judgment reaffirms the doctrine of stare decisis by endorsing earlier High Court interpretations and approving analogous reasoning adopted by the Allahabad High Court Full Bench. By setting aside the contrary view of the Uttarakhand High Court, the Supreme Court restored doctrinal clarity and administrative consistency, holding that teachers whose superannuation does not fall on 30 June are statutorily entitled to continue till the end of the academic session on re-employment basis, with consequential benefits.
- [State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh and Ors. [2020] 13 SCR 571](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-u-p-v-sudhir-kumar-singh-and-ors-2020-13-scr-571/): The judgment in State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh and Ors. is a significant exposition on the doctrine of audi alteram partem and the evolving contours of judicial review in contractual matters involving the State. The Supreme Court examined whether cancellation of a concluded tender and contract by a State instrumentality, without affording a prior hearing to the successful bidder, could withstand constitutional scrutiny under Article 14 and Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The dispute arose from repeated cancellations and reissuance of e-tenders by the U.P. State Warehousing Corporation for handling and transportation contracts, culminating in cancellation of an already executed contract after one year of performance, solely on the basis of ex parte inquiries alleging financial irregularities. The Court reconciled competing considerations of public interest, financial loss to the State, and procedural fairness owed to the contractor. It clarified that breach of natural justice itself may not always result in invalidity, unless prejudice is shown, but equally reaffirmed that prejudice is presumed where the affected party is kept completely in the dark. The judgment also authoritatively restated when writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is maintainable in contractual disputes involving State action, especially where allegations of arbitrariness and violation of natural justice are raised. While partially setting aside the High Court’s judgment for exceeding the scope of relief sought, the Supreme Court upheld the core finding that the tender cancellation was vitiated by denial of natural justice. The ruling harmonizes administrative efficiency with constitutional fairness and serves as a doctrinal guide on the “prejudice test” in natural justice jurisprudence.
- [Rajesh Dhiman v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [2020] 8 S.C.R. 1057](https://lawfoyer.in/rajesh-dhiman-v-state-of-himachal-pradesh-2020-8-s-c-r-1057/): The judgment in Rajesh Dhiman v. State of Himachal Pradesh examines the contours of fair investigation, evidentiary standards, and appellate interference in acquittals under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The Supreme Court addressed whether an investigation stands vitiated merely because the complainant is also the investigating officer, particularly in prosecutions involving commercial quantities of contraband. The Court revisited earlier conflicting jurisprudence and relied upon the Constitution Bench ruling in Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) to reaffirm that no automatic presumption of bias arises from such dual roles unless actual prejudice or likelihood of bias is demonstrated. The judgment further clarifies the doctrine of reasonable doubt, emphasizing that fanciful or implausible defence theories cannot undermine a consistent prosecution case supported by official witnesses. The Court also dealt with the evidentiary value of hostile independent witnesses and reiterated that non-examination of such witnesses is not per se fatal. Importantly, the judgment upholds the High Court’s power to reverse an acquittal where the trial court has misapplied legal principles or adopted a perverse appreciation of evidence. The ruling strengthens prosecutorial standards in NDPS cases while balancing the accused’s right to a fair trial, thereby contributing significantly to criminal jurisprudence on narcotics control and appellate review.
- [M. Ravindran v. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, [2020] 12 SCR 915](https://lawfoyer.in/m-ravindran-v-the-intelligence-officer-directorate-of-revenue-intelligence-2020-12-scr-915/): The judgment in M. Ravindran v. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence authoritatively settles the scope, nature, and enforceability of the indefeasible right to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, read with Section 36A(4) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The Supreme Court examined whether such a right, once accrued and invoked by the accused upon expiry of the statutory investigation period of 180 days, can be defeated by the prosecution through the subsequent filing of an additional complaint before disposal of the bail application. The Court firmly reaffirmed that the right to default bail is not a procedural formality but a constitutional safeguard flowing from Article 21. It held that the accused is deemed to have “availed of” the right the moment an application for default bail is filed along with willingness to furnish bail, and not when actual release occurs. Any contrary interpretation would legitimise illegal detention and permit prosecutorial manipulation. The judgment harmonises prior conflicting interpretations arising from Sanjay Dutt, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, and Uday Mohanlal Acharya, while emphatically preferring an interpretation that protects personal liberty. It further cautioned courts and prosecutors against dilatory tactics that undermine statutory mandates. The ruling strengthens due process, reinforces investigative accountability, and elevates default bail from a statutory right to a constitutional imperative.
- [Raveen Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [2020] 8 SCR 1044](https://lawfoyer.in/raveen-kumar-v-state-of-himachal-pradesh-2020-8-scr-1044/): The judgment in Raveen Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh examines the permissible scope of appellate interference with an order of acquittal under criminal jurisprudence, particularly in prosecutions under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the High Court was justified in reversing an acquittal based on erroneous reliance placed by the trial court on a prosecution reply filed during bail proceedings. The Court analysed the evidentiary value of court records, the legal consequences of non-confrontation of such material with witnesses, and the principles governing appreciation of testimony of official witnesses in the absence of independent corroboration. A crucial legal determination was made regarding the doctrine of “chance recovery” and the extent to which prior information must be proved to invoke the safeguards under Section 42 of the NDPS Act. The judgment clarifies that pleadings filed before a court do not enjoy any presumption of truth unless duly proved and confronted during trial. The Court further reinforced that hostile testimony of an independent witness does not efface corroborative value if material portions support prosecution compliance. On sentencing, the Court revisited the mandatory minimum punishment under Section 20 of the NDPS Act both before and after the 2001 amendment and reconciled the High Court’s lenient approach with subsequent authoritative clarification in Hira Singh v. Union of India. While upholding conviction and sentence, the judgment significantly contributes to evidentiary law, appellate standards, and NDPS sentencing jurisprudence.
- [Satyama Dubey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 9 SCR 517](https://lawfoyer.in/satyama-dubey-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-9-scr-517/): The judgment in Satyama Dubey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. arises out of an extraordinary invocation of Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking judicial intervention in the investigation of a brutal gang rape and subsequent death of a nineteen-year-old woman in Hathras, Uttar Pradesh. The petitions raised serious constitutional and procedural concerns relating to fair investigation, alleged illegal cremation, witness protection, and judicial monitoring. The Supreme Court was confronted with competing institutional considerations: safeguarding the victim’s family and public confidence in criminal justice, while respecting the federal structure and jurisdictional primacy of the High Court. The Court acknowledged that the State of Uttar Pradesh had already transferred the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation, thereby neutralising apprehensions of police bias. Emphasis was placed on judicial restraint and institutional comity, with the Court declining to monitor the investigation when the Allahabad High Court had already assumed seisin through a suo motu public interest litigation. A significant constitutional intervention was made by directing Central Reserve Police Force protection to the victim’s family and witnesses as a confidence-building measure, without casting aspersions on the State Police. The judgment also addressed statutory confidentiality under Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code, cautioning against disclosure of the identity and familial particulars of a rape victim. The decision reflects a calibrated balance between victims’ rights, due process, and judicial federalism, reinforcing the principle that constitutional remedies must not disrupt parallel proceedings unless compelling circumstances so demand.
- [Dharmendra Kumar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 557](https://lawfoyer.in/dharmendra-kumar-singh-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2020-12-scr-557/): The judgment in Dharmendra Kumar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. addresses a recurring conflict between environmental protection and vested commercial interests in the mining sector. The Supreme Court examined whether mining leaseholders, whose operations were halted due to judicial and administrative interdictions aimed at forest conservation, were entitled to an extension of their mining leases for the obstructed period. The appellants argued that since mining was stopped without fault on their part, equity demanded extension of leases to restore them to their original position. The State of Uttar Pradesh contended that neither the Uttar Pradesh Mining Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 nor the lease deeds permitted such extension, and that statutory policy had shifted decisively towards auction-based grants. The Court rejected the proposition that every judicial interdict automatically entitles a party to restoration by extension of contractual or statutory rights. It held that extension of a mining lease must strictly flow either from statutory authority or contractual terms, and cannot be granted merely on equitable considerations. The Court interpreted Rule 68 narrowly as a limited relaxation provision and affirmed that Rule 40(h) exhaustively governs consequences of disruption of mining operations. In light of the New Mining Policy, 2017, which mandates e-auction and does not contemplate extensions, the Court declined to order lease extensions. However, invoking Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court balanced equities by directing refund of security deposits and advance royalties with simple interest at 9% per annum. The judgment reinforces statutory supremacy, restricts judicially created commercial benefits, and clarifies that environmental protection orders cannot be used as a basis to bypass transparent mining policies.
- [Mrs Ritika Sharan v. Mr Sujoy Ghosh, [2020] 10 SCR 363](https://lawfoyer.in/mrs-ritika-sharan-v-mr-sujoy-ghosh-2020-10-scr-363/): The judgment concerns a complex matrimonial and guardianship dispute involving the custody and overseas relocation of a minor child amid pending divorce and domestic violence proceedings. The appellant-mother and respondent-father had been living separately since 2016, with the minor child continuously residing under the care of the mother. The dispute arose when the appellant, upon being posted to Singapore for employment, sought permission to take the child along. The Family Court restrained such removal on jurisdictional apprehensions, which was later affirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court decisively intervened, holding that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration, overriding procedural technicalities and jurisdictional objections. The Court clarified that assistance rendered by maternal grandparents does not divest the mother of legal custody. Importantly, the Court engaged directly with the minor child through video conferencing and placed substantial weight on the child’s expressed preference to live with the mother. Invoking its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Court set aside the High Court judgment and permitted the child’s relocation to Singapore with the mother, while simultaneously safeguarding the father’s visitation and access rights through structured directions. The ruling reinforces a welfare-centric, child-sensitive approach in custody jurisprudence, especially in transnational employment contexts, and demonstrates the Supreme Court’s willingness to transcend procedural rigidity to secure substantive justice.
- [Thomas Lawrence v. State of Kerala & Ors., [2020] 9 S.C.R. 325](https://lawfoyer.in/thomas-lawrence-v-state-of-kerala-ors-2020-9-s-c-r-325/): The judgment in Thomas Lawrence v. State of Kerala & Ors. addresses the procedural and substantive contours of environmental adjudication before the National Green Tribunal, particularly in relation to execution proceedings arising from prior directions concerning alleged destruction of wetlands. The appeal arose from the dismissal of an execution application by the National Green Tribunal on the ground that no separate orders were required, as the matter could be examined within another pending original application. The appellant contended that the execution application stemmed from an earlier NGT order directing the District Collector to take action regarding alleged destruction of wetlands and a ten-acre pond within the Technopark region in Thiruvananthapuram. The Supreme Court examined whether the execution application remained maintainable once the District Collector had already passed an order pursuant to the NGT’s original direction. The Court carefully analyzed the scope of the NGT’s order dated 19.12.2018, the subsequent order of the District Collector dated 30.04.2019, and the legal effect of such compliance on execution proceedings. Emphasis was placed on the statutory framework under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 and the Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2010, especially the exemption provisions for public purpose projects. The Court held that once the Collector had passed an order in compliance with the NGT’s direction, the execution application became infructuous. However, it preserved the appellant’s right to challenge the Collector’s order independently in accordance with law, granting protection against dismissal on the ground of delay if such challenge was filed within a stipulated period. The decision clarifies the boundary between execution jurisdiction and substantive judicial review in environmental matters.
- [Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2020] 12 SCR 583](https://lawfoyer.in/tofan-singh-v-state-of-tamil-nadu-2020-12-scr-583/): The Constitution Bench decision in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu marks a watershed moment in Indian criminal jurisprudence concerning prosecutions under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The central controversy before the Supreme Court revolved around the evidentiary admissibility of confessional statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act by officers empowered under Sections 42 and 53. The Court was tasked with determining whether such officers qualify as “police officers” within the meaning of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, thereby rendering confessions made to them inadmissible. The majority opinion, authored by Justice R.F. Nariman, decisively held that officers vested with investigative powers under Section 53 NDPS Act exercise powers identical to those of police officers, including investigation culminating in the filing of a police report. Consequently, they fall squarely within the mischief of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The Court ruled that statements recorded under Section 67 cannot be treated as confessional or substantive evidence and any conviction founded solely upon such statements would infringe Articles 14, 20(3), and 21 of the Constitution of India. In overruling Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India and Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India, the Court reaffirmed constitutional primacy over coercive investigative shortcuts, especially under a statute prescribing draconian punishments. The dissent by Justice Indira Banerjee underscored societal interest and effective enforcement of narcotics law, yet the majority emphasized procedural fairness and fundamental rights as non-negotiable.
- [State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Heem Singh, [2020] 13 S.C.R. 951](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-rajasthan-ors-v-heem-singh-2020-13-s-c-r-951/): The judgment examines the legal permissibility of sustaining a departmental dismissal of a police constable for grave misconduct arising out of alleged involvement in a murder, despite his acquittal in a criminal trial. The Supreme Court scrutinised the limits of judicial review under Article 226 in disciplinary matters, particularly where the High Court interferes with findings of misconduct recorded by the disciplinary authority. The Court reaffirmed the settled distinction between the standard of proof applicable in criminal trials and departmental proceedings, holding that proof beyond reasonable doubt governs criminal liability, whereas preponderance of probabilities governs service discipline. The Court analysed whether the respondent’s acquittal on the ground of benefit of doubt amounted to a clean acquittal warranting reinstatement. It was held that an acquittal does not automatically obliterate the findings of a departmental enquiry, especially where the conduct of a police officer adversely impacts the integrity, credibility, and public confidence in the police force. The judgment emphasises that disciplinary proceedings are not constrained by the rigours of criminal procedure or the strict rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act. The Supreme Court further delineated the “two ends of the spectrum” doctrine governing judicial review in service law. While courts must ordinarily defer to the disciplinary authority as the primary fact-finding body, interference is justified where findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or where vital evidence has been ignored. Applying these principles, the Court found that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in reappreciating evidence and substituting its own conclusions. The reinstatement order was therefore set aside, reinforcing institutional discipline and administrative autonomy.
- [Chunthuram v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2020] 8 SCR 1071](https://lawfoyer.in/chunthuram-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-2020-8-scr-1071/): The judgment examines the evidentiary fragility of a murder conviction resting primarily on weak forensic linkage, defective Test Identification Parade, and unreliable ocular testimony. The appellant was convicted under Sections 302/34 IPC for the alleged murder of the deceased while returning from the market. The prosecution case was built on recovery of weapons, identification of a lungi, and testimony of an alleged eyewitness. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether these circumstances formed an unbroken chain pointing exclusively towards the guilt of the appellant. The Court found that the alleged weapons of assault were never scientifically connected to the crime. The purported chemical analyst report was neither produced nor available on record. Vital forensic material, including the seized shirt of the co-accused, was withheld, attracting an adverse inference against the prosecution. The Test Identification Parade was vitiated by police presence and internal inconsistencies, rendering it unreliable in law. The testimony of the sole eyewitness suffered from serious infirmities. His admitted poor eyesight, weak hearing, adverse weather conditions, and unnatural post-incident conduct eroded his credibility. The motive suggested by the prosecution was remote and lacked proximity. Applying the settled principle that where two views are possible the one favouring the accused must prevail, the Court set aside the conviction. This decision reinforces the constitutional commitment to fair trial standards, the evidentiary value of forensic science, and the cautious approach required while relying on solitary eyewitness testimony in criminal trials.
- [M/s. Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni and Another, [2020] 12 SCR 373](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-imperia-structures-ltd-v-anil-patni-and-another-2020-12-scr-373/): The judgment in M/s. Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni and Another authoritatively settles the long-standing conflict between remedies available under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016. The Supreme Court examined whether the enactment of RERA impliedly ousted the jurisdiction of consumer fora in disputes concerning delay in delivery of possession and refund of amounts paid by homebuyers. The controversy arose from a housing project launched in 2011, where despite substantial payments by allottees, construction remained incomplete even after the contractually stipulated period. Consumer complaints were instituted before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission seeking refund with interest. The builder resisted the complaints on grounds that the allottees were not consumers, that RERA created an exclusive statutory mechanism, and that registration of the project under RERA deferred any finding of delay. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions and reaffirmed that remedies under the Consumer Protection Act are additional and concurrent. The Court clarified that Section 79 of RERA bars only civil courts and not consumer fora, which are quasi-judicial bodies. The judgment underscores legislative intent by reading Sections 18 and 88 of RERA harmoniously with Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act. It recognizes the autonomy of the allottee to choose the forum and protects consumer rights against delayed real estate projects. The ruling has significant implications for real estate litigation, forum choice, and the balance between special statutes and consumer welfare legislation.
- [Shatrughna Baban Meshram v. State of Maharashtra, [2020] 13 SCR 1](https://lawfoyer.in/shatrughna-baban-meshram-v-state-of-maharashtra-2020-13-scr-1/): The judgment examines an extremely grave instance of sexual assault and homicidal death of a minor child aged two and a half years, committed by a close family member. The Supreme Court was called upon to assess the correctness of conviction under Sections 376(2)(f), (i), (m), 376A and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, as well as the confirmation of death penalty imposed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court. The case was founded entirely on circumstantial evidence, including last-seen theory, medical evidence, DNA profiling, and forensic corroboration. The Court undertook a meticulous evaluation of the chain of circumstances in light of the principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, reaffirming that circumstantial evidence, when unimpeachable and complete, can sustain conviction even in capital cases. The judgment further engages in an elaborate doctrinal discussion on the interplay between Sections 299 and 300 IPC, especially clause fourthly of Section 300, to determine whether the accused possessed the requisite mens rea for murder. While upholding the conviction for murder and aggravated sexual assault, the Court revisited the jurisprudence on rarest of rare doctrine and sentencing proportionality. It ultimately commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC and imposed rigorous imprisonment for 25 years under Section 376A IPC, holding that although the crime was exceptionally brutal, the option of a lesser sentence was not entirely foreclosed due to absence of specific intent to cause death.
- [The State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. K. Fazlur Rahman & Anr., [2020] 9 SCR 906](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-tamil-nadu-anr-v-k-fazlur-rahman-anr-2020-9-scr-906/): The judgment examines the scope and limitations of the State Government’s power to supersede a Waqf Board under Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995, particularly in light of the second proviso inserted by the 2013 amendment. The dispute arose from the supersession of the Tamil Nadu Waqf Board on the ground that the number of elected members had fallen below nominated members, allegedly rendering the Board incapable of functioning. The Supreme Court closely scrutinised whether such a situation, arising without any fault or misconduct of the Board, could justify supersession.
- [Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank & Anr. v. Anit Kumar Das [2020] 9 SCR 925](https://lawfoyer.in/chief-manager-punjab-national-bank-anr-v-anit-kumar-das-2020-9-scr-925/): The Supreme Court examined the legality of continuation in service of a candidate appointed as a Peon in Punjab National Bank despite being ineligible under the prescribed recruitment criteria. The Bank’s recruitment advertisement, issued pursuant to internal circulars, expressly disqualified graduates from applying for the post of Peon, limiting eligibility to candidates who had passed 12th Standard with basic English knowledge. The respondent, though a graduate since 2014, suppressed this material fact and declared only Higher Secondary qualification in his application. An appointment order was issued based on the disclosed qualifications, but during document verification, the Bank discovered the respondent’s graduation degree and cancelled his candidature.
- [Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through LRs v. Vinod Kumar Rawat & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 865](https://lawfoyer.in/shri-ram-sahu-dead-through-lrs-v-vinod-kumar-rawat-ors-2020-11-scr-865/): The decision in Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through LRs v. Vinod Kumar Rawat & Ors. is a definitive exposition on the limits of review jurisdiction under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Supreme Court examined whether a High Court, while exercising review powers, could delete substantive factual observations made in an earlier appellate judgment concerning possession of immovable property. The controversy arose after the High Court, nearly two years after disposing of a first appeal, entertained a review petition and deleted an entire paragraph recording findings on possession, solely on the ground that no specific issue on possession had been framed by the Trial Court. The Supreme Court emphatically held that such an exercise amounted to overstepping review jurisdiction. It reiterated that review is not an appeal in disguise and cannot be used to re-appreciate evidence or to unsettle findings recorded after detailed examination of pleadings and proof. The Court underscored that absence of a formally framed issue does not vitiate findings when parties were aware of the controversy, led evidence, and suffered no prejudice. Observations on possession were based on depositions, pleadings, and even admissions by defendants through interlocutory applications. By restoring the deleted paragraph, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of finality of judgments, clarified the distinction between error apparent on the face of record and erroneous findings, and reinforced judicial discipline in exercising review powers. The judgment carries substantial precedential value in civil procedure, particularly in property litigation and appellate practice.
- [Rajesh @ Sarkari & Anr. v. State of Haryana, [2020] 14 SCR 1](https://lawfoyer.in/rajesh-sarkari-anr-v-state-of-haryana-2020-14-scr-1/): The judgment addresses the foundational criminal law principle that suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court examined the evidentiary worth of alleged eye-witness testimony, forensic inconsistencies, and the legal effect of refusal to participate in a Test Identification Parade in a prosecution for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The prosecution case rested substantially on the testimonies of the deceased’s father and brother, who claimed to have witnessed the shooting inside a university campus and to have transported the injured victim to hospital. However, documentary evidence in the form of the ruqqa, hospital records, and defence testimony created serious doubt regarding their presence at the scene of occurrence. The Court undertook a meticulous scrutiny of forensic science laboratory reports prepared across two different FIRs and highlighted irreconcilable discrepancies concerning the recovery, identification, and ballistic linkage of alleged weapons. The non-examination of ballistic experts, despite serious contradictions in forensic reports, was held to be fatal in the absence of unimpeachable direct evidence. The Court further clarified that refusal to undergo a Test Identification Parade is not substantive evidence and cannot independently sustain a conviction where the prosecution fails to establish the identity of the accused beyond doubt. The judgment reinforces constitutional protections under criminal jurisprudence by emphasizing procedural fairness, evidentiary rigor, and the prosecution’s burden of proof. Ultimately, the appellants were acquitted and extended the benefit of doubt, resulting in the reversal of concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court.
- [Rajnesh v. Neha & Anr., [2020] 13 SCR 1093](https://lawfoyer.in/rajnesh-v-neha-anr-2020-13-scr-1093/): The judgment in Rajnesh v. Neha & Anr. constitutes a landmark exposition on the law of maintenance in India, particularly addressing the systemic inconsistencies arising from overlapping statutory remedies, prolonged pendency of interim maintenance applications, and difficulties in enforcement of maintenance orders. The Supreme Court was seized of an appeal challenging concurrent findings of the Family Court and the Bombay High Court granting interim maintenance to the wife and minor child under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. While affirming the maintenance awarded in the present case, the Court expanded the scope of adjudication by exercising its constitutional powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to frame comprehensive and binding guidelines on maintenance. The Court undertook a purposive interpretation of maintenance laws, locating them firmly within the constitutional framework of Articles 15(3) and 39, emphasizing their role as instruments of social justice. Recognizing the multiplicity of proceedings under statutes such as the Cr.P.C., Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, Special Marriage Act, 1954, and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the Court sought to harmonize their operation. The judgment mandates uniform disclosure of assets and liabilities, clarifies the date from which maintenance should ordinarily be awarded, lays down criteria for determining quantum, and strengthens enforcement mechanisms. By addressing both the individual dispute and the broader jurisprudential vacuum, the decision serves as a guiding precedent aimed at ensuring consistency, transparency, and fairness in maintenance adjudication across India.
- [Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr., [2020] 9 SCR 593](https://lawfoyer.in/hitesh-verma-v-state-of-uttarakhand-anr-2020-9-scr-593/): The judgment examines the scope and limits of Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, particularly in disputes arising out of property and civil conflicts. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether allegations of caste-based abuse, arising during a private land dispute and allegedly occurring within the four walls of a house, satisfy the statutory ingredients of an offence under the Act. The Court clarified that every insult or intimidation against a Scheduled Caste member does not ipso facto attract the Act, unless such conduct is intentionally directed at humiliating the victim because of caste identity and occurs in a place within public view. The judgment further reaffirms the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, holding that there is no legal prohibition against quashing a charge-sheet in part. The Court carefully balanced the object of the SC/ST Act with safeguards against its misuse in purely civil disputes. It emphasised that invocation of civil remedies by either party cannot, by itself, be construed as caste-based oppression. By quashing the charges under the SC/ST Act while permitting prosecution under the IPC to continue, the Court delineated the doctrinal boundary between caste-based atrocities and ordinary criminal or civil disputes, ensuring that the protective intent of the Act is preserved without allowing procedural abuse.
- [C. Bright v. The District Collector & Ors. [2020] 7 SCR 997](https://lawfoyer.in/c-bright-v-the-district-collector-ors-2020-7-scr-997/): The Supreme Court in C. Bright v. The District Collector & Ors. examined the legal character of the time limits prescribed under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The controversy centred on whether the statutory mandate requiring the District Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to pass orders within thirty days, extendable to sixty days with recorded reasons, is mandatory or merely directory. The appellant contended that failure to comply with the outer limit renders the authority functus officio, thereby frustrating the secured creditor’s remedy. The Court rejected this contention and upheld the High Court’s reasoning that the time stipulation is directory in nature. The judgment reaffirmed settled principles of statutory interpretation that the mere use of the word “shall” does not conclusively determine mandatory intent. Emphasis was placed on the object, purpose, scheme, and consequences of non-compliance. The Court held that Section 14 performs a public function aimed at facilitating recovery of public dues and that the secured creditor has no control over the Magistrate’s administrative functioning. Treating the provision as mandatory would defeat the legislative purpose and enable defaulting borrowers to obstruct recovery. By harmonising SARFAESI’s objectives with constitutional and interpretative doctrines, the Court clarified that procedural timelines imposed on public authorities are ordinarily directory unless penal consequences are prescribed. The decision reinforces judicial restraint against hyper-technical interpretations that undermine economic legislation intended for expeditious enforcement of security interests.
- [Gurusimran Singh Narula v. Union of India & Anr., [2020] 12 S.C.R. 351](https://lawfoyer.in/gurusimran-singh-narula-v-union-of-india-anr-2020-12-s-c-r-351/): The writ petition examined the legality and constitutional permissibility of spraying or fumigating chemical or organic disinfectants on human beings and exposing individuals to artificial ultraviolet rays as a preventive response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petition asserted that such practices violated the right to life and health under Article 21. The petitioner relied upon advisories issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and international guidance, particularly from the World Health Organization, which cautioned against human disinfection through tunnels and sprays. Despite such advisories, several public authorities and organisations continued deploying disinfection tunnels, creating regulatory ambiguity and health risks. The Supreme Court analysed the Disaster Management Act, 2005, particularly Sections 10 and 36, to determine whether the Union Government merely possessed discretionary powers or was under a positive statutory obligation to act. The Court reaffirmed that statutory powers conferred for public welfare are powers coupled with duties. It held that issuance of advisories alone was insufficient when evidence showed continued harmful practices across the country. While the Court refrained from imposing an immediate blanket ban, it directed the Union Government to actively consider and issue binding directions regulating or prohibiting such practices, including exposure to ultraviolet radiation. The judgment reinforces the jurisprudence that public health protection during disasters requires affirmative executive action, and that regulatory silence in the face of known harm amounts to constitutional failure.
- [Hindustan Unilever Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2020] 9 SCR 455](https://lawfoyer.in/hindustan-unilever-limited-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2020-9-scr-455/): The judgment in Hindustan Unilever Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh examines the interplay between corporate criminal liability, vicarious liability of nominated officers, and the effect of repeal and savings clauses under Indian criminal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court was required to decide whether prosecution and punishment under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 could continue despite its repeal by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, and whether a nominated officer could be convicted independently when the company itself was not convicted. The Court reaffirmed the settled doctrine under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 97 of the 2006 Act, holding that repeal does not extinguish pending prosecutions or liabilities unless a contrary intention is expressly stated. It categorically rejected the argument that the accused could claim the benefit of the milder penal regime under the 2006 Act. More significantly, the judgment clarifies that Section 17 of the 1954 Act creates conjoint and not alternative liability. The Court held that the company and the nominated person form an inseparable unit for the purpose of prosecution. In the absence of conviction of the company, conviction of the nominated officer alone was held to be legally unsustainable. The Court further deprecated the High Court’s decision to remand the matter after three decades to cure a fundamental defect, holding such remand to be unfair, prejudicial, and contrary to principles of criminal justice. The ruling strengthens safeguards against prolonged criminal trials and reinforces strict compliance with statutory requirements in corporate prosecutions.
- [Shanti Devi alias Shanti Mishra v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 279](https://lawfoyer.in/shanti-devi-alias-shanti-mishra-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-12-scr-279/): The judgment examines the contours of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India in the context of pensionary disputes of a retired employee. The Supreme Court addressed whether a writ petition challenging the stoppage of pension and recovery of pension amounts could be entertained by the Patna High Court when the employee had served in West Bengal but was receiving pension at his native place in Bihar. The Court clarified that cause of action must be assessed from the bundle of facts giving rise to the grievance and not merely from the place of employment or location of the authority. The Court distinguished between two writ petitions filed by the deceased employee. The first writ petition related to refund of allegedly illegal deductions from provident fund and was dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The subsequent writ petition challenged a later administrative action involving stoppage of pension after eight years and recovery of a substantial amount already paid. The Supreme Court held that these petitions arose from distinct causes of action, and dismissal of the earlier petition did not bar the later one. Significantly, the Court reaffirmed that receipt of pension and its stoppage at the place of residence constitutes an integral part of cause of action. The hardship caused to a retired employee was emphasized, and the doctrine of forum non conveniens was held inapplicable. The judgment restores the writ petition before the Patna High Court and grants interim relief of provisional pension to the widow, reinforcing the constitutional mandate of access to justice.
- [Vetindia Pharmaceuticals Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, [2020] 9 SCR 607](https://lawfoyer.in/vetindia-pharmaceuticals-limited-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-another-2020-9-scr-607/): The judgment examines the legality, proportionality, and procedural validity of an indefinite blacklisting order passed against a licensed pharmaceutical manufacturer without any direct supply of the drug to the State authority. The dispute arose from allegations of misbranding of a veterinary drug, based on a State Analyst’s report, even though the appellant was neither a successful tenderer nor a supplier under the concerned tender. The Supreme Court scrutinised the scope of tender conditions, principles of natural justice, and the constitutional limits on administrative discretion while imposing blacklisting. The Court held that blacklisting is a drastic civil consequence amounting to commercial civil death and therefore mandates strict adherence to procedural safeguards. It reaffirmed that a show-cause notice must expressly or by necessary implication disclose the proposed action of blacklisting. Invocation of tender clauses against a non-supplier was held to be a fundamental jurisdictional error reflecting complete non-application of mind. On the issue of delay, the Court clarified that limitation does not strictly apply to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, and delay cannot defeat relief where the illegality is continuing and the petitioner has been diligently pursuing remedies. The judgment also reiterated that permanent or excessively long blacklisting is arbitrary and disproportionate, ordinarily exceeding permissible administrative limits. The decision strengthens procedural fairness in public procurement, restricts arbitrary blacklisting, and balances State power with constitutional equity.
- [UMC Technologies Private Limited v. Food Corporation of India & Anr., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 1175](https://lawfoyer.in/umc-technologies-private-limited-v-food-corporation-of-india-anr-2020-13-s-c-r-1175/): The judgment addresses the legality of blacklisting by a State instrumentality in the absence of a clear and specific show cause notice. The appellant, a private recruitment agency, was awarded a contract by the Food Corporation of India for conducting recruitment examinations for watchmen. Following allegations of question paper leakage during an examination conducted by the appellant, the Corporation terminated the contract and blacklisted the appellant for five years. The appellant restricted its challenge before the Supreme Court only to the order of blacklisting. The Court examined whether the principles of natural justice were complied with prior to the imposition of blacklisting. It held that blacklisting has grave civil consequences, including stigmatization, loss of reputation, and long-term exclusion from government contracts. Such an action therefore mandates a prior, unambiguous, and particularized show cause notice clearly indicating the proposed penalty of blacklisting. The show cause notice issued to the appellant merely referred to contractual breaches and vaguely stated that “appropriate action” would be taken. It neither expressly proposed blacklisting nor permitted such inference. The Court reiterated that an administrative authority cannot travel beyond the scope of the show cause notice. The existence of a contractual clause referring to blacklisting does not cure the defect of a deficient notice. Relying on settled precedents including Erusian Equipment, Raghunath Thakur, and Gorkha Security Services, the Court quashed the blacklisting order while leaving the termination of contract undisturbed. The ruling reinforces procedural fairness as a non-negotiable requirement in State actions involving penal civil consequences.
- [Rattan Singh & Ors. v. Nirmal Gill & Ors., [2020] 12 S.C.R. 422](https://lawfoyer.in/rattan-singh-ors-v-nirmal-gill-ors-2020-12-s-c-r-422/): The judgment adjudicates a complex intra-family property dispute founded on allegations of fraud, impersonation, and misuse of fiduciary trust in execution of a General Power of Attorney and multiple sale deeds. The plaintiff alleged that her step-brothers and step sister-in-law procured her signatures by deceit and used them to alienate her share in ancestral land through registered instruments executed in 1990. The Trial Court dismissed both suits for want of proof of fraud. The First Appellate Court substantially concurred, with marginal modification. The High Court, however, reversed concurrent findings, inferring fraud from circumstances and discrepancies. The Supreme Court restored the Trial Court and First Appellate Court findings, emphasizing settled principles governing registered documents, burden of proof, attestation, expert evidence, and limitation. It held that registration raises a presumption of genuineness and the initial burden lies on the party alleging fraud. Mere suspicion, familial confidence, or clerical inconsistencies cannot displace statutory presumptions. The Court reaffirmed that civil cases are decided on preponderance of probabilities and expert opinions are corroborative, not conclusive. On limitation, the Court held that Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 requires proof of both fraud and discovery, which the plaintiff failed to establish. The judgment also delineates the limited scope of second appeals and condemns interference with concurrent factual findings based on conjecture. The ruling is significant for property law, evidence law, and civil procedure, reinforcing judicial restraint and evidentiary discipline in fraud-based challenges to registered conveyances.
- [NTPC Ltd. (Simhadri Project) v. Rajiv Chakraborty, [2020] 13 SCR 1090](https://lawfoyer.in/ntpc-ltd-simhadri-project-v-rajiv-chakraborty-2020-13-scr-1090/): The judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India in NTPC Ltd. (Simhadri Project) v. Rajiv Chakraborty addresses the limited yet significant issue concerning the classification of creditor claims in the Information Memorandum prepared during a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The appellant, NTPC Ltd., contended that its claim ought to have been reflected under the category of Operational Creditors rather than being placed in the List of Other Creditors. The claim was, however, pending adjudication before an Arbitrator at the relevant time. The Court clarified the legal nature and purpose of the Information Memorandum, emphasizing that it is a disclosure document meant to present the financial position of the corporate debtor and does not operate as a determinative instrument adjudicating claims. The Resolution Professional, the Court held, lacks the statutory authority to accept, reject, or finally classify claims that remain sub judice before a competent forum. The judgment reinforces that a claim pending adjudication does not stand extinguished merely due to its categorization in the Information Memorandum and remains enforceable subject to final adjudication or operation of law. The decision thus preserves the rights of creditors whose claims are under adjudication while also protecting the integrity of the insolvency resolution framework by preventing premature adjudication by insolvency professionals. The Court left open all remedies available to the appellant against the final resolution plan, if aggrieved, thereby balancing procedural discipline with substantive justice.
- [Kirpa Ram (Deceased) Through LRs & Ors. v. Surendra Deo Gaur & Ors., [2020] 13 SCR 1030](https://lawfoyer.in/kirpa-ram-deceased-through-lrs-ors-v-surendra-deo-gaur-ors-2020-13-scr-1030/): The judgment resolves a long-standing dispute concerning civil court jurisdiction over land possession disputes where overlapping claims arise between two revenue estates. The Supreme Court examined whether a suit for permanent injunction based purely on possession is barred by statutory revenue laws, specifically Section 28 and Section 83 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954, read with Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The appellants contended that the controversy constituted a boundary dispute between Village Basai Darapur and Village Shakarpur and therefore lay exclusively within the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities. The Court rejected this contention and clarified the conceptual distinction between a boundary dispute between revenue estates and a dispute regarding identification and possession of private land. The Court reaffirmed that civil courts enjoy plenary jurisdiction unless expressly or impliedly barred. It held that the Land Revenue Act does not provide any mechanism for granting injunctions relating to possession, thereby preserving civil court jurisdiction. The judgment also addresses procedural aspects concerning Order XLI Rule 27 CPC and reiterates settled law on Section 100 CPC, holding that a High Court is not bound to frame a substantial question of law where none arises. This decision strengthens the doctrinal clarity on jurisdictional overlap between civil courts and revenue authorities and reinforces access to civil remedies under the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium.
- [M/s. Fertico Marketing and Investment Pvt. Ltd. and Others v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another, [2020] 12 S.C.R. 956](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-fertico-marketing-and-investment-pvt-ltd-and-others-v-central-bureau-of-investigation-and-another-2020-12-s-c-r-956/): The judgment in M/s. Fertico Marketing and Investment Pvt. Ltd. and Others v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another addresses the scope, nature, and legal consequences of consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 in the context of investigations conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation within a State. The case arose from allegations of diversion and black-marketing of coal supplied under a Fuel Supply Agreement, allegedly executed through collusion between private company officials and State Government public servants. The principal challenge before the Court related to the legality of the CBI investigation on the ground that prior consent of the State Government had not been obtained before registration of the FIR and completion of investigation. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of the federal scheme underlying Sections 5 and 6 of the DSPE Act, the distinction between private individuals and public servants, and the jurisprudence governing procedural irregularities in investigation. The Court clarified that no consent under Section 6 is required for investigation against private individuals, where general consent exists. In relation to public servants of the State Government, the Court held that post-facto consent granted by the State Government was valid in law, particularly where the accused were not named in the FIR and where no prejudice or miscarriage of justice was demonstrated. Relying upon settled precedents such as H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi and Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, the Court reaffirmed that defects or irregularities in investigation do not vitiate criminal proceedings unless they result in failure of justice. The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity on federal consent, investigative jurisdiction of the CBI, and the prejudice test under criminal procedure, while remitting unresolved ancillary issues back to the High Court for determination.
- [Ram Sharan Maurya and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, [2020] 12 S.C.R. 466](https://lawfoyer.in/ram-sharan-maurya-and-others-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-others-2020-12-s-c-r-466/): The judgment in Ram Sharan Maurya and Others v. State of U.P. and Others examines the legality and constitutional validity of fixation of minimum qualifying marks for the Assistant Teacher Recruitment Examination-2019 (ATRE-2019) conducted by the State of Uttar Pradesh. The dispute arose primarily from challenges mounted by Shiksha Mitras, ex-servicemen, and persons with disabilities against the post-examination prescription of qualifying cut-off marks at 65% for General category candidates and 60% for reserved categories. The appellants contended that such fixation was arbitrary, retrospective, discriminatory, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court undertook an extensive examination of the statutory framework governing teacher recruitment, including the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981, the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, and the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009. A crucial issue concerned the authority of the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) to prescribe eligibility norms, including permitting B.Ed. candidates to teach Classes I to V subject to a six-month bridge course, as laid down in its Notification dated 28.06.2018. The Court upheld the power of the State Government to determine minimum qualifying marks “from time to time” under Rule 2(1)(x) read with Rule 14 of the 1981 Rules, even after the conduct of the examination, provided the decision is free from mala fides and aligned with the objective of selecting meritorious teachers. The judgment reaffirms the primacy of educational quality under Article 21A and validates the State’s policy decision to raise standards to ensure competent primary education.
- [Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Udayant Malhouta, [2020] 14 S.C.R. 327](https://lawfoyer.in/securities-and-exchange-board-of-india-v-udayant-malhouta-2020-14-s-c-r-327/): The judgment in Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Udayant Malhouta addresses the contours of SEBI’s power to pass ex-parte interim orders, particularly in cases alleging insider trading under the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015. The dispute arose from allegations that the respondent, being the Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director of the listed company, had traded in company shares while allegedly in possession of unpublished price sensitive information relating to unaudited financial results. Acting on this allegation, SEBI issued an ex-parte interim order directing the respondent to deposit a quantified amount representing notional loss allegedly averted. The Securities Appellate Tribunal set aside this interim order on the ground that no extreme urgency existed, especially since the investigation had been pending since 2017 and information had already been supplied in 2019. The Supreme Court, while affirming the Tribunal’s conclusion on facts, clarified that SEBI does possess statutory authority under Section 11(4) of the SEBI Act, 1992 to pass interim orders, including ex-parte directions, but such powers must be exercised in accordance with statutory parameters and factual necessity. Importantly, the Court held that the interpretation of law made by the Tribunal concerning SEBI’s powers should not be treated as precedent. The ruling thus balances investor protection with procedural fairness, reinforcing that regulatory urgency must be real, demonstrable, and proportionate to the action taken.
- [Jayantilal Verma v. State of M.P. (now Chhattisgarh), [2020] 12 S.C.R. 411](https://lawfoyer.in/jayantilal-verma-v-state-of-m-p-now-chhattisgarh-2020-12-s-c-r-411/): The decision examines the evidentiary standards applicable in cases of homicidal death occurring within the privacy of a matrimonial home. The Supreme Court was concerned with a conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for the murder of a wife by strangulation, where the prosecution case substantially rested on circumstantial evidence, medical testimony, and the statement of a solitary witness. The Court scrutinised whether the absence of multiple eyewitnesses, hostile witnesses, and the non-recovery of the weapon of offence could dilute the prosecution’s case. The judgment reiterates that when a death occurs in the exclusive domain of the accused, particularly within the matrimonial household, the burden on the prosecution is comparatively lighter once foundational facts are established. In such circumstances, Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 assumes critical relevance, placing an obligation on the accused to offer a plausible explanation for the cause of death. Mere denial under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was held insufficient. The Court upheld the conviction of the husband, relying on consistent testimony of the deceased’s brother, corroborated by medical evidence indicating death by strangulation. At the same time, the Court showed sentencing sensitivity by directing the State to consider premature release after completion of fourteen years of actual imprisonment. The judgment reinforces settled principles relating to circumstantial evidence, hostile witnesses, and domestic homicide within the privacy of the home.
- [M/s Kaledonia Jute and Fibres Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Axis Nirman and Industries Ltd. & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 800](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-kaledonia-jute-and-fibres-pvt-ltd-v-m-s-axis-nirman-and-industries-ltd-ors-2020-11-scr-800/): The judgment resolves a significant conflict arising during the transition from the Companies Act, 1956 regime to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Supreme Court examined whether a winding-up proceeding, already admitted and advertised by a High Court, could be transferred to the National Company Law Tribunal at the instance of a financial creditor who was not the original petitioning creditor. The dispute emerged against the backdrop of overlapping jurisdictions between Company Courts and the NCLT, especially where insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC run parallel to winding-up proceedings. The Court interpreted Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013, including its fifth proviso inserted by the IBC (Second Amendment) Act, 2018. A detailed examination of Rules 5 and 6 of the Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 and Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 was undertaken to determine the stage at which transfer is permissible. The Court clarified that while Rules 5 and 6 restrict automatic transfer once service under Rule 26 is completed, these restrictions do not apply where transfer is sought under the fifth proviso to Section 434(1)(c). Importantly, the Court held that winding-up proceedings are proceedings in rem, and any creditor of the company is a “party” entitled to seek transfer. Allowing parallel proceedings would defeat the object of the IBC. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s refusal and directed transfer of the winding-up proceedings to the NCLT to be heard along with the Section 7 application.
- [Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law](https://lawfoyer.in/intellectual-property-rights-and-competition-law/): Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Competition Law are both necessary for innovation and economic growth. IPRs create exclusive rights while Competition Law seeks to correct market failures caused by monopolies and restrictive practices. Tension arises when IPRs are used to restrict competition beyond the intended scope.
- [Personality Rights as an Emerging Intellectual Property in India](https://lawfoyer.in/personality-rights-as-an-emerging-intellectual-property-in-india/): Personality rights in India empower individuals to control the commercial use of their identity, including name, image, likeness, or other distinctive traits. These rights, though not explicitly codified, have been recognized through judicial interpretations, intertwining with the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution...
- [RGNUL–SAM LEGISLATION DRAFTING COMPETITION, 2026 | Centre for Advanced Studies in Cyber Law and Artificial Intelligence (CASCA), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Last Date to Register for the Event - 15th January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/rgnul-sam-legislation-drafting-competition-2026-centre-for-advanced-studies-in-cyber-law-and-artificial-intelligence-casca-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-rgnul-punjab-last/): RGNUL–SAM LEGISLATION DRAFTING COMPETITION, 2026 | Centre for Advanced Studies in Cyber Law and Artificial Intelligence (CASCA), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Last Date to Register for the Event - 15th January 2026
- [Rusoday Securities Ltd. v. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. & Ors., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 218](https://lawfoyer.in/rusoday-securities-ltd-v-national-stock-exchange-of-india-ltd-ors-2020-13-s-c-r-218/): The judgment examines the scope of regulatory powers of a recognised stock exchange and its clearing corporation under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, particularly in relation to the issuance and enforceability of operational circulars governing trading exposure limits, capital adequacy, withdrawal of trading facilities, closing out of open positions, expulsion of members, and realisation of security deposits and withheld securities. The Supreme Court addressed whether a circular dated 19.05.1997, prescribing gross exposure limits and consequences of breach, required prior approval of the Central Government or SEBI, and whether such circular was ultra vires the Byelaws of the National Stock Exchange. The Court upheld the validity and binding nature of the circular, holding that operational parameters fall within the autonomous regulatory domain of the Exchange under its approved Byelaws and do not require separate governmental approval. It further clarified the distinction between withdrawal of trading facility and expulsion from membership, holding that obligations relating to capital adequacy and security deposits continue even during suspension of trading rights. The judgment also draws a clear legal line between security deposits and withheld securities, elaborating on statutory lien, vesting, declaration of defaulter, and the applicability of equitable principles such as nemo dat quod non habet, fiduciary duties, and constructive trust. The decision provides authoritative clarity on the enforceability of exchange circulars, the scope of residuary powers under exchange byelaws, and the legal framework governing realisation of assets of defaulting trading members, thereby strengthening market discipline and regulatory certainty.
- [Venkatesan Balasubramaniyan v. The Intelligence Officer, D.R.I. Bangalore, [2020] 9 SCR 942](https://lawfoyer.in/venkatesan-balasubramaniyan-v-the-intelligence-officer-d-r-i-bangalore-2020-9-scr-942/): The judgment examines the interplay between default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and cancellation of such bail under Section 439(2) CrPC in the context of offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The case arose from a coordinated investigation by different zonal units of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence involving recovery of commercial quantity of psychotropic substances at different locations but forming part of a single transaction. The accused were granted default bail by the Special Court at Hyderabad on the ground that the complaint was not filed within 180 days. However, it later emerged that a combined complaint encompassing both recoveries had already been filed within the statutory period before the Special Court at Omerga, Maharashtra. The Supreme Court addressed whether miscommunication or non-disclosure of the filing of a combined complaint could confer an indefeasible right to default bail. The Court reaffirmed that default bail is not an absolute right divorced from factual reality and statutory compliance. Where the complaint is filed within the prescribed period before a competent court having jurisdiction, default bail granted due to an erroneous assumption can be cancelled under Section 439(2) CrPC. The judgment reinforces the principle that procedural lapses or administrative miscommunication cannot defeat substantive justice in serious NDPS offences. It also clarifies jurisdictional competence, continuity of offence, and the legal permissibility of filing a consolidated complaint covering multiple recoveries forming part of the same conspiracy.
- [Chief Executive Officer and Vice Chairman, Gujarat Maritime Board v. Asiatic Steel Industries Ltd. & Ors., [2020] 10 SCR 375](https://lawfoyer.in/chief-executive-officer-and-vice-chairman-gujarat-maritime-board-v-asiatic-steel-industries-ltd-ors-2020-10-scr-375/): The judgment examines the obligation of a statutory maritime authority to act fairly while refunding contractual consideration and interest where a public contract becomes commercially unviable due to the authority’s inaction. The dispute arose from the allotment of a ship-breaking plot by the Gujarat Maritime Board, where despite receipt of earnest money and substantial premium, the allotted land remained unusable owing to unremoved rocks and lack of infrastructure. The respondent company sought refund with interest after prolonged correspondence and inaction by the Board. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether interest could be awarded in the absence of an express contractual clause and without a formal finding of breach. The Court emphasised that interest is compensatory in nature, especially where a public authority retains money without justification. It held that arbitrariness, discrimination, and deliberate inaction by a State instrumentality violate constitutional norms of fairness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. While affirming the High Court’s direction to refund the principal with interest, the Supreme Court corrected the commencement date for interest calculation, holding that interest could only accrue from the date on which the full consideration was actually paid and not from the earlier date of earnest money deposit. The judgment reinforces that public bodies cannot compel parties to litigate for legitimate refunds and must act proactively, transparently, and equitably.
- [Tej Bahadur v. Shri Narendra Modi, [2020] 13 SCR 554](https://lawfoyer.in/tej-bahadur-v-shri-narendra-modi-2020-13-scr-554/): The judgment addresses the foundational requirement of locus standi in election petitions under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Supreme Court examined whether a person whose nomination paper was rejected for non-compliance with mandatory statutory requirements could maintain an election petition questioning the election of a returned candidate. The appellant, a former Border Security Force employee dismissed from service, challenged the election of the respondent from the Varanasi Parliamentary Constituency after his nomination was rejected due to non-submission of a mandatory certificate under Section 33(3) read with Section 9(2) of the Act. The Court analysed the statutory meaning of “candidate” under Section 79(b) and the scope of Section 81 governing who may present an election petition. The Court reaffirmed that compliance with nomination requirements is a condition precedent to claiming the status of a candidate. The absence of the certificate rendered the nomination legally non est. The Court further upheld the power of courts to summarily reject election petitions lacking cause of action under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and Section 86(1) of the Act. The judgment reinforces strict statutory interpretation in election law and discourages frivolous or speculative election challenges.
- [B. K. Ravichandra & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 974](https://lawfoyer.in/b-k-ravichandra-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-12-scr-974/): The judgment examines the legality of continued occupation of privately owned immovable property by the Union of India after the statutory lapse of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952. The appellants, successors-in-interest of the original landowner, challenged the refusal of the Karnataka High Court to direct restoration of possession despite categorical findings that the lands were never lawfully acquired. The Supreme Court scrutinized the legal character of requisition, emphasizing its inherently temporary nature and the impermissibility of its conversion into de facto acquisition without statutory sanction. The Court reaffirmed that although the right to property no longer enjoys the status of a fundamental right, it remains a valuable constitutional right under Article 300-A, deeply anchored in the rule of law. The judgment condemns executive lawlessness and judicial condonation thereof, holding that continued possession after 1987 was unconstitutional and illegal. It underscores the judiciary’s constitutional role as a protector of liberties and rejects the notion that public purpose or national defense can justify unlawful deprivation. The Court ordered restitution of possession within a fixed timeframe and permitted fresh arbitration for compensation for continued unlawful occupation. The ruling reinforces constitutional accountability of the State and decisively curtails indefinite executive possession without authority of law.
- [Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Dubey, [2020] 13 SCR 1191](https://lawfoyer.in/director-general-of-police-railway-protection-force-ors-v-rajendra-kumar-dubey-2020-13-scr-1191/): The judgment authoritatively delineates the constitutional limits on judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in matters arising from departmental disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court examined the legality of interference by the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, which had substituted the punishment of compulsory retirement imposed on a Railway Protection Force officer with reversion in rank and reinstatement with 50% back wages. The Court reaffirmed that a High Court exercising writ jurisdiction does not function as a court of appeal over disciplinary findings. Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of factual conclusions, or substitution of punishment is impermissible unless the disciplinary process is vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice, absence of evidence, perversity, arbitrariness, mala fides, or statutory non-compliance. The delinquent officer, holding a position of trust as a Sub-Inspector in the Railway Protection Force, was found guilty of gross neglect of duty leading to theft of railway property and consequent pecuniary loss. The Supreme Court emphasized the heightened standard of integrity expected from personnel entrusted with protection of public property. By restoring the order of compulsory retirement, the Court underscored that proportionality of punishment must be assessed with reference to the nature of duties, gravity of misconduct, and institutional discipline, and not on sympathetic considerations. The ruling consolidates long-standing service jurisprudence restricting judicial intervention in disciplinary matters and reinforces administrative autonomy in maintaining discipline within uniformed forces.
- [Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 11 S.C.R. 786](https://lawfoyer.in/skoda-auto-volkswagen-india-private-limited-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2020-11-s-c-r-786/): The judgment addresses the limits of judicial intervention at the stage of criminal investigation, particularly when allegations overlap with issues pending before a specialized environmental forum. The case arose from a challenge by a major automobile manufacturer seeking quashing of an FIR alleging cheating, forgery, criminal breach of trust, and conspiracy in relation to alleged installation of emission “defeat devices” in vehicles sold in India. The petitioner argued that the FIR was barred because the same subject matter was pending before the National Green Tribunal and this Court in connected civil appeals, and further that the complaint was vitiated by delay and factual inaccuracies. The Court reaffirmed the settled principle that criminal investigations cannot be interdicted merely because civil or environmental proceedings on overlapping subject matter are pending. The jurisdiction of the police to investigate cognizable offences remains intact so long as the FIR discloses the commission of an offence, even broadly. The Court emphasized that proceedings before the NGT were environmental and regulatory in nature and did not adjudicate individual consumer grievances or alleged misrepresentations made to specific purchasers. Questions relating to delay, number of vehicles purchased, existence of defeat devices, and alleged representations were held to be disputed questions of fact incapable of determination in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The judgment consolidates jurisprudence discouraging premature quashing of FIRs and reiterates the doctrine of separation of functions between investigative agencies and constitutional courts.
- [Manohar Lal Jat & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 948](https://lawfoyer.in/manohar-lal-jat-ors-v-state-of-rajasthan-ors-2020-11-scr-948/): The judgment concerns the determination of inter se seniority between direct recruits and departmental promotees appointed to the newly created post of Tax Assistant under the Rajasthan Commercial Taxes Subordinate Services (General Branch) Rules, 1975. The controversy arose from the first-ever recruitment to a newly constituted cadre consisting of 554 posts, filled through two streams: 80% by direct recruitment and 20% by departmental promotion through examination. Separate advertisements were issued at different times, and though the direct recruitment process commenced earlier, departmental promotees were appointed earlier owing to administrative and procedural factors. The seniority list consequently placed departmental promotees above direct recruits, triggering litigation. The appellants argued that Rule 27, particularly its second proviso, mandated seniority based on the chronology of selection rather than appointment. The respondents contended that post the 2002 amendment, seniority was determined strictly from the date of appointment and that both recruitments formed part of a composite first selection. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed interpretative exercise of Rule 27, its provisos, and their legislative intent. It affirmed that the main rule governed seniority and that the proviso applied only when selections were from the same source. Administrative delay in issuing appointment orders to direct recruits did not vitiate the seniority determination. The Court upheld the seniority of departmental promotees, dismissing allegations of mala fides, and clarified the doctrinal limits of provisos in service jurisprudence. The ruling reinforces principles of statutory interpretation, service law equity, and administrative practicality.
- [Noy Vallesina Engineering SpA v. Jindal Drugs Limited & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 1019](https://lawfoyer.in/noy-vallesina-engineering-spa-v-jindal-drugs-limited-ors-2020-12-scr-1019/): The judgment conclusively settles the long-standing controversy relating to the maintainability of petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 against foreign arbitral awards. The Supreme Court examined whether Indian courts can exercise supervisory jurisdiction over arbitral awards rendered outside India when the substantive law of the contract is Indian law, but the seat of arbitration is located abroad. The Court reaffirmed the territorial principle of arbitration and emphasized that the seat of arbitration is determinative of curial law and supervisory jurisdiction. It held that once parties have consciously chosen a foreign seat, Indian courts are excluded from entertaining challenges under Part I of the Act. The Court harmonized earlier conflicting precedents by clarifying the scope and applicability of Bhatia International and Venture Global in light of the Constitution Bench ruling in BALCO. The judgment also addressed the scope of appellate remedies under Section 50, holding that no appeal lies except as expressly provided, thereby barring Letters Patent Appeals or other appellate mechanisms in enforcement proceedings concerning foreign awards. This decision strengthens India’s pro-arbitration stance, aligns domestic arbitration jurisprudence with the New York Convention, and reinforces certainty in international commercial arbitration by preventing multiple and parallel challenges across jurisdictions.
- [Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 896](https://lawfoyer.in/arnab-manoranjan-goswami-v-state-of-maharashtra-ors-2020-11-scr-896/): The judgment examines the constitutional limits on State power in criminal prosecution and the corresponding duty of constitutional courts to safeguard personal liberty. The Supreme Court scrutinised the arrest of the appellant under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, arising out of allegations of non-payment of contractual dues leading to suicide. The Court analysed whether the First Information Report, even if taken at face value, disclosed the essential ingredients of abetment of suicide. Relying on a consistent line of precedent, the Court reaffirmed that mere financial disputes, business disagreements, or mental stress without active instigation, intentional aid, or proximate conduct cannot attract criminal liability under Section 306 IPC. The decision strongly criticises the failure of the Bombay High Court to conduct a prima facie evaluation of the FIR while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, and consequently declining interim bail under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court emphasised that constitutional courts cannot abdicate their duty by mechanically relegating an accused to statutory remedies when personal liberty is at stake. The ruling reiterates that liberty is not to be sacrificed at the altar of procedural formalism. The judgment also clarifies the scope of further investigation after acceptance of an ‘A Summary’ and balances investigative autonomy with constitutional restraint.
- [Madras Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr., [2020] 2 SCR 246](https://lawfoyer.in/madras-bar-association-v-union-of-india-anr-2020-2-scr-246/): The decision in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr. represents a decisive reaffirmation of constitutional principles governing tribunalisation in India. The Supreme Court examined the constitutional validity of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualification, Experience and Other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2020, framed under Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017. The challenge was rooted in concerns of excessive executive control, dilution of judicial independence, short tenure of tribunal members, exclusion of advocates from eligibility, and retrospective application of subordinate legislation. The Court revisited a long line of precedents beginning from S.P. Sampath Kumar through L. Chandra Kumar and Rojer Mathew, reiterating that tribunals exercising judicial functions must conform to standards equivalent to constitutional courts. Emphasis was placed on judicial dominance in appointments, security of tenure, financial independence, and insulation from executive interference. A major constitutional intervention was the direction to constitute a National Tribunals Commission as an independent supervisory body. The Court also modified several provisions of the 2020 Rules relating to tenure, search-cum-selection committees, disciplinary control, eligibility of advocates and members of the Indian Legal Service, housing allowance, and timelines for appointments. The ruling strengthens the doctrine of separation of powers and reinforces that tribunals, though creatures of statute, cannot be reduced to executive-controlled bodies. It underscores that rule of law and access to justice are compromised when adjudicatory institutions lack independence, stability, and institutional dignity.
- [Indian Commodity Exchange Limited v. Neptune Overseas Limited & Ors., [2020] 13 SCR 129](https://lawfoyer.in/indian-commodity-exchange-limited-v-neptune-overseas-limited-ors-2020-13-scr-129/): The judgment in Indian Commodity Exchange Limited v. Neptune Overseas Limited & Ors. addresses the delicate balance between regulatory authority and procedural fairness under the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952. The Supreme Court examined whether the proceedings initiated by the Forward Markets Commission suffered from violation of principles of natural justice, particularly in relation to supply of documents and grant of reasonable opportunity to respond. The dispute arose from allegations of serious trading irregularities and abuse of fiduciary position by the promoters of a recognised commodity exchange. The show cause notice issued was extensive, supported by voluminous documentation exceeding 4,000 pages, yet the respondents were provided limited time to reply. The Court scrutinised whether denial of adjournments and partial supply of documents vitiated the proceedings. It clarified that service of notice on a key individual holding dual roles could be deemed service on the corporate entity when facts justify piercing of the corporate veil. However, the Court emphasised that reliance on voluminous records obliges the regulator to furnish copies and adequate time. The judgment reiterates that natural justice is not a ritualistic formality but a substantive safeguard against arbitrary exercise of power. The ruling harmonises earlier jurisprudence on substantial compliance, test of prejudice, and reasonable opportunity, while directing a fresh adjudication by SEBI with procedural safeguards. It reinforces that regulatory efficiency cannot override fairness when serious civil and penal consequences ensue.
- [Gajendra Sharma v. Union of India and Another [2020] 13 SCR 835](https://lawfoyer.in/gajendra-sharma-v-union-of-india-and-another-2020-13-scr-835/): The writ petition arose in the backdrop of the unprecedented economic and social disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the nationwide lockdown imposed under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. The petitioner, a housing loan borrower, challenged the Reserve Bank of India Notification dated 27.03.2020 to the limited extent that it permitted accrual of interest during the moratorium period. The petitioner asserted that charging interest during a period when economic activity was suspended defeated the very purpose of the moratorium and infringed the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. The petition also invoked principles of natural justice and proportionality, arguing that the State could not simultaneously halt livelihoods and allow financial institutions to impose interest burdens. During the pendency of the petition, the Union of India placed on record a series of affidavits detailing policy measures undertaken to mitigate borrower distress. Central to the resolution was the Ministry of Finance Order dated 23.10.2020, approved by the Union Cabinet, introducing an ex-gratia scheme for waiver of the difference between compound interest and simple interest for specified categories of loans up to ₹2 crores, including housing loans. The petitioner acknowledged that his loan fell squarely within the eligibility framework of the scheme and expressed satisfaction with the relief granted. The Supreme Court, while recognising the magnitude of economic hardship caused by the pandemic, refrained from adjudicating the constitutional validity of the RBI notification. Instead, it disposed of the petition in view of subsequent executive policy decisions, directing effective implementation of the relief scheme so that its benefits reach eligible borrowers. The judgment underscores judicial restraint in economic policy matters during emergencies and affirms the State’s proactive role under disaster management jurisprudence.
- [The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. & Anr., [2020] 14 S.C.R. 45](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-jharkhand-ors-v-brahmputra-metallics-ltd-anr-2020-14-s-c-r-45/): The judgment addresses the enforceability of fiscal incentives promised under a State industrial policy and the consequences of administrative delay in issuing statutory notifications. The dispute arose from the Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2012, which assured 50 percent exemption from electricity duty for captive power plants for five years and mandated issuance of implementing notifications within one month. Despite the policy assurance, the State issued the exemption notification under Section 9 of the Bihar Electricity Duty Act, 1948 after nearly three years and applied it prospectively. The respondent industrial unit contended that such delay defeated the policy promise and violated the doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. The High Court struck down the prospective operation of the notification. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the evolution of promissory estoppel, its distinction from legitimate expectation, and the standards of fairness binding State action under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Court held that while the State retains discretion in fiscal matters, it cannot act arbitrarily when it has made a clear representation inducing reliance. The unexplained delay and prospective application of the exemption were found to negate the solemn assurance contained in the policy. However, relief was confined strictly to the financial years consistent with the policy’s own stipulation that benefits accrue from the financial year following commencement of production. The judgment reinforces constitutional accountability in economic governance and clarifies the doctrinal boundaries between promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation in Indian administrative law.
- [S. D. Containers Indore v. M/s Mold Tek Packaging Ltd., [2020] 12 SCR 1104](https://lawfoyer.in/s-d-containers-indore-v-m-s-mold-tek-packaging-ltd-2020-12-scr-1104/): The decision in S. D. Containers Indore v. M/s Mold Tek Packaging Ltd. addresses the nuanced jurisdictional conflict arising at the intersection of the Design Act, 2000 and the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The Supreme Court was called upon to clarify the legal mechanism governing the transfer of suits involving design infringement where the defendant raises a plea for cancellation of a registered design under Section 19 of the Design Act, 2000. The core controversy emerged from the improper reliance placed by the High Court on Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Reckitt Benckiser Australia Pty. Ltd., leading to an erroneous conclusion that only the Controller of Designs possessed exclusive jurisdiction over cancellation proceedings. The Court undertook a meticulous statutory interpretation of Sections 19 and 22 of the Design Act, 2000, delineating the two independent remedies available for cancellation of registered designs. It reaffirmed that while Section 19 empowers any interested person to seek cancellation before the Controller, Section 22(4) mandates the transfer of an infringement suit to the High Court when revocation is pleaded as a defence. The judgment further clarified that the transfer is automatic and ministerial in nature once such defence is raised. The ruling decisively resolves the confusion concerning the appropriate High Court to which such suits must be transferred, holding that jurisdiction vests in the High Court within whose territorial limits the cause of action arises. By setting aside the High Court’s order and remitting the matter to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench, the Supreme Court reinforced jurisdictional discipline and procedural clarity in intellectual property litigation.
- [Sandeep Kumar and Others v. State of Uttarakhand and Another, (2020) 13 SCR 848](https://lawfoyer.in/sandeep-kumar-and-others-v-state-of-uttarakhand-and-another-2020-13-scr-848/): The judgment examines the legal sustainability of a conviction under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 concerning an alleged dowry death by poisoning. The appellants, being the husband and parents-in-law of the deceased, were acquitted by the Trial Court, but the High Court reversed the acquittal and imposed life imprisonment. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether the essential statutory ingredients of dowry death were satisfied and whether the High Court was justified in overturning a reasoned acquittal. The Court undertook a meticulous reappreciation of evidence relating to dowry demand, cruelty soon before death, and unnatural death. The prosecution case rested heavily on oral testimonies alleging a demand of Rs. 10 lakhs and a theory of poisoning. However, material contradictions among prosecution witnesses, absence of contemporaneous complaints, lack of medical or forensic proof of poisoning, and credible defence evidence regarding the deceased’s prolonged medical condition were found decisive. The judgment reiterates that Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 creates a presumption only after the prosecution discharges its foundational burden. The Court clarified that suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof, and appellate interference with acquittal is permissible only where findings are perverse or manifestly illegal. By restoring the Trial Court’s acquittal, the Court reaffirmed principles governing dowry death prosecutions, evidentiary standards in poisoning cases, and the limited scope of appellate reversal of acquittals.
- [Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh & Ors., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 770](https://lawfoyer.in/paramvir-singh-saini-v-baljit-singh-ors-2020-13-s-c-r-770/): The judgment in Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh & Ors. addresses the persistent failure of States, Union Territories, and central investigative agencies to meaningfully implement prior directions of the Supreme Court concerning installation and functioning of CCTV cameras in police stations and investigative offices. The Court examined compliance with its earlier order dated 03.04.2018 passed in Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, which mandated videography of crime scenes and establishment of oversight mechanisms. Upon perusal of affidavits filed by several States and Union Territories, the Court found the disclosures grossly inadequate, vague, and evasive, particularly regarding the number, positioning, operational status, audio-video capability, and data retention period of CCTV cameras. The judgment emphasises that CCTV surveillance in police stations is not an administrative luxury but a constitutional necessity flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court laid down detailed directions regarding constitution of State Level and District Level Oversight Committees, allocation of funds, technical specifications of CCTV systems, responsibility of Station House Officers, preservation of footage, and accessibility of recordings for redressal of custodial violence, serious injuries, and deaths. The judgment also extended the mandate to central agencies such as CBI, NIA, ED, NCB, DRI, and SFIO. The Court reinforced accountability, transparency, and human rights protection as the core constitutional values underpinning these directions and treated non-compliance as a serious affront to rule of law.
- [Sandeep Kumar and Others v. State of Uttarakhand and Another, [2020] 13 S.C.R. 848](https://lawfoyer.in/sandeep-kumar-and-others-v-state-of-uttarakhand-and-another-2020-13-s-c-r-848/): The judgment concerns the scope and limits of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, dealing with dowry death, and the corresponding presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in reversing an order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court in a case alleging dowry death by poisoning. The deceased, married within seven years of her death, was found dead under circumstances alleged to be unnatural. The prosecution relied primarily on circumstantial evidence, assertions of dowry demand, and alleged poisoning. The Supreme Court undertook a meticulous reappreciation of evidence, emphasizing that proof of unnatural death and cruelty or harassment soon before death in connection with dowry demand are foundational requirements under Section 304B IPC. The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish poisoning as the cause of death, particularly in light of the Forensic Science Laboratory report negating the presence of poison and medical testimony suggesting alternate natural causes such as tuberculosis. The Court also scrutinized contradictions in testimonies regarding the alleged demand of ₹10 lakhs and found them irreconcilable. Importantly, the Court reiterated the settled principle that appellate courts should not lightly interfere with acquittals unless findings are perverse or manifestly illegal. Holding that the High Court exceeded its appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court restored the acquittal.
- [Nimay Sah v. State of Jharkhand, [2020] 13 S.C.R. 566](https://lawfoyer.in/nimay-sah-v-state-of-jharkhand-2020-13-s-c-r-566/): The judgment in Nimay Sah v. State of Jharkhand examines the evidentiary threshold required to sustain a conviction under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Supreme Court scrutinised the legality of the conviction of the appellant, who was the elder brother of the deceased’s husband, in a prosecution alleging dowry-related harassment. The case arose from allegations that the deceased woman was subjected to cruelty and harassment for a dowry demand of ₹10,000 shortly after her marriage, culminating in her unnatural death. While the husband and father-in-law were also tried, the present appeal was confined to the role attributed to the appellant-brother-in-law. The Court undertook a meticulous evaluation of oral testimonies and emphasised the distinction between generalised allegations and specific, cogent evidence required to establish cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC. It noted that the prosecution witnesses failed to attribute any definite acts of cruelty or persistent dowry demands to the appellant individually. The judgment reiterates that criminal liability cannot be fastened merely on the basis of familial proximity or omnibus allegations. It reinforces the principle that conviction under penal statutes demands proof beyond reasonable doubt, particularly when the charge concerns matrimonial cruelty implicating extended family members. The decision thus clarifies the scope of Section 498-A IPC and safeguards against its mechanical application, while balancing the legislative intent to curb dowry harassment with the fundamental requirement of fair trial and evidentiary rigour.
- [Chaman Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [2020] 12 SCR 1000](https://lawfoyer.in/chaman-lal-v-state-of-himachal-pradesh-2020-12-scr-1000/): The judgment examines the legal permissibility of reversing an acquittal in an appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in a prosecution concerning rape of a mentally retarded woman. The prosecutrix, whose IQ was assessed at 62, was found medically incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of sexual acts. The trial court had acquitted the accused primarily on grounds of delay in lodging the FIR and an erroneous appreciation of the prosecutrix’s mental capacity. The High Court reversed the acquittal after a complete re-appreciation of evidence, particularly medical and psychiatric testimony, and convicted the accused under Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, holding that the trial court’s approach was perverse and contrary to settled principles governing sexual offences involving persons of unsound mind. The Court clarified the scope of appellate powers in acquittal appeals, reiterating that where material evidence is ignored and conclusions are illogical, reversal is justified. The judgment significantly interprets clause fifthly of Section 375 IPC, emphasizing that consent obtained from a person incapable of understanding due to mental retardation is legally invalid. The Court underscored the obligation of courts to adopt a victim-centric approach in cases involving vulnerable persons and condemned exploitation of mental disability. The ruling reinforces judicial sensitivity towards sexual offences against persons with intellectual disabilities and strengthens the jurisprudence on appellate scrutiny of acquittals.
- [Inderjit Singh Sodhi and Others v. The Chairman, Punjab State Electricity Board and Another, [2020] 11 SCR 966](https://lawfoyer.in/inderjit-singh-sodhi-and-others-v-the-chairman-punjab-state-electricity-board-and-another-2020-11-scr-966/): The decision in Inderjit Singh Sodhi and Others v. The Chairman, Punjab State Electricity Board and Another addresses the limits of parity claims in service jurisprudence where promotional benefits are structured through distinct statutory channels for promotees and direct recruits. The controversy arose from the claim of time bound promotional scales by Assistant Engineers who had entered the cadre by promotion from Junior Engineer posts under the Punjab State Electricity Board Service of Engineers (Civil) Regulations, 1965. The appellants sought parity with juniors appointed through direct recruitment and granted higher scales under a later circular. The Supreme Court examined the architecture of the Regulations and two contemporaneous circulars issued in April and May 1990 providing for stagnation relief through time bound scales. The judgment clarifies that promotional benefits must strictly flow from the source and mode of recruitment. It underscores that a legal fiction created for limited categories cannot be expanded to obliterate statutory distinctions. The Court reaffirmed that dismissal of Special Leave Petitions does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 and cannot override a reasoned judgment of the Supreme Court. By relying on Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Krishan Kumar Vij, the Court harmonised service equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India with regulatory classification based on qualifications and recruitment channels. The ruling reinforces doctrinal clarity on stagnation schemes, parity claims, and the non-extension of benefits contrary to express regulatory intent.
- [Skill Lotto Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 13 SCR 151](https://lawfoyer.in/skill-lotto-solutions-pvt-ltd-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-13-scr-151/): The writ petition questioned the constitutional validity of levying Goods and Services Tax on lottery transactions under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, particularly challenging the inclusion of actionable claims within the statutory definition of goods under Section 2(52). The petitioner, an authorised distributor of State-run lotteries, alleged violation of Article 14 on the ground of hostile discrimination, arguing that only lottery, betting, and gambling were taxed while other actionable claims were excluded under Schedule III. The petition further contested the legislative competence of Parliament to expand the constitutional meaning of goods, contending that actionable claims stood excluded under established legal understanding as reflected in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. The Court examined the scope of Article 32 maintainability, the nature of inclusive definitions under constitutional interpretation, and the effect of Article 246A inserted by the 101st Constitutional Amendment. Reliance was placed on the Constitution Bench ruling in Sunrise Associates, clarifying that lotteries are actionable claims and that such classification formed the ratio decidendi of that judgment. The Court also analysed the valuation mechanism under Section 15 read with Rule 31A of the CGST Rules, rejecting the plea to exclude prize money from the taxable value. The judgment upheld the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions, reaffirmed Parliament’s plenary taxing power under the GST regime, and reiterated judicial restraint in fiscal matters. The writ petition was dismissed in entirety.
- [Sumedh Singh Saini v. State of Punjab and Another, [2020] 13 SCR 812](https://lawfoyer.in/sumedh-singh-saini-v-state-of-punjab-and-another-2020-13-scr-812/): The judgment in Sumedh Singh Saini v. State of Punjab and Another examines the scope and discretionary contours of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in the context of a prosecution revived after an extraordinary lapse of time. The case arises from allegations relating to the illegal abduction, custodial torture, and alleged murder of Balwant Singh Multani in the year 1991. Nearly twenty-nine years later, an FIR was lodged by the brother of the deceased, invoking serious penal provisions including Sections 364, 201, 344, 219, 120-B, and subsequently Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant, a former Director General of Police, Punjab, sought anticipatory bail contending that the FIR was a second FIR on identical facts, that the delay was unexplained and fatal, and that the addition of Section 302 IPC was founded solely on statements of approvers recorded decades later. The State and the informant opposed the plea, asserting the gravity of allegations and the necessity of custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court, while consciously refraining from adjudicating the legality or maintainability of the FIR, focused on the limited question of entitlement to anticipatory bail. The Court emphasised the significance of prolonged delay, prior quashing proceedings in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, the appellant’s status as a retired senior police officer, and the procedural history relating to the belated addition of the murder charge. Ultimately, the Court held that the cumulative circumstances justified the grant of anticipatory bail, clarifying that such protection would not prejudice pending proceedings seeking quashing of the FIR. The decision reinforces the principle that anticipatory bail serves as a shield against arbitrary arrest, even in serious offences, when the factual matrix discloses exceptional features warranting judicial protection.
- [Jayant Etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2020] 11 SCR 665](https://lawfoyer.in/jayant-etc-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2020-11-scr-665/): The decision in Jayant Etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh addresses the interface between the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the context of illegal mining, storage, and transportation of minor minerals. The Supreme Court examined whether a Judicial Magistrate can exercise powers under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct registration of an FIR for offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules framed thereunder, notwithstanding the statutory bar under Section 22 of the Act. The Court clarified the doctrinal distinction between the stage of investigation and the stage of cognizance, holding that the bar under Section 22 is attracted only when the Magistrate takes cognizance and issues process, and not at the pre-cognizance stage of directing investigation. The judgment further analysed the effect of compounding of offences under Section 23A MMDR Act, concluding that once an offence under the Act or the Rules is compounded, no further proceedings can continue in respect of such offences, though prosecution under the Indian Penal Code for distinct offences such as theft remains unaffected. The ruling harmonises environmental protection objectives with procedural criminal law, reinforces the autonomy of police investigation in cognizable offences, and reiterates the doctrine that offences under special statutes and the IPC can coexist when their ingredients are distinct.
- [Pankjeshwar Sharma and Others v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others, [2020] 13 S.C.R. 198](https://lawfoyer.in/pankjeshwar-sharma-and-others-v-state-of-jammu-kashmir-and-others-2020-13-s-c-r-198/): The judgment in Pankjeshwar Sharma and Others v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others examines the constitutional validity of appointments made to public service posts in deviation from the merit list prepared under statutory recruitment rules. The Supreme Court was confronted with a complex service law dispute arising from a prolonged recruitment process initiated in 1999 for the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Executive) in the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir. The litigation spanned over two decades and involved three distinct rounds of judicial scrutiny. The core controversy centered on whether appointments granted to twenty-two candidates—who were admittedly lower in merit than the appellants—could be sustained when such appointments were made pursuant to a concession recorded by the Supreme Court in earlier proceedings, and not strictly in accordance with the redrawn State-wise merit list. The appellants invoked Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, contending that denial of appointment to more meritorious candidates amounted to arbitrariness and hostile discrimination. The Court undertook an elaborate analysis of the doctrine of negative equality, reiterating that illegality or irregularity committed in favour of one candidate cannot be relied upon by others to claim similar relief. While holding that the appointments of the twenty-two candidates were irregular and not in conformity with recruitment rules, the Court declined to disturb them on equitable considerations, including long years of service, bonafide state action, and the need to bring quietus to prolonged litigation. The judgment draws a critical distinction between illegal and irregular appointments and reinforces settled principles governing public employment, merit-based selection, and constitutional equality.
- [Telangana Power Generation Corporation Ltd. v. Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation Ltd., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 987](https://lawfoyer.in/telangana-power-generation-corporation-ltd-v-andhra-pradesh-power-generation-corporation-ltd-2020-13-s-c-r-987/): The judgment addresses a long-standing and complex service law dispute arising from the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh under the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014. The core controversy pertained to the allocation and distribution of employees of power sector undertakings between the newly formed State of Telangana and the residuary State of Andhra Pradesh. Following the appointed day, 02.06.2014, the respective power utilities failed to reach consensus on modalities for employee distribution as mandated under Section 82 of the Act. In the absence of agreement, the Telangana power utilities unilaterally relieved 1157 employees based predominantly on the principle of nativity, directing them to join Andhra Pradesh utilities. This action triggered multiple writ petitions before the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad, which decisively rejected nativity as a valid criterion and quashed the unilateral action. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s ruling and, with the consent of parties, constituted a One-Man Committee headed by Justice D.M. Dharmadhikari (Retd.) to effectuate final allocation. The Committee’s process culminated in a Final Report, Supplementary Report, and a Concluding Report, collectively allocating 655 employees from Telangana to Andhra Pradesh and an equal reciprocal number in the reverse direction, subject to special categories such as spouse, medical, SC/ST, and retirement cases. A series of miscellaneous applications challenged the Committee’s mandate, methodology, reciprocity principle, and finality of allocation. The Supreme Court rejected all objections, reaffirmed the binding nature of the Committee’s conclusions, and clarified that no employee, utility, or association could challenge the finalized allocation before any forum. The judgment reinforces statutory intent, administrative equity, and finality in post-reorganisation service matters.
- [QUIZ COMPETIITON ON UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT | Organized by CANONSPHERE LAW REVIEW | Register by January 7, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/quiz-competiiton-on-unlawful-activities-prevention-act-organized-by-canonsphere-law-review-register-by-january-7-2026/): QUIZ COMPETIITON ON UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT | Organized by CANONSPHERE LAW REVIEW | Register by January 7, 2026
- [Amish Devgan v. Union of India and Others, [2020] 14 S.C.R. 198](https://lawfoyer.in/amish-devgan-v-union-of-india-and-others-2020-14-s-c-r-198/): The judgment in Amish Devgan v. Union of India and Others addresses the constitutional and statutory boundaries of hate speech, freedom of speech and expression, and criminal process in the context of televised media debates. The case arose from allegedly offensive remarks made by the petitioner during a live news debate concerning The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, wherein references were made to Pir Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti, a revered Sufi saint. Multiple FIRs were registered across several States invoking Sections 153A, 295A and 505(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The petitioner sought quashing of FIRs, protection from arrest, and consolidation of proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court undertook an extensive doctrinal and comparative analysis of hate speech jurisprudence, identifying three determinative elements—content, intent, and harm. The Court clarified that Section 295A IPC criminalises only aggravated and malicious insults to religion and does not penalise mere offensive or careless speech. It emphasised that the evaluation of hate speech requires contextual and factual inquiry, rendering premature quashing inappropriate at the FIR stage. The Court rejected the plea for quashing but granted interim protection from arrest, subject to cooperation with investigation. Applying the doctrine against multiplicity of FIRs, all subsequent FIRs were directed to be transferred and clubbed with the first FIR at Ajmer. The judgment reinforces constitutional balance between free speech and public order while preserving investigative autonomy.
- [The Project Director, Project Implementation Unit v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy & Ors., [2020] 14 SCR 86](https://lawfoyer.in/the-project-director-project-implementation-unit-v-p-v-krishnamoorthy-ors-2020-14-scr-86/): The Supreme Court in The Project Director, Project Implementation Unit v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy & Ors. authoritatively examined the scope of legislative and executive competence of the Union of India under Articles 246, 248 and Entry 23 of List I of the Seventh Schedule concerning declaration and construction of national highways over green-field lands. The controversy arose from challenges to notifications issued under Sections 2(2) and 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 for acquisition of lands for the Chennai–Krishnagiri–Salem National Corridor under Bharatmala Pariyojana – Phase I. The Madras High Court had partially invalidated the acquisition on grounds of lack of legislative competence, arbitrariness in route realignment, and absence of prior environmental clearance. The Supreme Court reversed these findings and held that the 1956 Act empowers the Central Government to declare any land, including non-existing roads and green-field lands, as national highways. The Court applied the doctrine of pith and substance to affirm Parliament’s exclusive domain over national highways and clarified that Entry 13 of List II does not dilute Entry 23 of List I. The Court further held that prior environmental or forest clearance is not a precondition for issuing notifications under Sections 2(2) or 3A, and such clearance is required only before commencement of actual construction. The judgment also clarified judicial restraint in policy decisions, especially infrastructure planning, and laid down a crucial interpretative mechanism under Article 142 to exclude time spent in environmental clearance from the statutory lapse period under Section 3D(3). The decision reinforces federal balance, sustainable development jurisprudence, and limits of judicial review in land acquisition for national infrastructure projects.
- [Daulat Singh (D) Thr. LRs v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 845](https://lawfoyer.in/daulat-singh-d-thr-lrs-v-state-of-rajasthan-ors-2020-11-scr-845/): The judgment examines the legality of reopening concluded ceiling proceedings and the validity of a registered gift deed executed prior to statutory cut-off dates under Rajasthan land ceiling laws. The dispute arose when land gifted by an agriculturist father to his son in 1963 was later subjected to reopening under the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973. The State authorities alleged that the transfer was invalid due to absence of acceptance and that the land exceeded the permissible ceiling limit. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of Section 15 of the Ceiling Act, 1973, determining the limitation framework governing reopening of settled cases. It clarified that the crucial dates are the date of the earlier final order and the issuance of the show-cause notice, and not the final reopening order. The Court also exhaustively examined Sections 122 and 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, reiterating that acceptance of a gift need not be express and may be inferred from conduct, possession, and surrounding circumstances. By relying upon documentary evidence, mutation records, and statements of both donor and donee, the Court held that acceptance was clearly established. Further, the Court harmonized Sections 30C, 30D, and 30DD of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, emphasizing the overriding nature of Section 30DD, which protects bona fide agricultural transfers made before 31 December 1969. The judgment reinforces statutory intent to protect genuine family transfers among agriculturists and curtails arbitrary resumption of land by the State.
- [Anita Sharma & Ors. v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., [2020] 12 SCR 1118](https://lawfoyer.in/anita-sharma-ors-v-the-new-india-assurance-co-ltd-anr-2020-12-scr-1118/): The decision in Anita Sharma v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. constitutes a significant reaffirmation of the settled principles governing adjudication of motor accident compensation claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine whether the High Court was justified in reversing a reasoned award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by discarding the testimony of a sole independent eyewitness and by importing standards of proof akin to criminal trials. The judgment analyses the evidentiary value of eyewitness testimony rendered by a disinterested bystander acting as a Good Samaritan, the legal consequences of failure to cross-examine a crucial witness, and the improper shifting of burden of proof upon claimants. The Court reiterates that MACT proceedings are summary in nature and governed by preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. It also clarifies the limited evidentiary worth of an FIR lodged on hearsay and at a belated stage. Importantly, the Court emphasises that the non-examination of an interested respondent who pleads an alternative version of events may give rise to an adverse inference. The ruling further aligns compensation jurisprudence with the principles laid down in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi by granting future prospects to the deceased’s income. The judgment thus restores claimant-centric justice and reinforces the benevolent object of accident compensation law.
- [The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. & Anr., [2020] 11 SCR 821](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-anr-v-u-p-state-bridge-corporation-ltd-anr-2020-11-scr-821/): The judgment adjudicates upon the legality of rejection of technical bids in a public procurement process and delineates the boundaries of judicial review in tender matters. The dispute arose from a Notice Inviting Tender dated 02.12.2019 issued by the Public Works Department, State of Madhya Pradesh for construction of an elevated corridor in Indore. The bid of U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. was rejected on the ground of suppression of material facts relating to a prior FIR and charge-sheet concerning collapse of a bridge constructed by it. The High Court interfered and directed issuance of a Letter of Intent in its favour, holding that no “investigation” was pending on the date of bid submission. The Supreme Court reversed this view by interpreting paragraphs 11 and 13 of Appendix-I-A conjointly with Clause 7(b) of Annex-I and the definition of fraudulent practice under Clause 4.3(b). The Court held that filing of a charge-sheet amounts to being “indicted” and non-disclosure thereof constitutes suppression of a material fact. The Court further upheld rejection of Rachana Construction Co. on the ground of failure to satisfy Clause 2.2.2.2(ii) relating to experience of one similar work. The ruling reiterates judicial restraint in contractual matters, emphasizes transparency in public tenders, and affirms that public interest cannot override mandatory disclosure requirements. Keywords:
- [Titty Alias George Kurian v. The Deputy Range Forest Officer, [2020] 13 S.C.R. 1230](https://lawfoyer.in/titty-alias-george-kurian-v-the-deputy-range-forest-officer-2020-13-s-c-r-1230/): The judgment examines the legal consequences of possession and seizure of a turtle allegedly protected under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. The controversy arose when forest officials seized a turtle from the respondent and registered offences under Sections 2, 9, 39A, 49A and 51 of the Act. The decisive issue before the Supreme Court was whether the seized turtle belonged to a species notified under Part II of Schedule I, thereby attracting penal consequences. The Veterinary Surgeon’s certificate identified the turtle as Indian Flap Shell Turtle (Lissemys punctata), whereas Schedule I, Part II includes only Indian Soft-shelled Turtle (Lissemys punctata punctata). The Court analysed the statutory scheme, scientific classification, and evidentiary value of the identification report. It reaffirmed the limited but significant jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to prevent abuse of process where basic statutory ingredients of an offence are absent. The Supreme Court concluded that continuation of prosecution would be legally unsustainable as the seized turtle was not a notified species. The judgment reinforces strict construction of penal statutes and underlines that wildlife offences must rest on precise statutory inclusion rather than assumptions or broad biological similarities.
- [Saritha S. Nair v. Hibi Eden, [2020] 13 SCR 635](https://lawfoyer.in/saritha-s-nair-v-hibi-eden-2020-13-scr-635/): The decision in Saritha S. Nair v. Hibi Eden examines two interconnected legal questions arising under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The first issue concerns whether defects relating to verification, annexures, and prayer clauses in an election petition are incurable so as to mandate dismissal under Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act. The second issue concerns the scope and operation of disqualification under Section 8(3) of the Act when the execution of sentence is stayed but the conviction itself remains unsuspended. The petitioner, a convicted individual sentenced to imprisonment exceeding two years in two criminal cases, challenged the rejection of her nomination papers and the dismissal of her election petition by the High Court of Kerala. The High Court treated procedural defects in the election petition as incurable and also held that the petitioner continued to suffer statutory disqualification. The Supreme Court undertook an extensive examination of precedent governing election petition procedure and reaffirmed the settled principle that defects in verification and prayer clauses fall within the category of curable defects. The Court found fault with the High Court’s approach in refusing an opportunity to rectify such defects. However, on the substantive question of electoral disqualification, the Court reiterated that suspension of sentence does not dilute the effect of conviction for the purposes of Section 8(3). Only a judicial stay of conviction under Section 389(1) CrPC can remove the statutory bar. The judgment harmonises procedural fairness in election litigation with the strict legislative mandate against criminalisation of politics.
- [Madhavi v. Chagan & Ors., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 1208](https://lawfoyer.in/madhavi-v-chagan-ors-2020-13-s-c-r-1208/): The judgment in Madhavi v. Chagan & Ors. addresses a recurring dispute in service jurisprudence under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 and the Rules, 1981, concerning inter se seniority and eligibility for promotion in secondary schools. The controversy arose from competing claims to the post of Head Master, where the respondent asserted seniority based on an earlier date of appointment, while the appellant relied on possession of requisite academic and training qualifications at the time of initial entry into service. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of the statutory framework governing qualifications, categorisation, and seniority of teachers, particularly the distinction between primary and secondary schools under Schedule ‘F’. The Court clarified that seniority in secondary schools is determined not merely by the date of initial appointment but by placement within the prescribed hierarchical categories based on qualifications. Teachers who enter service without the minimum graduate and training qualifications cannot retrospectively claim seniority in a higher category upon later acquisition of such qualifications. Relying on Bhawna v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that the respondent, who was initially an untrained undergraduate teacher, could not claim parity with teachers who were trained graduates from inception. The judgment decisively rejected the High Court’s reliance on Viman Vaman Awale, holding it applicable only to primary schools. The ruling reinforces the principle that statutory categorisation under Schedule ‘F’ constitutes a ladder of seniority, ensuring that professional qualifications remain central to promotion in secondary education institutions.
- [Kush Kalra v. Union of India and Others, [2020] 12 S.C.R. 1133](https://lawfoyer.in/kush-kalra-v-union-of-india-and-others-2020-12-s-c-r-1133/): The decision in Kush Kalra v. Union of India and Others examines the legality and constitutional validity of the practice adopted by several States and Union Territories during the COVID-19 pandemic of affixing posters outside the residences of COVID-19 positive persons undergoing home isolation. The writ petition, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, raised serious concerns relating to right to privacy, human dignity, and non-discrimination, particularly in the context of public health emergencies. The petitioner challenged the administrative actions of State authorities as being arbitrary, stigmatizing, and unsupported by any statutory mandate under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. The Supreme Court confined its adjudication to the narrow but crucial issue of whether such a practice was authorised by the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. The Court relied heavily on the Revised Guidelines for Home Isolation dated 02.07.2020 and the subsequent D.O. Letter dated 19.11.2020, which clarified that no instruction existed for pasting posters outside residences of infected persons. Without entering into a detailed adjudication on privacy jurisprudence, the Court restrained States from continuing the practice unless expressly authorised by a competent authority under the 2005 Act. The judgment reinforces administrative discipline during emergencies and underscores that even during disasters, executive action must remain anchored to statutory authority and constitutional values.
- [The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India & Ors. v. Shaji Poulose & Ors., [2020] 9 S.C.R. 851](https://lawfoyer.in/the-institute-of-chartered-accountants-of-india-ors-v-shaji-poulose-ors-2020-9-s-c-r-851/): The judgment addresses the exercise of the Supreme Court’s transfer jurisdiction under Article 139A(1) of the Constitution of India in the context of multiple writ petitions pending before different High Courts challenging the constitutional validity of Chapter VI of the Guidelines dated 08.08.2008 issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. The impugned guidelines impose a numerical ceiling on the number of tax audit assignments a Chartered Accountant may undertake in a financial year under Section 44AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The writ petitioners before various High Courts contended that the said restriction infringes their fundamental right to practise a profession under Article 19(1)(g) and results in arbitrary disciplinary action under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949. The petitioner Institute sought transfer of all such writ petitions to the Supreme Court to avoid conflicting decisions, multiplicity of proceedings, and legal uncertainty affecting a regulated profession of national importance. The respondents opposed the transfer, invoking the sanctity of Article 226 jurisdiction and arguing that Article 139A is an exceptional power to be exercised sparingly. The Supreme Court, while not adjudicating upon the constitutional validity of the guidelines themselves, held that the controversy raises questions of general public importance, impacting not only Chartered Accountants but also citizens subject to compulsory tax audits. Emphasising the need for authoritative settlement of law and uniformity, the Court allowed the transfer petitions while protecting existing interim orders. The ruling clarifies the scope of transfer jurisdiction and balances institutional regulation with constitutional safeguards.
- [Rohtas & Anr. v. State of Haryana, [2020] 11 S.C.R. 983](https://lawfoyer.in/rohtas-anr-v-state-of-haryana-2020-11-s-c-r-983/): The judgment in Rohtas & Anr. v. State of Haryana authoritatively examines the legal permissibility of altering charges during the course of criminal proceedings, particularly when a prosecution initially framed under Sections 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 fails due to acquittal of some accused, resulting in the number falling below the statutory minimum of five persons constituting an unlawful assembly. The Supreme Court analyses the scope and object of Sections 211–224, 386 and 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and clarifies that criminal courts are vested with wide discretion to modify or alter charges at any stage, including at the appellate level, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused and no failure of justice ensues. The Court further draws a doctrinal distinction between Section 149 IPC and Section 34 IPC, emphasizing that while both impose vicarious liability, the former is based on mere membership of an unlawful assembly, whereas the latter requires proof of common intention and active participation. On facts, the Court finds that despite the collapse of the unlawful assembly charge, the evidence unmistakably established individual culpability of the appellants for the offence of attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC, read with Section 34 IPC. The judgment also addresses evidentiary principles relating to reliance on related witnesses and non-examination of independent witnesses in crimes occurring in private spaces. Finally, the Court adopts a victim-centric approach to sentencing, refusing leniency in light of the gravity of injuries and permanent disability caused to the complainant. The decision reinforces substance over form in criminal justice and curtails hyper-technical objections that obstruct accountability.
- [APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University & Anr. v. Jai Bharath College of Management and Engineering Technology & Ors., [2020] 13 SCR 732](https://lawfoyer.in/apj-abdul-kalam-technological-university-anr-v-jai-bharath-college-of-management-and-engineering-technology-ors-2020-13-scr-732/): The decision of the Supreme Court in APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University v. Jai Bharath College of Management and Engineering Technology & Ors. authoritatively clarifies the scope of statutory powers of a State Technical University to prescribe norms and standards for affiliation of additional courses, even in the interregnum period prior to the framing of University Statutes. The judgment addresses an important institutional conflict between university autonomy and regulatory oversight by the All India Council for Technical Education. The Court decisively rejects the view that, in the absence of formally notified Statutes, the Syndicate of the University becomes functus officio in matters of affiliation. It holds that the power of the Syndicate to prescribe norms flows directly from the parent Act and is not contingent upon the existence of Statutes. The Court further delineates the correct interpretation of Section 14(6) of the APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University Act, 2015, holding that the Vice-Chancellor’s interim regulatory power cannot eclipse the statutory authority of the Syndicate. On the second limb, the judgment reaffirms settled constitutional doctrine that while universities cannot dilute minimum standards prescribed by AICTE, they are legally entitled to impose enhanced norms in furtherance of academic excellence. The Court critically examines post-2012 AICTE regulatory practice based on online self-disclosure and underscores the continuing responsibility of universities towards students and institutional reputation. The ruling restores institutional balance, strengthens university autonomy, and harmonises regulatory federalism in technical education.
- [Vidya Drolia and Others v. Durga Trading Corporation, [2020] 11 SCR 1001](https://lawfoyer.in/vidya-drolia-and-others-v-durga-trading-corporation-2020-11-scr-1001/): The judgment in Vidya Drolia and Others v. Durga Trading Corporation constitutes a seminal exposition on arbitrability, judicial intervention at the reference stage, and the doctrines of separability and competence–competence under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court undertook a comprehensive reconsideration of conflicting precedents to settle the scope of judicial scrutiny under Sections 8 and 11 of the Act. The Court authoritatively held that the jurisdiction of courts at the pre-arbitral stage is identical, limited, and prima facie in nature, and interference is permissible only where the arbitration agreement is manifestly non-existent, invalid, or the dispute is ex facie non-arbitrable. A four-fold test was crystallized to determine non-arbitrability, focusing on actions in rem, third-party rights, sovereign functions, and statutory prohibitions. Applying this framework, the Court clarified that landlord–tenant disputes governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 are arbitrable, while disputes under rent control statutes are not. The decision overruled prior inconsistent rulings and reinforced India’s pro-arbitration stance by emphasizing minimal judicial interference and prioritizing arbitral tribunals as the first forum to decide jurisdictional objections. The judgment harmonizes Indian arbitration law with international standards and ensures predictability, efficiency, and party autonomy.
- [Dr. AKB Sadbhavana Mission School of Homoeo Pharmacy v. The Secretary, Ministry of AYUSH & Ors., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 1074](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-akb-sadbhavana-mission-school-of-homoeo-pharmacy-v-the-secretary-ministry-of-ayush-ors-2020-13-s-c-r-1074/): The Supreme Court in Dr. AKB Sadbhavana Mission School of Homoeo Pharmacy v. The Secretary, Ministry of AYUSH & Ors. examined the permissible scope of practice of Homeopathic practitioners during the COVID-19 pandemic and the extent to which courts may issue regulatory directions beyond the pleadings. The appeal arose from a Kerala High Court judgment that, while disposing of a writ seeking implementation of the Ministry of AYUSH advisory dated 06.03.2020, issued wide directions cautioning AYUSH practitioners against advertising or prescribing medicines claiming a cure for COVID-19 and authorised monitoring and action under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. The appellant, though not a party before the High Court, challenged these directions as excessive, prejudicial, and unsupported by the advisory framework. The Supreme Court analysed the AYUSH advisory and subsequent Homeopathy guidelines and clarified that Homeopathy was envisaged as a preventive, prophylactic, symptomatic, and add-on therapeutic aid, subject to strict limitations against claiming a cure. The Court also reaffirmed that statutory ethical regulations already prohibit advertisement by Homeopathic practitioners, rendering additional judicial directions unnecessary. The judgment balances public health imperatives, statutory regulation of medical ethics, and judicial restraint, while correcting an over-expansive approach adopted by the High Court.
- [Smt. S. Vanitha v. The Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 1057](https://lawfoyer.in/smt-s-vanitha-v-the-deputy-commissioner-bengaluru-urban-district-ors-2020-12-scr-1057/): The judgment in Smt. S. Vanitha v. The Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors. examines the legal tension between the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, particularly when eviction proceedings against a daughter-in-law intersect with her claim of residence in a shared household. The Supreme Court was required to determine whether senior citizens could secure eviction of their daughter-in-law through summary proceedings under the 2007 Act in a manner that effectively extinguished her statutory right of residence under the 2005 Act. The dispute arose from intra-family property transfers, matrimonial discord, and competing claims of vulnerability between aged parents and a deserted woman with a minor child. The Court undertook an in-depth statutory interpretation exercise, emphasizing harmonious construction between two special welfare legislations, each containing overriding provisions. It clarified the scope of the expression “shared household” under Section 2(s) of the 2005 Act and reinforced that a woman’s right of residence is not contingent upon ownership or title. The judgment cautions against mechanical eviction orders by Tribunals under the 2007 Act without considering competing remedies available to women under the 2005 Act. The ruling reaffirms gender-sensitive constitutional values under Articles 14, 15, and 21 and underscores that statutory protections for senior citizens cannot be misused to defeat safeguards against domestic violence. The Court ultimately held that eviction orders under the 2007 Act must be moulded to avoid negating the right to residence guaranteed under the 2005 Act.
- [Samir Agrawal v. Competition Commission of India & Ors., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 1044](https://lawfoyer.in/samir-agrawal-v-competition-commission-of-india-ors-2020-13-s-c-r-1044/): The judgment in Samir Agrawal v. Competition Commission of India & Ors. marks a significant doctrinal development in Indian competition jurisprudence concerning the locus standi of informants under the Competition Act, 2002. The Supreme Court decisively rejected the restrictive interpretation adopted by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal which confined access to the Competition Commission of India only to persons who had suffered direct legal injury. The Court clarified that proceedings under the Act are in rem and driven by public interest, thereby permitting any person to furnish information regarding alleged anti-competitive conduct irrespective of personal harm. The Court undertook a purposive interpretation of Sections 19, 26, 35, 53B and 53T of the Act, read with the Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009, to hold that the legislative intent post the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007 was to replace adversarial complaint-based mechanisms with an inquisitorial information-based regime. The judgment also examined allegations of cartelisation and price fixing in the context of algorithmic pricing employed by digital cab aggregators Ola and Uber. Affirming concurrent findings of the CCI and NCLAT, the Court held that algorithmic fare determination did not amount to a hub-and-spoke cartel nor satisfied the statutory requirement of an agreement or meeting of minds under Section 3. The ruling strengthens access to competition enforcement mechanisms while simultaneously safeguarding enterprises through statutory deterrents against frivolous or mala fide information.
- [Sanjai Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2020] 9 S.C.R. 966](https://lawfoyer.in/sanjai-tiwari-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2020-9-s-c-r-966/): The judgment in Sanjai Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. decisively examines the contours of locus standi in criminal proceedings, particularly in the context of petitions filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether a third party, styling himself as a social activist and advocate, could invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to seek expeditious disposal of a pending criminal trial under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. While reaffirming the settled principle that trials relating to corruption offences must be concluded expeditiously owing to their deleterious impact on public administration and societal confidence, the Court simultaneously underscored that such procedural directions cannot be sought by strangers to the prosecution under the guise of public interest. The ruling harmonises two competing considerations. One relates to the constitutional and statutory obligation of courts to ensure speedy trials, especially in corruption cases. The other concerns the sanctity of criminal process, which restricts participation to the State, the accused, and legitimately aggrieved parties. By setting aside the High Court’s order, the Supreme Court clarified that inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be converted into a forum for unsolicited third-party interventions. The judgment draws authoritative support from Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, reinforcing that criminal law cannot be piloted by self-appointed public watchdogs. At the same time, the Court carefully preserved the trial court’s discretion to independently expedite proceedings, thereby maintaining institutional balance between efficiency and procedural propriety.
- [Seelan @ Jeyaseelan v. The Inspector of Police, [2020] 13 S.C.R. 1235](https://lawfoyer.in/seelan-jeyaseelan-v-the-inspector-of-police-2020-13-s-c-r-1235/): The judgment in Seelan @ Jeyaseelan v. The Inspector of Police concerns the dismissal of a Special Leave Petition challenging conviction and sentence for the offence of rape of a minor child. The Supreme Court was required to examine whether the petitioner’s plea that the charge was framed only under Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and not under Section 376(2) could sustain interference with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court. The case involved the rape of a six-year-old girl, supported by consistent ocular and testimonial evidence, including that of the victim and her mother, who was an eye witness. The petitioner attempted to raise technical objections regarding the nature of the charge and physical incapacity on account of having only one hand. The Court rejected these submissions, holding that the charge framed under Section 376 IPC necessarily included Section 376(2) and that both courts below had adequately dealt with the plea of physical impossibility. The Supreme Court emphasized the settled principle that it would not interfere with concurrent findings of fact, particularly in cases involving grave sexual offences against children, unless there was manifest perversity or miscarriage of justice. The dismissal of the petition reaffirmed the evidentiary value of a child victim’s testimony, the limited scope of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, and the approach of courts in sexual offences involving minors.
- [Action Ispat and Power Pvt. Ltd. v. Shyam Metalics and Energy Ltd., [2020] 13 SCR 783](https://lawfoyer.in/action-ispat-and-power-pvt-ltd-v-shyam-metalics-and-energy-ltd-2020-13-scr-783/): The judgment in Action Ispat and Power Pvt. Ltd. v. Shyam Metalics and Energy Ltd. examines the scope and application of the fifth proviso to Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 in the context of transfer of winding-up proceedings from the High Court to the National Company Law Tribunal. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a winding-up petition, which had already been admitted and in which a Company Liquidator had taken possession of assets, could still be transferred to the NCLT for resolution under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Court undertook a detailed statutory analysis of Chapter XX of the Companies Act, 2013, juxtaposed with the objectives and overriding nature of the IBC under Section 238. It reaffirmed that the legislative intent behind the IBC prioritises revival and resolution over liquidation, and that winding-up is a measure of last resort. The Court clarified that the power to transfer winding-up proceedings is discretionary and not constrained by the stage of the proceedings, provided that no irreversible steps such as sale of assets have occurred. Applying this principle, the Court upheld the concurrent findings of the Company Judge and the Division Bench that mere possession of assets by the Official Liquidator does not amount to irreversibility. The judgment harmonises corporate insolvency jurisprudence by preventing parallel proceedings and reinforces the supremacy of the IBC framework in achieving value maximisation and equitable treatment of stakeholders.
- [M/s. SS Group Pvt. Ltd. v. Aaditiya J. Garg & Anr., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 779](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-ss-group-pvt-ltd-v-aaditiya-j-garg-anr-2020-13-s-c-r-779/): The judgment in M/s. SS Group Pvt. Ltd. v. Aaditiya J. Garg & Anr. addresses the interplay between statutory limitation under consumer law and extraordinary constitutional powers exercised by the Supreme Court during the Covid-19 pandemic. The dispute arose from consumer complaints filed by flat purchasers alleging deficiency in service due to delayed possession and seeking refund. The builder failed to file its written statement within the mandatory 45-day period prescribed under Section 38 of the Consumer Protection Act. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission refused to take the written statement on record, relying on the Constitution Bench ruling in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (P) Ltd., which categorically held that consumer fora lack power to extend this limitation. The Supreme Court examined whether the suo motu extension of limitation ordered in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation applied even to proceedings governed by special statutes prescribing non-condonable timelines. The Court held that the pandemic-related order, issued under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution, had universal application across all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Since the limitation period expired during the subsistence of the extension order, the delay of four days in filing the written statement was held to be legally condonable. The ruling harmonises strict procedural mandates with constitutional equity during extraordinary circumstances, reaffirming the binding nature of Supreme Court directions during national crises.
- [Dr. Naresh Kumar Mangla v. Smt. Anita Agarwal & Ors. [2020] 14 SCR 294](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-naresh-kumar-mangla-v-smt-anita-agarwal-ors-2020-14-scr-294/): The judgment in Dr. Naresh Kumar Mangla v. Smt. Anita Agarwal & Ors. constitutes a significant reaffirmation of the principles governing anticipatory bail, cancellation of bail, and judicial oversight over defective criminal investigations, particularly in cases involving dowry death under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine the legality of an order passed by the Allahabad High Court granting anticipatory bail to the parents-in-law and relatives of a deceased woman who died an unnatural death within seven years of marriage. The deceased’s father alleged sustained dowry harassment, physical assault, financial extortion, and ultimately murder camouflaged as suicide. The Court found that the High Court’s approach suffered from grave perversity, as it disregarded specific allegations in the FIR, ignored documentary evidence of money transactions, and prematurely assessed disputed facts such as the authenticity of a suicide note and absence of external injuries. The judgment draws a clear distinction between cancellation of bail due to supervening circumstances and setting aside a perverse bail order passed in ignorance of material evidence. Further, the Court invoked its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to transfer further investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation, citing serious lapses, selective investigation, and erosion of public confidence due to the influential status of the accused. The decision strengthens victim-centric criminal jurisprudence and underscores that anticipatory bail cannot become a shield against fair and effective investigation in heinous offences like dowry death.
- [Rahna Jalal v. State of Kerala and Another [2020] 13 SCR 621](https://lawfoyer.in/rahna-jalal-v-state-of-kerala-and-another-2020-13-scr-621/): The decision in Rahna Jalal v. State of Kerala and Another addresses the interpretative contours of Section 7(c) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 vis-à-vis the power of courts to grant anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The appeal arose from the denial of anticipatory bail to a mother-in-law accused in a criminal case involving allegations under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the 2019 Act, following the alleged pronouncement of talaq-e-biddat by her son. The Supreme Court undertook a purposive and harmonious interpretation of the statutory framework governing bail, personal liberty, and gender-specific penal provisions. The Court clarified that the offence created under Sections 3 and 4 of the 2019 Act is exclusively attributable to a Muslim husband and cannot be extended to female relatives by implication. It further held that Section 7(c) does not impose an absolute bar on anticipatory bail, but prescribes procedural safeguards, including a mandatory hearing of the aggrieved Muslim woman and judicial satisfaction of reasonable grounds. Drawing upon constitutional principles of personal liberty under Article 21, and precedents interpreting non-obstante clauses, the Court reinforced that statutory exclusions of anticipatory bail must be express and strictly construed. The judgment serves as a critical exposition on balancing statutory intent, gender justice, and fundamental rights within criminal procedure.
- [Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pty Ltd. v. MMTC Ltd. [2020] 14 SCR 510](https://lawfoyer.in/anglo-american-metallurgical-coal-pty-ltd-v-mmtc-ltd-2020-14-scr-510/): The judgment concerns an international commercial arbitration arising out of a long-term coal supply agreement between an Australian mining company and an Indian public sector enterprise. The dispute stemmed from the respondent’s failure to lift the contracted quantity of coking coal during the Fifth Delivery Period, coinciding with the global financial crisis of 2008–09. The arbitral tribunal, by majority, held the respondent guilty of breach and awarded substantial damages representing the difference between the contract price and the market price. The dissenting arbitrator took the opposite view, holding that the claimant had failed to establish availability of coal and proof of damages. The Supreme Court examined the scope of judicial interference with international arbitral awards under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as it stood prior to the 2015 amendment. The Court decisively reaffirmed that courts cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute their interpretation for that of the arbitral tribunal if the award represents a possible view. A significant part of the judgment analyses the application of Sections 92, 94, and 95 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to contractual correspondence, especially in distinguishing patent ambiguity from latent ambiguity. The Court held that the Delhi High Court Division Bench erred in cherry-picking isolated emails while ignoring the entire chain of correspondence and oral evidence. The Majority Award was restored, reinforcing party autonomy, evidentiary finality in arbitration, and minimal judicial intervention in international commercial awards.
- [,Registrar, Karnataka University & Anr. v. Dr. Prabhugouda & Anr. [2020] 9 S.C.R. 859](https://lawfoyer.in/registrar-karnataka-university-anr-v-dr-prabhugouda-anr-2020-9-s-c-r-859/): The judgment in Registrar, Karnataka University & Anr. v. Dr. Prabhugouda & Anr. authoritatively settles the controversy relating to the effective date of promotion under the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS) for university teachers whose prior service was rendered in affiliated colleges. The dispute arose from the claim of an Associate Professor, who, after joining a constituent department of Karnataka University, sought CAS promotion to the post of Professor from a date anterior to his entry into university service by relying upon his earlier teaching experience in an affiliated college. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine the interpretation of the term “College” under the relevant Statute framed under Section 40(1)(k) of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 2000, and to determine whether service in an affiliated college could justify a retrospective effective date of CAS promotion within the University. The Court undertook a purposive and harmonious interpretation of the Statute, particularly the Preamble and Clauses 12.6 and 12.7, and decisively rejected the expansive interpretation adopted by the High Court. It held that while past service in affiliated colleges may be counted for eligibility, the effective date of promotion cannot precede the date of entry into the service of the University or its constituent colleges. The judgment reinforces settled principles of service jurisprudence that promotion is intrinsically linked to the employer-employee relationship and cannot be granted for periods when such relationship did not subsist. The ruling restores institutional discipline in CAS promotions and clarifies the legal distinction between constituent colleges and affiliated colleges for promotional benefits.
- [Pradeep Kumar Sonthalia v. Dhiraj Prasad Sahu @ Dhiraj Sahu & Anr., [2020] 14 S.C.R. 480](https://lawfoyer.in/pradeep-kumar-sonthalia-v-dhiraj-prasad-sahu-dhiraj-sahu-anr-2020-14-s-c-r-480/): The judgment adjudicates a narrow yet constitutionally significant question concerning the temporal operation of disqualification under Article 191(1)(e) of the Constitution of India read with Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The dispute arose out of the biennial election to the Council of States from Jharkhand, where the margin of victory was extremely slender. The controversy centered on whether a vote cast by a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly in the forenoon of the election day could be invalidated on account of his criminal conviction and sentence pronounced later on the very same day. The appellant argued that the phrase “from the date of such conviction” in Section 8(3) must be interpreted to mean the entire calendar day beginning at midnight, thereby rendering the vote void. The Supreme Court rejected this construction, holding that disqualification is a consequence of conviction and cannot precede the cause. The Court emphasized the principle of legality and the foundational presumption of innocence until conviction. The judgment carefully harmonizes constitutional provisions, election law, criminal jurisprudence, and interpretative principles. It clarifies that the expression “date” is context-dependent and can denote a precise point of time rather than a full calendar day. The Court also invoked the de facto doctrine to sustain the validity of acts performed before the disqualification actually came into existence. The ruling thus reinforces certainty in electoral processes while preserving fundamental criminal law principles.
- [,The State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Keshao Vishwanath Sonone & Anr. [2020] 11 S.C.R. 597](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-maharashtra-anr-v-keshao-vishwanath-sonone-anr-2020-11-s-c-r-597/): The judgment addresses the constitutional limits on judicial intervention in matters concerning Scheduled Tribes identification under Article 342 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court examined whether the Bombay High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by declaring the Gowari community as synonymous with the Gond Gowari Scheduled Tribe listed under the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. The Court undertook a detailed historical, constitutional, and statutory analysis of amendments made to the Scheduled Tribes Order from 1950 to 2002. It emphasized the exclusive power of Parliament under Article 342(2) to include or exclude tribes from the notified list. The judgment critically evaluated reliance placed by the High Court on census data, anthropological literature, and historical extinction theories. The Court reaffirmed settled constitutional jurisprudence laid down in B. Basavalingappa v. D. Munichinnappa and State of Maharashtra v. Milind, holding that courts cannot conduct evidentiary inquiries to alter Scheduled Tribe entries. It categorically held that Gowari and Gond Gowari are distinct communities, rejecting the High Court’s finding that Gond Gowari had become extinct prior to 1911. The decision restores constitutional discipline in affirmative action jurisprudence and reinforces the doctrine of separation of powers. It also balances equities by protecting admissions and appointments secured during the pendency of litigation while denying future Scheduled Tribe benefits to Gowari claimants.
- [M/s Galaxy Transport Agencies, Contractors, Traders, Transports and Suppliers v. M/s New J.K. Roadways, Fleet Owners and Transport Contractors & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 1090](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-galaxy-transport-agencies-contractors-traders-transports-and-suppliers-v-m-s-new-j-k-roadways-fleet-owners-and-transport-contractors-ors-2020-12-scr-1090/): The judgment addresses the contours of judicial review in contractual and tender matters, particularly emphasising the doctrine of judicial restraint in the interpretation of tender conditions by constitutional courts. The Supreme Court examined the legality of interference by the Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir with the decision of a tendering authority relating to technical eligibility under an e-tender issued by the Inspector General of Police, Kashmir Zone, for the supply of commercial vehicles for troop movement. The dispute revolved around the interpretation of Condition No. 31 of the Notice Inviting Tender, which required ownership of “30 vehicles both HMV/LMV”, and Condition No. 27, which prescribed five years of work experience with a minimum valuation of Rs. 2 crores. The Court reaffirmed that the author of the tender document is the best judge of its requirements, and unless the interpretation adopted by the authority is perverse, arbitrary, or mala fide, courts must not substitute their own construction. The Division Bench was found to have exceeded its jurisdiction by re-evaluating technical criteria and substituting the expert opinion of the Tender Opening Committee with its own assessment. The Supreme Court restored the judgment of the Single Judge, reinforcing the settled position that judicial review does not extend to technical evaluation of bids. The ruling strengthens predictability in public procurement and safeguards administrative discretion from unwarranted judicial interference.
- [Suresh Shah v. Hipad Technology India Private Limited, [2020] 13 SCR 821](https://lawfoyer.in/suresh-shah-v-hipad-technology-india-private-limited-2020-13-scr-821/): The judgment in Suresh Shah v. Hipad Technology India Private Limited authoritatively examines the arbitrability of landlord–tenant disputes arising out of lease and sub-lease deeds governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether disputes concerning determination of lease, forfeiture, and eviction under the TP Act could be resolved through arbitration when an arbitration clause exists between the parties. The Court undertook a detailed doctrinal and statutory analysis of Sections 111, 114, and 114A of the TP Act and clarified that these provisions confer equitable and discretionary relief, not statutory protection akin to Rent Control legislations. The judgment resolves the doctrinal conflict created by Himangni Enterprises v. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia, which had expanded the category of non-arbitrable disputes to include TP Act governed tenancies. Relying on the reasoning in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, the Court conclusively held that landlord–tenant disputes under the TP Act are arbitrable, provided the tenancy is not protected by a special rent statute. The Court further clarified that arbitrators are competent to consider equitable reliefs available under Sections 114 and 114A while adjudicating eviction claims. The decision reinforces party autonomy, strengthens arbitration jurisprudence, and draws a clear distinction between statutory tenancies and contractual leases. It also confirms the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator in cases qualifying as international commercial arbitration under Section 2(1)(f) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
- [In Re: Proper Treatment of COVID-19 Patients and Dignified Handling of Dead Bodies in the Hospitals Etc. [2020] 13 S.C.R. 762](https://lawfoyer.in/in-re-proper-treatment-of-covid-19-patients-and-dignified-handling-of-dead-bodies-in-the-hospitals-etc-2020-13-s-c-r-762/): The Supreme Court of India, exercising its suo motu jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution, addressed systemic failures exposed during the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly incidents of fire in dedicated COVID hospitals and deficiencies in treatment, safety, and dignified handling of deceased patients. Triggered by the tragic fire incident at a COVID hospital in Rajkot, Gujarat, which resulted in multiple fatalities, the Court expanded the scope of adjudication to encompass broader public health governance, disaster management, hospital safety compliance, and enforcement of pandemic-related guidelines. The judgment underscores the constitutional status of the right to health as an integral facet of Article 21, extending beyond mere access to treatment to include affordability, safety, and dignity in death. The Court recognised the pandemic as an unprecedented national crisis akin to a “world war” requiring coordinated action between the Union, States, local administrations, and citizens. It examined affidavits filed by the Union of India and various States, particularly focusing on fire safety audits, issuance and renewal of fire safety No Objection Certificates, hospital inspections, and compliance with advisories issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Significant emphasis was placed on the failure of implementation of Standard Operating Procedures and guidelines under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, leading to avoidable loss of life. The Court issued wide-ranging mandatory directions relating to hospital fire safety, price regulation of private hospitals, enforcement of public health guidelines, crowd management, police deployment, testing transparency, containment strategies, and regulation of political gatherings during elections. The judgment reflects judicial assertiveness in safeguarding public health while reiterating citizens’ constitutional duties during a public emergency.
- [Saurav Yadav & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 281](https://lawfoyer.in/saurav-yadav-ors-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2020-11-scr-281/): The judgment in Saurav Yadav & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. settles a long-standing conflict concerning the correct application of horizontal reservation vis-à-vis vertical reservation in public employment. The controversy arose from the recruitment of constables in the Uttar Pradesh Police pursuant to the 2013 selection process, where female candidates belonging to reserved categories, despite securing marks higher than the last selected candidate in the General Female Category, were denied placement in the open category. The State justified this exclusion by relying on judicial precedents of the Allahabad and Madhya Pradesh High Courts which had adopted an interpretation that prevented such migration. The Supreme Court decisively rejected this interpretation, holding that the open/general category is not a reserved compartment, but one that is available to all candidates solely on the basis of merit. The Court reaffirmed that horizontal reservation is interlocking in nature and does not operate as a rigid quota excluding meritorious candidates merely because they belong to reserved social categories. The ruling harmonises constitutional principles under Articles 14 and 16 with established precedents such as Indra Sawhney, Anil Kumar Gupta, and Rajesh Kumar Daria. The Court disapproved the so-called “second view” adopted by certain High Courts and approved the “first view” which prioritises merit in open category selection. Relief was moulded to protect existing appointees while extending appointment to eligible OBC female candidates. The decision strengthens the constitutional mandate of equality of opportunity and prevents artificial compartmentalisation that undermines merit.
- [Soumen Paul & Ors. v. Shrabani Nayek & Ors., [2025] 4 SCR 651 : 2025 INSC 451](https://lawfoyer.in/soumen-paul-ors-v-shrabani-nayek-ors-2025-4-scr-651-2025-insc-451/): The judgment in Soumen Paul & Ors. v. Shrabani Nayek & Ors. addresses a recurring controversy in public employment relating to the determination of the cut-off date for possessing minimum educational qualifications. The dispute arose from recruitment to the post of Assistant Teachers in primary schools in West Bengal, governed by the West Bengal Primary School Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2016, particularly Rule 6(2) as amended on 22.12.2020. The appellants were candidates enrolled in the 2020–2022 Diploma in Elementary Education (D.El.Ed.) batch whose examinations were delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and administrative paralysis of the West Bengal Board of Primary Education. Apprehending disqualification on age grounds, the appellants approached the High Court seeking equitable relief. The Single Judge permitted provisional participation in the recruitment process. However, the Division Bench reversed this decision by treating 29.09.2022 as the recruitment notification date and holding that the appellants lacked the requisite qualifications on that date. The Supreme Court rejected this approach, holding that Rule 6(2) merely incorporates the NCTE-prescribed qualifications prevailing at the time of recruitment and does not prescribe any cut-off date for acquisition of qualifications. The Court clarified the settled position that where rules do not specify a cut-off date, the date mentioned in the recruitment advertisement, or alternatively the last date of application, would govern eligibility. The judgment reinforces transparency in recruitment, prevents arbitrary exclusion of candidates affected by systemic delays, and reaffirms judicial restraint against importing cut-off dates not contemplated by statutory rules. The Court further exercised its Article 142 powers to ensure completion of the recruitment process in the interests of justice.
- [Kousik Das & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 695 : 2025 INSC 448](https://lawfoyer.in/kousik-das-ors-v-state-of-west-bengal-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-695-2025-insc-448/): The judgment in Kousik Das & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. examines the legal validity of excluding candidates possessing an 18-month Diploma in Elementary Education (D.El.Ed.) obtained through NIOS under Open and Distance Learning mode from teacher recruitment processes. The controversy arose after the West Bengal Board of Primary Education imposed a blanket exclusion pursuant to a High Court directive, relying on the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Jaiveer Singh & Ors. v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors. The Supreme Court scrutinised the statutory framework under Section 23 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, the 2014 NCTE Regulations, and the Recognition Order dated 22.09.2017 issued by the National Council for Teacher Education. The Court clarified that the 18-month D.El.Ed. programme was a one-time statutory relaxation intended solely for in-service untrained teachers appointed on or before 10.08.2017, enabling them to meet minimum qualifications before the statutory cut-off of 01.04.2019. The High Court’s interpretation was found erroneous as it imposed an indiscriminate ban without considering the limited statutory purpose of the relaxation. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that eligible in-service teachers who completed the programme within the stipulated period are valid diploma holders, entitled to consideration for recruitment, promotional avenues, and applications to other institutions. The ruling reinforces statutory interpretation principles, prevents administrative overreach, and protects vested service rights arising from transitional educational policies.
- [Jogeswar Sahoo & Ors. v. The District Judge, Cuttack & Ors., [2025] 5 SCR 13 : 2025 INSC 449](https://lawfoyer.in/jogeswar-sahoo-ors-v-the-district-judge-cuttack-ors-2025-5-scr-13-2025-insc-449/): The judgment in Jogeswar Sahoo & Ors. v. The District Judge, Cuttack & Ors. adjudicates the legality of post-retirement recovery of financial benefits extended to ministerial staff of the district judiciary pursuant to retrospective promotion based on Shetty Commission recommendations. The appellants, who served as Stenographer Grade-I and Personal Assistants, were granted arrears following retrospective upgradation in 2017. These amounts were credited without any allegation of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment. After their superannuation in 2020, recovery proceedings were initiated in 2023 on the ground that the financial benefit had been granted due to an erroneous interpretation of the recommendations. The Supreme Court confined its inquiry to the permissibility of recovery after retirement, particularly when no opportunity of hearing had been afforded. The Court reiterated the equitable doctrine consistently followed in service jurisprudence that recovery of excess payment is impermissible when the employee is not at fault and the error is attributable solely to the employer. Emphasis was placed on the vulnerability of retired ministerial employees and the disproportionate hardship caused by belated recovery. The judgment reinforces the principle that such protection flows not from enforceable entitlement but from judicial equity. It also clarifies that undertakings extracted mechanically do not override settled equitable doctrines. By setting aside the recovery orders and reversing the High Court’s decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed constitutional fairness in administrative action under service law.
- [A. Rajendra v. Gonugunta Madhusudhan Rao & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 681 : 2025 INSC 447](https://lawfoyer.in/a-rajendra-v-gonugunta-madhusudhan-rao-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-681-2025-insc-447/): The judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in A. Rajendra v. Gonugunta Madhusudhan Rao & Ors. authoritatively settles the commencement point of limitation for filing appeals under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The controversy arose from the dismissal of appeals by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal on the ground of limitation, where the appellant asserted that limitation should commence from the date of knowledge or receipt of a certified copy rather than from the date of pronouncement of the order. The Court rejected this contention and reaffirmed that the triggering event for limitation is the date of pronouncement of the order, except in cases where the order is not pronounced and is later uploaded. The judgment reinforces the strict and time-bound framework of the IBC and emphasizes that procedural flexibility cannot be employed to dilute substantive legislative intent. The Court meticulously interpreted Section 61(2) of the IBC, its proviso, and the interplay with the Limitation Act, 1963 and NCLAT Rules, 2016. It clarified that the right to receive a free certified copy does not dispense with the obligation to apply for one and that exclusion of time under Section 12 of the Limitation Act is available only upon a formal application for a certified copy. The ruling strengthens certainty in insolvency jurisprudence, curtails dilatory tactics, and upholds the primacy of the IBC over general procedural statutes. It also reiterates judicial discipline by refusing to extend limitation beyond statutorily prescribed limits, even through equitable considerations or Article 142 powers.
- [New Mangalore Port Trust & Anr. v. Clifford D Souza Etc. Etc., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 177 : 2025 INSC 440](https://lawfoyer.in/new-mangalore-port-trust-anr-v-clifford-d-souza-etc-etc-2025-5-s-c-r-177-2025-insc-440-2/): The judgment examines the interplay between the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly addressing whether recovery proceedings for arrears of licence fee under Section 7 of the PP Act are barred by limitation and whether acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act extends the limitation period. The dispute arose after the New Mangalore Port Trust revised licence fees retrospectively pursuant to a TAMP notification, and raised demands for arrears against licensees. While the revision itself had been upheld by a Single Judge of the High Court, the licensees resisted payment citing pendency of intra-court appeals. Subsequent statutory recovery proceedings were quashed by the District Judge and affirmed by the High Court on the ground of limitation. The Supreme Court decisively held that once the Limitation Act is applicable to proceedings under the PP Act, all its provisions, including Section 18, apply. The Court interpreted written objections by the licensees, stating that payment was premature due to pending appeals, as a valid acknowledgment of liability, even though accompanied by a refusal to pay at that stage. The judgment clarifies that an acknowledgment need not be unconditional or immediate and that technical objections on limitation cannot be used to unjustly delay statutory dues. The Court further criticised the High Court for deciding the writ petitions without awaiting the outcome of pending intra-court appeals on the substantive tariff issue. The ruling reinforces doctrinal clarity on limitation, acknowledgment of debt, and procedural discipline in public revenue recovery.
- [M/s R. K. Transport Company v. M/s Bharat Aluminum Company Ltd. (BALCO), [2025] 5 SCR 401 : 2025 INSC 438](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-r-k-transport-company-v-m-s-bharat-aluminum-company-ltd-balco-2025-5-scr-401-2025-insc-438/): The judgment addresses the precise computation of limitation under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and clarifies the applicability of Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 to arbitral proceedings. The dispute arose from an arbitral award dated 09.04.2022 passed in favour of the appellant, which was admittedly received by the respondent on the same date. The respondent filed an application under Section 34 on 11.07.2022. The controversy centred on whether the limitation period of three months expired on 08.07.2022 or 09.07.2022, and whether exclusion of the date of receipt of the award was permissible. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the phrase “three months” in Section 34(3) signifies three calendar months and not ninety days. It held that Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act applies to proceedings under Section 34, thereby mandating exclusion of the date on which the award was received. Consequently, the limitation period commenced on 10.04.2022 and expired on 09.07.2022, which was a court holiday. The benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act was therefore available, rendering the filing on the next working day within time. The Court upheld the High Court’s decision allowing the Section 37 appeal and dismissed the civil appeal. The ruling consolidates jurisprudence on limitation in arbitration and reinforces procedural certainty.
- [State (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 617 : 2025 INSC 456](https://lawfoyer.in/state-nct-of-delhi-v-rajeev-sharma-2025-4-s-c-r-617-2025-insc-456-2/): The judgment addresses the precise interpretative scope of Section 167(2)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, particularly the phrase “imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years”. The controversy arose in the context of offences under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923, read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, where the statute prescribes a maximum punishment extending up to fourteen years, but does not stipulate any minimum mandatory sentence. The respondent-accused claimed statutory or default bail on the ground that the charge-sheet was not filed within sixty days from the date of arrest. The State contended that the ninety-day period applied, arguing that the offence was punishable up to fourteen years and thus fell within clause (i) of the proviso to Section 167(2). The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the legislative intent behind the phrase “not less than ten years” necessarily postulates the existence of a statutorily prescribed minimum sentence. In the absence of such minimum, an offence punishable with imprisonment up to fourteen years cannot be equated with an offence punishable with imprisonment not less than ten years. Relying on the authoritative pronouncement in Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam and its subsequent reaffirmation in M. Ravindran v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, the Court held that the sixty-day period was applicable. The respondent was therefore entitled to default bail upon the failure of the investigating agency to complete the investigation within the stipulated time. The decision reinforces the constitutional significance of personal liberty and procedural safeguards in criminal investigation, and clarifies that statutory ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the accused when liberty is at stake.
- [UCO Bank & Anr. v. Vijay Kumar Handa, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 389 : 2025 INSC 442](https://lawfoyer.in/uco-bank-anr-v-vijay-kumar-handa-2025-5-s-c-r-389-2025-insc-442-2/): The decision in UCO Bank & Anr. v. Vijay Kumar Handa settles an important question in Indian service jurisprudence concerning the entitlement of a bank employee to terminal and pensionary benefits after being removed from service for gross misconduct. The controversy arose from disciplinary proceedings initiated against a clerical employee of UCO Bank for riotous, disorderly, and indecent behaviour within bank premises. While the disciplinary authority imposed dismissal from service, the appellate authority modified the punishment to removal from service with terminal benefits. This appellate order attained finality when it remained unchallenged by the employer. Subsequently, an industrial dispute led to judicial scrutiny of the proportionality of punishment under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, culminating in the High Court restoring the appellate authority’s punishment. The dispute resurfaced when the employee claimed pensionary benefits under the UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995, which the Bank resisted by invoking Regulation 22 relating to forfeiture of service. The Supreme Court harmonised the apparent conflict between Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement dated 19.10.1966 and Regulation 22, relying on its earlier ruling in Bank of Baroda v. S.K. Kool. The Court affirmed that where an employee is removed from service with terminal benefits and satisfies eligibility requirements, pension cannot be denied. The judgment reinforces the binding nature of bipartite settlements and clarifies the legal consequences of unchallenged appellate disciplinary orders in service law.
- [Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. & Anr., [2025] 5 SCR 446 : 2025 INSC 472](https://lawfoyer.in/kashmiri-lal-sharma-v-himachal-pradesh-state-electricity-board-ltd-anr-2025-5-scr-446-2025-insc-472/): The judgment examines the constitutional and statutory legitimacy of extending the age of superannuation for persons with disabilities and the permissibility of withdrawing such benefit through executive instructions. The appellant, a locomotor-disabled employee with 60% permanent disability, challenged his retirement at the age of 58 years, contending that the Office Memorandum dated 29.03.2013, which extended retirement age to 60 years, though expressly limited to visually impaired employees, ought to apply to all persons suffering from disabilities recognised under the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the settled position that persons suffering from benchmark disabilities constitute a homogeneous class for the purpose of service benefits once employed. Confining retirement age extension only to visually impaired employees was held discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, relying decisively on Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab. However, the Court upheld the withdrawal of the benefit by OM dated 04.11.2019, applying Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, holding that executive authority competent to issue an office memorandum retains the power to rescind it. The Court clarified that no employee has a fundamental right to continue in service till a particular age, and superannuation does not amount to removal under Article 311(2). The appellant was held entitled to the benefit of age extension only till the date the OM remained operative, i.e., 04.11.2019, and not beyond. Consequently, partial relief was granted with back wages and pensionary benefits.
- [Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana and Ors., [2025] 4 SCR 497 : 2025 INSC 433](https://lawfoyer.in/vinay-aggarwal-v-state-of-haryana-and-ors-2025-4-scr-497-2025-insc-433/): The judgment in Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana and Ors. addresses the judicial limits on directing transfer of criminal investigation from State Police to the Central Bureau of Investigation under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Court scrutinised the legality and sustainability of an order passed by a Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court directing CBI investigation at a nascent stage of inquiry based on vague and unsubstantiated allegations against local police officials. The appellant, accused of impersonation and financial extortion under multiple provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, challenged the High Court’s intervention contending absence of exceptional circumstances warranting such extraordinary relief. The Court reaffirmed settled constitutional jurisprudence that although Constitutional Courts possess wide powers to direct CBI investigation, such power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously, and only in exceptional cases. Mere allegations of police bias, without cogent material or prima facie evidence, were held insufficient. The judgment emphasises judicial restraint, federal balance, and institutional respect for State investigative machinery. By setting aside the High Court’s order, the Supreme Court clarified that extraordinary investigative transfers cannot be invoked as a matter of course, thereby reinforcing procedural discipline and safeguarding investigative autonomy.
- [The Superintending Engineer, Operation, Telangana State Southern Power Distribution Company Ltd. & Ors. v. Ch. Bhaskara Chary, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 543; 2025 INSC 428](https://lawfoyer.in/the-superintending-engineer-operation-telangana-state-southern-power-distribution-company-ltd-ors-v-ch-bhaskara-chary-2025-4-s-c-r-543-2025-insc-428/): The dispute concerns the respondent’s claim for appointment to the post of Lower Division Clerk (LDC) under the ex-casual labourers quota framed by the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (APSEB) through its policy dated 18.05.1997. The respondent’s candidature was rejected multiple times on grounds ranging from the alleged non-genuineness of his service certificate to the absence of vacancies in his category. The High Court intervened and directed consideration of his claim in parity with other similarly placed candidates who, despite possessing less man-days and being lower in the seniority list, had already been appointed pursuant to judicial directions. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in treating the respondent at par with those candidates and whether the list relied on by the High Court constituted a seniority list. Holding that the list titled “Seniority list of qualified candidates for the post of LDCs” was indeed a seniority list and that persons placed below the respondent with fewer man-days had secured appointment, the Court upheld the High Court’s reasoning. The Court directed reconsideration of the respondent’s appointment to the post of LDC or any equivalent post in which a vacancy exists, while permitting the authority to evaluate other factual objections raised by it. The ruling reaffirms parity principles in service jurisprudence, especially where similarly situated candidates secure benefits through judicial intervention.
- [Smt. Uma Devi and Ors. v. Sri Anand Kumar and Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 521; 2025 INSC 434](https://lawfoyer.in/smt-uma-devi-and-ors-v-sri-anand-kumar-and-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-521-2025-insc-434/): The decision in Smt. Uma Devi & Ors. v. Sri Anand Kumar & Ors., 2025 INSC 434, concerns the propriety of the High Court’s interference with a trial court order passed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, rejecting a partition suit of 2023 as time-barred and disclosing no cause of action. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in remanding the matter for trial despite overwhelming material showing a prior oral family partition of 1968, subsequent mutation entries, and registered alienations executed in 1978 by members of the family lineage from which the plaintiffs themselves derived title. The Court emphasised that registered sale deeds operate as constructive notice and confer full publicity to the world, placing a corresponding duty of inquiry upon interested parties. Since the plaintiffs’ predecessors lived for decades after the execution of the 1978 deeds without ever challenging them, the Court held that the cause of action was extinguished by lapse of time and by the presumption of notice arising under Section 3, Transfer of Property Act, and principles laid down in Suraj Lamp Industries, Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust, and Dahiben. The Court read the plaint meaningfully and found suppression of material facts, absence of specific pleadings on knowledge of earlier transactions, and an attempt at “clever drafting” to create an illusion of a cause of action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that the High Court erred in treating the matter as a triable dispute and in remanding the suit. The trial court’s rejection of the plaint was restored. The judgment underscores the strict discipline of pleadings, finality of long-settled family partitions, and the curtailment of stale litigation re-agitated after decades.
- [Maukam Singh & Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 336 : 2025 INSC 435](https://lawfoyer.in/maukam-singh-others-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2025-4-s-c-r-336-2025-insc-435-2/): The dispute arose from hostility regarding ownership of a place of worship, which escalated when the accused appellants, armed with deadly weapons—specifically a farsa and a luhangi—entered the house of the deceased Than Singh and confronted the victims. A scuffle ensued, during which the deceased suffered fatal head injuries and his grandchildren sustained multiple wounds. The Trial Court convicted the appellants under ss.302/34, 323, 324 r/w s.34 IPC, and the High Court affirmed those findings. The Supreme Court examined the credibility of the ocular testimony of PWs 1–3, each of whom was an injured eyewitness and a grandchild of the deceased. The Court reiterated that relationship alone does not render witnesses “interested,” especially when their presence at the scene is natural. The medical evidence showing a possibility of accidental fall did not dilute the prosecution’s case, because the ocular evidence consistently indicated a blow to the deceased’s head with the reverse side of an axe. The Court rejected the defence plea for conversion to s.304 Part II IPC, holding that the appellants were aggressors who trespassed with premeditation, armed with lethal weapons, and inflicted injuries sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No Exception to s.300 IPC applied. The conviction under s.302/34 IPC and accompanying sentences were upheld.
- [The Management of Worth Trust v. The Secretary, Worth Trust Workers Union, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 360 : 2025 INSC 432](https://lawfoyer.in/the-management-of-worth-trust-v-the-secretary-worth-trust-workers-union-2025-5-s-c-r-360-2025-insc-432-2/): The dispute concerned whether The Management of Worth Trust, an organization originally founded for charitable rehabilitation of leprosy-cured and differently abled persons, could claim exemption under Section 32(v)(a) or (c) of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 and thus refuse statutory bonus to its employees. The Trust had gradually expanded from purely charitable work to robust industrial and commercial manufacturing activities after 1985, generating surplus from factories engaged in the production of automobile and industrial machinery components. Workers employed in these factories—most of whom were rehabilitated individuals—had formed a union and raised an industrial dispute seeking bonus and ex-gratia for the year 1996-97. The Tribunal awarded minimum bonus at 8.33% and upheld entitlement to ex-gratia. Both the Single Judge and Division Bench of the Madras High Court affirmed the award with minor modification. The Supreme Court held that once the Trust was running factories, its employees were workmen and employees under the Factories Act, 1948 and the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965. A charitable character does not nullify statutory obligations when commercial industrial operations yield surplus. The Court rejected the plea that the Trust was an institution “like the Indian Red Cross Society” or “not established for profit” under Section 32(v)(a) and (c). Ex-gratia payments also cannot substitute statutory bonus. The Trust was directed to pay bonus from 1996-97 onwards within one month.
- [Ashok Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 504 : 2025 INSC 427](https://lawfoyer.in/ashok-singh-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2025-4-s-c-r-504-2025-insc-427-2/): The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in overturning the concurrent conviction of respondent no.2 under Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The appellant had advanced a loan of Rs. 22,00,000 to the accused, for which a cheque was issued and subsequently dishonoured with the endorsement “payment stopped by drawer”. Despite statutory notice, the accused neither replied nor repaid the amount. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court found the accused guilty, relying on the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 that favour the existence of a legally enforceable debt. The High Court, however, upset these findings by holding that the complainant had failed to establish the source of the funds. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's approach was erroneous since the complainant is not initially required to prove his financial capacity unless the accused raises a specific defence regarding such inability, which was absent in this case. The defence of a lost cheque was found untrustworthy because the police intimation was in fact made only in 2011, despite being back-dated. The Court held that the complaint was also maintainable even though the Partnership Firm was not arrayed as an accused, as the signatory partner was the person in charge of the firm. While restoring the conviction, the Court modified the sentence by imposing only a fine considering the age of the accused.
- [Jomon K.K. v. Shajimon P. & Ors. Etc., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 369 : 2025 INSC 425](https://lawfoyer.in/jomon-k-k-v-shajimon-p-ors-etc-2025-5-s-c-r-369-2025-insc-425-2/): The dispute concerns whether the appellant, who possessed a Syrang’s licence (a superior licence) but did not hold a current Lascar’s licence on the last date for receipt of applications, could be deemed eligible for appointment to the post of Boat Lascar under the Kerala State Water Transport Department. The Special Rules of 1975 mandated possession of a current Lascar’s licence as an essential qualification. Despite the statutory prescription, the Director of Ports issued a communication suggesting equivalence between a Syrang’s licence and a Lascar’s licence, resulting in candidates with higher licences, including the appellant, being included in the KPSC “Ranked List.” Subsequent challenges before the Kerala Administrative Tribunal led to the direction to recast the Ranked List and exclude those without a current Lascar’s licence. The appellant’s appointment, made while litigation was pending, was later cancelled. The Supreme Court affirmed that recruitment must strictly follow statutory qualifications, and no authority could dilute the explicit mandate of Rule 6 of the Special Rules. A higher qualification could not substitute a mandatory essential qualification, particularly where the recruitment process carved out a distinct class: holders of a current Lascar’s licence. The Court further held that public employment must maintain equality of opportunity; permitting candidates with superior licences, without extending that relaxation to all similarly placed candidates, would distort competition and unfairly advantage some aspirants. The appellant’s non-joinder before the Tribunal did not invalidate the proceedings because he chose not to challenge the Tribunal’s order until after termination. The Court refused to invoke Article 142, noting that the appointment was contrary to statutory norms and therefore void.
- [M/s Ferro Concrete Construction (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 529 : 2025 INSC 429](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-ferro-concrete-construction-india-pvt-ltd-v-the-state-of-rajasthan-2025-4-s-c-r-529-2025-insc-429-2/): The controversy in M/s Ferro Concrete Construction (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 529 : 2025 INSC 429 concerns the scope of an arbitrator’s power to award pendente lite interest under the Arbitration Act, 1940 when the contract contains a clause stating that the contractor “shall not be entitled to claim any interest upon any payment, arrears or upon any balance which may be found due to him at any time”. The Supreme Court evaluated whether this phrasing constituted an express bar on the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to grant interest during the pendency of arbitration proceedings. The Court reaffirmed earlier jurisprudence such as Secretary, Irrigation Dept., Govt. of Orissa v. G.C. Roy and N.C. Budharaj, which recognised an implied arbitrator’s power to award interest under the 1940 Act unless contractually excluded. It examined the interpretative scheme in Reliance Cellulose and the First Ambica decision, which mandate strict construction of interest-ouster clauses and require a clear, specific exclusion for disputes, misunderstandings, delays, or arbitral references. The Court held that Clause 22 in this contract did not sufficiently exclude pendente lite interest because it merely restricted the contractor from claiming interest, without addressing disputes, arbitration, or delayed payments. The Court set aside the High Court judgment and restored the arbitrator’s power, though it modified the rate of pendente lite interest to 9% considering the long passage of time and payments already made.
- [Shri. Masaidevi Vividh Karyakari Sahakari Seva Sanstha Maryadit Warewadi v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 409; 2025 INSC 436](https://lawfoyer.in/shri-masaidevi-vividh-karyakari-sahakari-seva-sanstha-maryadit-warewadi-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-409-2025-insc-436-2/): The judgment in Shri. Masaidevi Vividh Karyakari Sahakari Seva Sanstha Maryadit Warewadi v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2025 INSC 436; [2025] 5 S.C.R. 409, concerns the legality of government action in granting registration to a proposed Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society (PACCS). The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court correctly set aside the State Government’s order that had overridden the Scrutiny Committee’s rejection of the appellant-society’s registration proposal. The Committee, constituted under Government Resolution dated 23.09.2013, had rejected the application owing to multiple deficiencies, primarily the absence of proof of economic viability as required under Sections 4 and 6 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, and under Government Resolution dated 14.02.2017. The State, however, allowed the appeal by relaxing these mandatory prerequisites on the basis of unsubstantiated undertakings and general assertions by the appellant-society. The Supreme Court emphasised that the statutory mandate under Section 4 prohibits registration of societies that are “likely to be economically unsound,” and that the policy regime instituted through Government Resolutions makes the Scrutiny Committee the expert body responsible for evaluating such financial viability. The State, by disregarding the Committee’s findings and accepting hypothetical claims, acted contrary to its own binding policy framework. The High Court, therefore, was justified in restoring the Committee’s decision. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s view and dismissed the appeal, holding that administrative discretion cannot be exercised in a manner that defeats the statutory scheme or the objectives of cooperative development.
- [The Secretary, All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society (AISSMS) & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 342 : 2025 INSC 422](https://lawfoyer.in/the-secretary-all-india-shri-shivaji-memorial-society-aissms-ors-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-342-2025-insc-422/): The judgment in The Secretary, All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society (AISSMS) & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 342 : 2025 INSC 422 addresses a recurrent interpretational conflict surrounding academic qualifications, career progression, and entitlement to higher pay scales within technical education regulated by the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987. The Supreme Court examined whether Assistant Professors who had completed three years in the pre-revised scale of ₹12,000–18,300 as of 01.01.2006 could claim placement in the Pay Band of ₹37,400–67,000 with AGP ₹9,000 and re-designation as Associate Professors under Clause (ix) of the AICTE Notification dated 05.03.2010, despite lacking the essential qualification of Ph.D., mandated from 15.03.2000 onwards. The Court differentiated teachers appointed prior to 15.03.2000—when Ph.D. was not compulsory—from those appointed after, who were bound by the stipulation to possess or acquire Ph.D. within seven years per the AICTE Notifications of 2000 and 2005. It held that non-Ph.D. appointees after 15.03.2000 who failed to acquire the qualification within the statutory period could neither claim higher pay scales nor redesignation. The expression “incumbent Assistant Professors” in the 2010 Notification was confined only to qualified personnel—those possessing Ph.D. either at entry or within the stipulated period, or those appointed before the qualification became mandatory. The Court affirmed the regulatory primacy of AICTE as an expert body and reiterated judicial restraint in academic-policy matters unless shown to be arbitrary or ultra vires. Teachers falling outside the mandated qualification matrix were held disentitled to claim parity in pay or designation. Certain respondents, however, including those appointed before 15.03.2000 and one who later acquired Ph.D., were granted consequential benefits with interest.
- [Kishore Chhabra v. The State of Haryana & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 327 : 2025 INSC 419](https://lawfoyer.in/kishore-chhabra-v-the-state-of-haryana-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-327-2025-insc-419-2/): The dispute concerns the appellant’s attempt to secure release of his industrial land from compulsory acquisition initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. His grievance arose from the State’s alleged discriminatory refusal to release his land, despite comparable release orders granted to neighbouring factories under various policies. The State resisted on grounds of delay, deemed vesting, and lack of entitlement under policy norms. Central to the adjudication was the statutory requirement of obtaining a Change of Land Use (CLU) certificate under the Punjab Scheduled Roads & Controlled Areas Restrictions of Unregulated Development Act, 1963, which governs controlled areas around Sonipat since the 1964 notification. The appellant, though claiming long-standing industrial use, failed to produce any CLU either for himself or his predecessor. The Supreme Court held that CLU is a mandatory prerequisite for seeking land release and the absence of CLU disentitles the appellant from parity with industries whose land had been released after securing CLU. The plea of discrimination thus failed. The Court also weighed the extensive public expenditure already made to develop the acquired area and found that release of the appellant’s land would disrupt planned development. Nevertheless, acknowledging continued physical possession and the existence of a running factory, the Court exercised its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution to direct that compensation be calculated under the more beneficial Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The decision thus reaffirms the statutory rigidity of CLU requirements while balancing equitable considerations through constitutional discretion.
- [Judgment Unfolded: Case Law Narration Competition 2026 | Organized by Canonsphere | Event Scheduled on 10th and 11th January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/judgment-unfolded-case-law-narration-competition-2026-organized-by-canonsphere-event-scheduled-on-10th-and-11th-january-2026/): Judgment Unfolded: Case Law Narration Competition 2026 | Organized by Canonsphere | Event Scheduled on 10th and 11th January 2026
- [Trade Law in the Digital Age: Navigating E-Commerce & Cybersecurity (Free National Webinar) | Organized by The Lawscape | Webinar on 21 December 2025 (Sunday)](https://lawfoyer.in/trade-law-in-the-digital-age-navigating-e-commerce-cybersecurity-free-national-webinar-organized-by-the-lawscape-webinar-on-21-december-2025-sunday/): Trade Law in the Digital Age: Navigating E-Commerce & Cybersecurity (Free National Webinar) | Organized by The Lawscape | Webinar on 21 December 2025 (Sunday)
- [Piramal Capital and Housing Finance Limited (Formerly Known as Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited) v. 63 Moons Technologies Limited & Others, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 344](https://lawfoyer.in/piramal-capital-and-housing-finance-limited-formerly-known-as-dewan-housing-finance-corporation-limited-v-63-moons-technologies-limited-others-2025-4-s-c-r-344/): The judgment resolves a complex cluster of appeals arising from the insolvency resolution of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The central contest involved the permissibility of the clause in the Resolution Plan (RP) submitted by Piramal Capital, the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA), which allowed it to appropriate the recoveries arising from Section 66 avoidance applications filed by the Administrator. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) held that such a clause was illegal and remanded the plan back to the Committee of Creditors (CoC) for reconsideration. The Supreme Court, applying the limited scope of judicial review under Sections 30(2), 31, and 61(3) of the IBC, reinstated the NCLT-approved RP and set aside the NCLAT’s interference. The Court undertook a careful examination of the legal position on avoidance applications, the commercial wisdom of the CoC, and the rights of suspended or superseded directors under the IBC and the RBI Act, 1934. The judgment further addressed the grievances of Fixed Deposit Holders (FDHs) and Non-Convertible Debenture Holders (NCDHs) who sought full repayment under the RP. The Court held that Section 238 of the IBC prevails over the NHB Act and RBI Act, and that FDHs constitute financial creditors bound by the CoC-approved distribution mechanism. The Court also clarified that superseded directors of an FSP are not entitled to participate in the CoC or seek copies of RPs during CIRP, though once approved by the NCLT, the RP becomes a public document under Section 74 of the Evidence Act. The judgment thus harmonizes the treatment of avoidance recoveries, creditor rights, and director rights within the specialized insolvency regime for Financial Service Providers.
- [Zulfiquar Haider & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 205 : 2025 INSC 480](https://lawfoyer.in/zulfiquar-haider-anr-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-205-2025-insc-480-2/): The Supreme Court addressed the legality of the demolition of the appellants’ residential structures by the Prayagraj Development Authority (PDA) under Section 27 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. The Court found that the action of demolition, executed within 24 hours of service of the last communication and conducted on a Sunday, constituted a gross violation of Article 21, specifically the right to shelter, and breached the doctrine of due process. The judgment emphasised that the statutory mandate of Section 43 concerning service of notices necessitates multiple bona fide attempts at personal service, and service by affixing may only follow after demonstrating that “the person cannot be found,” which itself requires genuine repeated efforts. The Court underscored that residential structures cannot be demolished summarily without ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice, including a reasonable opportunity to show cause and adequate time to file an appeal under Section 27(2). The demolition was labelled an instance of “bulldozer justice,” exhibiting high-handedness and disregard for constitutional protections. The Court relied on its earlier ruling in In Re: Directions in the matter of demolition of structures, which mandates proper service by registered post A.D. along with affixture and a mandatory 15-day period for response. Finding the PDA’s action arbitrary, illegal, and inhuman, the Court set aside the High Court order dismissing the writ petition and imposed costs of Rs.10,00,000/- in each appeal. It further directed the PDA to strictly comply with the demolition guidelines from the 2024 decision and left the appellants free to pursue compensation and further proceedings regarding rights over the land.
- [Satbir Singh v. Rajesh Kumar and Others, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1; 2025 INSC 416](https://lawfoyer.in/satbir-singh-v-rajesh-kumar-and-others-2025-5-s-c-r-1-2025-insc-416-2/): The matter concerns the ambit of Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, specifically the standard for summoning additional accused after commencement of trial. The Supreme Court examines whether the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, was justified in overturning the Sessions Judge’s order summoning four individuals—Rajesh Kumar, Sagar @ Bittoo, Neeraj, and Ankit—to stand trial alongside the principal accused Mukesh. The factual matrix describes a violent altercation following a volleyball dispute, where the appellant Satbir Singh, a serving Army personnel, sustained knife injuries allegedly inflicted by Mukesh while the other respondents allegedly held, assaulted, or threatened him. Despite repeated police enquiries exonerating these co-accused, the appellant’s examination-in-chief directly implicated them. The Sessions Judge, relying on the principles crystallized in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab and reaffirmed in Jitendra Nath Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, concluded that the evidentiary threshold for invoking Section 319—a satisfaction higher than prima facie yet lower than certainty of conviction—stood satisfied. The High Court, however, interfered, giving weight to medical reports, the absence of injuries attributable to the co-accused, and multiple DSP enquiries that negated their involvement. The Supreme Court restores the Sessions Judge’s order, reiterating that police enquiries cannot override sworn testimony during trial, and that the High Court ought to have adopted a “hands-off” approach, as its revisional jurisdiction mandates intervention only where the lower court’s view is perverse or untenable. The Court affirms that the Sessions Judge’s satisfaction was plausible, rooted in evidence, and compliant with the framework laid down in Hardeep Singh. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and the summoning of the co-accused is reinstated.
- [Amresh Shrivastava v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [2025] 4 SCR 488; 2025 INSC 417](https://lawfoyer.in/amresh-shrivastava-v-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-ors-2025-4-scr-488-2025-insc-417/): The decision examines the permissibility of initiating disciplinary proceedings against a Tehsildar for a land settlement order passed in exercise of quasi-judicial powers under Section 57(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. The core conflict centred on whether the order contained elements of extraneous influence, recklessness, undue favour, negligence, or corrupt motive as contemplated in the categories outlined in Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan. The Supreme Court assessed whether the allegations within the Show Cause Notice (2009) and Chargesheet (2011) contained any material pointing to misconduct beyond a mere erroneous quasi-judicial order. The Court found that the accusations reflected only that the order granting settlement to the applicants was “wrong,” without any suggestion of bribery, mala fides, ulterior motive, or recklessness. It observed that the order was passed after following notice, Gram Panchayat consultation, Patwari statement, and satisfaction of procedural requirements. The Court further addressed the 14-year unexplained delay in initiating disciplinary action. Noting that the alleged irregularities were always within the knowledge of the department and that no justification for the delay was provided, the Bench held that such inordinate and unexplained delay militated against allowing the proceedings to continue. The Court applied precedent in State of M.P. v. Bani Singh and P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, TN Housing Board, affirming that delayed disciplinary action imposes hardship, mental distress, and unfairness on employees. Consequently, the Supreme Court restored the Single Judge’s order quashing the chargesheet, holding that neither the factual allegations nor the substantial delay permitted continuation of departmental proceedings. The appeal was allowed.
- [Rakesh Bhanot v. M/s. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 573 : 2025 INSC 445](https://lawfoyer.in/rakesh-bhanot-v-m-s-gurdas-agro-pvt-ltd-2025-4-s-c-r-573-2025-insc-445-2/): The judgment in Rakesh Bhanot v. M/s. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd. addresses whether proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 may be stayed owing to the interim moratorium under Section 96, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 triggered upon filing personal insolvency applications under Section 94 IBC. The Supreme Court rejects the plea for stay, emphasizing that the moratorium available under Part III of the IBC is intended only to suspend civil actions relating to recovery of debt and not criminal prosecutions arising from penal statutes. The Court distinguishes between protection accorded to a corporate debtor under Section 14 IBC and the scheme applicable to individuals under Sections 96 and 101 IBC, reiterating that insolvency mechanisms do not extinguish personal criminal liability for dishonour of cheques. The Court underscores that the liability under Sections 138/141 NI Act is personal, statutory and penal, intended to uphold the credibility of negotiable instruments. It holds that neither the presentation of personal insolvency petitions nor the commencement of interim moratorium can bar or stall criminal prosecutions which aim not at “recovery of debt” but at punishing dishonour of cheque. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis is invoked to interpret “legal action in respect of any debt” under Section 96 IBC as confined to civil recovery actions only. The Court relies extensively on P. Mohanraj, Narinder Garg, and Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka, clarifying that directors, signatories, and natural persons remain personally liable notwithstanding corporate insolvency or personal insolvency proceedings. The appeals and writ petitions are dismissed, affirming the High Courts’ orders refusing to stay Section 138 proceedings.
- [Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 436 : 2025 INSC 424](https://lawfoyer.in/ramayana-ispat-pvt-ltd-anr-v-state-of-rajasthan-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-436-2025-insc-424-2/): Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 7964/2019 (decided 1 Apr. 2025, Vikram Nath & Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.) addresses the conflict between the statutory scheme of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the territorial reach and substance of the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms & Conditions for Open Access) Regulations, 2016 (“Regulations of 2016”). The principal controversies concerned (i) whether a State Electricity Regulatory Commission may regulate aspects of open access where electricity is sourced inter-state but delivered/consumed within the State; (ii) whether scheduling conditions (notably a 24-hour advance scheduling requirement in Regulation 26(7)) and penalties for deviation (notably Regulation 21 on unscheduled interchange pricing) unlawfully trench upon the statutory right to open access and are arbitrary or discriminatory (particularly as against captive power producers — CPPs); and (iii) whether the combined effect of the Regulations forecloses open access. The Supreme Court upheld the Regulations. It read the Act as drawing a practical distinction between inter-state transmission (CERC domain under Section 79(1)(c)) and intra-state aspects of open access (State Commission domain under Section 42 and Section 86), emphasised grid stability and the technical necessity of scheduling and deviation charges, and held that the impugned provisions are reasonable, proportionate and within the competence of the RERC. The Court relied on statutory architecture, Energy Watchdog v. CERC, and prior precedents, while giving weight to the regulatory expertise of commissions in framing operational rules for system security.
- [M/s Faime Makers Pvt. Ltd. v. District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies (3), Mumbai & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 331; 2025 INSC 423](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-faime-makers-pvt-ltd-v-district-deputy-registrar-co-operative-societies-3-mumbai-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-331-2025-insc-423/): The dispute concerns competing applications under Sections 5 and 11 of the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 where the Competent Authority first dismissed an application by Prakash Apartment Co-op Housing Society Ltd. on 22.02.2021 because of unresolved legal complications, granting liberty to re-apply only after those complications were settled. Without approaching a civil court as directed, the Society filed a second application which the Competent Authority allowed on 05.10.2021. The landowner, M/s Faime Makers Pvt. Ltd., challenged that second order. The High Court upheld the Competent Authority’s later order. The Supreme Court examined whether the first order operated as a final determination binding the Competent Authority (a quasi-judicial body) and whether entertaining and allowing the second application amounted to an impermissible review or collateral re-decision contrary to the doctrine of res judicata. The Court held that the 22.02.2021 order did not grant unconditional liberty to re-apply; it required the Society to get the complications resolved before a civil forum and only thereafter seek relief. Applying settled authority that the principles of res judicata and finality bind quasi-judicial authorities, the Court concluded the Competent Authority lacked jurisdiction to entertain a second application contrary to its earlier findings and quashed the 05.10.2021 order. The appeal was allowed and the High Court order set aside.
- [Gastrade International v. Commissioner of Customs, Kandla, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1350 : 2025 INSC 411](https://lawfoyer.in/gastrade-international-v-commissioner-of-customs-kandla-2025-3-s-c-r-1350-2025-insc-411/): Gastrade International v. Commissioner of Customs, Kandla concerns classification of imported cargo declared as Base Oil SN 50 but treated by revenue authorities as High Speed Diesel (HSD). The Adjudicating Authority (Commissioner of Customs) found the goods to be HSD, ordered confiscation and penalties; CESTAT reversed and treated the goods as Base Oil since full IS:1460:2005 testing was not performed; the High Court reversed CESTAT and sided with revenue on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. The Supreme Court re-examined laboratory reports from three notified labs (Vadodara Central Excise & Customs Lab; Central Revenues Control Laboratory, New Delhi; IOCL Central Laboratory, Mumbai) and the testimony of the IOCL expert, Dr. Gobind Singh. The Court held that classification under Chapter 27 depends on whether the substance is “most akin” to a specified commodity under the Tariff Act and that the “most akin” test (Rule 4 of General Rules) requires a higher degree of certainty than mere preponderance of probability when penal/confiscatory consequences attend. The Court found laboratory reports and expert evidence ambiguous and incomplete (many parameters untested; evasive answers on flash-point significance) and therefore inadequate to classify the goods as HSD. Applying the most akin test, the Court concluded benefit of doubt must go to appellants and set aside confiscation and penalties. Key legal themes: standards of proof (preponderance vs heightened certainty for technical classification with penal consequences), role and limits of expert opinion (Evidence Act, s.45), and the primacy of most akin rule for tariff classification.
- [Akhilesh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1431 : 2025 INSC 431](https://lawfoyer.in/akhilesh-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-1431-2025-insc-431/): This appeal arises from the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad’s revision setting aside a trial court order that had summoned two persons under Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to face trial for the murder of the deceased in a daylight firing. The FIR named four assailants and criminal proceedings were charge-sheeted only against two; a final report was filed in respect of the other two (the present respondent nos. 2 & 3). During the trial the depositions of PW-1 (the complainant-son) and PW-2 (an eyewitness cousin) implicated those two persons. Relying on those testimonies the trial court exercised its power under Section 319 CrPC and summoned them. The High Court, on revision, set aside that summoning order giving weight to certain s.161 CrPC statements and perceived weaknesses in the witnesses’ credibility. The Supreme Court restored the trial court order, holding that the scope of Section 319 CrPC is wide; once prima facie evidence surfaces in the course of trial that a person not charged appears to be involved, the court may summon such person and try him along with the accused already facing trial. The Court emphasized that challenges to credibility and contradictions that go to the root of the witnesses’ testimony are matters for full trial and cross-examination and should not obstruct exercise of Section 319 powers at the summoning stage. The decision applied Rajesh v. State of Haryana and S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak and cautioned against giving undue weight to s.161 CrPC statements at the summoning stage.
- [The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1254 : 2025 INSC 412](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-jharkhand-ors-v-rukma-kesh-mishra-2025-3-s-c-r-1254-2025-insc-412/): The appeal concerns the validity of disciplinary proceedings culminating in dismissal of a State civil servant on the ground that the charge-sheet was not separately approved by the Chief Minister at or about the time of its issuance. The respondent faced nine articles of charge for alleged dishonesty, financial irregularities and forgery; a proposal containing a draft charge-sheet and ancillary proposals (suspension; names of inquiry and presenting officers) was placed before the Chief Minister who approved the proposal on 21 March 2014; the formal charge-sheet was issued thereafter and inquiry followed, culminating in dismissal by the Government on 16 June 2017. The High Court quashed the dismissal holding that the charge-sheet lacked requisite approval, relying on Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath and State of Tamil Nadu v. Promod Kumar. The Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal. The Court analysed the interplay of Article 311(1), the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 (Rule 55), and the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2016 (notably Rules 16 and 17). It reaffirmed that absent a statutory rule requiring that the appointing authority must itself draw up or approve the charge-sheet, initiation by a competent controlling authority or by delegation is permissible; that the phrases “draw up” and “cause to be drawn up” have distinct meanings allowing delegated preparation; and that where the draft charge-sheet formed part of the file placed before and approved by the Chief Minister, such approval must be read as inclusive of the draft charge-sheet and related proposals. The High Court’s reliance on B.V. Gopinath and Promod Kumar was held misplaced on the facts and by reason of differing rules; orders of the Single Judge and Division Bench were set aside while preserving the respondent’s right to pursue statutory appeal or revision.
- [CNLU-DPIIT-IPR NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Chanakya National Law University, Patna | Register by 26 December, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/cnlu-dpiit-ipr-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-chanakya-national-law-university-patna-register-by-26-december-2025/): CNLU-DPIIT-IPR NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Chanakya National Law University, Patna | Register by 26 December, 2025
- [Call for Blogs | Organized by Centre for Research in Air and Space Law (CRASL), Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai | Submit Blogs by 7th January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-organized-by-centre-for-research-in-air-and-space-law-crasl-maharashtra-national-law-university-mumbai-submit-blogs-by-7th-january-2026/): CALL FOR BLOGS – IRASL BLOG ON EMERGING TRENDS IN AIR AND SPACE LAWS | Organized by Centre for Research in Air and Space Law (CRASL), Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai | Submit Blogs by 7th January 2026
- [Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1309 : 2025 INSC 410](https://lawfoyer.in/imran-pratapgadhi-v-state-of-gujarat-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-1309-2025-insc-410/): Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1309 : 2025 INSC 410 — The Supreme Court examined whether the recitation (in Urdu) of a poem that appeared as background audio in a 46-second video posted by a Rajya Sabha member attracted offences under Sections 196, 197(1), 299, 302, 57 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). The informant alleged that the poem promoted communal enmity, hurt religious feelings and threatened national unity. On close textual and contextual analysis the Court held that the poem did not refer to any religion, caste, community, language or region; its tenor was protest and sacrifice against rulers and a call to suffer injustice with love rather than incite inter-communal violence. Applying the statutory text, constitutional guarantees under Article 19(1)(a) read with its exception in Article 19(2), and established judicial standards for speech-related offences (reasonable, strong-minded person test), the Court found no prima facie case under the cited BNS provisions. The Court additionally underlined the duty of police under Article 51-A(a) to respect constitutional freedoms and explained the scope of Section 173(3), BNSS (preliminary inquiry for offences punishable between three and seven years). Because mens rea is an essential ingredient where speech offences are alleged, and because the police did not exercise the s.173(3) option (or, on a plain reading, receive information disclosing a cognizable offence), the FIR was mechanically registered and constituted an abuse of process; the High Court’s refusal to quash the FIR was set aside and the FIR quashed.
- [Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation v. Vincent Daniel and Others, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1277 : 2025 INSC 408](https://lawfoyer.in/madhya-pradesh-road-development-corporation-v-vincent-daniel-and-others-2025-3-s-c-r-1277-2025-insc-408/): This analysis examines Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation v. Vincent Daniel and Others (Civil Appeal No. 3998 of 2024; judgment dated 27 March 2025) focusing on whether the judicially evolved theory of deduction (developed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) can be applied to reduce compensation under The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter 2013 Act). The Supreme Court held that the market value under s.26(1) of the 2013 Act must be computed by applying the statutory criteria — clauses (a)–(c) and the four Explanations — and that the highest value among (a) circle/stamp-act value, (b) average sale price of similar land, and (c) consented amounts, is the market value. Where clause (a) yields the highest value (circle rate fixed under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899), it binds unless the Collector, after recording reasons under Explanation 4, finds it not to reflect the prevailing market value and adjusts it. Consequently, in the facts of this case (no reliable exemplars and no PPP/private-company consent), the circle rate (Collector’s Guidelines 2014) governed and the Commissioner’s enhancement and award (including assets and solatium) were upheld; the theory of deduction could not be used to reduce compensation in the absence of an exercise of Collector’s discretion with recorded reasons. This judgment emphasises the primacy of statutory criteria in s.26, the limited and reasoned scope of Explanation 4, and the importance of scientifically fixed, transparent circle rates.
- [Ramesh Kumaran & Anr. v. State Through The Inspector of Police & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1245 : 2025 INSC 405](https://lawfoyer.in/ramesh-kumaran-anr-v-state-through-the-inspector-of-police-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-1245-2025-insc-405/): This judgment concerns cross-registered First Information Reports arising from a single incident between two practising advocates in Kodaikanal. The dispute produced FIR No.499 of 2017 (registered by the first appellant) and FIR No.500 of 2017 (registered by the second respondent), both alleging offences under Sections 294(b), 323 and 506(1) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Supreme Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, explored and facilitated an amicable resolution because the parties are members of the same local Bar, the incident had a history of past animosity, and both litigational and professional interests of the parties were at stake. The second respondent filed a voluntary, unconditional affidavit of apology; the first appellant initially reacted emotionally (threatening self-harm if the other FIR were quashed) but subsequently filed an affidavit of apology and an undertaking. Taking these facts into account and noting that the complaints were mirror-image in offences and closely spaced in time, the Court quashed FIR No.500 of 2017 and quashed FIR No.499 of 2017 only against the second respondent, while recording the apologies and undertakings. The order emphasises restorative resolution between legal professionals, the Court’s duty to deliver substantial justice, and the limited use of penal process when reconciliation is practicable.
- [Aslam alias Imran v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1226 : 2025 INSC 403](https://lawfoyer.in/aslam-alias-imran-v-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2025-3-s-c-r-1226-2025-insc-403/): Aslam alias Imran v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Crim. App. No. 1538 of 2025 ([2025] 3 S.C.R. 1226 : 2025 INSC 403) examines whether the prosecution proved murder under Section 302, Indian Penal Code beyond reasonable doubt where the case largely rested on the testimonies of lay witnesses who were internally inconsistent, delayed in furnishing statements, partially hearsay, and affected by prior enmity with the accused. The trial court convicted and the High Court affirmed. On appeal the Supreme Court scrutinized witness credibility — focusing on contradictions between PW-1 (brother of the deceased) and other witnesses, absence of expected bloodstains on carriers, failure to inform nearby police or use an available telephone, delayed recording of statements, suppression or non-production of earlier statements, and that several witnesses were hostile or deposed on hearsay. The Court held that these cumulative infirmities generated serious doubts about the veracity of the prosecution case. The Court further observed that though prior enmity supplies motive, it equally raises the possibility of false implication. In consequence the conviction under Section 302 IPC was quashed, the appellant acquitted and bail bonds discharged.
- [Hiralal Motilal Parikh (Deceased Through Lrs) v. Spl. LAQ Officer & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1519 : 2025 INSC 815](https://lawfoyer.in/hiralal-motilal-parikh-deceased-through-lrs-v-spl-laq-officer-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-1519-2025-insc-815/): The appeal concerns enhancement of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for non-agricultural Survey No. 25 (≈33,387 sq. m.) acquired by Gujarat Housing Board. The Reference Court fixed compensation at Rs. 45/- per sq. m., the High Court raised it to Rs. 53/- per sq. m., and the claimants challenged adequacy before the Supreme Court. The appellants relied primarily on two proximate exemplars: (i) Exhibit 44, an allotment letter dated January 1985 allotting adjacent Survey No. 864 at Rs. 65/- per sq. m. (pre-notification); and (ii) Exhibit 53, a sale deed dated 29.08.1985 of an adjoining plot in a developed cooperative colony at Rs. 152.37/- per sq. m. (post-notification but within one month). Applying settled principles in Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special LAO and Mehta Ravindrarai Ajitrai v. State of Gujarat, the Court accepted proximate, bona fide transactions as exemplars unless there is evidence that the acquisition itself inflated prices. The Court found Exhibit 53 genuine (supported by purchaser testimony) and Exhibit 44 indicative of pre-acquisition official valuation. Accounting for development-leftover (30% deduction for layout/development cost) and averaging the exemplars, the Court determined a fair compensation at Rs. 107/- per sq. m. (rounding the mean Rs.108.68 toward Rs.107), with statutory benefits (solatium, severance, interest) to follow as earlier awarded. Appeal partly allowed; directions issued for recalculation and payment.
- [M/s JSW Steel Limited v. Pratishtha Thakur Haritwal & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1200 : 2025 INSC 401](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-jsw-steel-limited-v-pratishtha-thakur-haritwal-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-1200-2025-insc-401/): M/s JSW Steel Limited v. Pratishtha Thakur Haritwal & Ors., Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 629 of 2023 arising out of Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1177 of 2020 (decided 27 March 2025) concerns the legal consequence of a Resolution Plan approved under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (the I&B Code) and whether post-approval recovery actions by State authorities for pre-transfer statutory dues — not included in the approved plan — are barred and, if persisted in after specific Supreme Court precedent was brought to their notice, whether such actions constitute contempt. The Bench reaffirmed the principles laid down in Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (paras 95, 140 of that judgment) that on approval of a resolution plan all claims not forming part of that plan stand extinguished and the successful resolution applicant takes over the corporate debtor on a clean slate. Applying that ratio to the facts where tax demand notices were issued after approval for the period prior to transfer, the Court held such demands to be contemptuous and quashed them, while extending leniency by not imposing punitive sanctions because the revenue officers tendered unconditional apology and were given the benefit of doubt. The judgment distinguishes State Tax Officer v. Rainbow Papers Ltd. on material facts (there the State had raised claims before the CoC) and relies on precedents such as Essar Steel (CoC v. Satish Kumar Gupta) and the Court’s earlier order in the Income-Tax SLP of August 2018. Practical directions and doctrinal clarity reinforce finality of an approved plan, obliging statutory authorities to assert claims during CIRP.
- [R. Shashirekha v. State of Karnataka and Others, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1217 : 2025 INSC 402](https://lawfoyer.in/r-shashirekha-v-state-of-karnataka-and-others-2025-3-s-c-r-1217-2025-insc-402/): R. Shashirekha v. State of Karnataka and Others, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1217 : 2025 INSC 402, examines the scope of judicial interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in petitions seeking quashing of FIRs where allegations of abetment of suicide (s.306 IPC) and cheating (s.420 IPC) arise from documents discovered post-facto. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s quashing of the s.306 count, affirming that a proximate, positive act of instigation is indispensable to sustain abetment of suicide, and that a wide temporal gulf between alleged instigatory acts and the act of suicide can dissolve the requisite proximate nexus. Conversely, the Court found the High Court’s quashing of s.420 proceedings to be cursory and inadequately reasoned: when material seized in investigation prima facie points to cheating, the High Court must articulate why such material is insufficient rather than summarily quashing the charge. The decision therefore splits the impugned order — upholding quash in relation to s.306 IPC while restoring the s.420 IPC proceedings for trial — and clarifies that while quashing powers must prevent abuse of process and mini-trials, they must not substitute for careful evaluation of investigative material, especially where offences like cheating are concerned.
- [Samtola Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1235 : 2025 INSC 404](https://lawfoyer.in/samtola-devi-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-1235-2025-insc-404/): The appeal concerns whether an Appellate Tribunal under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 could lawfully order eviction of the eldest son from a portion of a house alleged to belong to his deceased father, when parallel civil suits over title and partitions are pending and the son is paying maintenance ordered by the Family Court. The Maintenance Tribunal initially imposed limited occupancy conditions and preservation of peaceful co-existence; the Appellate Tribunal ordered eviction; the High Court set aside the eviction while preserving other protective directions. The Supreme Court, after examining statutory scheme, prior authority including S. Vanitha v. Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit & Ors., held that though the Tribunal may in exceptional circumstances order eviction under Section 23 read with the Act’s protective object, eviction is not an automatic or mandatory remedy in every petition. On facts—existence of pending civil suits claiming 1/6th share, transfer/gift/sale deeds executed by the father, continued payment of maintenance and absence of fresh material showing harassment after the Tribunal’s order—the Appellate Tribunal erred in directing eviction without recording necessity or expediency to protect the senior citizen. The High Court’s interference setting aside eviction but keeping other protective conditions was sustained.
- [Sheikh Javeed Ahmad & Anr. v. State of J&K & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1503 : 2025 INSC 624](https://lawfoyer.in/sheikh-javeed-ahmad-anr-v-state-of-jk-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-1503-2025-insc-624/): Sheikh Javeed Ahmad & Anr. v. State of J&K & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 4426–4427 of 2025, decided 27 March 2025, concerns the validity of appointments of two doctors as Assistant Professors in the Department of Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation (PMR) at Sher-I-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences (SKIMS) when they lacked the prescribed two-year diploma in PMR. The High Court set aside the appointments on the view that there was no evidence of impossibility in obtaining that diploma and that the candidates had not made efforts to secure admission. The Supreme Court reversed. It emphasised the notification of SKIMS which expressly blocked two posts for the candidates subject to SKIMS sponsoring them for the two-year diploma and executing a service bond; therefore SKIMS, not the candidates, bore the affirmative duty to secure admissions. The record showed SKIMS could not obtain diploma seats because many institutions discontinued the diploma course; instead short-term on-the-job training at AIIMS, New Delhi was arranged and completed. A letter from the Head, PMR, AIIMS explained AIIMS did not run a diploma and recommended short-term training for practical competence. The Court held the High Court erred in ignoring these material facts and in discrediting expert recommendation by Dr. U. Singh. The Supreme Court ordered reinstatement with continuity of service, directed revival of the specific posts and allowed the appeals — while stating the decision should not be treated as precedent.
- [State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Chennai City-I Department v. G. Easwaran, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1174 : 2025 INSC 397](https://lawfoyer.in/state-rep-by-the-deputy-superintendent-of-police-vigilance-and-anti-corruption-chennai-city-i-department-v-g-easwaran-2025-3-s-c-r-1174-2025-insc-397/): The appeal challenges the High Court of Madras order quashing criminal proceedings under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against a public servant accused of possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of income for the check period 01.01.2001–31.08.2008. The prosecution registered FIR No. 11/AC/2009/CC-III on 27.07.2009; sanction to prosecute was recorded in G.O. Ms. No. 178 dated 08.07.2013; charge-sheet was filed on 23.09.2013. The trial court dismissed the accused’s discharge application under Section 239 Cr.P.C.; the High Court dismissed the revision petition under Sections 397/401 Cr.P.C.; but, within seven months, the accused invoked the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings on substantially identical grounds. The High Court allowed the quashing petition, holding (inter alia) that the sanction was tainted by delay/irregularity and that the documents and witness statements did not justify prosecution. The Supreme Court restored the trial, holding that the High Court exceeded the narrow limits of Section 482 Cr.P.C., impermissibly embarked upon a mini-trial and revisited findings already negatived by the trial court and the High Court in revision. The Supreme Court reiterated settled principles: (i) inherent powers must be exercised sparingly; (ii) discharge-stage scrutiny requires that prosecution material be accepted on its face value to determine prima facie ingredients; (iii) validity of sanction ordinarily calls for trial-stage examination and prejudice must be proved; and (iv) mere delay in sanction is not automatically fatal. The judgment emphasizes adherence to precedents such as Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, Renu Kumari v. Sanjay Kumar, State by Karnataka Lokayukta v. M.R. Hiremath, Dinesh Kumar v. Chairman, AAI and Director, CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aswal in delimiting quashing jurisdiction.
- [Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1417 : 2025 INSC 532](https://lawfoyer.in/angadi-chandranna-v-shankar-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-1417-2025-insc-532/): Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1417 : 2025 INSC 532, considers whether land transferred within a family-division context remains ancestral or becomes self-acquired when subsequently purchased by one brother from another and later alienated to a stranger. The dispute arose after a registered partition deed dated 09.05.1986 among three brothers, followed by a sale deed dated 16.10.1989 by which the share allotted to C. Thippeswamy (the A-schedule plot) was sold to C. Jayaramappa (Defendant No.1), and a later sale deed dated 11.03.1993 transferring that same land to the appellant (Defendant No.2). Plaintiffs (children of Defendant No.1) sued for partition and separate possession asserting the property was effectively joint/ancestral because it was acquired out of nucleus/joint family funds or blended with the family stock. The trial Court decreed plaintiffs; the First Appellate Court reversed; the High Court in second appeal set aside the First Appellate Court and restored the trial decree; the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the First Appellate Court. The Court held that the High Court improperly re-appreciated evidence under Section 100 CPC and mis-applied Section 103 CPC and the doctrine of blending. Where partition had lawfully converted joint family lands into separate shares, the share so allotted became self-acquired for the allottee unless the plaintiffs proved the existence of an income-yielding nucleus from which the later purchase was made. On the record, the evidence supported the conclusion that Defendant No.1 purchased the suit land from his brother using his own funds and a loan from DW3, not from joint family nucleus; the High Court’s factual re-appraisal therefore could not stand.
- [Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1407 : 2025 INSC 420](https://lawfoyer.in/yadwinder-singh-v-lakhi-alias-lakhwinder-singh-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-1407-2025-insc-420/): Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1713–1720 of 2025) concerns the scope and exercise of the court’s power under Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to summon persons not originally arraigned as accused where evidence produced during trial points to their complicity. The appellant (informant) alleged a brutal homicide of his brother; the FIR named several private persons as being present at the scene. A Special Investigation Team (SIT) later reported no incriminating material against some private respondents, and the High Court set aside a Trial Court order summoning those private respondents under Section 319. The Supreme Court, after reviewing authorities including Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab and Brijendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, held that (i) the SIT’s negative findings do not fetter the court’s power under Section 319, (ii) evidence given in examination-in-chief before the trial court — even if untested by cross-examination — is evidence for the purposes of Section 319 and may ground the exercise of the power where the court is satisfied that stronger-than-mere-possibility material points to complicity, and (iii) discretionary exercise of Section 319 must be sparing but not mechanically fettered by investigative findings. On the facts, eyewitnesses had named the private respondents as present at the occurrence; the Supreme Court found the Trial Court’s exercise of discretion not arbitrary and set aside the High Court’s order, directing fresh summons.
- [Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1189 : 2025 INSC 399](https://lawfoyer.in/rekha-sharad-ushir-v-saptashrungi-mahila-nagari-sahkari-patsansta-ltd-2025-3-s-c-r-1189-2025-insc-399/): Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., Criminal Appeal No. 724 of 2025, concerns the maintainability of a complaint under Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 where the complainant suppressed material documentary communications that, if disclosed, would have materially affected the Magistrate’s satisfaction under Section 200, CrPC. The respondent-credit society lodged the complaint after the deposit and dishonour of a security cheque. The appellant replied to the statutory demand by seeking production of documents relied upon in the notice; two letters from the appellant’s advocate dated 28 November 2016 and 13 December 2016 requesting loan documents were not produced with the complaint and were omitted from the complainant’s sworn statement. The Supreme Court held that recording of the complainant’s statement under Section 200, CrPC is substantive and the Magistrate must test the veracity of facts and documents before issuing process. Where a complainant suppresses very material documents and thereby makes out a false case that the accused failed to reply to the demand notice, it amounts to abuse of process. Reliance was placed on the principle in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath & Ors. that a party must come to court with clean hands. The Court quashed the complaint and cognizance order, while leaving open civil/recovery remedies. The decision underscores the duty to disclose material documentary communications when initiating criminal proceedings under Section 138 and emphasises the Magistrate’s active role under Section 200, CrPC to elicit the truth.
- [J. Ganapatha & Ors. v. M/s N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust Rep. by its Trustees & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1150 : 2025 INSC 395](https://lawfoyer.in/j-ganapatha-ors-v-m-s-n-selvarajalou-chetty-trust-rep-by-its-trustees-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-1150-2025-insc-395/): This dispute concerns competing claims of title arising from a court auction sale (04.05.1962) and a subsequently executed Will (30.05.1962) coupled with later inter vivos transfers. The core legal question was whether the Plaint Schedule — a 0.75-cent parcel — stood transferred to the late Padmini Chandrasekaran by virtue of the court auction and consequent sale deed dated 25.09.1963 (advocate-commissioner deed) so as to defeat the testamentary bequest made by Somasundaram Chettiar in favour of S. Sarvothaman (defendant No.1) and later transfers by defendant No.1 to purchasers (defendant Nos.3–6). The trial court and the Division Bench accepted that the court sale order (04.05.1962) and sale deed vested title in Padmini, and on that factual matrix moulded relief in favour of the executor H.B.N. Shetty (arm of the testatrix) to set aside sale deeds in favour of defendants 3–6 and to give effect to the testatrix’s testamentary provision for Vinayagamurthy and his children. The Supreme Court upheld the findings: (i) the court sale and sale deed remained valid and conclusive; (ii) testamentary disposition by Somasundaram executed after the court sale could not defeat the perfected conveyance; and (iii) the courts below legitimately exercised discretionary power to mould relief to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to effectuate justice. The decision reiterates the twin limits on moulding: it must be exercised to do complete justice and must not take a party by surprise or cause prejudice. Relevant precedents referred include Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders and Shivanna v. B.S. Puttamadaiah; the appeal was dismissed with costs.
- [Srikrishna Kanta Singh v. The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1113 : 2025 INSC 394](https://lawfoyer.in/srikrishna-kanta-singh-v-the-oriental-insurance-company-ltd-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-1113-2025-insc-394/): This judgment examines an appeal from an award in a Section 166 claim where the claimant, a Block Development Officer riding pillion on a scooter, suffered amputation of both legs in a collision with a long trailer on 3 November 1999. The Tribunal apportioned blame and reduced recovery by finding contributory negligence on the part of the scooter owner/driver; the High Court affirmed that view after scrutinising witness statements and a sketch map. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the finding of contributory negligence. The Court emphasised that a criminal charge-sheet and the FIR recording rash and negligent driving by the trailer driver constitute material evidence that shifts the preponderance of probability in favour of the claimant. It held that driving with a learners licence, or the mere fact of collision at the trailer’s tail-end, does not automatically or presumptively establish contributory negligence; negligence must be proved as a matter of fact and not presumed. On quantum, the Court reassessed heads of loss — medical treatment (including prosthetics), permanent disability, pain and suffering, attendant cost — and allowed a composite award of ₹16,00,000, directing the trailer’s insurer to pay with statutory interest and adjustments. The decision reinforces (i) that motor accident claims are non-adversarial and decided on the preponderance of probabilities, (ii) that illegality/error such as driving with a learners licence is not per se negligence for apportionment without supporting proof, and (iii) principles for assessing just compensation for severe amputative injuries.
- [Akshay Gupta & Anr. v. ICICI Bank Limited & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1122 : 2025 INSC 391](https://lawfoyer.in/akshay-gupta-anr-v-icici-bank-limited-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-1122-2025-insc-391/): This judgment records and accepts a comprehensive settlement between three commercial actors — the borrowers (flat purchasers), the developer (Rajsanket Realty Ltd.) and the lender (ICICI Bank Ltd.) — in four consolidated consumer appeals arising from the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission decision dated 02.01.2023. The Supreme Court, through orders dated 23.10.2024 and 06.11.2024, delineated precise financial adjustments: waiver components, 30% discount on pre-EMI interest by the Bank, 50% share of pre-EMI by the Builder, and timelines for deposits and reconciliations. The parties complied and filed affidavits proving performance; the Bank issued a certificate that no further dues remained. The Court addressed three residual contentions: (i) removal of the word “settlement” from loan account records and substitution with “re-paid” or treating the account as fully paid up; (ii) completion and handing over of possession of apartments by 31.03.2025; and (iii) formal written acknowledgment by the Builder for payments received. The Court directed the Bank to close accounts and withdraw recovery proceedings before the DRT, directed the Builder to issue acknowledgments and complete possession, and required appellants to withdraw RERA proceedings. The appeals were disposed of with directions to ensure “complete quietus to the litigation”, thereby converting a negotiated commercial compromise into a final judicial closure.
- [The Secretary to Government Department of Health & Family Welfare & Anr. v. K.C. Devaki, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1133 : 2025 INSC 389](https://lawfoyer.in/the-secretary-to-government-department-of-health-family-welfare-anr-v-k-c-devaki-2025-3-s-c-r-1133-2025-insc-389/): The Secretary to Government Department of Health & Family Welfare & Anr. v. K.C. Devaki concerns fixation of seniority when a government employee is moved from one cadre to another by reason of medical incapacity at the employee’s request and after invocation of Rule 16(a)(iii) of the Karnataka Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1977. The respondent, originally appointed as Staff Nurse in 1979, sought a cadre change to First Division Assistant on medical grounds; a medical board confirmed bronchitis and the State placed her in the clerical cadre subject to her written consent “to take seniority below the last person”. Final cadre-change orders were issued in 1989. When a seniority list published in 2007 placed her seniority from 1989, the respondent challenged, asking that her seniority in the new cadre be reckoned from her original appointment in 1979. The Karnataka Administrative Tribunal and Karnataka High Court accepted the respondent’s claim — relying on an earlier High Court precedent — but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court analysed the exceptionality and operation of Rule 16 and the express provisos of Rule 6 of the Karnataka Government Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1957, distinguished transfers “in public interest” from transfers “at the request of the officer”, and held that where transfers occur at the officer’s request (even for medical reasons) and on the officer’s consent to forego seniority, the transferee must be slotted below incumbents in the new cadre. The High Court’s equating of a cadre change following a medical-board report with a transfer in the public interest was held unsound. Consequently, the State’s final seniority list (seniority from 19.04.1989) was upheld.
- [Jothiragawan v. State Rep. By The Inspector of Police & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 951 : 2025 INSC 386](https://lawfoyer.in/jothiragawan-v-state-rep-by-the-inspector-of-police-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-951-2025-insc-386/): Jothiragawan v. State Rep. By The Inspector of Police & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1434 of 2025 (Supreme Court of India, K. Vinod Chandran, J., 24 March 2025) examines whether criminal proceedings alleging rape and cheating should be quashed under the inherent powers of the High Court in Section 482, Cr.P.C.. The victim and accused were close relatives who admitted a prior relationship and three instances of sexual intercourse occurring after meetings and visits. The High Court refused quashing, relying on a precedent (Prithvirajan). On appeal the Supreme Court closely analysed the FIR and statements to determine whether the ingredients of Section 376, IPC were made out or whether proceedings would amount to an abuse of process. The Court found no evidence that promise of marriage preceded the first intercourse and concluded the alleged promise, if any, was made after sexual intercourse; the victim repeatedly accompanied the accused willingly to hotel rooms; statements contained inconsistent contentions of both consent and force; and the sequence of events made inducement by prior promise improbable. The Court held that where the complainant’s own statements show a consensual relationship and the promise of marriage (if asserted) arose after intercourse, continuation of prosecution would be an abuse of process. Exercising Section 482, Cr.P.C., the Court quashed the proceedings. The decision emphasises careful scrutiny of preliminary statements where alleged consent and inducement overlap, and draws a limiting principle on invoking criminal process where material averments contradict each other and suggest abuse.
- [N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 957 : 2025 INSC 388](https://lawfoyer.in/n-p-saseendran-v-n-p-ponnamma-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-957-2025-insc-388/): This analysis examines N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 4312 of 2025 (Supreme Court, 24 March 2025) and focuses on whether the instrument dated 26.06.1985 (Ext.A1 / “Dhananischayaadharam”) is a gift, settlement or will, and whether legal requirements for vesting a right were satisfied. The Court held that Ext.A1 must be read as a settlement (gift by settlement): its opening clause effectuates an immediate disposition in praesenti in favour of the daughter (Respondent No.1), while later clauses reserve a life interest and limited mortgage rights to the donor (father). The judgment applies settled principles: (i) nomenclature is not decisive — substance and intention govern construction; (ii) delivery of possession is not an absolute requirement for gifts of immovable property where a registered instrument and conduct show acceptance; (iii) a settlement may contain elements of gift and consideration (often non-monetary) and such consideration may be satisfied by familial care/obligations; (iv) unilateral revocation of a valid gift/settlement is barred by s.126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; and (v) later repugnant clauses cannot cut down an earlier absolute disposition (doctrine of repugnancy / priority of earlier clause). Applying these principles to the facts and recitals, the Court affirmed the High Court’s decree declaring Respondent No.1’s title and holding the 1993 cancellation and sale deeds void as against her. Key authorities and statutory provisions (discussed below) were applied to interpret acceptance, consideration in settlements, life-interest reservations and revocability.
- [Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. The State of Maharashtra, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 933 : 2025 INSC 387](https://lawfoyer.in/firoz-khan-akbarkhan-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-2025-3-s-c-r-933-2025-insc-387/): The appeal challenges concurrent convictions under Section 302 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860 for an incident in Gujri Bazar, Village Hiwarkhed where the deceased Sukhdeo Mahadeorao Dhurve was stabbed to death allegedly by the appellant and co-accused on 19 April 2005. The core factual matrix records a prior quarrel the previous night and an encounter next morning near a shop where the three accused approached the deceased; the appellant is described by multiple eyewitnesses as inflicting repeated knife-stabs causing instant death. Trial and High Court convictions rested on consistent eyewitness testimony, post-mortem and seizure records, and the Investigating Officer’s account; delay of 2–3 days in recording statements under Section 161, CrPC was explained by communal disturbances/riots and police engagement in controlling law and order. The appellant’s alternate plea of heat-of-the-moment culpable homicide was rejected because the knife was found to be with him, indicating prior intention to cause grievous bodily injury likely to cause death. On remission, this Court recalled principles from State of Haryana v. Jagdish and Union of India v. V Sriharan, held that remission policy ordinarily follows policy at conviction date (or more benevolent policy if applicable), and granted liberty to the appellant to make a fresh representation for premature release; the State to decide by reasoned order expeditiously.
- [STATE OF RAJASTHAN V. CHATRA, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 95 : 2025 INSC 360](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-rajasthan-v-chatra-2025-4-s-c-r-95-2025-insc-360/): The Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Chatra re-affirmed conviction for rape of a three-year-old child under Section 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court set aside the acquittal order of the Rajasthan High Court, which had reversed the trial court conviction mainly due to the child victim’s silence in court and minor discrepancies in eyewitness testimony. The Court held that no rigid formula governs competency or evidentiary value of a child witness, and that the silence of a traumatised child cannot automatically favour the accused. The Bench emphasised that when medical and circumstantial evidence form a complete chain, conviction can stand even without direct testimony of the prosecutrix. The judgment discussed principles on appreciation of child-witness evidence drawn from precedents like Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, Panchhi v. State of U.P., Hari Om v. State of U.P. and State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar. The Court also applied the “panchsheel” tests for circumstantial evidence from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra. Further, the Bench criticised the High Court’s casual approach as first appellate court and its use of the prosecutrix’s name despite privacy jurisprudence under Nipun Saxena v. Union of India. The medical testimony identifying genital injuries on the child and compatible injuries on the accused, coupled with prompt FIR, conduct of parties and absence of credible motive for false implication, created a conclusive chain pointing to guilt. The Court therefore restored the trial court judgment and directed the accused to surrender and serve the remaining sentence.
- [Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Dept. of Revenue & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1011; 2025 INSC 383](https://lawfoyer.in/yerikala-sunkalamma-anr-v-state-of-andhra-pradesh-dept-of-revenue-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-1011-2025-insc-383/): Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Dept. of Revenue & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 4311 of 2025, raises whether appellants who trace title by purchase and long possession could sustain a declaratory title and possession remedy against the State which asserted the land to be an assigned government land subject to resumption. The trial court accepted documentary and oral proof — notably a registered sale deed (10.12.1970), continuous possession from 1970, issuance of a pattadar passbook and years of revenue receipts — and decreed title and possession for the plaintiffs. The High Court reversed, treating the property as an assigned land and holding that assignment conditions (including Government’s right of resumption) prevent transferees and successors from acquiring superior title. The Supreme Court re-examined (i) the evidentiary weight of a pattadar passbook under the Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971, (ii) the operation of Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977, (iii) the statutory presumption created by s.113 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, and (iv) the purpose and exigencies of s.80 CPC notice practice. The Court concluded that appellants had established possession and pattadar rights; the State failed to prove a subsisting title or lawful resumption; and, as practical justice, ordered compensation rather than demolition of long-standing public constructions.
- [A. John Kennedy Etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1437 : 2025 INSC 443](https://lawfoyer.in/a-john-kennedy-etc-v-state-of-tamil-nadu-and-others-2025-3-s-c-r-1437-2025-insc-443/): The judgment in A. John Kennedy Etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others addresses restoration and protection of the Agasthyamalai landscape — a biodiversity hotspot in the Western Ghats — and the competing claims of displaced plantation workers evicted from lands formerly under Bombay Burma Trading Corporation Ltd. (BBTCL). The Court emphasises the primacy of forest conservation for ecological balance, water security and climate resilience and reiterates the established principle that core critical tiger habitat and reserved forests merit the highest protection. Noting historical leases and century-long plantation cultivation on Singampatti Zamin lands which were subsequently notified as reserved forest, wildlife sanctuary and core tiger habitat, the Court finds the conservation imperative outweighs non-forestry uses and orders a scientific, technology-enabled survey by the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) to identify non-forestry activities, encroachments and to recommend restoration measures for reserved forests, tiger habitats, elephant corridors and wildlife sanctuaries within the Agasthyamalai landscape. The Court frames time-bound directions for completion of the survey and lists future dates for receipt of the CEC report and separate consideration of rehabilitation claims. The decision builds on a line of Supreme Court precedents stressing restoration of forest cover and enforcement of statutory safeguards under the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 and the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.
- [Sudam Prabhakar Achat v. The State of Maharashtra, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 897; 2025 INSC 378](https://lawfoyer.in/sudam-prabhakar-achat-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-2025-3-s-c-r-897-2025-insc-378/): Sudam Prabhakar Achat v. The State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No. 641 of 2024; judgment dated 21 March 2025) raises whether a conviction under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 should be converted to a lesser offence under Section 304 (Part I or II), IPC. The prosecution case—based on ocular testimony of relatives and corroborative medical evidence—found that a sudden quarrel over the use of a shared bundh (boundary) escalated when the appellant and his co-accused attacked the deceased; the latter succumbed to injuries the same night. The courts below convicted the appellant under ss.302/34 and 324/34 IPC; the High Court affirmed. Before the Supreme Court the principal contentions were (i) that the testimony of interested, related witnesses is unreliable, and (ii) that the facts do not disclose murder but at most culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Court accepted (i) that relatives’ evidence must be scrutinized with circumspection but not discarded merely for relationship, and (ii) that the assault arose in a sudden quarrel, with weapons being a stick and the blunt side of an axe — tools readily available in agricultural fields — and that the injuries and manner of assault did not indicate premeditation, cruelty or taking undue advantage. Applying Exception IV to Section 300 IPC, the Court converted the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I and directed that the appellant be sentenced to time already undergone (having served six years ten months). The judgment clarifies the approach to interested-witness testimony, the test for premeditation and cruelty, and the scope for altering a murder conviction to culpable homicide where heat of the moment and weapon-type vitiate the existence of murderous intention.
- [Dhirubhai Bhailalbhai Chauhan & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 904 : 2025 INSC 381](https://lawfoyer.in/dhirubhai-bhailalbhai-chauhan-anr-v-state-of-gujarat-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-904-2025-insc-381/): The appeal concerns whether the High Court was justified in reversing the Trial Court’s acquittal and convicting six villagers as members of an unlawful assembly that took part in night-time rioting at village Vadod on 28.02.2002. The core legal question is whether mere presence at a large public disturbance — a mob of over a thousand persons where police resorted to firing and a stampede ensued — can, without specific overt acts or incriminating material, sustain a conviction under ss. 143, 147, 153A, 295, 436 and 332 of the Indian Penal Code. The Trial Court acquitted all accused due to perfunctory and stereotyped police evidence, failures of identification, absence of seized weapons/inflammables and contradictions in eyewitness testimony. The High Court partially reversed that acquittal for those named in the FIR and arrested on the spot, treating arrest and naming as proof of presence and hence participation. The Supreme Court, on appellate scrutiny, emphasized the heavy duty to protect innocent bystanders in group-clash cases, reiterated the evidentiary limits of general witness statements in large crowds, and applied cautious inferential standards (including reference to the plurality test and principles in Masalti, Nagarjit Ahir and Busi Koteswara Rao). Holding that no reliable evidence connected the appellants to any overt act, arms or incendiary material, the Court set aside the High Court’s order and restored the Trial Court’s acquittal.
- [Inder Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 915 : 2025 INSC 382](https://lawfoyer.in/inder-singh-v-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2025-3-s-c-r-915-2025-insc-382/): The appeal concerns the condonation of an inordinate delay of 1,537 days by the State of Madhya Pradesh in preferring a Second Appeal after reversal in the first appellate forum and after a belated review petition. The High Court condoned the delay under Section 5 / Section 5/51 (Extension of prescribed period) of the Limitation Act, 1963, permitting the Second Appeal to be listed on merits. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine whether the High Court erred in treating the State more liberally on limitation grounds and whether the facts warranted condonation. The majority reasoned that although delay cannot be lightly condoned, when a dispute involves title to land claimed and held by the State as government land, and possession and public interest are implicated, the court must weigh substantive justice and prima facie considerations against strict limitation rules. Reliance was placed on established precedents endorsing a pragmatic, case-sensitive exercise of discretion where merit scrutiny is necessary. The delay was condoned subject to a costs condition of Rs.50,000 payable by the State within one month, failing which the Second Appeal would stand dismissed. The judgment reiterates that the State enjoys no undue indulgence; it must act with due diligence, but courts may adopt a liberal approach when substantial justice requires adjudication on merits.
- [State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamlal & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 144 : 2025 INSC 377](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-madhya-pradesh-v-shyamlal-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-144-2025-insc-377/): The appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh challenges the High Court’s conversion of convictions under Section 302, IPC into convictions under the second part of Section 304, IPC and the consequent sentencing order in respect of an assault on 1 November 1989 that culminated in the subsequent death of Laxman. The Trial Court had convicted respondents for offences under Sections 147, 452, 302, 325, 323 read with Section 149, IPC and awarded life imprisonment for the Section 302/149 counts. On appeal the High Court (Jabalpur) set aside the Section 302/149 conviction and convicted the accused under the second part of Section 304, IPC, reducing punishment to the sentence already undergone and levying fines; it also directed payment of compensation to the deceased’s family and to injured victims. The State contends that the brutal nature and multiplicity of injuries, and the medical evidence documenting occipital injury and internal trauma, warranted affirmation of Section 302/149 convictions. The Supreme Court examined the contemporaneous medical records, post-mortem notes and the testimony of PW-17 (medical officer), and observed that the cause of death was recorded as asphyxia with the post-mortem opinion unable to specify a definitive causal mechanism linking the earlier external injuries to death fifteen days later. Because the medical evidence left open a real doubt on whether the injuries inflicted by the accused caused death, the conversion to Section 304 (second part) and remission to the sentence already undergone was upheld; additionally, the Court recorded the importance of giving priority to old criminal appeals where an accused is on bail and the effect of long pendency and advanced age on sentencing.
- [Vaibhav Goel & Anr. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 841 : 2025 INSC 375](https://lawfoyer.in/vaibhav-goel-anr-v-deputy-commissioner-of-income-tax-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-841-2025-insc-375/): This analysis examines Vaibhav Goel & Anr. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr. where the Supreme Court considered whether post-approval demands by the Income-tax Department for earlier assessment years can be sustained when those dues were not submitted as claims during the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) and were not part of the approved resolution plan. The Court reaffirmed the clean-slate effect of an approved resolution plan under Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, relying on the binding precedents of Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss ARC. Where statutory dues (including Central Government dues) existing prior to approval are not included in the approved resolution plan, they stand extinguished and cannot be the subject of subsequent proceedings. The facts showed that income-tax demands for AY 2012-13 and 2013-14 were raised after approval though no claim was filed during CIRP; those dues were not part of the plan. The NCLT had dismissed the Monitoring Professional’s application without reasons and imposed costs; NCLAT affirmed. The Supreme Court set aside both orders, held the post-approval demands invalid, criticised NCLT’s non-consideration and costs order, and emphasised the necessity of finality for a successful resolution applicant to restart business on a clean slate. This analysis draws only on the attached judgment.
- [Chandra Shekhar Singh and Others v. The State of Jharkhand and Others, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 129 : 2025 INSC 372](https://lawfoyer.in/chandra-shekhar-singh-and-others-v-the-state-of-jharkhand-and-others-2025-4-s-c-r-129-2025-insc-372-2/): Chandra Shekhar Singh & Ors. v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 129 : 2025 INSC 372, addresses whether the word degree in the Food Safety and Standard Rules, 2011 and in a state recruitment advertisement for Food Safety Officer (FSO) can be confined to an undergraduate qualification or whether it embraces postgraduate and doctoral qualifications as well. The appellants, who possessed Master’s degrees in relevant sciences (microbiology, food science and technology), were shortlisted but later disqualified by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission on the ground that the advertisement required only a degree at the graduate level for specified subjects, with an explicit reference to Master’s degree in Chemistry only. The High Court upheld disqualification. The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme — notably Sections 37, 91 and 94 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 and the definition of degree under Section 22(3) of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 — and applied the golden rule of interpretation. The Court concluded that, absent an express exclusion, degree includes Bachelor’s, Master’s and Doctorate degrees; the special mention of Master’s degree in Chemistry imposes a higher minimum only for Chemistry, not an exclusion for other subjects. The appeal was allowed and the appellants were directed to be reinstated at the interview stage, with provision for supernumerary posts if necessary; appointments, if made, were to be without back wages but with notional service benefits.
- [Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) v. Neetu Gaur & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 850 : 2025 INSC 374](https://lawfoyer.in/indian-council-of-social-science-research-icssr-v-neetu-gaur-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-850-2025-insc-374/): Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) v. Neetu Gaur & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 850 : 2025 INSC 374 (Supreme Court, 20 March 2025) examines the limits of control exercised by a funder-authority over a recipient autonomous society and the lawful exercise of grant-withholding powers where the beneficiary has been found to flout conditions attached to grants. The Court upheld ICSSR’s discretion to withhold recurring grant-in-aid where independent enquiry reports found systemic irregularities at the recipient institution, Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development (CRRID), including appointments on dubious qualifications, irregular promotions and misuse of grant funds. The High Court’s conclusion that ICSSR exercised “deep and pervasive” control over CRRID — thereby imposing on ICSSR an obligation to pay employee salaries — was rejected. The Supreme Court held that (i) the mere nomination of ICSSR representatives on CRRID’s governing body and the fact of financial dependency does not convert CRRID into a State instrumentality under Article 12; (ii) grant-in-aid under ICSSR Rules is discretionary and conditional, and compliance failures permit withholding and refund actions; and (iii) employer-employee liabilities rest with CRRID, not ICSSR. The Court directed CRRID to pay withheld salaries from its own resources, allowed ICSSR to continue withholding further grants if CRRID failed, and ordered release of sums deposited in Court to ICSSR.
- [State (CBI) v. Mohd. Salim Zargar @ Fayaz & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 156 : 2025 INSC 376](https://lawfoyer.in/state-cbi-v-mohd-salim-zargar-fayaz-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-156-2025-insc-376-2/): State (CBI) v. Mohd. Salim Zargar @ Fayaz & Ors., Criminal Appeal Nos. 1681 & 1770 of 2009 (judgment 20 March 2025) examines the scope and mandatory nature of procedural safeguards under Section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and Rule 15 of the TADA Rules for confessions recorded by police officers not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. The appeals arose from acquittals by the Special Court in two separate but related criminal trials concerning kidnapping and subsequent murders (including the Vice-Chancellor of Kashmir University) where the prosecution’s case relied heavily on confessional statements recorded by an SP (A.K. Suri). The Supreme Court’s analysis focused on admissibility and reliability of such confessions, adherence to the Kartar Singh guidelines, the doctrine of issue estoppel where an identical confession had been earlier rejected, and the impact of non-recovery of the weapon and weak ocular testimony. The Court found pervasive non-compliance with Rule 15 — absence of questions and answers establishing voluntariness, failure to record time/place or reflection period, discrepancies in dates, recording in intimidating environments (BSF camps/JICs) and lack of authorization for the Recording Officer — and held that the Special Court rightly rejected the confessions and acquitted the accused. The appeals were dismissed. This judgment reinforces the mandatory nature of procedural safeguards under Section 15 and Rule 15, emphasises the protective rationale behind excluding police confessions, and reiterates the limits to reliance on confessions in the absence of corroboration and compliance with statutory safeguards.
- [M/s Citicorp Finance (India) Limited v. Snehasis Nanda, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 866 : 2025 INSC 371](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-citicorp-finance-india-limited-v-snehasis-nanda-2025-3-s-c-r-866-2025-insc-371-2/): This judgment examines whether the complainant, Mr. Snehasis Nanda, qualifies as a “consumer” under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, and whether M/s Citicorp Finance (India) Ltd. (the appellant) owed any enforceable obligation to pay the outstanding sale consideration of Rs.31,00,000/- to the complainant arising out of the alleged Tripartite Agreement dated 09.02.2008. The factual matrix shows a primary sale transaction between the complainant (seller) and Mr. Mubarak Vahid Patel (buyer), with the buyer procuring a home loan from the appellant. The appellant disbursed Rs.17,80,000/- to ICICI Bank to facilitate foreclosure of the complainant’s earlier housing loan and later issued a cheque for the remaining sanctioned amount which remained unencashed when the borrower closed the account. The NCDRC had granted relief to the complainant for Rs.13,20,000/- plus interest and costs; this Court set aside that order. The Court analysed privity of contract and held that, on a conjoint reading of the MoU, Agreement for Sale, Home Loan Agreement and the alleged Tripartite instrument, the essential contractual relationship of sale was between the complainant and the borrower; the appellant’s contractual relation was only with the borrower and, at best, limited to foreclosure payment obligations quantified by the Home Loan Agreement. The Court also observed procedural infirmities at the NCDRC — notably absence of a reasoned order on limitation under Section 24-A and failure to implead the borrower, a necessary and proper party. The decision reaffirmed that a person lacking privity cannot be treated as a consumer for imposing deficiency of service under the 1986 Act and reiterated the consumer’s exclusive choice in electing forum where arbitration clauses exist.
- [M/s Citicorp Finance (India) Limited v. Snehasis Nanda, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 866 ; 2025 INSC 371](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-citicorp-finance-india-limited-v-snehasis-nanda-2025-3-s-c-r-866-2025-insc-371/): This analysis examines the Supreme Court’s judgment in M/s Citicorp Finance (India) Ltd. v. Snehasis Nanda (Civil Appeal No.14157 of 2024), delivered on 20 March 2025, wherein the Court set aside the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission’s order directing refund of Rs.13,20,000/ with interest and costs. The core questions were (i) whether the complainant qualified as a “consumer” under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, (ii) whether the financier (appellant) was liable to pay the outstanding sale consideration of Rs.31,00,000/ to the complainant under a purported tripartite agreement, and (iii) whether non-joinder of the purchaser (borrower) vitiated proceedings before the NCDRC. The Court analysed the contractual matrix — memorandum of understanding, agreement for sale, home loan agreement and a partly produced tripartite document — and held that the substantive sale transaction was between the complainant and the borrower; there was no privity of contract between complainant and appellant. The judgment emphasises (a) the necessity of privity (contractual obligation) for invoking remedies under the 1986 Act where no service is shown; (b) the burden of proof on the party asserting the existence of an agreement; (c) the limited scope of financier’s liability under the home loan; and (d) the procedural prerequisites for condoning delay under Section 24-A and for impleading necessary parties. The Court also reiterated that arbitration clauses, if present, cannot be forced upon a consumer — arbitration remains an elective forum for the consumer.
- [Supreme Court Bar Association & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 821 : 2025 INSC 364](https://lawfoyer.in/supreme-court-bar-association-anr-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-821-2025-insc-364/): Supreme Court Bar Association & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (Misc. Applns. Nos. 3–4 of 2025 in Crim. App. Nos. 3883–3884 of 2024) addresses the scope and effect of directions given in paragraph 42 of the Court’s judgment dated 20 September 2024 concerning recording of appearances in the Supreme Court. The applications by Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) and Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) sought clarification/modification of the directions which limited marking of appearances to those advocates authorised to appear and argue on a particular day, and required adherence to Form No.30 (Appearance Slip) and related endorsement requirements for vakalatnamas. The Court examined whether advocates have an indefeasible right to have their appearances marked absent proper authorisation, and whether the directions impinge on any legal, fundamental or statutory rights of advocates. Relying upon Article 145, Supreme Court Rules, 2013 (as amended), the Advocates Act, 1961 and Bar Council of India Rules, the Court reiterated that the Rules framed under Article 145 carry statutory force and must be strictly followed. The Bench clarified duties of Advocate-on-Record (AOR) regarding certification/endorsement of vakalatnamas, the limited circumstances for marking assisting counsel, the necessity of physical presence and effective participation for recording appearance, and reaffirmed that a Senior Advocate cannot appear without an AOR. The applications were disposed of with modifications of para 42 and directions for administrative compliance.
- [Sunita & Ors. v. Vinod Singh & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 811 : 2025 INSC 366](https://lawfoyer.in/sunita-ors-v-vinod-singh-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-811-2025-insc-366/): Sunita & Ors. v. Vinod Singh & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 811 : 2025 INSC 366, considers adequacy of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 where a truck driven in a rash and negligent manner crushed and killed Smt. Tarawati on 07.02.2003. The claimants pleaded the deceased’s age as about 45 years and monthly earnings of Rs.10,000/ (inclusive of family pension and agricultural income). The MACT awarded Rs.4,31,680/; the High Court enhanced it to Rs.5,96,761/. On appeal, this Court examined (i) computation of monthly income (including notional wages for a housewife), (ii) appropriate multiplier (dependent on age as per Sarla Verma), (iii) deduction for personal expenses, (iv) allowance for loss of love and affection and funeral expenses, and (v) loss of future prospects. Relying on post-mortem age assessment and precedents including Rajendra Singh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Pranay Sethi, the Court fixed monthly income at Rs.7,000/ (rounded), applied a multiplier of 14, allowed 25% for future prospects, assessed loss of love and affection at Rs.40,000/ per claimant escalated by 10% per three years (adopting the Pranay formula and Magma interpretation), increased funeral expenses to Rs.20,000/, and changed personal deduction to 1/4th (per Sarla Verma). Total compensation quantified at Rs.13,82,500/ with 7.5% p.a. interest. The judgment reiterates that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is remedial and courts must award just compensation guided by established precedents.
- [Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal and Others, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 50; 2025 INSC 361](https://lawfoyer.in/parminder-singh-v-honey-goyal-and-others-2025-4-s-c-r-50-2025-insc-361/): Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 4299 of 2025, concerns enhancement of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for a 21-year-old veterinary student and State-level volleyball player who suffered quadriplegia (100% permanent disability) after being struck by a car on 03.06.2014. The Tribunal originally awarded ₹5,16,000; the High Court enhanced the award to ₹15,25,600 by taking monthly income at ₹5,600 and applying multiplier 18. The Supreme Court held that (i) the income figure was underestimated and should be taken at ₹7,500 per month, (ii) future prospects of 40% ought to be added, yielding an adjusted monthly income of ₹10,500, (iii) multiplier 18 was appropriate, and (iv) additional heads such as attendant charges, special diet, pain and suffering, physiotherapy and future medical expenses warranted substantial lumpsum awards. The Court thus enhanced total compensation to ₹36,84,000 and directed payment by bank transfer within specific timelines, while issuing comprehensive directions to streamline direct bank payment of awards in motor accident cases to avoid delay and loss of interest. The judgment takes judicial notice of physiotherapy needs, the minimum wages applicable at the time, and national data on road accidents; it reiterates the Tribunal’s and High Court’s duties to assess realistic future prospects and ancillary heads.
- [Yogesh Kumar v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 890 : 2025 INSC 379](https://lawfoyer.in/yogesh-kumar-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-others-2025-3-s-c-r-890-2025-insc-379/): Yogesh Kumar v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 890 : 2025 INSC 379 — The Supreme Court allowed an appeal by former stenographers who had worked for about eight years in District Court (Fast Track Courts) but whose appointments were terminated as surplus. Earlier orders including dismissal of a Special Leave Petition had left open the question of recovery of unpaid salary by granting liberty to sue in an appropriate civil action. The High Court later dismissed petitions for salary on the ground that writ jurisdiction could not substitute for a civil suit. The Supreme Court held that a hyper-technical approach was inappropriate under Article 226 where undisputed facts showed eight years’ service and where relief could be granted on affidavit evidence without prolonged trial. Relying on precedents that permit writ relief even when questions of fact exist but are amenable to summary adjudication (ABL International Ltd. and subsequent cases), the Court directed payment of salaries for the period actually worked with 6% interest and awarded costs of Rs.1,00,000. The decision underscores the duty of courts and the State to be model litigants, avoids formalistic barriers to relief where factual position is clear, and clarifies that direction to pursue a civil remedy should not be used to deny substantive justice when the writ forum can decide the claim summarily.
- [Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal & Others, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 50 ; 2025 INSC 361](https://lawfoyer.in/parminder-singh-v-honey-goyal-others-2025-4-s-c-r-50-2025-insc-361-2/): Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 4299 of 2025 (Supreme Court, 18 Mar. 2025) concerns enhancement of compensation in a Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claim where the 21-year-old claimant suffered quadriplegia and was declared 100% disabled after being struck by a car. The Tribunal awarded a conservative lump sum; the High Court increased it by reassessing monthly income and applying multiplier methodology but omitted future prospects. The Supreme Court further revised the assessment: it found the monthly income assessment low compared to contemporaneous minimum wages, fixed a realistic monthly income, applied a 40% future prospects uplift, adopted multiplier 18, and granted lumpsum awards for attendant charges, special diet, pain and suffering, physiotherapy, future medical expenses and loss of marriage prospects—arriving at ₹36,84,000 with interest. The Court also addressed systemic delay and operational friction in disbursing awards and directed streamlined direct bank transfers of compensation with procedural safeguards (bank particulars at pleadings stage; fixed deposit directions where appropriate). The judgment reiterates the compensatory object of the Motor Vehicles Act and endorses technology-enabled payments to prevent loss of interest and hardship to claimants.
- [Bank of India & Ors. v. Muthyala Saibaba Suryanarayana Murthy & Anr., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 120 : 2025 INSC 373](https://lawfoyer.in/bank-of-india-ors-v-muthyala-saibaba-suryanarayana-murthy-anr-2025-4-s-c-r-120-2025-insc-373-2/): Bank of India & Ors. v. Muthyala Saibaba Suryanarayana Murthy & Anr., decided by the Supreme Court on 18 March 2025, concerns the limits of writ relief where a retired employee belatedly sought to opt into the Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Scheme, 1995 after the time-window prescribed by a widely publicised circular had closed. The respondent retired in 2000 and, though eligible under a settlement executed on 27 April 2010, failed to submit his option between 1 September and 30 October 2010. He returned from the USA shortly after the circular was issued, underwent a short hospitalisation in October, and only on 19 March 2011 (four months late) sought to exercise the option. The Bank refused; a Single Judge dismissed the writ petition; a Division Bench allowed the appeal on grounds of the beneficial character of the policy and condonable delay; the Supreme Court granted leave and restored the Single Judge’s order. The Court emphasised that when a benefit-conferring policy prescribes a deadline and the employer takes reasonable steps to communicate it, courts exercising Article 226 powers must not rescue the tardy or extend mandamus where there is no legally protected right. The judgment reiterates the mandate that mandamus requires a judicially enforceable legal right and cautions against importing sympathy or charity to override settled deadlines, relying on Mani Subrat Jain v. State of Haryana and guidance in Calcutta Port Trust v. Anadi Kumar Das regarding modes of communication to retirees.
- [Sajithabai and Ors. v. The Kerala Water Authority and Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 789 : 2025 INSC 354](https://lawfoyer.in/sajithabai-and-ors-v-the-kerala-water-authority-and-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-789-2025-insc-354/): The appeals raise whether an officer who becomes Assistant Engineer under the Kerala Public Health Engineering Subordinate Service Rules, 1966 (the 1966 Rules) — by direct recruitment or promotion — has the statutory option under Rule 4(b) of the Kerala Public Health Engineering Service Special Rules, 1960 (the 1960 Rules) to migrate between the degree and diploma promotion quotas for purposes of subsequent promotion to Assistant Executive Engineer (and higher). The core dispute arose where Draftsmen holding degrees were promoted to Assistant Engineer under the 40% promotion (diploma) quota before the result of a 6% in-service direct recruitment (degree quota) exam was declared; other candidates secured entry to Assistant Engineer via the 6% degree quota. Lower courts held that those who entered by promotion under the diploma stream had effectively chosen the diploma quota and could not thereafter switch to the degree quota. The Supreme Court held the 1960 and 1966 Rules govern distinct services and that Rule 4(b) of the 1960 Rules applies to all officers holding the post of Assistant Engineer, irrespective of the mode by which they entered that feeder post. Consequently, once appointed as Assistant Engineer, an eligible officer (degree/diploma holder) may opt to be counted under either quota for higher promotions subject to the proviso in Rule 4(b). The High Court orders were set aside.
- [State of Haryana & Others v. Aalamgir & Others, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1460 ; 2025 INSC 407](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-haryana-others-v-aalamgir-others-2025-3-s-c-r-1460-2025-insc-407/): State of Haryana & Others v. Aalamgir & Others, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1460 ; 2025 INSC 407, concerns multiple writ petitions before the Punjab & Haryana High Court challenging the validity of land acquisition processes undertaken under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the LA Act, 1894) and subsequent relief sought under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the 2013 Act). The High Court in several matters followed this Court’s earlier decision in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183, granting relief under Section 24(2). Thereafter a five-Judge Bench in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129, revisited and overruled Pune Municipal Corporation and clarified the scope, interpretation and interplay of Section 24(1) and Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The State of Haryana challenged the High Court orders in a batch of appeals. The Supreme Court declined to decide the merits afresh, held that Indore Development Authority governs, set aside the impugned High Court orders and remanded the writ petitions for fresh consideration applying the ratio in Indore Development Authority. The Court preserved existing status quo orders pending fresh adjudication, permitted respondents to raise all available contentions including equitable and subsequent developments, and directed substitution where necessary. The Court also dealt with condonation of delay in filing SLPs and fixed a sliding scale of costs. Remand and directions were issued without expressing views on merits.
- [Tr. A. Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 926 : 2025 INSC 799](https://lawfoyer.in/tr-a-babu-v-state-of-tamil-nadu-2025-3-s-c-r-926-2025-insc-799/): This appeal by special leave challenged only the quantum of sentence imposed on the appellant who was convicted for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and related criminal breach of trust / misappropriation pertaining to grant-in-aid funds (total Rs. 15,45,000/-). The appellant, a lifelong managing trustee of two trusts established by his then-wife (a Minister for Social Welfare), did not contest conviction before this Court but sought mitigation of sentence and release on bail subject to deposit of an enhanced fine of Rs. 5 crores to be used for welfare of specially-abled children. The Supreme Court, while affirming the findings of guilt recorded by trial and High Court, entertained the appeal limited to sentence. Considering the appellant’s advanced age (about 68 years), protracted trial duration, the offer to deposit the enhanced fine and the public purpose proposed, the Court directed conditional release on bail on furnishing an undertaking and deposit of the balance amount by a prescribed date. The entire sum (including Rs. 50 lakhs earlier deposited) is ordered transmitted to the Tamil Nadu State Legal Services Authority to be invested in a fixed deposit; interest to be utilised by the Juvenile Justice Committee, High Court of Madras, for government childcare institutions. The bail will automatically stand cancelled on non-compliance. The order balances penal accountability with restorative utilisation of funds for child welfare under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015.
- [Ranjit Sarkar v. Ravi Ganesh Bhardwaj and Others, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1448 : 2025 INSC 415](https://lawfoyer.in/ranjit-sarkar-v-ravi-ganesh-bhardwaj-and-others-2025-3-s-c-r-1448-2025-insc-415/): The appeal concerns the validity of the Judicial Magistrate’s orders of 6 January 2021 and 16 April 2021 that culminated in dismissal of a complaint for default in a Section 304-A IPC complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C. The respondents had earlier secured interim stay of the subordinate-court proceedings by approaching the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The complaint was called on 6 January 2021 for the limited purpose of requiring the complainant to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed for default; the Magistrate fixed 16 April 2021 for the complainant’s response. The complainant — a septuagenarian who contracted COVID-19 — did not attend, and the Magistrate dismissed the complaint for default. The Sessions Judge in revision restored the complaint, holding that the complainant had sufficient cause and that Section 256 Cr.P.C. (acquittal for non-appearance of complainant) did not automatically apply because the date was not appointed for appearance of the accused. The High Court later set aside the revisional order, relying on an earlier observation that non-appearance of complainant ordinarily attracts Section 256 and results in acquittal. The Supreme Court, allowing the appeal, held that (i) the Magistrate could not have validly dismissed the complaint on 16 April 2021 while an operative stay and pandemic SoP were in place unless cognizable reasons were recorded; (ii) Section 256 operates only when the date is one appointed for appearance of the accused (or any adjourned day for that purpose); and (iii) the Sessions Judge had correctly intervened by restoring the complaint. The High Court order of 15 July 2024 was set aside and the complaint and related CRR restored for fresh adjudication.
- [Gangubai Raghunath Ayare v. Gangaram Sakharam Dhuri (D) Thr. LRs and Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 184 : 2025 INSC 355](https://lawfoyer.in/gangubai-raghunath-ayare-v-gangaram-sakharam-dhuri-d-thr-lrs-and-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-184-2025-insc-355-2/): Gangubai Raghunath Ayare v. Gangaram Sakharam Dhuri (D) Thr. LRs and Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 184 : 2025 INSC 355, examines the interplay between suits for administration of an estate and incidental reliefs which effectively seek partition or possession. The plaintiff sued for administration of her deceased father's estate and declaratory reliefs that a sale deed executed by her brother Vishnu in favour of the 2nd defendant was void. The Trial Court found the administration suit non-maintainable for non-impleadment of necessary heirs of a subsequently deceased party but nevertheless declared the sale void and directed possession to be delivered. The High Court reversed on two grounds: (i) the sale deed could not be set aside in toto because the transferor held only an undivided share and (ii) possession relief was unsustainable in a suit where co-owners claiming their shares were not properly before the court. The Supreme Court approved the High Court’s approach, holding that once the principal relief for administration was struck down as non-maintainable for want of necessary parties, consequential reliefs amounting to partition or possession could not be granted until proper impleadment; and that the sale by V was valid only to the extent of his undivided 1/5th share. The plaintiff’s possession was to remain undisturbed until partition according to law, and the 2nd defendant’s title stood limited to the share actually transferred.
- [Shivaleela and Others v. The Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Others., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 63 : 2025 INSC 357](https://lawfoyer.in/shivaleela-and-others-v-the-divisional-manager-united-india-insurance-co-ltd-others-2025-4-s-c-r-63-2025-insc-357/): This judgment examines the correct approach to fixation of monthly income and consequent compensation in a fatal motor accident claim. The MACT had awarded Rs.25,49,000/ with 6% interest after taking a notional monthly income of Rs.10,000/; the High Court reduced the award to Rs.20,61,320/ and fixed monthly income at Rs.8,000/ per month. The appellants contended that the deceased carried primary responsibility for multiple income-generating activities (agriculture, milk-vending and tractor hiring) and produced documentary and oral evidence (bank loan record, milk society passbook, purchaser’s evidence and sale lists) to show substantially higher receipts; they sought Rs.40,000/ per month. The insurer urged division of family income among co-heirs and supported the lower assessment. The Supreme Court, after a holistic appraisal of depositions of PW3, PW4, PW5 and PW6 and the documentary record, found both the MACT and the High Court erred on the lower side. Applying the compensatory and forward-looking principles in Smt. Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation and National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, the Court adopted a realistic mid-point and fixed monthly income at Rs.15,000/; added 40% for future prospects, deducted 1/5th for personal living expenses, applied multiplier 16, enhanced interest to 7.5% p.a., and computed total compensation as Rs.35,66,600/. The decision underscores careful evaluation of cumulative income streams, corroborative documentary evidence, the physical nature of the deceased’s work (which disfavors shifting of burden to aged parents), and application of forward-looking compensation doctrine under the Motor Vehicles framework.
- [Vishnoo Mittal v. M/s Shakti Trading Company, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 41 : 2025 INSC 346](https://lawfoyer.in/vishnoo-mittal-v-m-s-shakti-trading-company-2025-4-s-c-r-41-2025-insc-346-2/): Vishnoo Mittal v. M/s Shakti Trading Company, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 41 : 2025 INSC 346, examines whether proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be quashed against a natural person (a former director) where an insolvency moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was in force when the statutory demand notice was served. The appellant, a director of M/s Xalta Food and Beverages Pvt. Ltd., drew cheques which were dishonoured on 07.07.2018. The demand notice was served on 06.08.2018, after the insolvency commencement date (25.07.2018) and the appointment of the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP). The High Court relied on P. Mohan Raj v. M/s Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. to reject quashal, treating the moratorium’s immunity as unavailable to natural persons. The Supreme Court distinguished P. Mohan Raj on its facts because in that case the cause of action under Section 138 had arisen before the moratorium. Relying on the statutory structure of Section 138 (specifically proviso clause (c)) and the management vesting provisions in Section 17 IBC, the Court held that a cause of action only accrues after the 15-day period post demand notice and that where that accrual happens during a moratorium and the director lacks capacity to make payment (management and bank accounts controlled by IRP), proceedings should be quashed. The summons and complaint were therefore quashed.
- [Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement & Anr., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 71 : 2025 INSC 349](https://lawfoyer.in/pradeep-nirankarnath-sharma-v-directorate-of-enforcement-anr-2025-4-s-c-r-71-2025-insc-349-2/): This judgment concerns an appeal by Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma against the High Court of Gujarat’s dismissal of his criminal revision challenging the Special Judge (PMLA)’s refusal to discharge him under Section 227, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Enforcement Directorate prosecuted the appellant under Section 3 & 4, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”), alleging that proceeds derived from scheduled offences (notably offences under the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988) were concealed, layered and projected as untainted property. The appellant’s central defenses were (i) that many alleged predicate acts predated the PMLA or predated inclusion of specific offences in the PMLA schedule, and (ii) that money-laundering is not a continuing offence applicable to past acts. The Supreme Court rejected these defenses, relying on established precedent that money-laundering is a continuing offence and that the relevant date is when the accused engages in processes connected with proceeds of crime, not simply the date of the predicate act. The Court held the material placed by the ED disclosed a prima facie case, the aggregated proceeds exceeded statutory thresholds, and the trial should proceed. The appeal was dismissed.
- [The Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 516 : 2025 INSC 347](https://lawfoyer.in/the-auroville-foundation-v-navroz-kersasp-mody-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-516-2025-insc-347-2/): The appeal challenges the National Green Tribunal’s decision in O.A. No.239/2021 that restrained further construction by The Auroville Foundation and directed preparation of a township plan, appointment of a Joint Committee to inspect the Crown Road alignment, and conditional permitting of completion of limited stretches of the road subject to environmental safeguards. The primary legal tension is whether the Tribunal possessed jurisdiction under Section 14 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 to entertain the application where no specific violation of the enactments listed in Schedule I (notably the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 or the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986) was proved, and whether application of the precautionary principle justified directions that effectively interfered with an approved statutory Master Plan (approved by the Town and Country Planning Organisation in 2001) and implementation decisions taken under the Auroville Foundation Act, 1988. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because no substantial question arising from the implementation of a Schedule I enactment was shown; it further held that by directing preparation of a fresh township plan and imposing environmental clearance requirements contrary to the stand of the MoEF&CC, the Tribunal exceeded its remit and substituted judicial review for executive/administrative decision-making. The appeals were allowed and the impugned NGT orders quashed.
- [The Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 469; 2025 INSC 348](https://lawfoyer.in/the-auroville-foundation-v-natasha-storey-2025-3-s-c-r-469-2025-insc-348-3/): The Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey ([2025] 3 S.C.R. 469; 2025 INSC 348), arising from the Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court dated 15.03.2024, examines two interrelated legal themes: (i) the strict applicability of the equitable doctrine of clean hands and non-suppression of material facts in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution; and (ii) the statutory contours of the roles and powers of the Governing Board and the Residents’ Assembly under the Auroville Foundation Act, 1988 read with the Auroville Foundation Rules, 1997. The respondent filed two successive writ petitions challenging the Standing Order No.1/2022 (Notification dated 01.06.2022) that reconstituted the Auroville Town Development Council (ATDC). The first petition (W.P. No. 22895/2022) was dismissed on 13.10.2022; without disclosing that outcome the respondent filed a second petition (W.P. No. 25882/2022) seeking substantially the same relief. The High Court allowed the second petition and set aside the Standing Order. The Supreme Court on appeal held that the High Court erred in entertaining the second petition without dealing with the material non-disclosure; suppression of the earlier dismissal amounted to abuse of process and warranted dismissal. On substantive law, the Court held that neither the Act nor the Rules confer a statutory right on the Residents’ Assembly or any individual resident to be members of committees or councils constituted by the Governing Board; the Governing Board alone enjoys the general superintendence, direction and management of the Foundation and may co-opt persons under s.16(2) (without voting rights) and frame Standing Orders under s.11(3) and r.5. The Standing Order impugned did not suffer legal infirmity. Costs of Rs.50,000 were imposed on the respondent.
- [Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 32 : 2025 INSC 350](https://lawfoyer.in/pradeep-nirankarnath-sharma-v-state-of-gujarat-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-32-2025-insc-350-2/): The appeal concerns a retired Indian Administrative Service officer, Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma, challenging the High Court of Gujarat’s refusal to direct that a preliminary inquiry be mandatorily conducted before the registration of any further First Information Reports arising from actions taken during his official tenure. The appellant relied principally on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2014) to contend that successive FIRs lodged against him—especially following his release on bail—constitute harassment and that a pre-FIR opportunity to explain should be mandated in cases of alleged administrative irregularities. The State countered that where information prima facie discloses a cognizable offence, registration under Section 154, CrPC is mandatory and no pre-FIR hearing or blanket protection can be carved out. The Supreme Court, after reviewing Lalita Kumari, held that the scope of a preliminary inquiry is limited to cases where the information does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence; where it does, police must register an FIR and investigate. Allegations of abuse of official position and corrupt practices, the Court held, ordinarily fall within cognizable offences and cannot be insulated by a court-mandated pre-FIR inquiry. The Court declined to issue any blanket direction restraining registration of FIRs against the appellant, observing that such directions would amount to judicial overreach and that statutory remedies (quashing under Section 482, CrPC, bail applications and trial safeguards) remain available.
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- [Kiran Raju Penumacha v. Tejuswini Chowdhury, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 802 : 2025 INSC 358](https://lawfoyer.in/kiran-raju-penumacha-v-tejuswini-chowdhury-2025-3-s-c-r-802-2025-insc-358/): The Supreme Court in Kiran Raju Penumacha v. Tejuswini Chowdhury (Civil Appeal No. 3842 of 2025) examined whether an execution petition to enforce a custody clause in a mutual-consent divorce decree can proceed independently while a modification petition filed by the custodial parent remains pending. The decree had awarded permanent custody of the minor to the mother with interim weekend custody to the father; subsequent breakdown in contact led the father to move an execution petition and the mother to move for modification. The High Court remanded the matter to the Family Court to decide both petitions afresh. The Supreme Court refused to set aside that remand but, mindful of its parens patriae duty and the child's welfare, directed a narrowly tailored interim visitation regimen — two hours every Sunday (4:00 PM–6:00 PM) with a caretaker present — until the Family Court disposes the matters within three months. The Court balanced the need not to prejudice a pending modification against the father’s right to maintain a relationship with the child, emphasising that custody determinations are governed by the best interest of the child doctrine and that courts must shape specific, practicable visitation arrangements. The judgment reiterates that execution proceedings cannot be used to short-circuit custody law; yet, interim relief may be fashioned to protect the child’s welfare and preserve parental contact.
- [The Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 469 : 2025 INSC 348](https://lawfoyer.in/the-auroville-foundation-v-natasha-storey-2025-3-s-c-r-469-2025-insc-348-2/): The Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey concerns whether a writ petitioner who filed a second petition after an earlier dismissal without disclosing that dismissal can invoke the High Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and whether the Residents’ Assembly or individual residents possess any statutory right to be members of committees or councils constituted by the Governing Board of the Auroville Foundation. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of clean hands and non-suppression of material facts applies with full force to writ proceedings; suppression of the earlier dismissal amounted to an abuse of process and the High Court should have dismissed the petition on that ground. On merits, the Court interpreted the Auroville Foundation Act, 1988 and the Auroville Foundation Rules, 1997, holding that the Governing Board has general superintendence, direction and management of the Foundation and power to constitute committees (s.11(3), ss.16–17; Rule 5). The functions of the Residents’ Assembly are advisory and recommendatory under s.19; neither the Act nor Rules confer a statutory right on the Assembly or any resident to be members of committees convened by the Governing Board. The impugned Standing Order re-constituting the Auroville Town Development Council was therefore lawful; the High Court’s order setting it aside was set aside and costs were imposed on the respondent. The decision reinforces limits on repetitive litigation and confirms the statutory allocation of powers between the Governing Board and Residents’ Assembly.
- [Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 32 : 2025 INSC 350](https://lawfoyer.in/pradeep-nirankarnath-sharma-v-state-of-gujarat-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-32-2025-insc-350/): The appeal concerns whether a preliminary inquiry must, as a matter of law, precede the registration of every First Information Report where allegations relate to the abuse of official position. The appellant, a retired IAS officer, challenged multiple FIRs registered over alleged irregularities in land allotments during his tenure as Collector of Kachchh, asserting that successive FIRs — often lodged after his release on bail — amounted to harassment and violated Articles 14, 20, 21, 22 and 226 of the Constitution. Reliance was placed on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. ((2014) 2 SCC 1) to contend that preliminary inquiry is mandatory in such matters. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that where the information prima facie discloses a cognizable offence the police must register an FIR under Section 154, CrPC, and no prior inquiry is permissible; preliminary inquiry is permitted only where the information does not disclose a cognizable offence but calls for verification. The Supreme Court in this appeal affirmed that principle, restricting Lalita Kumari to cases where disclosure is not prima facie cognizable and rejecting any blanket pre-FIR hearing or protective order for the appellant. The Court held that allegations of abuse of official position and corruption ordinarily disclose cognizable offences and that remedies for abuse — quashing under Section 482 CrPC, bail applications and trial safeguards — are available. The Court refused to convert judicial functions into administrative safeguards or to rewrite CrPC procedure.
- [Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 490 : 2025 INSC 335](https://lawfoyer.in/gyanendra-singh-raja-singh-v-state-of-u-p-2025-3-s-c-r-490-2025-insc-335-2/): The appeal concerns whether convictions for offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter IPC) — specifically ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) — could properly coexist with convictions under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter POCSO Act, ss.3/4), where the same acts constitute offences under both statutes. The trial court convicted the appellant, Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh, for penetrative sexual assault of his minor daughter and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and fine; the High Court affirmed conviction but interpreted the IPC life sentence to mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life. The narrow legal question was whether s.42 and s.42A of the POCSO Act require that only POCSO punishment apply (or that POCSO override IPC), or whether the court must apply the law that prescribes the greater punishment. The Supreme Court held that s.42 operates to permit selection of the law providing the greater punishment where the same act is punishable under both POCSO and IPC; s.42A does not displace that enabling rule. Consequently, convictions under both statutes were sustainable but the Court corrected the High Court’s enhancement: while the trial court’s life sentence stands, the direction that life must extend to the remainder of natural life (no possibility of early release) was not warranted; the Court restored the trial court’s sentence under POCSO and ordered concurrent sentences, awarding a substantial fine under IPC.
- [Delhi Development Authority v. S.G.G. Towers (P) Ltd. & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 779 : 2025 INSC 337](https://lawfoyer.in/delhi-development-authority-v-s-g-g-towers-p-ltd-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-779-2025-insc-337/): The appeal arises from sale of a Nazul plot originally subject to an agreement to lease executed by the Delhi Improvement Trust (now Delhi Development Authority) dated 17 July 1957 in favour of M/s Mehta Constructions & Industrial Corporation Pvt. Ltd. The lease contemplated later execution and registration of a lease deed; clause 24 expressly provided that until execution/registration the agreement would not create any right, title or interest. M/s Mehta Constructions purportedly transferred its position to M/s Pure Drinks (New Delhi) Ltd. by a registered conveyance cum assignment dated 15 February 1985 (registered after an order of the Company Court). M/s Pure Drinks went into liquidation and the plot was auctioned in liquidation; the highest bidder (S.G.G. Towers (P) Ltd.) had the auction sale confirmed by the Company Judge and later by the Division Bench of the High Court. The DDA challenged confirmation on the ground that no leasehold rights ever vested in Mehta (and hence could not be transferred or sold) and that transfer required DDA’s prior consent under Section 22 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 and the Delhi Development Authority (Disposal of Developed Nazul Land) Rules, 1981 (Rule 43). The Supreme Court held that because the lease deed was never executed the original agreement conferred no proprietary interest on Mehta; accordingly the transferee in liquidation could only acquire those rights, if any, which Mehta could lawfully confer — but that did not amount to ownership or a valid executed lease. The auction was on “as it is basis” and the Company Judge’s order made sale absolute; therefore the successful bidder acquired only such rights as flowed from Mehta’s position and no greater. The Court declined to order appropriation of liquidation moneys for unearned income in favour of DDA given multiple creditors and ongoing liquidation. The DDA’s remedy to recover possession or unearned income remains available and the buyer may apply to regularise the transaction by tendering unearned income or other sums in accordance with law.
- [State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 598 : 2025 INSC 334](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-assam-ors-v-arabinda-rabha-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-598-2025-insc-334-2/): This judgment examines the limits of judicial review when a successor State authority cancels a previously prepared select list for public employment. The Court balances competing principles: (i) the established rule that mere empanelment does not create an indefeasible right to appointment; (ii) the constitutional requirement that recruitment processes remain fair, non-arbitrary and consistent with Articles 14 and 16; and (iii) the standard of review applicable to administrative decisions — contrasting Wednesbury unreasonableness with the more intrusive proportionality analysis. Facts reveal a recruitment process for 104 constables in the Assam Forest Protection Force conducted largely by interview in 2016, followed by a successor Government’s cancellation of the select list on the PCCF’s note alleging systemic irregularities and violation of reservation norms. The Gauhati High Court held the irregularities curable and directed the process to be completed; this Court reversed. Applying precedent, the Supreme Court finds the successor Government’s choice to cancel (one of three realistic options) defended by cogent material in the PCCF note, and concludes that cancellation was neither Wednesbury-unreasonable nor disproportionate. The Court clarifies that while selectees possess no automatic right to appointment, they retain locus to challenge arbitrary executive decisions; relief depends on facts. Directions emphasise framing or public promulgation of recruitment rules and permit respondents to reapply with specified relaxations under Article 142. The ruling thus affirms wide but not unlimited executive discretion to protect the public interest where systemic taint in selection is credibly shown.
- [Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 502; 2025 INSC 338](https://lawfoyer.in/yuvraj-laxmilal-kanther-anr-v-state-of-maharashtra-2025-3-s-c-r-502-2025-insc-338-2/): Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 2356 of 2024 (judgment dated 07 March 2025) considers whether prima facie material existed to proceed under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for two deaths caused when workers engaged in shop-front decoration were electrocuted and fell from an iron ladder. The police initially chargesheeted under Sections 304A/182/201 r/w Section 34 IPC; the Magistrate committed the case to Sessions on Section 304 Part II; the Trial Court and High Court refused discharge. The Supreme Court reviewed the ingredients of Section 304 Part II—culpable homicide not amounting to murder where the act is done with knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without intention to cause death—and held that neither requisite knowledge nor intention was made out even on material taken at its highest. The Court emphasized that at the Section 227 stage a threadbare appraisal is not required but there must still be sufficient material to justify trial. On facts — provision of an iron ladder, absence of safety gear, post-incident compensatory measures, and lack of overt act or overt mens rea — the Court found only accidental death and no prima facie case under Section 304 Part II or even Section 304A. Consequently, orders of the Trial Court and High Court were quashed and the appellants discharged.
- [Vijay Bahadur v. Sunil Kumar & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 11; 2025 INSC 332](https://lawfoyer.in/vijay-bahadur-v-sunil-kumar-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-11-2025-insc-332-2/): This judgment examines whether a Sub-Divisional Magistrate was justified in ordering a recount of votes in a Gram Pradhan election under Section 12-C of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, where an apparent discrepancy existed between the oral count communicated at the polling booths (total 1194 votes across booths 43–45) and the figure recorded in Form 46 (1213 votes) — a difference of 19 votes. The High Court set aside the recount order for want of documentary support and for alleged vagueness in pleadings. The Supreme Court, after surveying precedent on the sanctity of the ballot and the narrow circumstances permitting inspection/recount (notably Hussain Kamil Kidwai, Vadivelu, Suresh Prasad Yadav), emphasized that secrecy of ballot is sacrosanct but not absolute. Where material facts are pleaded and prima facie satisfaction exists that recount is necessary to do complete justice — particularly when Presiding Officer’s diary and other contemporaneous records are missing, and multiple candidates (three of four) suspect impropriety — the Court held that recount was justified. The High Court’s quashing of the recount order was set aside; the Sub-Divisional Magistrate’s order restored and directions issued to fix date for recount. The judgment balances ballot secrecy with the constitutional imperative of free and fair elections and underscores preservation of election documents and the value of procedural integrity.
- [Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 419 : 2025 INSC 327](https://lawfoyer.in/joyi-kitty-joseph-v-union-of-india-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-419-2025-insc-327-2/): The appeal concerns the validity of a preventive detention under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA Act) challenged on behalf of the detenu by his wife. The Supreme Court considered whether the detaining authority applied its mind to the facts and whether the subjective satisfaction required for preventive detention survived judicial review. The detenu was shown by the detaining order to be the head of an organized syndicate smuggling foreign-origin gold into India, receiving consignments through carriers, passing them to commission agents and effecting cash sales without invoices; successive raids and large seizures corroborated those findings. The Court accepted that the allegations, taken together, invoked clauses (i)–(iv) of Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA, and relied on confessional and agent statements recorded under Section 108, Customs Act, 1962. However the Court found a distinct procedural and substantive lacuna: after the detenu was released on bail by the Magistrate on 16.04.2024 under conditions intended to prevent re-offending, the detaining authority did not examine or record any satisfaction as to why those bail conditions were insufficient to obviate the need for preventive detention. Because the detention order was silent on this crucial point of subjective satisfaction, the Court held that the requisite consideration was absent and interfered with the detention order, set it aside and directed immediate release. The judgment carefully balanced deference to executive subjective satisfaction in preventive detention with the duty to show it was in fact exercised, referring to Rameshwar Lal Patwari v. State of Bihar and related precedents.
- [M/s Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 714 : 2025 INSC 328](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-shri-sendhur-agro-oil-industries-v-kotak-mahindra-bank-ltd-2025-3-s-c-r-714-2025-insc-328/): This judgment concerns a batch of Section 406 CrPC transfer petitions challenging complaints filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. in courts at Chandigarh, while the petitioner-drawer (a proprietorship operating from Coimbatore/Tamil Nadu) contended the entire transaction and prior recovery proceedings occurred in Tamil Nadu and therefore the Chandigarh courts lacked territorial legitimacy. The principal questions were whether the Supreme Court can transfer a Section 138 complaint under Section 406 CrPC on grounds of territorial jurisdiction, whether lack of territorial jurisdiction alone warrants transfer, and whether the phrase “expedient for the ends of justice” in Section 406 includes jurisdictional defects under Section 142(2) NI Act. After examining the scheme introduced by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 — particularly Section 142(2) and Section 142A — and recent precedents (including Yogesh Upadhaya v. Atlanta Ltd. and Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod), the Court held that the power under Section 406 CrPC continues to exist but must be exercised sparingly and only where transfer is “expedient for the ends of justice.” Mere inconvenience, distance, language difficulty or multiplicity of proceedings without evidence of reasonable apprehension that justice will be denied, does not satisfy that standard. The court read Section 142(2)(a) with its Explanation to underscore that jurisdiction exists where a cheque is delivered “for collection through an account” — the place of presentation/collection branch is decisive — and therefore the Chandigarh filing was permissible; the transfer petitions were dismissed.
- [Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 540 ; 2025 INSC 329](https://lawfoyer.in/periyammal-dead-through-lrs-ors-v-v-rajamani-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-540-2025-insc-329-2/): This analysis examines Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr., Civil Appeals Nos. 3640–3642 of 2025, decided by the Supreme Court on 06 March 2025. The Court analysed the scope of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the specific machinery in Order XXI, Rules 97–103 CPC for adjudicating objections to execution raised by third-party occupants — here, persons claiming to be cultivating tenants under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955. The primary questions were (i) whether the executing court (and appellate courts) rightly entertained applications by respondent-occupants under s.47/Or.XXI r.97 and (ii) whether those occupants could invoke the special enactment of 1955 to render the underlying decree a nullity. The Supreme Court emphasised a harmonised reading: s.47 is a general provision for questions arising in execution, while Or.XXI r.97/101 furnish a specific code to determine right, title or interest where obstruction occurs. The Court held that executing courts may adjudicate only those questions relevant to execution and generally limited to matters arising after the decree; they must not be a forum to re-open issues which should have been raised in the main suit. The Court found material indicia of collusion and inadequate documentary proof of tenant status; it set aside the orders that had frustrated execution and directed remedial administrative steps to curb undue delay in execution proceedings.
- [Jamin & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 638 : 2025 INSC 330](https://lawfoyer.in/jamin-anr-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-638-2025-insc-330/): Jamin & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1184 of 2025 (J.B. Pardiwala & Manoj Misra, JJ., 06 Mar. 2025) examines the scope, object and procedural safeguards of Section 319 CrPC when a superior court (High Court) in revision sets aside a trial-court order rejecting a s.319 application and directs reconsideration — including whether such revisional relief can “relate back” so that a later summoning order operates as if made before conclusion of the original trial. The Bench restates that s.319 exists to prevent real perpetrators escaping punishment and identifies three statutory preconditions for its exercise: (i) an ongoing inquiry/trial; (ii) evidence in the course of proceedings showing another person appears to have committed an offence; and (iii) that such person could be tried together with the accused. The Court holds a High Court exercising revisional powers under ss.397/401 CrPC may rectify a patent illegality in the trial court; such rectification is to be treated like appellate substitution and therefore relates back to the date of the subordinate court’s order — enabling a later summoning order (to give effect to revision) to stand even if passed after trial conclusion. The decision clarifies that a person not previously arraigned need not be heard before summons under s.319 (unless previously discharged and the revisional order prejudices that accrued benefit), and affirms the mandatory de novo trial requirement of s.319(4) if a person is added. The judgment reconciles Sukhpal Singh Khaira and other precedents, carving out how revisional relief must operate to avoid miscarriages of justice.
- [Sita Ram & Anr. v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 204 : 2025 INSC 359](https://lawfoyer.in/sita-ram-anr-v-the-state-of-himachal-pradesh-2025-4-s-c-r-204-2025-insc-359-2/): This analysis examines Sita Ram & Anr. v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 228 of 2013, decided 6 March 2025 (reported as [2025] 4 S.C.R. 204 : 2025 INSC 359). The core controversy concerned whether the High Court rightly reversed a trial court acquittal and convicted the first appellant for culpable homicide not amounting to murder (s.304 IPC) and the second appellant for hurt and house-trespass (ss.323, 451 IPC), for injuries inflicted on the deceased who later died of asphyxia after treatment for a skull fracture. The judgment evaluates (i) medical causation linking head injury to death by asphyxia via hypoxic brain injury and complications (gastroenteritis, aspiration), and (ii) evidentiary law on the admissibility and probative value of statements made by the deceased—specifically the First Information Report (FIR) lodged by him—as a dying declaration under Section 32, Evidence Act, 1872. The Court affirmed the High Court’s re-appreciation of evidence and held there was no perversity in findings, explaining medico-legal pathways (brain swelling, damage to breathing centers, aspiration) by which head trauma may culminate in asphyxia. Crucially, the Court reiterated settled law that admissibility under s.32 does not require the maker to have an apprehension of imminent death; if a statement relates to the circumstances causing death and is found believable, it may operate as substantive evidence without mandatory corroboration. Mitigating factors prompted substantial sentence reduction. The judgment therefore binds medico-legal causation and dying-declaration jurisprudence, while emphasising the appellate court’s power to re-appreciate evidence when trial findings are found erroneous on the record.
- [Patel Babubhai Manohardas & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 432 : 2025 INSC 322](https://lawfoyer.in/patel-babubhai-manohardas-ors-v-state-of-gujarat-2025-3-s-c-r-432-2025-insc-322-2/): This analysis examines Patel Babubhai Manohardas & Ors. v. State of Gujarat (Criminal Appeal No. 1388 of 2014), decided by the Supreme Court on 05 March 2025. The appellants were convicted under Sections 306 and 114, Indian Penal Code, 1860 for allegedly abetting the suicide of Dashrathbhai Karsanbhai Parmar by blackmail and extortion arising from compromising photographs and videos. The prosecution relied principally on a two-page suicide note recovered after delay, oral testimony of family witnesses and a post-mortem indicating death from organophosphorus poison (Dichlorvos). The Court undertook a close credibility and evidentiary analysis and set aside the convictions. Key reasons were: (i) an unexplained twenty-day delay in lodging the complaint and in producing the alleged suicide note; (ii) material inconsistencies among prosecution witnesses on how, when and by whom the note was found; (iii) absence of recovery of the alleged instruments of blackmail (photos, videos), ornaments or signed banking instruments from the accused; (iv) no recovery of the poison container at the scene; (v) expert handwriting opinion was not placed by oral testimony of the handwriting expert and there was no record of admission of the report by the accused; and (vi) even if the note were genuine, there was no proved proximate positive act on the part of the appellants that left the deceased with no alternative but suicide. Applying established authority on abetment and proximate instigation — including Ramesh Kumar, Chitresh Kumar Chopra, Amalendu Pal, Rajesh, Prakash and recent decisions — the Court held conviction unsustainable and allowed the appeal.
- [Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v. Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 450 : 2025 INSC 325](https://lawfoyer.in/smt-lavanya-c-anr-v-vittal-gurudas-pai-since-deseased-by-lrs-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-450-2025-insc-325-2/): The present judgment examines whether appellants who, through their counsel, undertook before the trial court not to alienate the subject-matter property and thereafter executed multiple sale deeds, were rightly held guilty of contempt for wilful disobedience of that undertaking and the subsequent order converting the undertaking into an injunction. The Supreme Court affirms that an undertaking given by an advocate binds the party if it is unequivocal and has been allowed to stand and be made an order; a litigant who believes the undertaking was given without authority must promptly seek discharge prolonged inaction weakens that plea. The Bench reiterates the fiduciary and agency-like nature of the advocate client relationship and stresses that an advocate must not make concessions affecting a client’s substantive rights without express instructions. Given that the undertaking was made in July-August 2007, formalised as an order on 17.11.2007 and extended repeatedly while sale deeds were executed (2007–2011), the High Court’s finding of contempt is upheld. The sentence of civil imprisonment is, however, commuted for age/health reasons and compensation increased from Rs.10 lakhs to Rs.13 lakhs with interest. Key legal touchstones include Order XXXIX Rules 1–2A CPC, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and the fiduciary duties of counsel as developed in case law.
- [Karandeep Sharma @ Razia @ Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1482 : 2025 INSC 444](https://lawfoyer.in/karandeep-sharma-razia-raju-v-state-of-uttarakhand-2025-3-s-c-r-1482-2025-insc-444-2/): Karandeep Sharma @ Razia @ Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1482 : 2025 INSC 444. The Supreme Court reappraised a conviction based wholly on circumstantial evidence charging kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of a minor and quashed concurrent convictions and death sentences where the prosecution failed to establish essential linkages in the chain of circumstances. The core pillars relied upon below — (i) last-seen witness testimony, (ii) recoveries of garments and articles, (iii) a confessional statement, and (iv) DNA/FSL reports — were critically examined. The Court found the last-seen evidence fatally weakened because witnesses did not report sightings to police at the scene or in the FIR and several identified the accused only after publicity; no identification parade was conducted. The confessional statement was treated with skepticism, recorded and exhibited in a procedurally improper manner and not relied upon by lower courts. The DNA/FSL evidence was excluded for want of proof of chain of custody and because the scientific expert who prepared the report was not examined; samples were not shown to have been sealed and preserved, raising the real possibility of tampering. Recoveries were held to be inherently improbable (appellant retaining soiled garments for two days) and thus susceptible to being planted. The trial suffered from undue haste — late provision of materials and inadequate time for defence preparation — producing a lopsided trial that denied a fair opportunity. Once FSL evidence was eschewed, the remaining circumstantial matrix failed to exclude all other hypotheses; conviction could not be sustained and the accused was acquitted.
- [Suresh v. State Rep. By Inspector of Police, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 317 : 2025 INSC 318](https://lawfoyer.in/suresh-v-state-rep-by-inspector-of-police-2025-3-s-c-r-317-2025-insc-318-2/): The appeal challenges the High Court of Madras’ affirmation of a trial court conviction and life sentence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 for allegedly setting the deceased (his wife) on fire by pouring kerosene over her on 12 September 2008. The prosecution relied heavily on a statement recorded by a Judicial Magistrate on 18 September 2008 treated as a dying declaration, together with oral testimony by the deceased’s parents. The record, however, contains two earlier and materially different statements by the deceased — both given on the day of the incident — in which she said she had caught fire while cooking. Medical evidence did not support presence of kerosene smell when the deceased reached hospital. Seizure-based corroboration (Observation Mahazar) proved weak: seizure witnesses turned hostile and there was delay in producing the Mahazar. The Supreme Court applied the settled principle that a dying declaration may, in appropriate circumstances, sustain a conviction, but that rule is contingent on the quality of the dying declaration and corroboration when declarations are inconsistent. Relying on Uttam v. State of Maharashtra and the record’s internal inconsistencies and surrounding circumstances, the Court held the dying declaration to be unreliable as the sole basis for conviction and acquitted the appellant.
- [Karandeep Sharma @ Razia @ Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1482 : 2025 INSC 444](https://lawfoyer.in/karandeep-sharma-razia-raju-v-state-of-uttarakhand-2025-3-s-c-r-1482-2025-insc-444/): This analysis examines Karandeep Sharma @ Razia @ Raju v. State of Uttarakhand ([2025] 3 S.C.R. 1482 : 2025 INSC 444) with focus on the reliability of circumstantial proof in a child sexual assault, kidnapping and murder prosecution. The Supreme Court overturned concurrent findings of guilt and death sentence because the prosecution’s case rested entirely on fragile circumstantial strands: last seen testimony, alleged recoveries, a confession and DNA/FSL reports. The Court found the last seen witnesses’ conduct—specifically their failure to tell the police promptly that the victim had been seen leaving with the appellant—and the absence of any identification parade, fatally undermined that theory. The confession was exhibited through police narration and not relied upon below; the trial court’s permitting a police officer to verbatim narrate and exhibit the accused’s Section 164 CrPC statement ran afoul of Sections 24–26 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The DNA/FSL evidence was inadmissible because the expert was not produced, chain-of-custody and sealing formalities were not proved, and transmission/receipt by the FSL was not established. Taken together, once FSL reports were eschewed, no admissible evidence linked the accused to the offence; the trial was also conducted with undue haste denying meaningful defence preparation. The result: convictions and death sentence quashed and appellant acquitted.
- [Siddharth Dalmia & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 197 : 2025 INSC 351](https://lawfoyer.in/siddharth-dalmia-anr-v-union-of-india-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-197-2025-insc-351-2/): Siddharth Dalmia & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 197 : 2025 INSC 351 addresses whether private hospitals can be administratively or legislatively regulated so as to prevent them from compelling patients to purchase medicines, implants, devices or consumables exclusively from hospital-linked pharmacies at allegedly inflated prices. The petition, filed under Article 32 as a public interest writ, arose from the petitioners’ personal experience of alleged overcharging during cancer treatment of the petitioner’s relative. The Court recognises the constitutional imperative under Article 21 (right to life) and the Directive Principles such as Articles 38, 39 and 47, which urge state action to secure health and welfare, while emphasising the federal distribution of powers: public health and hospitals fall under the State List (List II). The Court refrains from issuing sweeping mandatory directions that might chill private investment in healthcare. Instead, it frames the controversy as essentially a policy matter best addressed by State Governments and directs all States to consider appropriate policy responses to curb unreasonable charges and exploitation in private hospitals. The judgment therefore disposes the petition with a call for policy-level action, while expressly reserving opinion on the merits and noting existing regulatory mechanisms (e.g., Drug Price Control Order, 2013; NPPA; National Council for Clinical Establishments standards).
- [K.S. Mehta v. M/s Morgan Securities and Credits Pvt. Ltd., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 315](https://lawfoyer.in/k-s-mehta-v-m-s-morgan-securities-and-credits-pvt-ltd-2025-4-s-c-r-1-2025-insc-315-2/): The appeals concern whether criminal proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be sustained against two non-executive directors who were neither signatories to the disputed post-dated cheques nor present at the board meeting that approved the underlying Inter-Corporate Deposit (ICD) agreement of ₹5,00,00,000. The High Court had refused quashing under Section 482 CrPC; the Supreme Court examined settled principles governing vicarious liability of directors under Section 141 and the requirement for specific averments showing that a director, at the time of the offence, was “in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business” of the company. Relying on precedents such as National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal, S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, Pooja Ravinder Devidasani, and other authorities, the Court reiterated that mere directorship or attendance at board meetings does not, without more, fasten criminal liability under Section 141. Record materials — ROC entries, Corporate Governance Reports and absence of Form 25(C) — established the appellants’ non-executive status and lack of remuneration beyond meeting fees; there were no specific allegations in the complaints linking them to issuance or signing of the dishonoured cheques. In consequence, the Court held that the complaints lacked the requisite specific averments to attract vicarious liability and quashed the proceedings against the appellants.
- [Maariyah Fatima Shines as Best Speaker at the 2nd Intra Moot Court Competition 2025, Kalinga University](https://lawfoyer.in/maariyah-fatima-shines-as-best-speaker-at-the-2nd-intra-moot-court-competition-2025-kalinga-university/): The Achievers’ Archive at LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of Maariyah Fatima, a dedicated second year B.A.LL.B. student from Kalinga University, Naya Raipur, who has earned the title of Best Speaker at the 2nd Intra Moot Court Competition 2025, organised by the Faculty of Law, Kalinga University. This achievement reflects Maariyah’s growing strength as
- [A. Ashritha, K. Hema Madhavi and G.N. Bhaveshyaa Earns Best Memorial Award at Avantika’s Nyayshastra 2nd Pan India Moot Court Competition 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/a-ashritha-earns-best-memorial-award-at-avantikas-nyayshastra-2nd-pan-india-moot-court-competition-2025/): LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of A. Ashritha, a dedicated fourth year BBA LLB student from K. L. University, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh, who has brought home the Best Memorial Award at Avantika University’s Nyayshastra 2nd Pan India Moot Court Competition 2025. This recognition is a testament to her commitment, discipline and growing
- [Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 325 : 2025 INSC 314](https://lawfoyer.in/saranga-anilkumar-aggarwal-v-bhavesh-dhirajlal-sheth-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-325-2025-insc-314-2/): The appeal concerns whether execution of penalty orders passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) under Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 can be stayed by operation of the interim moratorium applicable to individuals/personal guarantors under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The appellant—a real estate developer and proprietor of a judgment-debtor entity—faced 27 penalties from the NCDRC for delayed delivery of possession. Insolvency proceedings under Section 95/96 IBC were invoked by a creditor; the appellant contended that the moratorium, commencing on the application date, stayed all proceedings “relating to any debt”, and hence execution under s.27 CP Act must be stayed. The NCDRC rejected that contention, and the Supreme Court (Vikram Nath, J.) affirmed the Commission. The Court draws a clear line between ordinary debt-recovery and regulatory/punitive liabilities: damages awarded by consumer fora are treated as “excluded debts” under s.79(15) IBC (fines, damages for negligence/breach, etc.), serving compensatory and deterrent/regulatory functions rather than contributory liabilities in insolvency estates. The Court also distinguishes s.27 CP Act proceedings from s.138 NI Act prosecutions, rejecting an analogy that would convert consumer-enforcement penalties into stayable “debt” proceedings under s.96 IBC. Public-policy considerations and precedent (including State Bank of India v. V. Ramakrishnan and Ajay Kumar Goenka v. TFCI) inform the judgment: insolvency moratoria cannot be used as a shield to evade regulatory/punitive obligations that protect vulnerable consumers. The appeal was dismissed and the appellant directed to comply with penalties.
- [Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay and Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 377 : 2025 INSC 299](https://lawfoyer.in/sharmila-velamur-v-v-sanjay-and-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-377-2025-insc-299/): This analysis examines Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay and Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 1037 of 2025, decided by the Supreme Court of India on 03 March 2025. The dispute concerns custody of Aadith Ramadorai (A), a twenty-two-year-old United States citizen diagnosed with Ataxic Cerebral Palsy and Mild Intellectual Developmental Disorder, who was brought from the US to India by his father during pending guardianship proceedings in Idaho. The Madras High Court, after a short in-court interaction with A, found no illegal detention and treated his residence with his father in India as consensual. The Supreme Court doubted that A possessed the capacity to make complex, legally binding decisions given his assessed cognitive functioning equivalent to an 8–10 year old child, and directed comprehensive multidisciplinary assessment at NIMHANS, Bengaluru. On medical and psychosocial evaluation, NIMHANS concluded that while A can make basic daily decisions, he lacks capacity for higher-order decisions (financial, long-term residence, legal). The Supreme Court held that judicial findings cannot lightly discard expert multidisciplinary evaluations; where an expert consensus establishes incapacity, courts must give it due credence unless strong reasons justify disbelief. Applying the doctrine of parens patriae and prioritizing best interests of the person with disability, the Court set aside the High Court order, recognised the Appellant-mother’s guardianship (consistent with the Idaho order) and directed return-and-care measures in the US as being in A’s best interests.
- [In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 222 : 2025 INSC 300](https://lawfoyer.in/in-re-recruitment-of-visually-impaired-in-judicial-services-2025-4-s-c-r-222-2025-insc-300/): This judgment of a three-judge Constitution Bench in In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 222 : 2025 INSC 300, addresses whether visually impaired persons may be excluded from recruitment to judicial service by administrative rule-making and whether additional procedural barriers (higher cut-offs, practice period requirements, non-declaration of separate cut-offs) violate the guarantees of equality, dignity and reasonable accommodation under the Constitution of India read with the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act) and India’s treaty obligations. The Court holds that visually impaired candidates cannot be assumed ‘not suitable’ for judicial office; the amendment to Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules (which excluded blind/low-vision persons) is struck down insofar as it bars educationally qualified visually impaired persons from applying. The Court applies a rights-based and substantive equality approach, invokes reasonable accommodation as a pre-requisite to assessing capability, recognises the RPwD Act as a quasi-constitutional “super-statute”, and invalidates parts of Rule 7 imposing further practice/first-attempt score requirements insofar as they apply to PwD candidates. The judgment also permits lawful relaxation of minimum/ interview cut-offs for PwD where adequate candidates are otherwise unavailable and mandates separate cut-offs and merit lists for the PwD category at each stage. International disability jurisprudence and prior constitutional disability decisions (including Vikash Kumar and Jeeja Ghosh) are relied upon to frame the obligation of courts and appointing authorities to ensure an enabling process rather than exclusion by clinical labels.
- [Shabeen Ahmad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 367 ; 2025 INSC 307](https://lawfoyer.in/shabeen-ahmad-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-367-2025-insc-307-2/): The appeals challenge four High Court orders granting bail to members of the deceased’s matrimonial household in a case registered under Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The deceased, Shahida Bano, married on 07.02.2022, was found dead on 22.01.2024 with multiple ante-mortem injuries and a pronounced ligature mark; the post-mortem concluded cause of death as “Asphyxia due to ante-mortem strangulation.” The Sessions Court refused bail to the in-laws but the High Court granted bail to the father- and mother-in-law and to two sisters-in-law. The Supreme Court, after examining the forensic, testimonial and investigative record, cancelled bail granted to the father-in-law (Accused No.2) and mother-in-law (Accused No.3) while upholding bail to the two sisters-in-law (Accused Nos.4 & 5) because the material showed a stronger, more direct prima facie role for the parents-in-law in repeated dowry demands and physical cruelty that culminated in violent death. The Court emphasized the need for stricter judicial scrutiny in alleged dowry-death cases, warning against mechanical application of bail norms and underscoring the social message of stern judicial vigilance in such matters.
- [The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 341 : 2025 INSC 30](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-goa-anr-v-namita-tripathi-2025-3-s-c-r-341-2025-insc-30/): The appeal concerns whether a Professional Laundry Service operating a central processing unit falls within the scope of “manufacturing process” and hence a “factory” under the Factories Act, 1948, where more than nine workers were employed and power was used. The Inspector’s report recorded absence of approved plans, licence and registration under the Goa Factories Rules, 1985, and the JMFC issued process under Section 92 of the Act. The High Court quashed the summons, relying on authority which confined “manufacturing” to processes that produce a transformed or commercially different product. The State appealed. The Supreme Court applied the plain meaning of Section 2(k) (which explicitly includes “washing, cleaning”) and the welfare purpose of the Act, rejected the High Court’s reliance on Central Excise/old ESIC interpretations requiring transformation, and held that cleaning and washing undertaken with a view to use, delivery or disposal are covered. The Court therefore reinstated the complaint and process. This analysis examines statutory language, legislative purpose, precedent interplay (including Triplex Dry Cleaners line), interpretive canons (plain meaning, mischief rule and beneficial construction), procedural challenge on the cryptic order, and consequences for regulatory enforcement.
- [Sanjay Sadashiv Bendre & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1165 : 2025 INSC 400](https://lawfoyer.in/sanjay-sadashiv-bendre-anr-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-1165-2025-insc-400/): The dispute concerns whether a later classification of the post Leading Fireman / Tandel as Class III under the Pune Municipal Corporation (Recruitment & Classification of Services) Rules, 2014 can displace the retirement prescription contained in the Municipal Service Regulations, 1954 (MSR, 1954) which places the post in Appendix A within the inferior service entitling incumbents to superannuation at 60 years. The Corporation reclassified the post in 2014 and issued retirement orders fixing the age at 58 years. The High Court upheld the 58-year retirement on a harmonious reading of the two rules. The Supreme Court, allowing the appeal, held that the 2014 Recruitment Rules — framed under Sections 454, 455 and 457 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (MMC Act) and principally concerned with qualifications and appointment modalities — do not evince an express intent to alter service-condition prescriptions framed by the Standing Committee under Section 465 of the MMC Act. The MSR, 1954 regulation fixing retirement ages is the more specific and specialized instrument on the question of superannuation; absent an express repeal or amendment following the statutory procedure, a general classification for recruitment cannot be read to curtail a distinct retirement provision. The Court therefore restored retirement at 60 years for incumbents of the post and directed remedial measures for those affected.
- [Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P. and Another, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 303 : 2025 INSC 308](https://lawfoyer.in/rajnish-singh-soni-v-state-of-u-p-and-another-2025-3-s-c-r-303-2025-insc-308/): The appeal questions whether criminal proceedings under Sections 376, 384, 323, 504 and 506 IPC may be sustained where the complainant alleges long-standing sexual relations with the accused arising from an initial promise of marriage, but the parties continued an intimate relationship for about sixteen years and at times portrayed themselves as husband and wife. The Supreme Court examined the credibility and temporal gaps in the complainant’s narrative, the conduct of the parties during the long period, and settled precedents distinguishing rape from consensual intercourse obtained by a mere breach of promise. Applying principles from Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra and Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court held that where the physical relationship is not shown to be directly and exclusively traceable to a false promise of marriage and continues over a prolonged period with apparent voluntary conduct, criminal liability for rape on the ground of misconception of fact is not made out. Material contradictions in the FIR and subsequent statements, demonstrable co-habitation or conduct consistent with a live-in/marital relationship, and inordinate delay combined to render the allegations ex facie unbelievable. Allowing the prosecution to proceed would, the Court concluded, amount to an abuse of process and therefore quashed the FIR and all consequent proceedings.
- [C. Kamalakkannan v. State of Tamil Nadu Rep. by Inspector of Police C.B.C.I.D., Chennai, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 629 : 2025 INSC 309](https://lawfoyer.in/c-kamalakkannan-v-state-of-tamil-nadu-rep-by-inspector-of-police-c-b-c-i-d-chennai-2025-3-s-c-r-629-2025-insc-309-2/): This appeal concerns the conviction of C. Kamalakkannan for offences under Sections 120B, 468 and 471 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, alleging that he prepared a postal cover used to transmit a forged MBBS marksheet. The trial court convicted the appellant primarily on the opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert and certain co-accused testimony; the appellate courts affirmed. On special leave, the Supreme Court reviewed whether opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert requires corroboration and, critically, whether the prosecution proved the original postal cover (primary evidence) before placing reliance on the expert’s conclusions. Applying the principles in Murari Lal v. State of M.P. and a cautious approach to handwriting identification under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the Court held there is no absolute rule requiring corroboration of handwriting expert evidence but emphasized probe, reason and corroboration where appropriate. The prosecution failed to produce or exhibit the original postal cover; the handwriting expert did not identify the cover in court as the very document examined; and the absence of the primary document rendered the expert’s report evidentially redundant. The Court therefore allowed the appeal, quashed convictions and acquitted the appellant.
- [Sudershan Singh Wazir v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1416 : 2025 INSC 281](https://lawfoyer.in/sudershan-singh-wazir-v-state-nct-of-delhi-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-1416-2025-insc-281-2/): This analysis examines Sudershan Singh Wazir v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., SLP (Crim.) arising from orders of the Delhi High Court that stayed an order of discharge and directed the discharged person to surrender pending revision. The Supreme Court considered (i) the scope of revisional powers under ss. 397 and 401 CrPC (and their counterparts in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), (ii) the legal nature and consequences of an order of discharge under s. 227 CrPC, and (iii) whether a revisional court may stay an order of discharge (including by ex parte interim order) and, if so, the manner in which such relief must be moulded. The Court emphasized that a discharge places a person on a higher pedestal than one merely on bail and that an order staying discharge is a drastic interference with liberty. Stay of discharge is permitted only in rare, exceptional cases where the discharge is ex facie perverse and even then only after affording the discharged person an opportunity to be heard; ordinarily the appropriate and proportionate interim relief in an admitted revision is to require appearance and bail under s. 390 CrPC rather than to nullify the discharge by an ex parte stay. The Court quashed the High Court’s ex parte stay and the subsequent surrender direction, directed the Sessions Court to receive the appellant and fix bail effective until final disposal of the revision, and left the revision to be decided on merits.
- [Union of India Through I.O., NCB v. Man Singh Verma, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1534 : 2025 INSC 292](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-through-i-o-ncb-v-man-singh-verma-2025-2-s-c-r-1534-2025-insc-292/): Union of India Through I.O., Narcotics Control Bureau v. Man Singh Verma, Criminal Appeal No. 77 of 2025 ([2025] 2 S.C.R. 1534 : 2025 INSC 292) examines whether a High Court, while adjudicating a bail application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can award monetary compensation for alleged wrongful confinement. The respondent was detained following seizure of suspected narcotics; initial chemical analysis by CRPL returned negative results, yet the Investigating Officer obtained permission for retesting and the second report was also negative. The District Court closed the matter and released the respondent. Subsequently, the High Court — in an adjudication of a pending bail application that had by then become infructuous — directed the Director, NCB to pay ₹5,00,000 as compensation for four months’ alleged wrongful confinement. The Supreme Court analysed the contours of Section 439 CrPC, precedent on the permissible scope of bail adjudication and the constitutional jurisprudence permitting compensation for violation of fundamental rights. Relying on a consistent line of authorities limiting Section 439 jurisdiction to grant or refuse bail and incidental conditions, the Court held the High Court lacked authority to award compensation in that forum; the compensation order was set aside while preserving other legal remedies available to the respondent.
- [The Chief Manager, Central Bank of India & Ors. v. M/s Ad Bureau Advertising Pvt. Ltd & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1445 : 2025 INSC 288](https://lawfoyer.in/the-chief-manager-central-bank-of-india-ors-v-m-s-ad-bureau-advertising-pvt-ltd-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-1445-2025-insc-288-2/): The Chief Manager, Central Bank of India & Ors. v. M/s Ad Bureau Advertising Pvt. Ltd & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1445 : 2025 INSC 288 considers whether a corporate borrower who obtained a project loan for post-production of a film falls within the statutory definition of “consumer” in Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The respondent company obtained a Rs. 10 crore project loan, defaulted, entered into a One-Time Settlement (OTS), paid the agreed sums and obtained No-Dues Certificates and a full-satisfaction memo filed before the DRT. Despite settlement, the bank reported the borrower as a defaulter to RBI/CIBIL under the Master Circular on Wilful Defaulters, causing loss of reputation and the forfeiture of an Airports Authority advertising licence. The NCDRC found deficiency in service and awarded ₹75,00,000. The Supreme Court evaluated whether the loan transaction was for a commercial purpose and whether the borrower therefore falls outside the definition of consumer. Applying this Court’s tests from Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust v. Unique Shanti Developers, Shrikant G. Mantri v. PNB and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harsolia Motors, the Court held that the dominant purpose of the project loan was profit generation through a commercial activity (film post-production and brand enhancement inseparable from revenue motives). Consequently, the relationship was business-to-business and the respondent was not a consumer under Section 2(1)(d)(ii). The NCDRC order was set aside for want of jurisdiction though the Court expressly refrained from adjudicating merits.
- [Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1456 : 2025 INSC 289](https://lawfoyer.in/sarita-choudhary-v-high-court-of-madhya-pradesh-another-2025-2-s-c-r-1456-2025-insc-289/): The writ petitions concern termination during probation of two women judicial officers Sushri Sarita Choudhary and Sushri Aditi Kumar Sharma whose services were dispensed with by the State on the recommendation of the High Court’s Administrative Committee (May 2023) citing unsatisfactory probationary performance (ACRs, unit values, complaints). The Supreme Court (Full Bench) invited reconsideration; four of six similarly-situated officers were reinstated but the two petitioners remained terminated after the Full Court relied on ACR gradings, disposal statistics and complaints. The petitions challenge: (i) non-communication or late communication of adverse entries in ACRs; (ii) reliance on closed/insufficiently probed complaints; (iii) arbitrariness and stigma in termination; and (iv) failure to consider pandemic effects and gender-sensitive circumstances (illness, miscarriage, caregiving). The Court analysed: (a) distinction between termination simpliciter and stigmatic/punitive dismissal under Article 311; (b) scope of judicial review over Full Court’s collective assessment; and (c) procedural fairness in communicating adverse material to probationers. Concluding that adverse ACR entries were inconsistently applied/communicated, some complaints were closed with mere advisories and that the surrounding material showed the terminations operated as punishment (stigmatic) rather than a non-stigmatic probationary end, the Court set aside the termination orders and directed reinstatement with consequential benefits.
- [Sachin Jaiswal v. M/s Hotel Alka Raje & Other, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1396 : 2025 INSC 275](https://lawfoyer.in/sachin-jaiswal-v-m-s-hotel-alka-raje-other-2025-2-s-c-r-1396-2025-insc-275-2/): Sachin Jaiswal v. M/s Hotel Alka Raje & Other, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1396 : 2025 INSC 275, examines whether immovable property originally owned by an individual partner becomes property of the firm under Section 14 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 when the partner, after formation of the partnership, uses the land to construct premises for the partnership business. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s conclusion that late Bhairo Prasad Jaiswal had, by conduct and clear intention, brought the land and the subsequently constructed hotel into the partnership stock, thereby making it partnership property. The Court relied on principle that a partner may convert his separate property into partnership property by bringing it into the partnership—no formal transfer instrument is necessary where intention and conduct establish contribution to firm capital. Prior authorities, notably Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa and the Full Bench decision in The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Chidambaram (Thachanallur), were applied to show that immovable property, when contributed to partnership stock, ceases to be individual property during the subsistence of the partnership and vests as property of the firm under Section 14. The Court further held that once the property was part of partnership assets, the High Court was correct to read the trial decree in favour of the firm alone, and there was no need to separately decide issues arising from a prior relinquishment deed. The appeal was dismissed.
- [Shivang Kumar Shines as Best Adjudicator at Debating Premier League 6.0, Central University of South Bihar](https://lawfoyer.in/shivang-kumar-shines-as-best-adjudicator-at-debating-premier-league-6-0-central-university-of-south-bihar/): LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive is proud to celebrate the remarkable accomplishment of Shivang Kumar, a dedicated B.A. LL.B student from the Central University of South Bihar, who has earned the prestigious title of Best Adjudicator at the Debating Premier League (DPL) 6.0. Organized by the School of Law and Governance, this event stands as one of
- [Muskaan Triumphs at Banasthali Vidyapith – Wins Winner and Best Speaker Award at the Intra Moot Court Competition 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/muskaan-triumphs-at-banasthali-vidyapith-wins-winner-and-best-speaker-award-at-the-intra-moot-court-competition-2025/): In the world of legal education, mooting stands as one of the most powerful platforms for shaping future advocates. It demands not only knowledge of law but also confidence, clarity of thought, and the courage to stand one’s ground. Among the many young legal minds who rose to this challenge, Muskaan, a final year B.A.
- [Tandrisa Banerjee, Sahil & Rajdeep emerge as Winners of 5th Adamas University National Moot Court Competition, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/tandrisa-banerjee-sahil-rajdeep-emerge-as-winners-of-5th-adamas-university-national-moot-court-competition-2025/): LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive proudly celebrates Tandrisa Banerjee, a fourth year B.A. LL.B student from Jogesh Chandra Chaudhuri Law College, Calcutta University, for securing the Winner’s title at the 5th National Moot Court Competition hosted by Adamas University, Kolkata. The competition took place from 10 April to 12 April 2025 and brought together some of the
- [Vanshika, Mantej Singh & Ram Shankar Tripathi from Chandigarh University shine on the National Stage Winner of the 4th Dr. B. R. Ambedkar National Moot Court Competition](https://lawfoyer.in/vanshika-mantej-singh-ram-shankar-tripathi-from-chandigarh-university-shine-on-the-national-stage-winner-of-the-4th-dr-b-r-ambedkar-national-moot-court-competition/): LawFoyer proudly celebrates Vanshika, a dedicated 5th year BCom LLB student from Chandigarh University, whose remarkable victory at the 4th Dr. B. R. Ambedkar National Moot Court Competition 2025, hosted by CT University, Ludhiana, has made her an inspiring example for aspiring legal minds across the country. Held from 3rd to 5th April 2025, this
- [National Webinar On Consumer Awareness by Mar Gregorios College of Law on 9th December, 2025 | Register Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/national-webinar-on-consumer-awareness-by-mar-gregorios-college-of-law-on-9th-december-2025-register-now/): National Webinar On Consumer Awareness by Mar Gregorios College of Law on 9th December, 2025 | Register Now!
- [Dhanvi Kadian Shines as a Top Performer in the Global Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Program 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/dhanvi-kadian-shines-as-a-top-performer-in-the-global-arbitration-and-dispute-resolution-program-2025/): LawFoyer proudly celebrates the outstanding accomplishment of Dhanvi Kadian, a dedicated final year BBA LLB (Hons.) student from GD Goenka University, Gurgaon, Haryana. Dhanvi has earned recognition as a Top Performer in the prestigious Global Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Program 2025, organized by the Dexon Global Centre for Legal Studies, Policy and Research. This achievement
- [Manik Dev Honored as Gold Medalist for BBA LLB (Hons.) at SRM University Delhi NCR](https://lawfoyer.in/manik-dev-honored-as-gold-medalist-for-bba-llb-hons-at-srm-university-delhi-ncr/): Excellence is never an accident. It is the result of consistent effort, discipline, curiosity, and the courage to rise above self-doubt. Standing as a shining example of these qualities is Manik Dev, who has been awarded the Gold Medal for the BBA LLB (Hons.) 2023 Batch during the 3rd Convocation Ceremony of SRM University Delhi
- [Palak Anand Shines at JIMS EMTC by Winning the Best Evidence Award in the 1st Complaint Drafting Competition](https://lawfoyer.in/palak-anand-shines-at-jims-emtc-by-winning-the-best-evidence-award-in-the-1st-complaint-drafting-competition/): Every journey in law begins with a spark of curiosity, a determination to learn, and the courage to step forward and explore the vast world of legal reasoning and expression. Today, LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of Palak Anand, a dedicated third year BA LLB student from JIMS Engineering Management Technical Campus, Greater Noida
- [Aliza Naved and Khushi Pawar Triumph at the 2nd NLIU-LAC WTP: Paralegal Training and Competition, 2023 – Pioneers of a New Legacy at Career College of Law, Bhopal](https://lawfoyer.in/aliza-naved-and-khushi-pawar-triumph-at-the-2nd-nliu-lac-wtp-paralegal-training-and-competition-2023-pioneers-of-a-new-legacy-at-career-college-of-law-bhopal/): In an inspiring display of determination and excellence, Aliza Naved, a 2024 graduate from Career College of Law, Bhopal, along with her teammate Khushi Pawar, etched their names in history by winning the Best Legal Opinion Award at the 2nd NLIU-LAC WTP: Paralegal Training and Competition, held in April 2023 at the National Law Institute
- [Nandana Suresh Honoured as Best Researcher at the 3rd Justice G. D. Kamat Memorial National Level Moot Court Competition 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/nandana-suresh-honoured-as-best-researcher-at-the-3rd-justice-g-d-kamat-memorial-national-level-moot-court-competition-2025/): LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive proudly celebrates the remarkable accomplishment of Ms. Nandana Suresh, a dedicated final-year BBA LLB (Hons.) student from Government Law College, Thrissur, who has been awarded the Best Researcher title at the 3rd Edition of the Justice G. D. Kamat Memorial National Level Moot Court Competition 2025. The prestigious event was hosted by
- [Utkarsh Kumar Wins First Position at NFSU Delhi’s Intra 2nd Client Counselling Competition](https://lawfoyer.in/utkarsh-kumar-wins-first-position-at-nfsu-delhis-intra-2nd-client-counselling-competition/): LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable accomplishment of Utkarsh Kumar, a dedicated second year B.B.A LL.B (Hons.) student at the National Forensic Sciences University, Delhi. Utkarsh, along with his teammate Amrutasha Panda, secured the first position at the Intra 2nd Client Counselling Competition organized by NFSU Delhi on 11 November 2025. His achievement stands as a
- [Virat Kumar and Divyanjali Vudipi Shine as Runner-Up at the ACCORDO Intercollegiate Mediation Competition 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/virat-kumar-and-divyanjali-vudipi-shine-as-runner-up-at-the-accordo-intercollegiate-mediation-competition-2025/): LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable success of Virat Kumar, a third year BBA LLB student from Birla Global University, Bhubaneswar, who has brought immense pride to his institution by securing the Runner Up position at the prestigious ACCORDO Intercollegiate Mediation Competition. The event was hosted by the School of Law and Kristu Jayanti College of
- [Mariya Hasan Suri Wins Best Paper Award at National Seminar on Labour Law at Dr. B. R. Ambedkar Law College, Hyderabad](https://lawfoyer.in/mariya-hasan-suri-wins-best-paper-award-at-national-seminar-on-labour-law-at-dr-b-r-ambedkar-law-college-hyderabad/): LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive proudly celebrates the remarkable accomplishment of Mariya Hasan Suri, a dedicated second-year BA LL.B. (Hons.) student from Maulana Azad National Urdu University, Hyderabad. Her achievement stands as an inspiring example of academic excellence, deep curiosity, and a sincere commitment to understanding the evolving dimensions of labour law in India. On 16 October
- [Saumya Arora Emerges as Winner of the Prestigious CGC 3rd Nation-Wide Moot Court Competition 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/saumya-arora-emerges-as-winner-of-the-prestigious-cgc-3rd-nation-wide-moot-court-competition-2025/): The journey of every young legal mind is filled with moments that define their dedication, sharpen their skills, and set them apart as future leaders of the legal fraternity. One such inspiring milestone has been achieved by Saumya Arora, a passionate and hardworking fourth year BALLB (Hons.) student from Amity University, Mohali. Saumya, along with
- [Ashima Garg Emerges as Winner of the National Youth Parliament 5.0 at GLA University, Mathura](https://lawfoyer.in/ashima-garg-emerges-as-winner-of-the-national-youth-parliament-5-0-at-gla-university-mathura/): LawFoyer celebrates the outstanding achievement of Ashima Garg, a second year BA.LL.B student at GLA University, Mathura, who has secured the Winner Position at the prestigious National Youth Parliament 5.0 held in November 2025. Her remarkable performance not only brought pride to her institution but also showcased her growing excellence as a young legal mind
- [Nandani Khandelwal Shines as Runner Up at the Prestigious VIPS 10th National Moot Court Competition 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/nandani-khandelwal-shines-as-runner-up-at-the-prestigious-vips-10th-national-moot-court-competition-2025/): LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable success of Nandani Khandelwal, a dedicated fourth year BA LLB (Hons) student from Amity Law School, Amity University Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior. Her outstanding performance as Runner Up at the highly esteemed VIPS 10th National Moot Court Competition 2025 stands as a powerful milestone in her journey as an aspiring legal
- [Christ Academy St. Chavara Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Register by 29th November 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/st-kuriakose-elias-chavara-moot-court-competition-2025-organized-by-christ-academy-institute-of-law-register-by-20th-november-2025/): ST. KURIAKOSE ELIAS CHAVARA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Christ Academy Institute of Law | Register by 20th November 2025
- [4th NATIONAL MEDIATION COMPETITION | Organized by The Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR) at Chanakya National Law University, Patna | Inaugural Ceremony on 10 January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/4th-national-mediation-competition-organized-by-the-chanakya-centre-for-alternative-dispute-resolution-ccadr-at-chanakya-national-law-university-patna-inaugural-ceremony-on-10-january-2026/): 4th NATIONAL MEDIATION COMPETITION | Organized by The Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR) at Chanakya National Law University, Patna | Inaugural Ceremony on 10 January 2026
- [1st FairSquare NLU Delhi National Essay Competition | Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Register by 30 November 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-fairsquare-nlu-delhi-national-essay-competition-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-30-november-2025/): 1st FairSquare NLU Delhi National Essay Competition | Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Register by 30 November 2025
- [The State of Chhattisgarh v. Ashok Bhoi Etc., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1785 : 2025 INSC 256](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-chhattisgarh-v-ashok-bhoi-etc-2025-2-s-c-r-1785-2025-insc-256-2/): The appeal concerns conviction and acquittal arising from the abduction, ransom demand and subsequent death of Suhash on 15 January 2006. The prosecution’s case rested wholly on circumstantial evidence — principally the “last seen together” evidence of PW-18, allegedly incriminating disclosures by juvenile co-accused, and recovery at the instance of one accused of a blood-stained blade, nails and a T-shirt. The Trial Court convicted Ashok Bhoi under Sections 364-A and 302 IPC while acquitting Vikash Khubwani. The High Court reversed conviction of Ashok and confirmed acquittal of Vikash. Before the Supreme Court the State challenged those acquittals. The Court reiterated the settled principle that in circumstantial cases the prosecution must prove a complete chain of events leading to only one irresistible conclusion — guilt — and that “last seen together” evidence, though it shifts the evidentiary burden under Section 106, Indian Evidence Act, cannot alone sustain conviction unless the rest of the incriminating circumstances are cogent and clinching. The recovery of incriminating articles after two days, absence of forensic or STD-PCO evidence to link the ransom call, non-examination of the PCO/STD operator and lack of any direct evidence connecting Vikash rendered the prosecution case weak. The Supreme Court found no infirmity in the High Court’s appellate appreciation and dismissed the appeals
- [Pappammal (Died) Through LR R. Krsna Murtii v. Jothi & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1411 : 2025 INSC 277.](https://lawfoyer.in/pappammal-died-through-lr-r-krsna-murtii-v-jothi-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-1411-2025-insc-277-2/): This Supreme Court judgment, delivered by Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. on 27 February 2025, addresses the narrow procedural question whether a sibling of a substituted plaintiff can be impleaded as a defendant in a pending suit for declaration and recovery of possession after the original plaintiff’s death and after substitution of a legal representative under an alleged registered will. The petitioner (son) relied on this Court’s earlier order (21.07.2022) restoring his substitution-application and his subsequent substitution as plaintiff; he contended that that substitution precluded his sister (another legal heir) from being impleaded as defendant. The trial court allowed the sister’s I.A. under Order I r.10(2) CPC; the High Court upheld that order; the son appealed. The Supreme Court held that substitution as plaintiff did not oust other legal heirs of the right to be heard or to contest the genuineness of the will; the object of a trial is to elicit truth by hearing all necessary parties. The Court rejected the appellant’s submission that impleadment was impermissible as neither logical nor legal. The orders of the trial court and the High Court allowing impleadment were upheld and the appeal dismissed. This decision reiterates that questions of representation, title and genuineness of testamentary instruments may require impleading rival claimants as parties so that the Court can conduct a fair enquiry under the CPC provisions invoked.
- [Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya v. Mahesh Prakash Ahuja & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1433 : 2025 INSC 282](https://lawfoyer.in/manoj-rameshlal-chhabriya-v-mahesh-prakash-ahuja-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-1433-2025-insc-282-2/): This judgment examines the legal standard a High Court must apply when deciding an application for leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against an acquittal. The Supreme Court reiterates that the High Court’s task at the leave-stage is not to re-try the case or reappreciate the entire evidence, but to apply judicial mind to determine whether a prima facie case or arguable points exist which warrant admission of the State’s appeal for full hearing. The Court relies on State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar and the doctrine of human fallibility in Sita Ram v. State of U.P. to emphasize that a single right of appeal is part of the procedural safeguards in matters implicating life and liberty. Where materials on record indicate that deeper scrutiny, reappreciation or reconsideration of evidence may be necessary, leave must be granted and the appeal decided on merits; where, conversely, the High Court refuses leave it must nonetheless record a reasoned order showing consideration of relevant materials and application of mind. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case (a prosecution based largely on circumstantial evidence with key witnesses turning hostile and disputed recoveries), the Supreme Court found the High Court erred in declining leave without adequately addressing whether arguable grounds existed and therefore granted leave, remitting the appeal to the High Court to decide on merits.
- [M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1625; 2025 INSC 274](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-a-p-electrical-equipment-corporation-v-the-tahsildar-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-1625-2025-insc-274/): The Supreme Court in M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors., 2025 INSC 274 examined whether the State had taken actual physical possession of a large tract of land under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (the ULC Act) before the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (the Repeal Act, 1999) came into force in the State. The dispute turned on the validity and genuineness of notices purportedly issued under ss.10(5) and 10(6) of the ULC Act and a panchnama dated 08.02.2008. The Single Judge of the High Court held the Section 10(6) order and the panchnama void — finding (i) mandatory procedure under ss.10(5)/10(6) was not followed, (ii) the 30-day notice window was not respected, (iii) the panchnama was poorly supported and likely fabricated, and (iv) de facto possession remained with the landholder; hence the Repeal Act applied to revive the owner’s rights. The Division Bench reversed, relying on accepted practice that panchnama is an acceptable mode of taking possession in large-area takings and treating certain date/anomaly issues as immaterial. The Supreme Court restored the Single Judge’s order: possession must be proved to be actual and de facto taken before the Repeal; mere vesting on record or paper entries does not suffice; the onus is on the State to show cogent evidence of physical possession; statutory steps and timeframes in ss.10(5)–(6) are mandatory in effect; and intra-court appeals must not supplant a reasonable Single-Judge view unless there is patent error. Key holdings emphasise that the Repeal benefits those in physical possession and that “paper possession” cannot trump de facto control.
- [Kanishk Sinha & Another v. The State of West Bengal & Another, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1405 : 2025 INSC 278](https://lawfoyer.in/kanishk-sinha-another-v-the-state-of-west-bengal-another-2025-2-s-c-r-1405-2025-insc-278-2/): Kanishk Sinha & Another v. The State of West Bengal & Another, Criminal Appeal Nos. 966–971 of 2025 (Supreme Court of India, 27 Feb. 2025) examines whether the Court’s direction in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 6 SCC 287; [2015] 4 SCR 108, requiring that applications under Section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) be supported by an affidavit has retrospective effect so as to invalidate a complaint filed in 2010–2011 which led to registration of the second FIR against the appellants. The appellants — a husband and wife — challenged the second FIR (FIR No. 298 of 2011) contending that the magistrate-ordered FIR emanated from a Section 156(3) complaint not accompanied by an affidavit and therefore ran afoul of the Priyanka Srivastava directive. The Calcutta High Court declined relief holding that the directions in Priyanka Srivastava operate prospectively; the appellants challenged that view before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court: while acknowledging the general rule that judicial decisions are retrospective unless expressly made prospective, the Court analysed the language and purpose of Priyanka Srivastava — especially paragraph 30 ("a stage has come in this country") — and concluded that the affidavit requirement was intended as a forward-looking procedural safeguard against frivolous, harassing complaints. Accordingly the Supreme Court held the direction to be prospective and dismissed the appeals. The judgment leaves open ordinary remedies (including discharge applications) available to the appellants in the criminal process.
- [Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India and Others, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1331 : 2025 INSC 272](https://lawfoyer.in/radhika-agarwal-v-union-of-india-and-others-2025-2-s-c-r-1331-2025-insc-272-2/): Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India and Others, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1331 : 2025 INSC 272 — Writ challenge to the constitutional validity of arrest powers conferred on authorised officers under the Customs Act, 1962 (particularly ss.104(1), 104(4), 104(6)) and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (notably ss.69, 70, 132). The petitioners relied on Om Prakash v. Union of India to contend that customs offences remained non-cognizable and that arrests without Magistrate-warrant violated the Code of Criminal Procedure and Articles 21 and 22. The Court (majority per Sanjiv Khanna, CJI) rejected the challenge, holding that post-Om Prakash legislative amendments (Finance Acts 2012, 2013, 2019) expressly made certain offences cognizable and some non-bailable; these statutory changes, read with Chapter XII of the CrPC, create a distinct arrest regime under the Customs and GST Acts and satisfy constitutional requirements. The Court emphasised that arrest under these special Acts must meet stringent pre-conditions: the authorised officer must have adequate material, form and record in writing reasons to believe tied to statutory thresholds (including monetary computations), inform the arrestee of grounds in writing, and maintain proper records to permit effective judicial review. The Court also held customs officers are not police officers for evidentiary purposes and reiterated that the CrPC applies except where expressly excluded. The GST provisions empowering arrest were held intra vires Article 246-A, being ancillary to GST levy and collection. The concurring opinion (Bela M. Trivedi, J.) urged judicial restraint in review of arrests under special Acts but insisted on compliance with statutory safeguards.
- [Raju @ Nirpendra Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1821 : 2025 INSC 392](https://lawfoyer.in/raju-nirpendra-singh-v-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2025-2-s-c-r-1821-2025-insc-392/): The judgment in Raju @ Nirpendra Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No. 1172 of 2014) examines conviction for kidnapping from lawful guardianship and gang-rape where the prosecutrix — a village girl — was taken on the pretext of employment, held captive and repeatedly assaulted over a continuing two-month period. The trial court convicted several accused under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2)(g) IPC; the High Court affirmed the convictions and sentences; the matter reached the Supreme Court by leave. Central questions were (i) the prosecutrix’s age at the start of the continuing offence; (ii) whether alleged consent negated rape charges; (iii) effect of delayed FIR; and (iv) probative value of medical findings describing the prosecutrix as “accustomed to sexual intercourse.” The Court upheld the concurrent findings on credibility and minority, relying on dental age assessment, school records and guardian’s statements. It emphasised that once minority is established, consent is legally immaterial and that subjection to repeated acts under threats cannot amount to consent. The Court rejected the defence reliance on absence of injuries and the medical phraseology as archaic moral stigma. Delay in lodging the complaint was held irrelevant given captivity. No mitigating circumstances justified reduction of sentence. The appeals were dismissed and appellants were directed to surrender to serve the unexpired portion of sentences.
- [Mansoor Ali Farida Irshad Ali & Others v. The Tahsildar-I, Special Cell & Others, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1703 : 2025 INSC 276](https://lawfoyer.in/mansoor-ali-farida-irshad-ali-others-v-the-tahsildar-i-special-cell-others-2025-2-s-c-r-1703-2025-insc-276/): This analysis examines the Supreme Court’s judgment in Mansoor Ali Farida Irshad Ali & Others v. The Tahsildar-I, Special Cell & Others ([2025] 2 S.C.R. 1703 : 2025 INSC 276), which considered the interplay between the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (“Slum Act”), the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (“MHAD Act”) and the Development Control Regulations for Greater Mumbai, 1991 (“DCR”). The principal questions were whether the subject plot constituted a MHADA layout or a censused slum, whether SRA had competence to redevelop a censused slum on MHADA land under Regulation 33(10) of DCR, whether ineligible transit-camp occupants could stall redevelopment by invoking Regulation 33(5) applicable to MHADA layouts, and whether a separate statutory notification under Section 4 of the Slum Act was necessary to treat a censused area as a slum for redevelopment. The Court affirmed the AGRC and Bombay High Court findings: MHADA consistently disowned layout status for the plot; the occupants were transit camp tenants paying transit fees (not rent) and many were ineligible under the Slum Act; the site was a censused slum (censused in 1981) and therefore fell within Regulation 33(10) for redevelopment; prior AGRC orders attained finality and could not be impeached belatedly; and allowing a handful of ineligible occupants to derail a sanctioned project would defeat the welfare purpose of the Slum Act. The appeals were dismissed and the redevelopment already at an advanced stage was permitted to proceed.
- [Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Limited v. GRSE Limited Workmens Union & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1813 : 2025 INSC 363](https://lawfoyer.in/garden-reach-shipbuilders-and-engineers-limited-v-grse-limited-workmens-union-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-1813-2025-insc-363/): Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd. v. GRSE Limited Workmens Union & Ors., decided by the Supreme Court on 25 February 2025, addresses a narrow but constitutionally significant question: whether adjudication by a bench of the High Court which was not allocated the matter by the Chief Justice (the master of the roster) can validly exercise jurisdiction in respect of writ petitions and intra-court appeals under the Letters Patent. The Court examined the Appellate Side Rules of the High Court at Calcutta, 1966—particularly r.26—and the Letters Patent clause 15, and underscored the primacy of the Chief Justice’s roster allocation. On the facts, a Single Judge had de-listed a writ petition pending a reference in this Court; despite that, a Division Bench (by consent of parties and subsequent placement of records before it) heard and finally decided the writ petition and intra-court appeal. The Supreme Court held that “consent does not confer jurisdiction”, reiterated the settled principle that the Chief Justice’s roster and determinations are final and binding on companion judges, and declared adjudications made beyond allocation to be void and a nullity. The impugned Division Bench order was set aside and the matter remanded to the High Court for re-assignment to an appropriate bench by the Chief Justice. Key holdings reaffirm judicial discipline on roster allocations, limit intra-court interventions where no authorized bench exists, and emphasize that parties’ consent cannot cure jurisdictional defects.
- [Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another, 2025 2 S.C.R. 918 : 2025 INSC 267](https://lawfoyer.in/suneeti-toteja-v-state-of-u-p-another-2025-2-s-c-r-918-2025-insc-267/): This analysis examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 975 of 2025), delivered 25 February 2025, focusing on the interplay between Section 197, CrPC (sanction for prosecution of public servants), the role of an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) under the POSH Act, 2013, and the correctness of a Magistrate taking cognizance in the absence of a prior sanction. The Court accepted that the appellant — a BIS official who acted as Presiding Officer of the ICC while on deputation to FSSAI — filed a counter-affidavit in administrative litigation and engaged with the complainant in an official capacity. The central legal question was whether those official acts required prior departmental sanction before criminal proceedings could be instituted, and whether any concept of “deemed sanction” can be read into Section 197. Applying established principles (notably Amrik Singh, Amod Kumar Kanth, Gurmeet Kaur), the Court held that where the alleged acts are connected to the discharge or purported discharge of official duty, Section 197 applies and prior sanction is a condition precedent to cognizance. The Court rejected the State’s contention of “deemed sanction” as unsupported by Section 197 and the cited precedents. Because the competent authority (BIS) ultimately refused sanction, the Court quashed the charge-sheet and summons insofar as they related to the appellant. The decision underscores the protective purpose of Section 197, circumscribes judicial inclination to treat administrative silence as permitting prosecution, and clarifies the limited and fact-sensitive enquiry required at the cognizance stage.
- [Nirmiti Developers Through its Partners & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2025 2 S.C.R. 1206 : 2025 INSC 265](https://lawfoyer.in/nirmiti-developers-through-its-partners-anr-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-1206-2025-insc-265/): This case concerns a 50,138 sq. ft. plot in Amravati shown as reserved for a private school in the revised Development Plan of 1993. The original owners served a purchase notice under Section 49 on 4-7-2006; the State confirmed the notice on 2-1-2007 and directed the acquiring trust to complete acquisition within twelve months. No acquisition or deposit of compensation occurred by 2-1-2008. The owners later sold the land (30-12-2015) to the appellants who, in March 2016, challenged continued reservation — seeking either deposit of compensation or a declaration that reservation had lapsed under Section 49(7). The High Court declined relief, holding that the benefit of the earlier Section 49 notice could not be claimed by the purchaser because the original owners had not utilized the de-reservation and had sold the land. The Supreme Court reversed. It held that once Section 49(7) timelines were not complied with (appropriate authority failed to apply to acquire within one year of confirmation), the reservation legally lapsed on 2-1-2008 and the land became available for permissible development. The Court further explained the interplay between Sections 49, 126 and 127 of the Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning Act, 1967 (MRTP Act), reaffirmed the sacrosanct nature of statutory timelines (ten years + one year / twelve months), and observed that prolonged inaction (here ≈ thirty years since reservation) may justify relief under Article 142 to do complete justice.
- [Lifecare Innovations Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 727 : 2025 INSC 269](https://lawfoyer.in/lifecare-innovations-pvt-ltd-anr-v-union-of-india-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-727-2025-insc-269/): Lifecare Innovations Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., Writ Petition (C) No. 1301 of 2021, examines the legal status and enforceability of the Public Procurement Policy for Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) Order, 2012 issued under Section 11 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 and tests the validity of mandatory minimum turnover clauses in Notice Inviting Tenders (NITs). The petitioners, a micro enterprise manufacturing a specialised drug (Liposomal Amphotericin B Suspension – LAmB) and its founder, alleged repeated disqualification from government procurement on account of high turnover thresholds which, they contend, frustrate the object of the 2012 Policy to reserve 25% of procurement for MSEs. The Supreme Court held that the Procurement Order 2012 has the force of law as an exercise of power under Section 11, and while it does not create a direct enforceable “right” for an individual MSE, it imposes enforceable duties on statutory authorities, review and grievance mechanisms. The Court directed the Review Committee to resolve whether the 25% procurement mandate is independent of the 358 reserved items, and ordered both the Review Committee and the Grievance Cell to examine and prescribe limits and guidelines on minimum turnover clauses so these do not defeat the policy. The Court emphasized institutional judicial review focused on the effective constitution and functioning of statutory bodies (National Board for MSMEs, Advisory Committee, Facilitation Council, Review Committee, Grievance Cell) rather than micro-managing procurement decisions. Directions were given to the respondents to take specified action within 60 days.
- [Mahaveer Sharma v. Exide Life Insurance Company Limited & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1311 : 2025 INSC 268](https://lawfoyer.in/mahaveer-sharma-v-exide-life-insurance-company-limited-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-1311-2025-insc-268/): Mahaveer Sharma v. Exide Life Insurance Company Limited & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 3562 of 2025 (decided 25 February 2025) addresses whether non-disclosure of other life insurance policies by the proposer amounted to material suppression justifying repudiation of a death claim. The insured (father of the appellant) procured a ₹25,00,000 term policy on 9 June 2014 and died in an accident on 19 August 2015. The insurer repudiated the claim on the ground that the proposer failed to disclose three existing policies issued by Life Insurance Corporation of India while disclosing only one policy from Aviva, which the proposal form mistakenly recorded as ₹4,00,000 though the Aviva policy in truth assured ₹40,00,000. The State and National Consumer Commissions found suppression and dismissed the claim. The Supreme Court examined the doctrine of uberrima fides, definitions of material under the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Protection of Policyholders’ Interests) Regulations, 2002, and precedents including Rekhaben Rathod, Manmohan Nanda, Mahakali Sujatha, and Satwant Kaur Sandhu. The Court held that the proposer had made a substantial disclosure by declaring the Aviva policy (and indeed providing its copy) and that the undisclosed LIC policies aggregated to only ₹2,30,000 — an inconsequential amount relative to the disclosed ₹40,00,000 and the subject policy of ₹25,00,000. Applying the prudent insurer test and authorities on materiality, the Court concluded the omissions would not have influenced a prudent insurer’s decision to grant the cover; repudiation was therefore improper. The orders of repudiation and the consumer fora were set aside and the insurer directed to pay policy benefits with nine percent interest.
- [Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1745 : 2025 INSC 301](https://lawfoyer.in/ram-lal-v-jarnail-singh-now-deceased-through-its-lrs-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-1745-2025-insc-301/): Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh (Now Deceased) through its LRs & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 3245 of 2025 (25 Feb 2025) examines the interplay between a decree for specific performance, the doctrine of merger, and the court’s continuing jurisdiction under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 together with Order XX, Rule 12A CPC. The trial court granted specific performance with a two-month timeline to deposit the balance sale consideration; the first appellate court affirmed the decree but did not stipulate a deposit time. The decree-holder delayed instituting execution and sought permission to deposit the balance consideration approximately two years after appellate dismissal; deposit was made in 2019. The High Court set aside the executing court’s order as the decree had become “inexecutable” because of delay; the Supreme Court reversed, holding that (i) once the appellate court affirms a decree the appellate decree merges with the trial decree and becomes the operative, executable decree; (ii) the court retains jurisdiction under Section 28 to extend time and should exercise discretion considering bona fides, reason for delay, length of delay and equities created during the interregnum; (iii) appellate courts disposing appeals on merits ought to specify a reasonable time for deposit under Order XX, r.12A CPC; and (iv) where delay exists but deposit is ultimately made, the executing court may permit execution subject to equities such as interest. The Court directed disbursement of the deposited amount to judgment-debtors with interest and required the decree-holder to pay simple interest at 9% from the date of the appellate judgment to the deposit date.
- [Jaya Bhattacharya v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1325 : 2025 INSC 270](https://lawfoyer.in/jaya-bhattacharya-v-the-state-of-west-bengal-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-1325-2025-insc-270/): Jaya Bhattacharya v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 3254–3256 of 2025 (Supreme Court of India, 25 Feb. 2025) deals with entitlement to pensionary benefits where a long period of unauthorised absence was subsequently regularised as extraordinary leave under the West Bengal Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules, 1971. The appellant—an L.D. Assistant—remained absent from duty first for 107 days and thereafter from 29.06.1987 to 12.07.2007. Although she alleged that she had joined, signed the attendance register and was prevented from performing duties and paid no salary from May 1987, no departmental inquiry was conducted despite directions to do so by the State Administrative Tribunal. The respondents treated the period as extraordinary leave (Rule 175 and Rule 176(4)) and allowed resumption but denied leave salary; the Tribunal held that the period did not qualify for pension under Rule 28A and relevant Government Order G.O. NO. 201-F (Pen.) dated 25.02.2009. The High Court dismissed the writ for want of prosecution. The Supreme Court held that once service is regularised by treating absence as extraordinary leave, the same cannot be treated as a break in service for the purpose of denying pensionary benefits; denial must have a statutory basis and—importantly—cannot rest on the failure of the authority to conduct the departmental inquiry ordered by the Tribunal. In the peculiar facts, the Court directed grant of pension prospectively (no arrears) and required finalisation within three months.
- [Hiralal Babulal Soni v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 708 : 2025 INSC 266](https://lawfoyer.in/hiralal-babulal-soni-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-708-2025-insc-266/): The appeal examines whether conviction under Sections 120B and 411 IPC can stand where the prosecution fails to prove that the seized gold bars are the same articles procured through the fraudulent Telegraphic Transfers (TTs) and forged demand drafts. The case arises from a largescale banking fraud in which bogus TTs credited Rs. 6,70,00,000/ to an account opened in the fictitious name M/s. Globe International; subsequent withdrawals via forged DDs were allegedly used to buy gold bars delivered to or through the appellant (accused No. 3). After delayed seizure (about four years) of 205 gold bars from the appellant’s shop, trial court convicted him under conspiracy and receipt of stolen property while paradoxically holding the seized bars were not proved to be the same as those sold against the tainted DDs. The Trial Court nonetheless convicted; the High Court sustained conviction and ordered confiscation; on appeal the Supreme Court analyzed (i) essentials of s.411 IPC (possession, prior possession by others, and accused’s knowledge or belief of theft), (ii) role of ss.106 and 114 Evidence Act as shifting evidential burdens, and (iii) impact of delayed recovery and absence of linking stock records/unique identification. The Court held prosecution failed to complete the essential chain of proof and could not invoke presumptions; conviction under ss.120B & 411 IPC set aside and 205 gold bars returned to accused No. 3.
- [The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 836 : 2025 INSC 261](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-v-balveer-singh-2025-2-s-c-r-836-2025-insc-261/): The appeal concerns conviction for ss. 302, 201 & 34 IPC arising from the nocturnal death and clandestine cremation of the deceased wife. The sole ocular witness was the seven-year-old daughter (PW-6 Rani). The Trial Court accepted PW-6’s testimony, convicted the accused and relied on several incriminating circumstances (night cremation, strained marital relations, accused absconding and the absence of any medical cause of death). The High Court reversed, chiefly on account of delay (18 days) in recording PW-6’s police statement and the risk of tutoring because she stayed with hostile relatives. The Supreme Court, after a detailed review of principles governing competence and reliability of child witnesses, tutored testimony, the judicial approach to ocular and circumstantial evidence and the limited, cautious role of s.106 Evidence Act, held that (i) no fixed minimum age determines competency — capacity to understand and answer is decisive; (ii) child-witness evidence stands on the same footing as others but demands circumspect evaluation for tutoring; (iii) delay in recording a statement is material only if it indicates malpractice and the IO must be asked to explain it; and (iv) once the prosecution proves a prima facie case with circumstances especially within accused’s knowledge, s.106 may operate to require an explanation from the accused — but it does not absolve the prosecution of proving the crime. Applying these principles, the Court found the High Court erred in discarding PW-6’s testimony, held that the prosecution had established more than a prima facie case and restored the Trial Court’s conviction.
- [Anmol v. Union of India & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1142 : 2025 INSC 256](https://lawfoyer.in/anmol-v-union-of-india-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-1142-2025-insc-256/): Anmol v. Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 14333 of 2024 ([2025] 2 S.C.R. 1142 : 2025 INSC 256) examines whether rigid reliance on quantified disability thresholds and prescriptive eligibility criteria in Appendix H-1 to the Graduate Medical Education Regulations (Amendment), 2019 can lawfully bar a candidate from admission to MBBS when a functional assessment, reasonable accommodations and assistive technologies may permit successful completion of the course. The Court applied the purposive mandate of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 and the doctrine of reasonable accommodation (as explained in Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India and Om Rathod v. DGHS) to hold that mechanical quantification (and the specific prescription “both hands intact, with intact sensations, sufficient strength and range of motion”) is overbroad and violates principles of equality, dignity and inclusion. A medical board’s denial of eligibility without a reasoned functional assessment and without considering accommodations was rejected. The separate, detailed functional assessment by Dr. Satendra Singh that tested psychomotor skills in simulation, recommended specific clinical accommodations and concluded the appellant could pursue MBBS, was accepted. The result: admission confirmed and directions to the National Medical Commission (NMC) to revise guidelines, include domain experts and persons with disability, and file an affidavit on progress by 03.03.2025.
- [Rahul Verma & Ors. v. Rampat Lal Verma & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1713 : 2025 INSC 296](https://lawfoyer.in/rahul-verma-ors-v-rampat-lal-verma-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-1713-2025-insc-296/): Rahul Verma & Ors. v. Rampat Lal Verma & Ors., SLP (C) No. 4330 of 2025, Supreme Court of India (21 Feb. 2025). This dispute concerned whether the legal heirs of a deceased partner, who were not original signatories to a partnership deed, could be bound by and could invoke the arbitration clause contained in that deed; and whether the right to sue for rendition of accounts survived to those legal heirs so as to permit invocation of arbitration. The Gauhati High Court had allowed an appeal under Section 37(1)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and directed reference to arbitration; the Civil Judge had earlier refused such reference. Relying on settled authorities, notably Ravi Prakash Goel v. Chandra Prakash Goel & Anr. ((2008) 13 SCC 667) and a Delhi High Court decision (Jyoti Gupta v. Kewalsons & Ors., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 7942), the Supreme Court reiterated that an arbitration agreement does not cease to exist upon the death of a party and is enforceable by or against the legal representatives of the deceased. The Court held that the term partners in a partnership instrument generally embraces legal heirs, representatives, assigns or legatees, and that the right to sue for rendition of accounts survives to the legal heirs under Sections 40 and 46 of the Partnership Act, 1932 read with Section 40 of the Arbitration Act. Applying these legal principles to the partnership deed clauses (clause 2 and clause 15), the Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition and upheld the High Court’s order referring the dispute to arbitration.
- [Surinder Dogra v. State Through Director CBI, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 696 : 2025 INSC 258](https://lawfoyer.in/surinder-dogra-v-state-through-director-cbi-2025-2-s-c-r-696-2025-insc-258/): Surinder Dogra v. State Through Director CBI, Criminal Appeal No. 1020 of 2022, concerns concurrent convictions under Sections 420, 468, 471 of the Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 and Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The accused, a Traffic Superintendent of Indian Airlines, Jammu, was found to have issued an infant ticket in the fictitious name Master Azim on 19.11.1997, deposited Rs. 102/-, and thereafter forged and tampered with the flight coupon to create an adult ticket in the name of Vikram, changing the sector from Jammu–Srinagar to Jammu–Delhi and enabling travel on flight no. 422. The Trial Court convicted the appellant after admission of documentary evidence, oral testimony of airline personnel acquainted with the accused’s handwriting and duties, and the expert opinion of the Deputy Government Examiner of Questioned Documents. The High Court upheld the conviction on reappreciation, holding that the coupons were in the appellant’s handwriting and that he alone had physical control of the subject coupons on the relevant date. On appeal, the Supreme Court, after considering relevant precedent concerning forgery, proof of manipulation and the weight of expert and ocular testimony, found no infirmity in the concurrent findings and dismissed the appeal. The authorities relied upon include Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors., Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, State of Rajasthan v. Islam and V.C. Shukla v. State Through CBI, considered in the context of handwriting opinion, possession of documents and control over ticketing coupons.
- [State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sudhansu Sekhar Jena, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1295 : 2025 INSC 259](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-odisha-ors-v-sudhansu-sekhar-jena-2025-2-s-c-r-1295-2025-insc-259/): The judgment State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sudhansu Sekhar Jena addresses whether the entire period of service rendered by employees engaged as job contractors must be reckoned for pensionary benefits, or only so much of that service as, when added to subsequent regular service, suffices to make them eligible for pension under the Odisha Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1992. The Supreme Court reviews conflicting orders: earlier Division Bench and Office Memoranda which limited reckoning to the necessary portion of job-contract service, and certain Tribunal/Single Judge decisions that allowed counting of the entire job-contract tenure. The Court emphasises the distinct statutory treatment of work-charged and job-contract establishments under Rule 18, sub-rules (3) and (6), and declines to extend to job-contract employees the reliefs earlier afforded to work-charged employees absent challenge to the Rules themselves. The State’s procedural lethargy in prosecuting appeals is censured and, while allowing the appeals on merits, the Court imposes costs (₹1,50,000) for inordinate delay in litigation management. The judgment thus upholds the textual and purposive reading of the Odisha Pension Rules 1992, constrains expansive readings of Tribunal/Single Judge precedents to the facts and statutory scheme, and leaves open the constitutional question of classification between the two categories since it was not argued.
- [State of Kerala & Ors. v. Moushmi Ann Jacob, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1273 : 2025 INSC 255](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-kerala-ors-v-moushmi-ann-jacob-2025-2-s-c-r-1273-2025-insc-255/): State of Kerala & Ors. v. Moushmi Ann Jacob, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1273 (2025 INSC 255) examines the scope and proper construction of a Government Notification dated 25.02.2021 issued under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008, which exempts landowners holding up to 25 cents from paying conversion (reclamation) fees and prescribes graded fee rates for larger holdings. The respondent owned 14.57 acres and applied for change of land category; the Revenue Officer demanded 10% of fair value calculated on the entire holding. The High Court (Single Judge and Division Bench) interpreted the Notification to permit exemption of the initial 25 cents and directed fee calculation only on the excess; the State challenged that view before the Supreme Court. The Court held that delegated notifications granting concessions must be strictly construed and that the plain language of Clauses (1) and (3) of the Notification forms two distinct classes: (i) holdings up to 25 cents (entitled to fee-free category change), and (ii) holdings exceeding 25 cents (liable to 10% on the entire holding, with higher slab for >1 acre). The High Court’s approach of deducting 25 cents before computation was held erroneous. The State’s classification was held permissible under Article 14 so long as there is a rational nexus to the object; the Court found such nexus. The appeals were allowed and the respondent directed to pay conversion fee calculated on the total extent of land.
- [Bank of Baroda v. Farooq Ali Khan & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 687 : 2025 INSC 253](https://lawfoyer.in/bank-of-baroda-v-farooq-ali-khan-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-687-2025-insc-253/): This judgment addresses the proper scope of constitutional judicial review under Article 226 where a High Court interdicted initiation of personal insolvency proceedings under Part III, Chapter III of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (the IBC), by holding that the guarantor’s liability had been waived. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court, holding that the Adjudicating Authority had followed the statutory process under Sections 95–100 IBC by appointing a Resolution Professional under Section 97 and directing a Section 99 report. The Court emphasised the distinction between the facilitative, fact-gathering role of the Resolution Professional (recommendatory report) and the adjudicatory function vested in the Adjudicating Authority under Section 100 to admit or reject applications. Relying on the earlier constitutional analysis in Dilip B. Jiwrajka v. Union of India and its own decision in Mohammed Enterprises (Tanzania) Ltd v. Farooq Ali Khan, the Court held that the High Court wrongly precluded the statutory mechanism, usurped fact-finding functions and decided a mixed question of fact and law (existence/waiver of debt) at a pre-adjudicatory stage. The decision re-asserts judicial restraint where specialised statutory tribunals are empowered to determine disputed facts and preserves the IBC’s procedural scheme as a “complete code” with its own safeguards and remedies.
- [Sajid Khan v. L. Rahmathullah & Ors., 2025 INSC 251; [2025] 2 S.C.R. 657](https://lawfoyer.in/sajid-khan-v-l-rahmathullah-ors-2025-insc-251-2025-2-s-c-r-657/): The appeal concerns whether Diploma in Electrical and Electronics Engineering held by selected candidates is equivalent to the prescribed Diploma in Electrical Engineering for appointment as Junior Engineer (Electrical) under the Lakshadweep Electricity Dept. (Group ‘C’ and ‘D’ Technical Posts) Recruitment Rules, 2002. The recruiting authority published an advertisement requiring either a Degree in Electrical Engineering or a Diploma in Electrical Engineering with two years’ experience. Several appellants with Diploma in Electrical and Electronics Engineering were selected. Unsuccessful candidates challenged those selections before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), which set aside the selections on the ground that unstated qualifications cannot be read into the advertisement. The High Court upheld CAT. The Supreme Court, applying settled principles on judicial restraint in matters of equivalence, held that the employer had legitimately examined and accepted equivalence — including a contemporaneous clarification from the Directorate of Technical Education, Government of Kerala that the Diploma (Elect./Electronics) – Board of Technical Education, Tamil Nadu is recognized and treated as equivalent to the Diploma (Electrical) – Board, Kerala. Given absence of convincing material to show arbitrary acceptance, and in light of precedent restricting judicial re-writing of recruitment conditions, the Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court and CAT orders.
- [The State of Himachal Pradesh v. Rajesh Kumar @ Munnu, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1806 : 2025 INSC 331](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-himachal-pradesh-v-rajesh-kumar-munnu-2025-2-s-c-r-1806-2025-insc-331/): The appeal concerns the correctness of a High Court order acquitting the respondent of Sections 376 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The prosecution alleged that on 10.08.2007 the respondent entered the house of the prosecutrix and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her; the FIR was lodged on 13.08.2007 by the prosecutrix’s father. The Trial Court convicted and sentenced the respondent to 10 years RI, but a Division Bench of the High Court set aside conviction and acquitted him, citing “glaring lacunae” in the prosecution’s case. On appeal before this Court the principal questions were whether the High Court’s conclusion of acquittal suffered from misreading or perversity and whether interference was warranted despite a trial court conviction. The record shows material weaknesses in the prosecution case: (i) the prosecutrix and her parents did not cooperate adequately with medical examination; (ii) vaginal swab and clothes were washed and no semen/blood linking the accused was found; (iii) the mother was declared hostile and denied occurrence; (iv) the father gave evasive testimony and did not explain the delay in lodging FIR; and (v) the Forensic Science Laboratory report did not link the accused to the occurrence. The High Court undertook a microscopic review of the evidence, held that the benefit of omissions and unexplained delay must accrue to the accused, and concluded that the accused deserved the benefit of doubt. This Court, applying settled principles restricting interference with an appellate acquittal unless based on perverse or misread evidence, refused interference and dismissed the State’s appeal.
- [The Role of Legal Awareness in Empowering Startups and Small Businesses](https://lawfoyer.in/the-role-of-legal-awareness-in-empowering-startups-and-small-businesses/): Find out how legal allows startups to handle contracts, compliance, taxation and IP better whilst minimising risk and impressing investors.
- [Racing Promotions Private Limited v. Dr. Harish & Ors., 2025 INSC 252; [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1608](https://lawfoyer.in/racing-promotions-private-limited-v-dr-harish-ors-2025-insc-252-2025-2-s-c-r-1608/): Racing Promotions Private Limited v. Dr. Harish & Ors., 2025 INSC 252 (Supreme Court of India) considers the limits of judicial intervention in a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) that attacked the state’s decision to host a Formula-4 motorsport event and, in particular, the High Court’s modification of an executed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Sports Development Authority of Tamil Nadu (SDAT) and a private rights-holder, Racing Promotions Private Ltd. (RPPL). The High Court declined to interfere with the policy decision to host the event but nevertheless imposed directions that effectively rewrote commercial allocations in the MoU — ordering reimbursement of Rs. 42 crores by RPPL to the State, advance deposits for future years, and a broad directive that the State should itself conduct such events going forward. The Supreme Court, after analysing the MoU, the role of SDAT and the policy context for public-private collaboration in sporting events, held that once hosting the event was accepted as a policy decision judicially permissible in a PIL, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to alter contractual terms and apportionment of costs agreed by the parties. Directions that prescribed new financial and contractual obligations were set aside as beyond the High Court’s remedial scope in a PIL; however, directions aimed at public safety and mitigation remained intact. The judgment underscores the restricted doctrinal space for courts to rewrite commercial bargains struck by state instrumentalities acting within policy, and affirms the legitimacy of public-private partnerships for hosting international sporting events.
- [Maatr Sparsh An Initiative by Avyaan Foundation v. Union of India & Others, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1772 : 2025 INSC 302](https://lawfoyer.in/maatr-sparsh-an-initiative-by-avyaan-foundation-v-union-of-india-others-2025-2-s-c-r-1772-2025-insc-302/): In Maatr Sparsh — An Initiative by Avyaan Foundation v. Union of India & Others, the Supreme Court considered whether the State must take positive steps to provide nursing-friendly facilities (feeding rooms, child-care rooms, crèches and related amenities) in public buildings and places so as to protect the rights of breastfeeding mothers and infants. The petition, filed in public interest, emphasised that absence of dignified, private spaces in public places infringes the right to life and health of infants and the privacy and dignity of mothers. The Court recognised breastfeeding as integral to the child’s right to life, survival and development and as part of a woman’s reproductive right. Relying on Article 21, Directive Principles (Articles 39(f), 47), Articles 14 and 15(3) and international instruments (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNCRC and UN special rapporteurs’ joint statement), the Court found that the Central Government’s advisory dated 27.02.2024 already encapsulated the relief sought and directed the Union to convert that advisory into reminder communications to States/UTs and public sector undertakings, and to ensure planning norms reserve space for nursing/child-care rooms in new public buildings. The writ petition was disposed of with directions to implement and disseminate the advisory.
- [State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 193 : 2025 INSC 248](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-rajasthan-v-surendra-singh-rathore-2025-3-s-c-r-193-2025-insc-248/): State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore concerns the maintainability of a second FIR registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) against the respondent, a senior official of the Bio-fuel Authority, after an earlier FIR had already been lodged in respect of an alleged demand and acceptance of bribe. The High Court quashed the second FIR under Section 482, Cr.P.C., treating it as an abuse where both FIRs related to the same offence. On appeal, the Supreme Court analysed the evolving jurisprudence on second or subsequent FIRs — notably T.T. Antony, Anju Chaudhary, Kari Choudhary, Upkar Singh, Babu Bhai and Nirmal Singh Kahlon — and distilled principles allowing a second FIR where it (a) constitutes a counter-complaint or rival version; (b) covers a broader ambit or separate incident; (c) discloses new facts or a larger conspiracy; or (d) reveals hitherto unknown material. Applying these principles to the facts — where the second FIR set out a prolonged period of alleged corrupt practice, detailed surveillance of middlemen, call records and an alleged wider conspiracy spanning months — the Court held the second FIR distinct in scope from the earlier FIR that concerned a discrete demand on 4 April 2022. Quashing would have prematurely stifled investigation into systemic corruption. The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the High Court order, restored FIR No.131 of 2022 and directed investigation to continue. Source: Supreme Court judgment.
- [Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu v. The State of Chhattisgarh, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 636 : 2025 INSC 242](https://lawfoyer.in/subhelal-sushil-sahu-v-the-state-of-chhattisgarh-2025-2-s-c-r-636-2025-insc-242/): This judgment concerns Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu v. The State of Chhattisgarh (Criminal Appeal No. 818 of 2025) in which the Supreme Court considered whether an accused, facing trial for alleged economic offences involving crypto-currency and charged under Sections 420, 201, 120-B read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860, should be released on bail under Section 437(6), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The trial before the Chief Judicial Magistrate involved a voluminous prosecution case — prosecution proposed to examine 189 witnesses though only one witness had been recorded — and the accused had remained in custody since December 2023. The Bench examined the nature and object of Section 437(6), explained that the sub-section does not confer an absolute right but creates a rebuttable entitlement to bail if trial is not concluded within sixty days of the first date fixed for taking evidence, and enumerated illustrative factors relevant to the Magistrate’s satisfaction (including whether delay is attributable to the accused, risk of tampering, risk of absconding, custody throughout the period, and the sentence exposure vis-à-vis detention period). Applying these principles to the facts, and noting the trial-court’s limited sentencing competence (maximum seven years) and the disproportion between custody duration and potential sentence, the Court granted bail subject to deposit of Rs. 35,00,000 within six months and other usual conditions. The decision emphasizes a liberal approach to Section 437(6) to protect individual liberty while preserving prosecutorial and societal interests.
- [Jaideep Bose v. M/s Bid and Hammer Auctioneers Private Limited, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 234 : 2025 INSC 241](https://lawfoyer.in/jaideep-bose-v-m-s-bid-and-hammer-auctioneers-private-limited-2025-3-s-c-r-234-2025-insc-241/): Jaideep Bose v. M/s Bid and Hammer Auctioneers Private Limited (Supreme Court dated 18 February 2025). The Court considered whether a single private complaint under s.200 Cr.P.C. read with ss.499–500 IPC could properly summon fourteen persons (editors, editorial director and journalists) for allegedly defamatory news articles published across different editions and dates. The apex court examined the interplay between the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 (statutory presumption in s.7 in favour of the named editor), the obligation under s.202 Cr.P.C. (mandatory inquiry where accused resides outside the Magistrate’s territorial jurisdiction), and the essential ingredients of criminal defamation under s.499 IPC. The Court held that (i) the statutory presumption attaches to the editor named in the publication but not automatically to other functionaries such as an editorial director unless specific averments establish control over selection of matter; (ii) where accused reside outside the Magistrate’s jurisdiction, the Magistrate must conduct the inquiry/inspection mandated by s.202(1) before issuing process; (iii) mere broad, generalized allegations or reliance on another accused’s article are insufficient to sustain summons against multiple persons; and (iv) where mandatory procedure under s.202 was not followed and no material established prima facie lowering of reputation or intent to defame, issuance of summons and criminal proceedings were to be quashed. The appeals were allowed and proceedings quashed as to the appellants.
- [CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Month of December 2025 – Online Volunteer Programme](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-volunteers-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-month-of-december-2025-online-volunteer-programme/): CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Month of December 2025 – Online Volunteer Programme
- [Free Webinar on Decoding the Companies Act - Classroom Concepts to Corporate Careers | Organized by the Lawscape | 16th November 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/free-webinar-on-decoding-the-companies-act-classroom-concepts-to-corporate-careers-organized-by-the-lawscape-16th-november-2025/): Free Webinar on Decoding the Companies Act - Classroom Concepts to Corporate Careers | Organized by the Lawscape | 16th November 2025
- [Dr. Poornima Advani & Anr. v. Government of NCT & Anr., 2025 2 S.C.R. 1178 : 2025 INSC 262](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-poornima-advani-anr-v-government-of-nct-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-1178-2025-insc-262/): The appeal concerns entitlement to interest on a delayed refund of stamp duty where the e-stamp paper purchased by the appellants on 06.07.2016 was misplaced and a fresh e-stamp was subsequently used to effect the transaction. The Delhi High Court (Single Judge) granted restitution of the principal sum of Rs. 28,10,000/ but declined interest; the Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, holding that where a public authority has retained money without lawful basis the claimant is entitled to compensation for deprivation of use — commonly awarded as interest — even in the absence of express statutory provision. The Court applied principles of restitution, compensation and the constitutional prohibition on collection of tax without authority (Article 265), surveyed authorities (including Secretary, Irrigation Department v. G.C. Roy and Union of India v. Tata Chemicals Ltd.) and observed that interest is a corollary of returning money retained without right. On the facts (delay between the Single Judge’s order and actual refund/deposit), the Court computed interest at appropriate slabs and directed payment of Rs. 4,35,968/ within two months. The reasoning emphasises equity, prevention of unjust enrichment and that monetary retention by the State without lawful justification attracts an obligation to make the claimant whole.
- [In Re: Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1588 : 2025 INSC 239](https://lawfoyer.in/in-re-policy-strategy-for-grant-of-bail-2025-2-s-c-r-1588-2025-insc-239/): In Re: Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail examines the scope and procedural safeguards surrounding the power of the appropriate Government to grant remission under Section 432, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (and the corresponding Section 473, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The Court addresses four core questions: (i) whether remission can be considered suo motu by the executive without an application by the convict or any person on the convict’s behalf where the Government has a policy; (ii) the permissible nature and limits of conditions attached to remission; (iii) the legal effect and procedure for revocation/cancellation of remission on alleged breach of conditions; and (iv) whether reasons must be recorded when applications for remission are granted or refused. The Court reads procedural safeguards into Section 432 and the BNSS: where a State/UT policy exists, the administration must consider all eligible convicts without insistence on an application; conditions attached must be reasonable, not vague or oppressive, and aim at rehabilitation and public safety; cancellation of remission impacts liberty and therefore requires show-cause, opportunity to be heard and brief recorded reasons; and orders granting or refusing remission must contain brief reasons and be communicated to the convict with legal-aid facilitation. The judgment directs States/UTs lacking an exhaustive policy to frame one within two months and mandates implementation of NALSA’s SOP and active monitoring by Legal Services Authorities.
- [Hitesh Umeshbhai Mashru v. The State of Gujarat & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 205 : 2025 INSC 246](https://lawfoyer.in/hitesh-umeshbhai-mashru-v-the-state-of-gujarat-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-205-2025-insc-246/): Hitesh Umeshbhai Mashru v. The State of Gujarat & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 205 : 2025 INSC 246 concerns an application for anticipatory bail where FIR No. 11203024220505 dated 16.07.2022 under Sections 493 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was registered. The High Court of Gujarat had declined successive anticipatory bail; this Court granted leave and entertained the appeal. The appellant, who allegedly married the prosecutrix when both were in their late forties and it was the third marriage for each, had been earlier granted protection against arrest by this Court and subsequently joined investigation. The State informed the Court that investigation had concluded and charge-sheet had been filed. The prosecutrix opposed bail on the ground of being cheated under the pretext of marriage and that the marriage was unregistered (allegedly solemnised according to customs). Without adjudicating the merits of the underlying criminal allegations, the Supreme Court exercised its discretionary power in favour of the appellant and directed that in the event of arrest he shall be released on bail subject to such conditions as the trial court may impose, provided he is not required in any other case and continues to cooperate with investigation. The State retains liberty to move for cancellation of bail on violation of conditions. The decision emphasises the court’s supervisory role in anticipatory bail applications, the relevance of investigation status (charge-sheet filed) and the co-operative conduct of the accused as factors favouring bail while expressly refraining from commenting on substantive guilt.
- [State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1241 : 2025 INSC 229](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-karnataka-v-t-n-sudhakar-reddy-2025-2-s-c-r-1241-2025-insc-229/): State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy, Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024 (Supreme Court, 17 Feb. 2025) examines whether a preliminary inquiry is an indispensable prerequisite before registering an FIR against a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and whether a superior police officer may pass a composite order under Section 17 of the PC Act directing both registration and investigation. The Superintendent of Police of the Karnataka Lokayukta relied upon a detailed source information report that quantified alleged disproportionate assets (Rs. 3,81,40,246; ~90.72% over known income) and, by order dated 4 Dec. 2023, directed the Deputy Superintendent to register an FIR and investigate. The High Court quashed the FIR, holding that a preliminary inquiry should have preceded registration and that the SP could not simultaneously order registration and authorize an investigation. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that preliminary inquiry is desirable but not mandatory where the information itself discloses a cognizable offence; a sufficiently detailed source report may functionally satisfy the limited object of a preliminary inquiry (i.e., to determine whether cognizable offence is disclosed). Further, on harmonious construction of the PC Act and CrPC, the Superintendent is competent to issue a composite order directing registration of FIR and authorizing investigation under Section 17, provided the exercise of power shows application of mind and assigns reasons. The decision reinforces Lalita Kumari’s principle that FIR-registration depends on whether information discloses a cognizable offence and upholds the investigatory purpose of the PC Act while warning against mechanical or casual orders.
- [Western Coal Fields Ltd. v. Manohar Govinda Fulzele & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 183 : 2025 INSC 233](https://lawfoyer.in/western-coal-fields-ltd-v-manohar-govinda-fulzele-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-183-2025-insc-233-2/): The Supreme Court examined whether forfeiture of gratuity under Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 is permissible where an employee is terminated for misconduct that constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, even though there has been no criminal conviction or the initiation of criminal proceedings. The Court held that the statutory language does not require a criminal conviction: a disciplinary finding that the misconduct constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude suffices to authorise whole or partial forfeiture, subject to procedural fairness and reasoned exercise of discretion. The Court rejected reading into the statute words like “duly established in a Court of Law” (an interpretation earlier articulated in Union Bank of India v. C.G. Ajay Babu), treating that part of C.G. Ajay Babu as obiter in any event because Section 4(5) rendered Section 4(6) inapplicable to the bank in that case. Applying the principle, the Court upheld complete forfeiture where an appellant obtained employment by producing a forged date of birth certificate (appointment thereby being illegal), relying on Devendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal for the proposition that suppression of material information at appointment amounts to moral turpitude. In contrast, in cases of misappropriation of meagre passenger fares by MSRTC conductors, the Court recognised misappropriation as moral turpitude but directed that forfeiture be limited to 25% of gratuity as a sympathetic and proportionate exercise of discretion. The ruling clarifies statutory scope, emphasises notice and representation before forfeiture, and balances the employee’s accrued statutory right with employer interest where misconduct is established administratively.
- [Vinod @ Nasmulla v. The State of Chhattisgarh, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 80 : 2025 INSC 220](https://lawfoyer.in/vinod-nasmulla-v-the-state-of-chhattisgarh-2025-3-s-c-r-80-2025-insc-220/): Vinod @ Nasmulla v. The State of Chhattisgarh (Criminal Appeal No. 1931 of 2019; judgment dated 14 February 2025) examines whether conviction for dacoity under Section 395 read with Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and for unlawful possession under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 can be sustained where (i) neither the FIR nor the Section 161 CrPC statements named the accused, (ii) a Test Identification Parade (TIP) identifying the accused was conducted but the TIP-identifying witnesses were not examined, (iii) dock identification by a single witness (a police personnel) was relied upon, and (iv) there was no recovery of looted articles or forensic linkage between the seized country-made pistol and crime-scene evidence. The Supreme Court re-affirms that a TIP is corroborative and not substantive; when TIP-identifying witnesses are not produced at trial the TIP report loses evidentiary value. The Court finds the dock identification by PW-9 unreliable given his doubtful presence on the bus and prior acquaintance with the accused, and it holds that the prosecution withheld best evidence (driver, conductor, khalasi) without justification. The alleged arrest and recovery also suffer from infirmities — delay in seizure memo, discrepancies in description, late forensic examination and absence of corroborative injuries, looted goods, or ballistic nexus. On cumulative appraisal, guilt not proved beyond reasonable doubt; convictions set aside and appellant acquitted.
- [Puja Ferro Alloys P. Ltd. v. State of Goa & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 138 : 2025 INSC 217](https://lawfoyer.in/puja-ferro-alloys-p-ltd-v-state-of-goa-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-138-2025-insc-217/): This analysis examines Puja Ferro Alloys P. Ltd. v. State of Goa & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 138 : 2025 INSC 217, a consolidation of civil appeals challenging recovery notices issued under the Goa (Prohibition of Further Payments and Recovery of Rebate Benefits) Act, 2002 for 25% electricity tariff rebates originally provided by State notifications. The central question was whether the appellants — industrial consumers who applied for supply while the 30.09.1991 notification was on the statute-book — were entitled to the rebate when actual power connections were effected after 31.03.1995, the date on which the 1991 notification was rescinded. The Court canvassed the history of notifications and amendments (including 15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996), earlier writ litigation culminating in GR Ispat Ltd. and Manohar Parrikar, the legislative recovery mechanism in the 2002 Act, and doctrines of promissory estoppel, public interest, and res judicata. It held that the 1991 notification stood rescinded w.e.f. 01.04.1995, that subsequent amending notifications were declared non-est/void ab initio in earlier proceedings, that the appellants (except one) received supply after rescission and therefore could not claim the 1991 rebate, and that the recovery notices under the 2002 Act were valid. The Court also applied res judicata in light of the prior GR Ispat proceedings and emphasised that promissory estoppel yields to overriding public interest where the State demonstrates unviability of the incentive.
- [JSW Steel Ltd. v. The Board of Trustees of the Mumbai Port Trust Mumbai & Ors, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 701 : 2025 INSC 257](https://lawfoyer.in/jsw-steel-ltd-v-the-board-of-trustees-of-the-mumbai-port-trust-mumbai-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-701-2025-insc-257/): JSW Steel Ltd. v. The Board of Trustees of the Mumbai Port Trust, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 701 : 2025 INSC 257 examines whether a High Court correctly treated a long-pending writ as infructuous and permitted the Port Trust to encash security deposited by the petitioner to meet costs of raising a capsized barge (Satyam). The central legal question is narrow and legal: under Section 14(1) of the Indian Ports Act, 1908, on whom does the statutory liability to raise or remove a wreck fall — the owner of the wrecked vessel or some other party (here, the appellant owner of the mother ship)? The appellant had deposited Rs.70,00,000 under compulsion and challenged the demand by writ under Article 226, contending that the actual owner of the barge (respondent no.3) alone bore statutory liability. The High Court allowed the Port Trust to withdraw the deposit and dismissed the writ as infructuous on account of elapsed time. The Supreme Court found this approach legally unsound because the dispute raised a pure question of law — not a factual minefield — and systemic delay could not extinguish the lis or preclude adjudication where legal rights remained unresolved. The Supreme Court therefore set aside the High Court order, revived the writ, and remitted the matter for disposal on merits, while noting that monetary withdrawal by the Port Trust could be compensated if the appellant succeeds. The judgment applies principles on exercise of Article 226 where no substantial factual controversy exists and restates that efflux of time/systemic delay is not a ground to deny adjudication of legal questions.
- [Khushi Vijayvargiya Triumphs at JECRC Intra Moot Court Competition 2025 – Showcasing Excellence in Advocacy and Legal Acumen](https://lawfoyer.in/khushi-vijayvargiya-triumphs-at-jecrc-intra-moot-court/): LawFoyer proudly celebrates the outstanding achievement of Ms. Khushi Vijayvargiya, a passionate BALLB (Hons.) student at JECRC University, Jaipur, who emerged as the Winner of the JECRC Intra Moot Court Competition 2025. This remarkable feat not only highlights her dedication to the study of law but also marks a significant milestone in her journey as
- [Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 630 : 2025 INSC 222](https://lawfoyer.in/tapas-kumar-palit-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-2025-2-s-c-r-630-2025-insc-222/): This judgment concerns the entitlement to bail of an under-trial accused, Tapas Kumar Palit, who has been in judicial custody since 24 March 2020 in a case registered under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), the Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Suraksha Adhiniyam, 2005, and various sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (arising from FIR No. 9/2020). The trial was underway: prosecution had examined 42 out of an intended 100 witnesses. The High Court refused bail; the appellant challenged that refusal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court (Pardiwala and Mahadevan, JJ.) allowed the appeal and granted bail, emphasising the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 21 and observing that prolonged pre-trial incarceration (five years at the time of the order) with no certainty about completion of evidence infringes that right. The Court noted absence of antecedents, hostility of panch witnesses to the recovery panchnama, and prosecutorial reliance on an excessively large witness list which could cause indefinite delay. The judgment reiterates prosecutorial discretion to limit witness examination and directs trial management measures (including online appearance and restricted local travel conditions). The Court also referred to Malak Khan v. Emperor to explain that prosecution need not call every possible witness when the testimony would be cumulatively repetitive. The order sets bail on conditions and provides directions for the Special Judge to probe the necessity of each proposed witness.
- [Ramesh Mishrimal Jain v. Avinash Vishwanath Patne & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 670 : 2025 INSC 213](https://lawfoyer.in/ramesh-mishrimal-jain-v-avinash-vishwanath-patne-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-670-2025-insc-213/): The judgment in Ramesh Mishrimal Jain v. Avinash Vishwanath Patne & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 670 : 2025 INSC 213, addresses whether an agreement to sell executed on 03.09.2003 attracts stamp duty and penalty under the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 by reason of Explanation I to Article 25 of Schedule I (which deems certain agreements evidencing or followed by delivery of possession to be conveyances). The appellant obtained and continued possession prior to the written agreement, described that possession in the instrument as being on a rental basis, and sought specific performance; respondents impounded the agreement under s.34 of the Stamp Act for recovery of deficit duty and penalty. The trial court and the Bombay High Court upheld impounding; the Supreme Court, relying on established precedents (notably Veena Hasmukh Jain v. State of Maharashtra and Shyamsundar Radheshyam Agrawal v. Pushpabai Nilkanth Patil), affirmed that stamp duty attaches to the instrument if the agreement either transfers or evidences transfer of possession (even if styled as tenancy) or if possession had already been given and the agreement records that fact, thereby satisfying Explanation I. The Court emphasised that stamp liability is on the instrument and looked to its terms and the jural change between parties (tenant → purchaser) rather than form. The impounding and direction to send the document to the Registrar of Stamps for recovery of deficit duty and penalty were held to be legally correct; the appeal was dismissed.
- [Jiya Javrani and Team from Dr. D.Y. Patil Law College, Pune Shine Bright at the 16th GNLU International Moot Court Competition 2025, Bag the Best Written Submissions Award](https://lawfoyer.in/jiya-javrani-and-team-from-dr-d-y-patil-law-college-pune-shine-bright-at-the-16th-gnlu-international-moot-court-competition-2025-bag-the-best-written-submissions-award/): LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of Ms. Jiya Javrani, a fifth-year B.A. LL.B. student from Dr. D.Y. Patil Law College, Pimpri, Pune, who, along with her teammates Isha Patel and Sejal Gotaphode, brought laurels to their institution by winning the Best Written Submissions Award at the 16th GNLU International Moot Court Competition (GIMC) 2025,
- [Prathmesh Kumar Shines as Winner and Best Mooter at the 4th Navodit Moot Court Competition, 2024](https://lawfoyer.in/prathmesh-kumar-shines-as-winner-and-best-mooter-at-the-4th-navodit-moot-court-competition-2024/): In a remarkable display of legal acumen, dedication, and courtroom confidence, Prathmesh Kumar, a third-year B.Com LL.B (Hons.) student from Dr. Shakuntala Misra National Rehabilitation University, Lucknow, has made his institution proud by securing the Winner title along with being adjudged the Best Mooter at the 4th Navodit Moot Court Competition, 2024. The event, organized
- [Financial Frauds & Digital Arrest: Legal Insights and Safeguards | Organised by Legal Aid Clinic, Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla | 15th November 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/financial-frauds-digital-arrest-legal-insights-and-safeguards-organised-by-legal-aid-clinic-himachal-pradesh-national-law-university-shimla-15th-november-2025/): Financial Frauds & Digital Arrest: Legal Insights and Safeguards | Organised by Legal Aid Clinic, Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla | 15th November 2025
- [3rd Mar Gregorios Moot Court Competition 2026 by Mar Gregorious College of Law Thiruvananthapuram [ JAN 22-24, 2026; Prizes worth Rs. 100K] Register by Nov 15, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-mar-gregorios-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-mar-gregorios-college-of-law-thiruvananthapuram-register-by-november-15-2025/): 3rd Mar Gregorios Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Mar Gregorios College of Law, Thiruvananthapuram | Register by November 15 2025
- [M/s ABCI Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Others, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 128 : 2025 INSC 215](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-abci-infrastructures-pvt-ltd-v-union-of-india-and-others-2025-3-s-c-r-128-2025-insc-215/): This analysis examines M/s ABCI Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 2546 of 2025, decided by the Supreme Court of India on 14 February 2025 (Sanjiv Khanna, CJI). The dispute arises from an online tender by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) for construction of long twin tunnels at Shinkun La Pass (estimated cost Rs. 1,504.64 crores) where the appellant’s financial bid, intended as Rs. 1,569 crores, appeared on record as Rs. 1,569/-. The BRO treated the bid as valid, declared the appellant L-1, and then, upon the appellant’s attempt to withdraw or correct the error after the financial opening, declared the appellant a defaulter and encashed the bid security (bank guarantee) of Rs. 15,04,64,000/-. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s writ; the Supreme Court granted leave. The Court applied principles under Section 20, Indian Contract Act, 1872 and equitable doctrines developed in West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering Co. and related authorities. It held that the quoted figure was a patent, self-evident error (not a mere opinion on value) making the bid incapable of performance for the works tendered. The Court rejected the appellant’s system-glitch plea but criticised BRO’s rigid conduct in refusing corrective, proportionate remedies and in precipitate invocation of the bank guarantee, thereby causing avoidable delay. Balancing fault and proportionality, the Court ordered the appellant to pay Rs. 1 crore to BRO and directed return of the original bank guarantee on payment. The impugned High Court judgment was set aside and the appeal allowed.
- [Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahadeo Krishna Naik, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 100 : 2025 INSC 218](https://lawfoyer.in/maharashtra-state-road-transport-corporation-v-mahadeo-krishna-naik-2025-3-s-c-r-100-2025-insc-218/): This analysis examines Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahadeo Krishna Naik (Civil Appeal No. 13834 of 2024), where the Supreme Court considered whether the Corporation committed suggestio falsi and suppresio veri by failing to disclose its contrary pleadings and the award in proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), and whether the High Court was justified in exercising review jurisdiction and awarding back wages. The MACT had held the lorry driver solely responsible and dismissed the claim against the Corporation; however, in industrial adjudication and writ proceedings the Corporation maintained that the departmental inquiry and punishment of the bus driver (Mahadeo) were valid. The High Court (Single Judge) allowed a review based on the MACT material and directed consequential relief including back wages; the Supreme Court affirmed that the Corporation’s non-disclosure amounted to suggestio falsi and suppresio veri, justified review under Order XLVII CPC and Section 114 Evidence Act principles, and modified the back-wages award to 75% (with full terminal benefits and interest). The Court reiterated that while full back wages are the normal rule when termination is set aside, the quantum is a discretionary, fact-sensitive exercise requiring a mini inquiry into gainful employment during the interregnum. This case underscores courts’ intolerance of deliberate suppression or contradictory pleadings, the probative utility of MACT findings in related proceedings, and the settled principles governing reinstatement and back wages.
- [CMJ Foundation & Ors. v. State of Meghalaya & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1020 : 2025 INSC 211](https://lawfoyer.in/cmj-foundation-ors-v-state-of-meghalaya-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-1020-2025-insc-211/): The appeals concern the validity of the Chancellor’s appointment at Chandra Mohan Jha University and the legality of the State Government’s dissolution order dated 31 March 2014 under Section 48 of the Chandra Mohan Jha University Act, 2009. The core legal findings are (i) the appointment of the Chancellor by the Sponsor was subject to the approval of the Visitor (the Governor) and, because such approval was never granted, the appointment was invalid and non-est ab initio; (ii) the State complied with the directions of this Court (order dated 13 September 2013), issued show-cause notices, considered replies and passed a speaking order under Section 48(2) dissolving the University — the dissolution was therefore lawful; and (iii) the Division Bench’s remand of the matter to the Single Judge for merits reconsideration was legally unnecessary and was set aside by this Court. The judgment reiterates that a statutory “subject to approval” requirement is conditional and cannot be converted into a deemed approval absent a legislative deeming provision; it also emphasizes the limited role of courts in substituting their view for Wednesbury-unreasonable executive decisions once procedure and reason are satisfied.
- [Kamalkishor Shrigopal Taparia v. India Ener-Gen Private Limited & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 91 : 2025 INSC 223](https://lawfoyer.in/kamalkishor-shrigopal-taparia-v-india-ener-gen-private-limited-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-91-2025-insc-223-3/): Kamalkishor Shrigopal Taparia v. India Ener-Gen Private Limited & Anr., Criminal Appeal Nos. 758-761 of 2025, decided 13 February 2025 by a Bench including B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma, addresses whether an independent non-executive director can be fastened with vicarious criminal liability under Section 141 read with Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour of company cheques. The appellant, an independent non-executive director, was arraigned in four complaints arising from dishonoured cheques issued by the company. The High Court dismissed his Section 482, CrPC petitions; this Court granted leave and examined precedent-based principles on vicarious liability for directors. The Supreme Court reiterated settled law that mere directorship or titular association does not attract penal vicarious liability under Section 141 unless the complaint contains specific, unambiguous averments showing the director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business at the relevant time, or falls within recognized exceptions (e.g., Managing Director or signatory to the cheque). The Court found that the appellant was neither a signatory nor involved in day-to-day financial management, had resigned before the offending transactions, and that the complaints lacked required specific averments. Relying on National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal, S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, N.K. Wahi v. Shekhar Singh, and Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra, the Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellant.
- [M/s Tomorrowland Limited v. Housing & Urban Development Corporation Limited & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 998 : 2025 INSC 207](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-tomorrowland-limited-v-housing-urban-development-corporation-limited-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-998-2025-insc-207/): This case involves M/s Tomorrowland Limited (Appellant) challenging HUDCO’s cancellation of an allotment for a 5-star hotel site at Andrews Ganj and forfeiture of amounts paid under an Allotment Letter dated 31.10.1994. The dispute turns on reciprocal obligations in the allotment document — principally Clause 5(vi), (viii) and (ix) — which required HUDCO to obtain statutory approvals under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 and the Income Tax Act (Chapter XX C) and to execute an Agreement to Sub-lease before demanding subsequent instalments or handing over possession. The appellant paid the first instalment but refused further payments contending HUDCO had not secured the approvals or executed the sub-lease; HUDCO insisted on instalments, threatened cancellation, and ultimately cancelled the allotment and forfeited ≈Rs.28.11 crore. Lower courts (Civil Court and First Appellate Court) found HUDCO guilty of breach and granted declaratory relief; the High Court reversed, holding the suit non-maintainable for failure to claim consequential possession under the proviso to s.34, Specific Relief Act, and criticizing the appellant’s conduct as inequitable. The Supreme Court held HUDCO had breached mandatory reciprocal obligations and must refund the forfeited amount (without contractual interest) under Clause 5(vi), but denied discretionary interest under s.34, CPC because the appellant had not come with clean hands (forum-shopping, failure to comply with a status-quo deposit condition, and abandoning possession claim to avoid court fee). Directions were issued for refund within three months, failing which 6% p.a. interest.
- [Ramesh A. Naika v. The Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1721; 2025 INSC 303](https://lawfoyer.in/ramesh-a-naika-v-the-registrar-general-high-court-of-karnataka-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-1721-2025-insc-303/): The Supreme Court of India in Ramesh A. Naika v. The Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka & Ors. affirmed the conviction of the appellant for the murder of his two minor children under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code but commuted his death sentence to imprisonment for life till the remainder of his natural life without remission. The judgment carefully reaffirmed the Panchsheel Principles on circumstantial evidence from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, and endorsed the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Karnataka High Court. The Court observed that the chain of circumstances, including the last-seen evidence, the recovery of the children’s bodies, contemporaneous SMS communications, and the absence of an alternative hypothesis, proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, while affirming conviction, it held that the trial court had not fully considered mitigating factors such as lack of criminal antecedents, good conduct, and the appellant’s potential for reform. The Bench, relying on Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 and Shatrughna Baban Meshram v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 1 SCC 596, ruled that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the death penalty should be reserved for the rarest of rare where the alternative of life imprisonment is foreclosed. Citing Deen Dayal Tiwari v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 237, the Court emphasized individualized sentencing and replaced the death sentence with life imprisonment without remission. It also clarified that sentencing on the same day as conviction does not per se violate Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure if meaningful assistance is provided to the accused, while noting that a reference on bifurcated sentencing is pending before a larger Bench.
- [Courts on its Own Motion in Re: Suicide committed by Sushant Rohilla, Law Student of I.P. University, W.P.(CRL) 793/2017 (Delhi H.C., Nov. 3, 2025)](https://lawfoyer.in/courts-on-its-own-motion-in-re-suicide-committed-by-sushant-rohilla-law-student-of-i-p-university-w-p-crl-793-2017-delhi-h-c-nov-3-2025/): Law Students Can't Be Barred From Exams Over Lack Of Minimum Attendance: Delhi High Court Issues Directions
- [Prashant Kumar Awarded the Prestigious Government of India Scholarship for LL.M. in International Climate Change and Environmental Law at Jigme Singye Wangchuck School of Law, Bhutan](https://lawfoyer.in/prashant-kumar-awarded-the-prestigious-government-of-india-scholarship-for-ll-m-in-international-climate-change-and-environmental-law-at-jigme-singye-wangchuck-school-of-law-bhutan/): Prashant Kumar Awarded the Prestigious Government of India Scholarship for LL.M. in International Climate Change and Environmental Law at Jigme Singye Wangchuck School of Law, Bhutan
- [Kamalkishor Shrigopal Taparia v. India Ener-Gen Private Limited & Anr, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 91 : 2025 INSC 223](https://lawfoyer.in/kamalkishor-shrigopal-taparia-v-india-ener-gen-private-limited-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-91-2025-insc-223-2/): Kamalkishor Shrigopal Taparia v. India Ener-Gen Private Limited & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 91 : 2025 INSC 223, examines whether an independent non-executive director can be vicariously criminally liable under Section 141 read with Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for cheques issued and dishonoured by the company. The appellant, who neither signed nor authorised the disputed cheques and who resigned from directorship before certain actions, was initially arrayed as an accused in multiple complaints for dishonour of cheques issued by the company. The Bombay High Court dismissed quashing petitions under Section 482, CrPC, treating the director’s role as a trial issue. The Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming settled principles that penal vicarious liability under Section 141 must be strictly pleaded and proved, and that mere directorship—particularly where the director is non-executive and has no role in day-to-day financial management—does not attract automatic liability. The Court relied on precedents including National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal, N.K. Wahi v. Shekhar Singh, S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra to emphasize the necessity for specific averments showing that the accused was “in charge of and responsible” for company business at the relevant time. Finding absence of such averments, non-signatory status to the cheques, and resignation formally communicated to the Registrar of Companies, the Court held the complaints failed the mandatory legal threshold and quashed criminal proceedings against the appellant. Keywords: Section 138, Section 141, independent non-executive director, vicarious liability, quashing, Section 482 CrPC.
- [Kamalkishor Shrigopal Taparia v. India Ener-Gen Private Limited & Anr, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 91 : 2025 INSC 223](https://lawfoyer.in/kamalkishor-shrigopal-taparia-v-india-ener-gen-private-limited-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-91-2025-insc-223/): Kamalkishor Shrigopal Taparia v. India Ener-Gen Private Limited & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 91 : 2025 INSC 223, examines whether an independent non-executive director can be vicariously criminally liable under Section 141 read with Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for cheques issued and dishonoured by the company. The appellant, who neither signed nor authorised the disputed cheques and who resigned from directorship before certain actions, was initially arrayed as an accused in multiple complaints for dishonour of cheques issued by the company. The Bombay High Court dismissed quashing petitions under Section 482, CrPC, treating the director’s role as a trial issue. The Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming settled principles that penal vicarious liability under Section 141 must be strictly pleaded and proved, and that mere directorship—particularly where the director is non-executive and has no role in day-to-day financial management—does not attract automatic liability. The Court relied on precedents including National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal, N.K. Wahi v. Shekhar Singh, S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra to emphasize the necessity for specific averments showing that the accused was “in charge of and responsible” for company business at the relevant time. Finding absence of such averments, non-signatory status to the cheques, and resignation formally communicated to the Registrar of Companies, the Court held the complaints failed the mandatory legal threshold and quashed criminal proceedings against the appellant. Keywords: Section 138, Section 141, independent non-executive director, vicarious liability, quashing, Section 482 CrPC.
- [CMJ Foundation and Others v. State of Meghalaya and Others, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1020 : 2025 INSC 211](https://lawfoyer.in/cmj-foundation-and-others-v-state-of-meghalaya-and-others-2025-2-s-c-r-1020-2025-insc-211/): CMJ Foundation & Ors. v. State of Meghalaya & Ors., decided on 13 February 2025, examines three principal questions: (1) whether the appointment of the Chancellor of Chandra Mohan Jha University (CMJ University) complied with Section 14(1) of the Chandra Mohan Jha University Act, 2009; (2) whether the State’s dissolution order dated 31 March 2014 complied with Section 48 of the Act and this Court’s direction of 13 September 2013; and (3) whether the Division Bench’s remand to the Single Judge for re-examination on merits was justified. The Supreme Court held that the sponsor’s appointment of the Chancellor without the Visitor’s approval was conditional and therefore non est — void ab initio — because the appointment under s.14(1) is expressly “subject to the approval of the Visitor”; no deeming fiction of approval exists absent statutory enactment. The Court further held that the State complied with the procedural mandate of s.48 (notice, show-cause, examination of replies, reminder and a speaking order) before the dissolution; the dissolution order of 31.03.2014 was therefore affirmed on the facts. Finally, the Court found the Division Bench’s remand to the Single Judge to be unnecessary and legally flawed because the appellate court had already examined and decided the core controversy on merits; the remand was set aside. Key precedents on “subject to” construction, deeming provisions and administrative fairness were applied.
- [M/s Tomorrowland Limited v. Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 998 : 2025 INSC 207](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-tomorrowland-limited-v-housing-and-urban-development-corporation-limited-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-998-2025-insc-207/): The dispute concerns a high-value allotment of land by HUDCO for construction of a 5-star hotel (subject property) pursuant to an Allotment Letter dated 31.10.1994. The appellant (highest bidder) paid the first instalment (40%) and maintenance corpus but refused further instalments on the ground that HUDCO had not procured statutorily required approvals nor executed the agreement to sub-lease (reciprocal obligations placed on HUDCO by clause 5). HUDCO insisted on further payments and ultimately cancelled the allotment (02.05.1996) and forfeited the payments. Appellant litigated in two suits (First Suit in High Court with a conditional status-quo requiring deposit of Rs.15 crores; Second Suit in Civil Court seeking declaration and subsequently possession). Procedural contestations (withdrawal of First Suit, forum-shopping allegations, court-fee objections under Order VII r.11 CPC) complicated the litigation. Trial and first appellate courts found HUDCO guilty of breach and granted declaratory relief; the High Court reversed, holding the suit defective for not claiming consequential possession per proviso to Section 34, Specific Relief Act, and criticized appellant’s conduct. The Supreme Court held that HUDCO was in breach of Clause 5(vi), 5(viii) and 5(ix) of the Allotment Letter (failure to obtain approvals under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 and Chapter XX C, Income Tax Act and failure to execute sub-lease), and therefore liable to refund the forfeited amount. However, on equitable grounds and invoking the clean hands doctrine, the Court declined to award interest under Section 34, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, observing appellant’s forum shopping, failure to comply with deposit directions and abandonment of possession claim to evade court fee. Refund ordered of Rs. 28,11,31,939 (principal) without interest; 6% p.a. interest allowed only as penalty if HUDCO failed to refund within three months. The Court relied on Central Bank of India v. Ravindra & Ors. for discretionary interest principles.
- [The Union of India through the Assistant Director v. Kanhaiya Prasad, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 544 : 2025 INSC 210](https://lawfoyer.in/the-union-of-india-through-the-assistant-director-v-kanhaiya-prasad-2025-2-s-c-r-544-2025-insc-210/): The Union of India through the Assistant Director v. Kanhaiya Prasad, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 544 : 2025 INSC 210, examines the mandatory twin-condition embargo on grant of bail contained in Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) and the approach a court must adopt while entertaining bail applications in money-laundering prosecutions. The facts reveal alleged large-scale illegal mining and sale of sand by a syndicate, generation of proceeds of crime and subsequent layering, concealment and utilisation of such proceeds through family-owned entities, investment in immovable property and renovation works. The High Court granted bail without recording satisfaction on the two mandatory requirements under s.45 — (i) that the Public Prosecutor be given opportunity to oppose and (ii) the court being satisfied on reasonable grounds that the accused is not guilty and not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s order was cryptic, failed to apply the rigours of s.45, misapplied the protective scope of Article 20(3) vis-à-vis s.50 PMLA, and that statements recorded under s.50 cannot be excluded ipso facto from consideration. Reliance on the three-Judge pronouncement in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and a line of authorities was emphasised to underscore that money-laundering is an aggravated, separate class of crime mandating stringent approach to bail. The High Court order was set aside and the matter remitted for fresh consideration by a different Bench.
- [K. Krishnamurthy v. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 557 : 2025 INSC 208](https://lawfoyer.in/k-krishnamurthy-v-the-deputy-commissioner-of-income-tax-2025-2-s-c-r-557-2025-insc-208/): The appeal concerns the scope and operation of Section 271AAA of the Income Tax Act, 1961 — the penal provision that empowers the Assessing Officer to impose a penalty equal to 10% of the “undisclosed income” of the “specified previous year” where a search under Section 132 has been initiated. The core issues were (i) whether the year in which the search was conducted (AY 2011–12 in this matter) was the specified previous year; (ii) whether the Assessing Officer had discharged the onus to show that particular receipts constituted undisclosed income “found in the course of search”; and (iii) whether the exemption in sub-section (2) of Section 271AAA applies where an assessee has admitted and later substantiated income and paid tax with interest albeit belatedly. The appellant had disclosed Rs. 2,27,65,580 during the search and later, during assessment proceedings, offered an additional sum of Rs. 2,49,90,000 (land-related receipts) as income from other sources. The Revenue levied penalty on the entire returned income; the High Court and Tribunal upheld the broader levy. The Supreme Court held that (a) by virtue of Explanation (b)(ii) to s.271AAA, AY 2011–12 (the year of search) was the specified previous year; (b) where an assessee admits an amount during the search, substantiates its derivation and pays tax with interest (even belatedly), the exemption in s.271AAA(2) operates and no penalty can attach to that admitted sum; and (c) however, receipts of Rs. 2,49,90,000 constituted undisclosed income found in the course of search (sale deeds were obtained from the Society as a consequence of the search), and penalty at 10% is leviable on that amount only. The Court reiterated that s.271AAA is a penalty provision to be strictly construed and that the Assessing Officer bears the onus to demonstrate that particular receipts were found in the course of search.
- [P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas & Ors, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1060 : 2025 INSC 212](https://lawfoyer.in/p-rammohan-rao-v-k-srinivas-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-1060-2025-insc-212/): P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1060 : 2025 INSC 212, examines whether prolonged officiating service rendered by employees appointed temporarily as Assistant Executive Engineers (AEEs) between 1990–1992 must be counted for cadre seniority vis-à-vis candidates regularly selected through the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission (APPSC) in 1997. The State regularised the services of temporary AEEs by G.O.M. No. 234 (27.06.2005) but placed them below the last regularly selected AEE; on representations the State issued G.O.M. No. 262 (17.06.2006) entitling the 1990–1992 batch to seniority from their date of initial induction. Aggrieved regular appointees challenged G.O.M. No. 262 and the High Court quashed it. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court. Applying the twofold test distilled in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra—(A) where initial appointment is ad-hoc/stop-gap officiation does not count; (B) where initial appointment was not under rules but incumbents served uninterruptedly until lawful regularisation officiation counts—the Court held the appellants fall under Proposition (B). The judgment emphasises (i) the factual matrix of project-based sanctioned posts under G.O.M. No. 540 (30.08.1990) and G.O.M. No. 391 (30.06.1994), (ii) absence of selection rules at the time of appointment, (iii) long uninterrupted service until regularisation in 2005, and (iv) that functus officio and requirement of individual hearings do not fetter the executive’s rule-making/policy power. The Court therefore upheld counting officiating service (1990–2005) for seniority, set aside the High Court order and validated G.O.M. No. 262.
- [M/s Techno Prints v. Chhattisgarh Textbook Corporation & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 208 : 2025 INSC 236](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-techno-prints-v-chhattisgarh-textbook-corporation-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-208-2025-insc-236/): This judgment examines whether a show-cause notice issued by a statutory corporation seeking to blacklist a successful tenderer for three years (and forfeit its EMD) was justified on the material before the Authority and whether judicial interference at the show-cause stage was warranted. The appellant, a printing contractor, was L-1 for multiple textbook printing groups but failed to complete the allotted quantity within contractual timelines during the COVID-19 period. The Corporation invoked clauses in the tender (notably Clauses 13.3, 16.1, 16.3, and 16.9) and served a detailed show-cause notice requiring explanation why the contractor should not be blacklisted and EMD forfeited. The High Court refused to quash the show-cause notice and the appeal reached the Supreme Court. The Court reiterated settled principles that ordinarily a writ challenge to a show-cause/charge sheet is premature unless the notice is issued without jurisdiction or tainted by mala fides, while emphasizing that blacklisting is a drastic and stigmatic step requiring strong and cogent materials. Applying precedents like Kulja Industries Ltd. and The Blue Dreamz Advertising Pvt. Ltd., the Court held that the Authority must test the reasonableness of invoking blacklisting even at the stage of issuing a show-cause. On the facts — with admitted disruption by the COVID-19 lockdown and absence of allegations of deliberate deceit — the Court permitted forfeiture of the EMD but quashed the limb of the show-cause calling for blacklisting. The decision preserves administrative inquiry but curtails premature initiation of blacklisting proceedings where the factual matrix does not justify such a punitive step.
- [Suman Mishra & Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 534 : 2025 INSC 203](https://lawfoyer.in/suman-mishra-ors-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-534-2025-insc-203/): The Supreme Court in Suman Mishra & Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 534 : 2025 INSC 203, scrutinised a High Court refusal to quash criminal proceedings initiated after a matrimonial dispute. The FIR (registered 19.08.2021) alleged multiple offences including Section 376, IPC; after investigation the charge under Section 376, IPC was not pressed in the charge-sheet and no protest petition was filed by the complainant. The High Court dismissed the petition under Section 482, CrPC by a cursory order; this Court held that where an FIR appears to be vexatious, omnibus and instituted post-initiation of matrimonial proceedings, the High Court must undertake a careful, contextual appraisal of the record rather than a perfunctory reading. Applying precedents such as Iqbal alias Bala v. State of U.P. and Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P., the Court found that once the principal specific allegation of rape was dropped by investigation and the FIR contained general/omnibus allegations without date/time particulars, the FIR bore indicia of ulterior motive. Given also the subsequent divorce decree and remarriage of the husband, the Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction and quashed FIR No. 733/2021 and the charge-sheet dated 02.02.2022. Keywords: quashing, Section 376 IPC dropped, omnibus allegations, vexatious FIR, Section 482 CrPC.
- [Jay Kishan and Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 65 : 2025 INSC 198](https://lawfoyer.in/jay-kishan-and-ors-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-65-2025-insc-198/): Jay Kishan and Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 65 : 2025 INSC 198 examines whether invocation of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (the Act) was justified where the predicate crimes arising from inter-family property and monetary disputes were framed under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The Supreme Court analysed the statutory definition of “gang” under Section 2(b) and emphasised that penal statutes in derogation of fundamental rights require strict construction. The Court applied the approach in Mohammad Wajid v. State of Uttar Pradesh to “lift the veil” and read between the lines where FIRs may be crafted to give a civil controversy a criminal colour. Finding that the three predicate CCs principally involved property/monetary transactions and that the materials then available did not prima facie disclose the kind of violence, threat, intimidation or coercion contemplated by Section 2(b), the Court held resort to the Act premature and quashed FIR CC No.0092/2023. The decision reaffirms protection of Article 21 interests against facile invocation of stringent penal measures and underscores judicial duty to examine overall circumstances — not merely the pleaded offences — before enabling special preventive or punitive regimes.
- [Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1569 : 2025 INSC 197](https://lawfoyer.in/sukhdev-singh-v-sukhbir-kaur-2025-2-s-c-r-1569-2025-insc-197/): In Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur (Civil Appeal No. 2536 of 2019, judgment dated 12 February 2025) the Supreme Court (Oka, A.A. Amanullah & A.G. Masih, JJ.; reference to three-Judge Bench) adjudicated two core questions under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: (i) whether a spouse of a marriage declared void under s.11 is entitled to claim permanent alimony and maintenance under s.25, and (ii) whether maintenance pendente lite can be ordered under s.24 in a petition seeking declaration of nullity under s.11. The Court analysed the statutory scheme—particularly ss.5, 11, 23, 24, 25—and the meaning of “decree” in the matrimonial context. Relying on canonical precedents such as Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan and Rameshchandra Daga v. Rameshwari Daga, the Court held that decrees under ss.9–13 (including a decree of nullity under s.11) fall within the scope of “any decree” in s.25, entitling the financially dependent spouse to seek permanent alimony subject to judicial discretion and consideration of conduct. The Court distinguished decisions dealing with s.125 CrPC and s.18 HAMA (eg. Yamunabai Adhav, Savitaben Bhatiya, Abbayolla Reddy) as operating in different remedial fields. On s.24, the Court held that a matrimonial court may grant interim maintenance pendente lite during s.11 proceedings if the statutory conditions are satisfied, even where a prima facie view of nullity exists, again emphasizing discretion and equitable considerations. The judgment censured pejorative descriptors (e.g., “illegitimate wife”, “faithful mistress”) used in a Bombay High Court Full Bench decision as violative of human dignity under Art.21. The reference was answered and the matters were directed to be placed before an appropriate Bench for decision on merits.
- [Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 574 : 2025 INSC 201](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-amaragouda-l-patil-v-union-of-india-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-574-2025-insc-201/): Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 301–303 of 2025, concerns challenge to the appointment of the Chairperson of the National Commission for Homeopathy under Section 4(2) of the National Commission for Homeopathy Act, 2020. The statutory eligibility required a post-graduate degree in Homoeopathy, 20 years’ experience in the field, and at least 10 years as a “leader” — explained as Head of a Department or Head of an Organisation. The Search Committee recommended the third respondent, then Director General, Central Council for Research in Homeopathy (CCRH), despite internal minutes recording doubt about whether he possessed ten years as Head. A Departmental Order from the Secretary, GoI, asserted equivalence, and the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court upheld the appointment. The Single Judge had earlier quashed it. The Supreme Court, on review of the sealed file and office orders, held there was no cogent material before selectors to establish the required 10 years as Head, found the decision to treat lesser experience as equivalent to the statutory requirement unsupported by evidence, and characterised the departure as amounting to malice in law (legal malice) and a fraud on the public when mandatory eligibility is ignored. The Court restored the Single Judge’s order, quashed the appointment, directed the third respondent to step down and ordered fresh selection in accordance with the statute. (Reference: judgment record supplied).
- [Rupa and Co. Limited and Another v. Firhad Hakim and Others, 2025 2 S.C.R. 648 : 2025 INSC 245](https://lawfoyer.in/rupa-and-co-limited-and-another-v-firhad-hakim-and-others-2025-2-s-c-r-648-2025-insc-245/): Rupa & Co. Ltd. obtained a formal allotment from the West Bengal Housing Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (HIDCO) by letter dated 6 April 2011 for 30 cottahs of Plot No. 11E/17, New Town, Kolkata on freehold terms for Rs. 4,00,92,000/ and paid the full amount. HIDCO later rescinded or sought to modify the allotment — first suggesting leasehold terms (99 years) and subsequently proposing changes under a new land policy — which led the appellants to challenge the action before the Calcutta High Court. The Division Bench allowed their appeal on 10 February 2020, issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus directing execution and registration of the deed of sale/conveyance in accordance with the original allotment. HIDCO’s Special Leave Petition was dismissed by this Court on 19 July 2021. Alleging non-compliance, the appellants pursued contempt proceedings. Despite repeated High Court directions and notices to the Chief Secretary to ensure compliance, the High Court on 9 February 2024 referred the matter to mediation and appointed a former Judge as mediator — against the express resistance of the appellants. This Court found that referral to mediation was legally impermissible where a clear mandamus had been issued and not obeyed; mediation cannot be forced and is inappropriate when the State’s conduct amounted to aggravation of contempt and an attempt to defeat the High Court’s writ. The impugned High Court order was quashed; this Court directed the Chief Secretary to ensure compliance in letter and spirit and fixed a personal show-cause date for non-compliance.
- [Union of India & Others v. Future Gaming Solutions Pvt. Ltd. & Another Etc., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 756 : 2025 INSC 181](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-others-v-future-gaming-solutions-pvt-ltd-another-etc-2025-2-s-c-r-756-2025-insc-181/): The Supreme Court in Union of India & Others v. Future Gaming Solutions Pvt. Ltd. & Another (11 Feb 2025) examined whether successive amendments to the Finance Act, 1994 validly attracted service tax on entities functioning as sole purchasers/ distributors of State-run paper and online lotteries organised by the Government of Sikkim. The petitions raised two interlinked questions: (i) whether the transactions of buying and reselling lottery tickets by the respondents constituted a service taxable under the Finance Act after amendments between 2010–2016; and (ii) whether the contractual and statutory matrix established a principal–agent relationship (making respondents liable as service providers) or a principal–principal / buyer–seller relationship (excluding service tax). The Court analysed the statutory definitions introduced across Finance Acts (2010, 2012, 2015, 2016), the negative list concept, the concept of actionable claim, and the Lotteries regulatory regime. Reliance was placed on earlier precedents recognizing lottery tickets as actionable claims and on constitutional allocation of taxing powers (Entries in the Seventh Schedule). In substance the Court upheld the High Court’s findings: the contractual terms, real substance of dealings, and the nature of lottery as an activity in the domain of betting and gambling demonstrated that respondents were purchasing tickets at their own risk and operating as principals; no agency-based service was rendered to the State such as to attract service tax under the amended Finance Act provisions. Consequently the appeals by the Union were dismissed.
- [Naushey Ali & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 289 : 2025 INSC 182](https://lawfoyer.in/naushey-ali-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-289-2025-insc-182/): In Naushey Ali & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr., the Supreme Court considered whether criminal proceedings invoking Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 could be quashed under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction in view of a subsequent settlement between the injured party and the accused. The High Court had declined quashment on the ground that offences under Section 307 IPC were non-compoundable; the Supreme Court corrected the conceptual conflation between compounding under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Court reaffirmed the settled principle that mere mention of Section 307 IPC in an FIR/chargesheet does not ipso facto bar quashing; a court must probe whether the allegation was an instance of overstating the offence and whether the material on record — nature and site of injuries, weapon used, overt act and role specificity — supports framing of Section 307. Applying precedents including Gian Singh, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, Narinder Singh and Ramgopal, and on the facts where the police had filed a closure report, the injuries were limited (contusions, incised lacerations and a fracture of the head of distal phalanx of the left ring finger), the overt act and specific role attributable to accused were limited (firing attributed to a deceased person), and the parties had voluntarily settled, the Court held that the case did not fall in the class of crimes “seriously endangering the well-being of society.” Quashment was therefore ordered as continuation of trial would be futile and a misuse of process.
- [Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr. v. The State of Karnataka, 2025 3 S.C.R. 158 : 2025 INSC 221](https://lawfoyer.in/vasant-girish-akbarasab-sanavale-anr-v-the-state-of-karnataka-2025-3-s-c-r-158-2025-insc-221/): Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr. v. The State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 593 of 2022 (11 Feb 2025) examines whether the High Court rightly reversed an acquittal and convicted both the husband and the mother-in-law for setting the deceased wife on fire, invoking ss. 498A, 302, 504 read with s. 34 IPC and ss. 3, 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The Supreme Court affirms conviction of the mother-in-law based primarily on a consistent oral dying declaration (recorded by the Tehsildar and a treating doctor) and corroborative medical opinion, while it sets aside the conviction of the husband for lack of cogent evidence of his individual participation or shared common intention within the meaning of s. 34 IPC. The Court elaborates the twin requirements under s. 34 — participation in the criminal act and sharing the common intention — distinguishing it sharply from s. 149 (common object). The judgment underscores that mere presence, flight or omission does not automatically constitute participation unless foundational facts show active or passive conduct in furtherance of the criminal act; s. 106 Evidence Act cannot be pressed into service unless prima facie foundational facts of involvement are made out. Dying declarations are held admissible here because medical evidence (and lack of meaningful cross-examination) support the victim’s fitness to speak. Result: conviction of appellant No.2 (mother-in-law) affirmed; appellant No.1 (husband) acquitted. 2025 3 S.C.R. 158 : 2025 INSC 221.
- [Om Prakash Gupta Alias Lalloowa (Now Deceased) & Ors. v. Satish Chandra (Now Deceased), [2025] 2 S.C.R. 937 : 2025 INSC 183](https://lawfoyer.in/om-prakash-gupta-alias-lalloowa-now-deceased-ors-v-satish-chandra-now-deceased-2025-2-s-c-r-937-2025-insc-183/): This analysis examines Om Prakash Gupta Alias Lalloowa (Now Deceased) & Ors. v. Satish Chandra (Now Deceased), [2025] 2 S.C.R. 937 : 2025 INSC 183, decided by Dipankar Datta and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ. The core questions were (i) whether the High Court rightly dismissed applications for condonation of delay in substitution and thereby treated the second appeals as abated; and (ii) the correct procedural sequence and consequences under Order XXII CPC read with Articles 120–121 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court applied the principles in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma to emphasize a justice-oriented, pragmatic approach in condoning delay and setting aside abatement. The Court held that applications for substitution filed by the legal representatives of a deceased party are legally permissible even if not filed by the opposite party, and that a prayer for substitution may, in substance, import a prayer for setting aside abatement (relying on Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini). The Court construed Order XXII Rule 10-A as imposing a duty on pleaders to inform the court of a party’s death and on courts to notify the other side, but stressed that mere oblique mention of death in an unrelated affidavit is not adequate compliance. Applying these principles, the Court set aside the High Court’s orders dismissing substitution/condonation applications, restored both second appeals to their original file and number, directed amendment of cause-titles and substitution of heirs, and urged prompt hearing by the High Court. The judgment reinforces a liberal approach to abatement/condonation to secure adjudication on merits, while preserving the strict time-frame sequence under Articles 120–121 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
- [Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K. (Appellant: Canara Bank, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 963 : 2025 INSC 184](https://lawfoyer.in/canara-bank-v-ajithkumar-g-k-appellant-canara-bank-2025-2-s-c-r-963-2025-insc-184/): Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 963 : 2025 INSC 184, concerns a long-running claim for appointment on compassionate grounds made by the son of a bank employee who died in service in December 2001. The Bank’s 1993 Scheme governed applications at the time of death; a 2005 circular later replaced compassionate appointment with a lump-sum ex-gratia option. The respondent applied within one month of death but was refused on two primary grounds: (i) the family was receiving family pension and substantial terminal benefits; and (ii) the respondent exceeded the upper age limit for the post (26 years) and was not given discretionary age relaxation. After protracted litigation and reconsideration, the High Court granted relief and directed appointment; a Division Bench later ordered appointment and exemplary costs. The Supreme Court examined settled principles governing compassionate appointment (including need/indigence, suitability, timing, and applicability of earlier v. later schemes), analysed whether lapse of time or receipt of pension/terminal benefits could bar relief, and evaluated whether the Bank had reasonably assessed the family’s finances and the respondent’s suitability. The Court held that (a) lapse of judicial delay cannot be visited upon a diligent claimant; (b) compassionate appointment is intended only in hand-to-mouth cases where immediate sustenance is absent; (c) terminal benefits/family pension are relevant to the financial assessment under the 1993 Scheme and cannot be simply ignored; (d) suitability must be tested before imposing appointment; and (e) age-relaxation is a later, conditional step which arises only after eligibility and suitability are established. Ultimately, the Court found the Bank’s refusal on financial assessment grounds sustainable but awarded compassionate monetary relief under Article 142 and directed a lumpsum payment to the respondent.
- [B.V. Ram Kumar v. State of Telangana and Another, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 48 : 2025 INSC 194](https://lawfoyer.in/b-v-ram-kumar-v-state-of-telangana-and-another-2025-3-s-c-r-48-2025-insc-194/): B.V. Ram Kumar v. State of Telangana and Another, Criminal Appeal No. 654 of 2025 (Supreme Court of India; judgment dated 10 February 2025) examines whether a superior officer’s workplace reprimand can constitute an intentional insult with intent to provoke under Section 504, Indian Penal Code, 1860, and whether allegations of deficient PPE supply could sustain criminal liability under Sections 269/270 IPC during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court reviewed the chargesheet, witness statements and the High Court’s refusal to quash proceedings and held that — on the material before it — the appellant’s conduct amounted to disciplinary admonition directed at restoring workplace discipline rather than to an act intended to provoke breach of public peace. The Court reiterated the legal contours of Section 504 IPC — requiring (i) an intentional insult sufficient to provoke, and (ii) mens rea that the insult was likely to cause breach of public peace or other offence — and applied established precedents including Fiona Shrikhande and Mohammad Wajid, and the Bhajan Lal categories for quashing. On the facts, the Court found absence of ingredients constituting Sections 269, 270 or 504 IPC and quashed the chargesheet and all proceedings. The judgment emphasizes protecting legitimate managerial discipline in workplaces (especially healthcare institutions under pandemic stress) from being converted into criminality while preserving the remedy where true deliberate provocation and public danger exist.
- [AC Chokshi Share Broker Private Limited v. Jatin Pratap Desai & Anr, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1545 : 2025 INSC 174](https://lawfoyer.in/ac-chokshi-share-broker-private-limited-v-jatin-pratap-desai-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-1545-2025-insc-174/): AC Chokshi Share Broker Private Limited v. Jatin Pratap Desai & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1545 : 2025 INSC 174. This case examines whether a registered stock broker may invoke arbitration under Bye-law 248(a) of the Bombay Stock Exchange Bye-Laws, 1957 against a husband for a debit balance that accrued in his wife’s trading account, where liability was alleged to arise from an oral understanding that both spouses would be jointly and severally liable. The arbitral tribunal held both spouses liable; the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court refused to set aside the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, while a Division Bench sitting under Section 37 set aside the award only as against the husband. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Division Bench and restored the arbitral award in full. The Court adopted a pragmatic, substance-over-form approach to the Bye-law’s scope, applied the non-signatory inclusion test from ONGC v. Discovery Enterprise (as affirmed in Cox & Kings), and held that where parties’ conduct and mutual intention demonstrate a composite transaction or oral undertaking, a non-signatory may be subject to institutional arbitration. The Court further reiterated the constrained role of courts under Sections 34 and 37, disapproved re-appreciation of evidence at the appellate stage, and found no patent illegality or perversity in the arbitral tribunal’s fact-based conclusion.
- [Amrit Yadav v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 24 : 2025 INSC 176](https://lawfoyer.in/amrit-yadav-v-the-state-of-jharkhand-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-24-2025-insc-176/): Amrit Yadav v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 24 : 2025 INSC 176, examines the legal validity of a district-level recruitment advertisement dated 29.07.2010 and the consequences of appointments made pursuant thereto. The Supreme Court held that a recruitment advertisement that omits essential information — notably the total number of posts and the allocation between reserved and unreserved categories — violates the twin guarantees of equality and non-arbitrariness under Article 14 and the equality-of-opportunity mandate under Article 16 of the Constitution. The Court reaffirmed that an appointment made contrary to mandatory statutory requirements and settled precedents is void ab initio. Where a selection process is declared void for being de hors the rules, the courts may set aside the entire selection without individual show-cause procedures to incumbents, because requiring fresh hearings may be futile and would not undo the constitutional defect. The judgment applies established principles on valid advertisement requirements (as in Renu v. Tis Hazari Courts), the limited nature of reservation entitlements under Article 16(4)/(4-A) (per Mukesh Kumar and M. Nagaraj reasoning), and the courts’ power to cancel entire tainted recruitments (per M.P. State Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Nanuram Yadav). The Court directed fresh compliant recruitment, ordered quashing of earlier appointments, and mandated reasonable age-relaxation in the new process to protect aspirants prejudiced by litigation delays.
- [Hansraj v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 612 : 2025 INSC 178](https://lawfoyer.in/hansraj-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-2025-2-s-c-r-612-2025-insc-178/): This analysis examines Hansraj v. State of Chhattisgarh, Criminal Appeal No. 1387 of 2012, decided by a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court on 10 February 2025, which reversed convictions under Section 302, Indian Penal Code and acquitted the appellant on the ground that the circumstantial case against him was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution relied solely on circumstantial evidence: alleged motive (dispute over wages), last-seen inference, recovery of a farsi said to be the weapon, and blood-stained clothes. The judgment applies the fivefold test in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra—the so-called panchsheel for circumstantial proof—and scrutinises each link: the uncorroborated testimony that the appellant returned because his cycle punctured; lack of independent proof that the cycle tyre was punctured; delayed recovery of the farsi on the appellant’s pointing out without forensic linkage of blood stains to the deceased; inconsistent witness statements about seeing the appellant flee; and failure to establish identity of the fleeing person. The Court held the motive trivial and not established; found the chain of circumstances riddled with doubts; emphasised that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; and concluded that benefit of doubt must go to the accused. The conviction and sentence imposed by trial and High Court were set aside and the appellant acquitted.
- [Ravi v. The State of Punjab, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 526 : 2025 INSC 170](https://lawfoyer.in/ravi-v-the-state-of-punjab-2025-2-s-c-r-526-2025-insc-170/): The appeal arises from convictions by the trial court and the High Court of Ravi for the murder of his first wife Jamni allegedly by strangulation on 22.08.2014. The prosecution relied principally upon a Zero FIR lodged by the deceased’s brother, contemporaneous panchnama noting ligature marks and a post-mortem opinion of asphyxia caused by hanging, together with investigative recovery of a rope. However, three material witnesses — the complainant (Chaina Ram), a neighbouring sister (Rajo) and a cousin (Deep Chand) — turned hostile, leaving only formal witnesses: the post-mortem doctor and investigating officers. The doctor conceded in cross-examination that the cause of death could also be attributable to chronic tuberculosis and that ligature marks might result from post-mortem handling during transport. The investigating officer admitted the recovered rope was of a common, market-available type. Applying the panchsheels of circumstantial evidence as laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra and the guidance on s.106 Evidence Act from Anees v. State Govt. of NCT, the Supreme Court found the prosecution had not established a complete chain of circumstances excluding every hypothesis of innocence. The courts below had also overlooked the appellant’s s.313 CrPC statement that the deceased suffered chronic tuberculosis and had been treated at Beas Hospital — a fact the prosecution did not probe by re-examining the post-mortem doctor. Given the presence of two plausible, conflicting inferences, benefit of doubt was held to lie with the appellant; the convictions were set aside and the appellant ordered released.
- [Vinubhai Mohanlal Dobaria v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 476 : 2025 INSC 155](https://lawfoyer.in/vinubhai-mohanlal-dobaria-v-chief-commissioner-of-income-tax-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-476-2025-insc-155/): The appeal arises from rejection of a compounding application under Section 276CC of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for assessment year 2013–14 while an earlier compounding for AY 2011–12 had been allowed. The principal questions were (i) the point of commission of an offence under s.276CC — whether on the actual belated filing date or on the day after the statutory due date under s.139(1); (ii) the correct meaning of the expression “first offence” in Clause 8 of the Guidelines for Compounding of Offences under Direct Tax Laws, 2014; (iii) what constitutes voluntary disclosure for Clause 8; and (iv) whether the 2014 Guidelines are mandatory or directory in their operation. The Supreme Court held that an offence under s.276CC is committed the day immediately after the due date fixed under s.139(1) (irrespective of subsequent filing under s.139(4)) and, therefore, both defaults in the present case (01.10.2011 for AY 2011–12 and 01.11.2013 for AY 2013–14) occurred before any prosecution notice that could displace the “first offence” character. The Court construed “first offence” in Paragraph 8 to mean an offence committed before issuance of any show-cause notice/intimation/launching of prosecution or offences voluntarily disclosed to the Department before detection — thus enlarging rather than narrowing protection for voluntary self-disclosure. The Court also held that, while eligibility conditions under Paragraph 7 are mandatory, the restrictions in Paragraph 8 must be read in light of Paragraph 4 (discretion guided by facts, conduct, nature and magnitude); therefore the Guidelines are generally binding but not so inflexible as to preclude exceptions in appropriate cases. The High Court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s writ was set aside and remitted for fresh consideration of compounding.
- [Raja Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 461 : 2025 INSC 167](https://lawfoyer.in/raja-khan-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-2025-2-s-c-r-461-2025-insc-167/): This analysis examines Raja Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, Criminal Appeal No. 70 of 2025, in which the Supreme Court reversed convictions under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, because the prosecution’s circumstantial case failed to exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence. The prosecution’s case relied primarily on (i) a memorandum recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 that allegedly led to recovery of a blood-stained stone and a gandasa from a pond, and (ii) recovery of two gold chains from the rooftop of the appellant’s house. The Court scrutinised the panch witnesses’ testimony, the manner and place of preparation of seizure memos, contradictions in the disclosure and recovery accounts, weaknesses in the Test Identification Parade (TIP) for the chains, and lack of reliable corroboration for the “last seen” circumstance. Applying the five principles for circumstantial evidence in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra and related precedents, the Court held that the chain of evidence was incomplete and the Section 27 disclosures did not carry the requisite guarantee of truth. Material inconsistencies—panches signing at police station, diver (PW-26) stating police directed recovery, mismatched descriptions in seizure memos, and absence of distinguishing marks on chains—created reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions.
- [Ayyub & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 452 : 2025 INSC 168](https://lawfoyer.in/ayyub-ors-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-452-2025-insc-168/): This appeal concerns the correctness of the High Court order refusing to quash criminal proceedings under Section 306, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (abetment of suicide) brought against the appellants after the death by suicide of Tanu. The factual matrix is intertwined with an earlier violent episode in which the first appellant’s son Ziaul Rahman allegedly suffered ante-mortem injuries and later died; that event led the first appellant to lodge an FIR against members of Tanu’s family. A separate FIR, lodged later by Vijay (respondent-no.2), accused the appellants of having used humiliating verbal expressions to Tanu — specifically “because of you our boy has died, why you do not die” — and alleges that she, distraught by the humiliation, committed suicide the same day. The police charge-sheet under Section 306 IPC largely reproduces the complainant’s version. The Supreme Court analyzes whether the charge-sheet and the material on record disclose the necessary ingredients of Section 306 IPC (read with Section 107 IPC), notably intention or instigation sufficient to leave the victim with “no other alternative” but suicide. Finding the investigation one-sided, the Court concludes that the charge-sheet does not remotely disclose the ingredients of Section 306 IPC, that the police proceeded on a unidimensional account without exploring other angles, and that the temporal and investigative anomalies (delayed FIR registration, post-mortem and inquest timings, belated s.161 Cr.P.C. statements) justify reinvestigation. The Supreme Court quashes the trial proceedings against the appellants and directs constitution of a Special Investigation Team for fresh inquiry.
- [Geddam Jhansi & Anr. v. The State of Telangana & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 160](https://lawfoyer.in/geddam-jhansi-anr-v-the-state-of-telangana-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-1-2025-insc-160/): This Supreme Court judgment quashes criminal proceedings under Section 498A IPC, Section 506 IPC, Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 insofar as they relate to two accused — Geddam Jhansi and Geddam Sathyakama Jabali. The Court examined the complaints, the charge-sheet and the material collected during investigation and concluded that, while specific allegations of dowry demand and harassment were made against the husband and mother-in-law, the imputations against the two appellants were generalized, devoid of specific overt acts and unsupported by independent or direct evidence. The investigating agency’s material relied primarily on the complainant’s statement and on statements of her parents and two panchayat elders; the latter witnesses’ accounts were found to be hearsay or mere repetitions of the complainant’s narrative and did not disclose any first-hand acts attributable to the appellants. The Court emphasised judicial restraint in criminalising intra-family disputes, warning against indiscriminate roping-in of relatives on the basis of general allegations and reiterated the principles in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi) on quashing under Section 482 CrPC. On the facts, no prima facie case was made out against the two appellants; accordingly the impugned High Court orders refusing quashment were set aside and proceedings against those two were quashed; the DV proceedings were also quashed against Geddam Jhansi by exercise of powers under Article 142.
- [Shri Binod Kumar Singh v. National Insurance Company Ltd, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 521 : 2025 INSC 154](https://lawfoyer.in/shri-binod-kumar-singh-v-national-insurance-company-ltd-2025-2-s-c-r-521-2025-insc-154/): Shri Binod Kumar Singh v. National Insurance Company Ltd., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 521 : 2025 INSC 154 — The appellant’s goods-carrying truck insured with the respondent caught fire on 08.06.2014 during the currency of the policy. The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (Bihar) directed settlement on a non-standard basis relying on National Insurance Co. v. Nitin Khandelwal (Criminal Appeal No. 8463/2014). The National Commission set aside that direction, holding that absence of a valid national permit (on account of alleged non-payment of authorization fee) disentitled the insured to claim. Before this Court it was demonstrated that a valid All India (National) Permit was in force up to 13.10.2017, and that the requirement of paying an authorization fee arose only when the vehicle moved outside Bihar. The truck caught fire within Bihar; the permit had been lawfully issued by the competent Bihar authority; therefore the purported non-deposit of the authorization fee could not vitiate the permit for intra-state use on the date of loss. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the National Commission’s order, directed the insurer to process and pay the claim with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of complaint before the State Commission until actual payment, and allowed 60 days for compliance.
- [Maya Singh and Others v. The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 602 : 2025 INSC 161](https://lawfoyer.in/maya-singh-and-others-v-the-oriental-insurance-co-ltd-and-others-2025-2-s-c-r-602-2025-insc-161/): Maya Singh & Ors. v. The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 602 : 2025 INSC 161, considers proper method for quantifying dependency in a fatal motor-vehicle claim where the deceased was aged about 57–58 years and employed in BSNL as a phone mechanic. The Tribunal awarded compensation using the conventional Sarla Verma multiplier approach (annual net income ₹4,57,000; multiplier 9; one-third deduction for personal expenses) resulting in a sizeable award. The High Court, however, applied a split-multiplier / split-period approach — dividing pre-retirement salary years and post-retirement pension years — and substantially reduced dependency. The Supreme Court held that deviation from the Sarla Verma multiplier regime requires recorded special reasons; mere proximity to retirement is not by itself a sufficient rationale to apply a split multiplier. The Court restored the Tribunal’s approach, added future prospects @ 15% (given the deceased’s technical qualifications and continuing capacity to work), adjusted heads for loss of consortium (three dependants @ ₹40,000 each), funeral and estate expenses (₹15,000 each), and directed interest as earlier awarded. The appeal was allowed and the award modified to ₹33,03,300 (rounded). Keywords: Motor Vehicle Accident Claim; Multiplier; Split Method; Future Prospects; Loss of Consortium; Loss of Estate.
- [Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 424 : 2025 INSC 162](https://lawfoyer.in/vihaan-kumar-v-state-of-haryana-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-424-2025-insc-162/): This judgment considers whether the arrest of Vihaan Kumar was vitiated by non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the Constitution — namely, that an arrested person must be informed, “as soon as may be,” of the grounds for arrest — and related statutory obligations under Section 50 CrPC (and correlative Section 47 BNSS). The Court reiterates settled doctrine that the communication must be meaningful: sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds must be effectively imparted in a language the arrestee understands; mere notice of arrest or informing relatives does not satisfy the mandate. The bench holds the burden to prove compliance lies squarely on the arresting agency and that contemporaneous written record (or delivery of written grounds to the arrestee) is the safest and preferred method. Where Article 22(1) is breached the arrest is rendered illegal and any remand orders flowing from that arrest are vitiated, though investigation and trial may proceed on merits. The Court applied these principles to the facts — finding no proof that grounds of arrest were communicated to the appellant, noting that the police relied on after-the-fact diary entries and on informing the appellant’s wife — and accordingly allowed the appeal, directed immediate release subject to trial attendance conditions, and issued directions to the State regarding handcuffing in hospital and strict compliance with Article 22 safeguards.
- [Gopal Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1174 : 2025 INSC 263](https://lawfoyer.in/gopal-singh-anr-v-state-of-uttarakhand-2025-2-s-c-r-1174-2025-insc-263/): Gopal Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1174 : 2025 INSC 263 (06 February 2025) examines whether the prosecution established the identity of the accused before court in an incident of communal/private violence resulting in death. At trial the accused were convicted under Sections 302 and 323 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code; the High Court reduced the conviction to Section 304 Part II, IPC. The Supreme Court, on scrutiny of oral testimony and court-witness evidence, found that the two surviving appellants were never identified as perpetrators in court — both PW-1 and PW-3 gave their initial statements naming persons but their evidence was recorded in the absence of the appellants and they did not identify them in open court. Court-witnesses’ testimony was largely hearsay and contained omissions as to naming the appellants. The Court emphasised the fundamental prosecutorial duty to establish identity of an accused by evidence in court and held that where identity is not established there is effectively no evidence against the accused. Applying that principle, the Court quashed convictions insofar as they applied to the two appellants and acquitted them. The judgment reinforces the elemental rule that identification evidence must be reliable and recorded in presence of accused; hearsay cannot substitute for direct identification.
- [Sanjay v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1790 : 2025 INSC 317](https://lawfoyer.in/sanjay-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-2025-2-s-c-r-1790-2025-insc-317/): The case concerns the alleged rape and murder of a four-year-old girl (‘X’). The Trial Court convicted Sanjay for offences under Sections 302 and 376(2)(g) IPC and imposed the death sentence, which the High Court confirmed. The prosecution’s case rested principally on three strands: (i) last-seen evidence placing the accused with the child after a marriage ceremony; (ii) an extra-judicial confession by the accused leading to the discovery of the child’s body and certain clothes; and (iii) forensic testing of recovered articles. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and sentence. The Court emphasised settled principles for circumstantial cases: all facts must be fully established and consistent only with the accused’s guilt; extra-judicial confessions must be proved to be voluntary and trustworthy and are weak unless independently corroborated; last-seen evidence alone cannot complete a chain of circumstances; independent witnesses to recovery are required where available; and forensic links must meaningfully connect the accused to the crime. Material contradictions in witness versions about where the confession occurred, the absence of independent witnesses to the recovery despite their availability, delay and gaps in reportage and search conduct, incomplete forensic linkage, and inexplicable omissions in investigation raised reasonable doubts. On that basis the Court held two views were possible and adopted the view favourable to the accused, set aside conviction under Sections 302 and 376 IPC and ordered his release if not otherwise detained.
- [M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 262 ; 2025 INSC 152](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-s-r-s-travels-by-its-proprietor-k-t-rajashekar-v-the-karnataka-state-road-transport-corporation-workers-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-262-2025-insc-152/): This analysis examines the Supreme Court’s decision in M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 262 ; 2025 INSC 152, focusing on two interlinked constitutional-administrative questions: (i) the validity of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 (which repealed the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976), and (ii) whether the State Transport Authority/Regional Transport Authority may delegate permit-granting powers under s.68(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with r.56 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989. The Court upheld the 2003 repeal as a legitimate exercise of legislative power, emphasising that the power to repeal equals the power to enact and that subsequent policy changes may justify repeal even where prior judicial decisions upheld the repealed statute. The Court rejected the argument that fresh Presidential assent was required for repeal. On delegation, the Court held that s.68(5) together with r.56(1)(d) authorises the STA/RTA to delegate non-stage carriage permit functions to officers such as the Secretary; delegation of routine/quasi-administrative permit work promotes administrative efficiency and does not nullify statutory oversight. The High Court’s contrary view on non-delegability was set aside. The judgment balances legislative supremacy in policy choices with administrative law principles permitting delegated exercise of certain quasi-judicial/administrative powers, subject to statutory safeguards.
- [P.M. Lokanath and Others v. State of Karnataka and Another, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 622 : 2025 INSC 202](https://lawfoyer.in/p-m-lokanath-and-others-v-state-of-karnataka-and-another-2025-2-s-c-r-622-2025-insc-202/): P.M. Lokanath and Others v. State of Karnataka and Another, Criminal Appeal No. 2514 of 2014 (reported as [2025] 2 S.C.R. 622 : 2025 INSC 202) raises whether criminal proceedings initiated by a private party were manifestly mala fide and therefore an abuse of process, warranting quashing under the Court’s inherent powers. The appellants, legal heirs and owners in possession of the suit property, had instituted civil suits for permanent injunction and declaration of title. Respondent No.2 lodged an FIR under Sections 448 and 506 IPC alleging threats to withdraw a suit — an allegation impossible on facts since respondent No.2 had filed no suit. The trial court took cognizance. High Court refused to quash. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found a pattern of previous false and malicious complaints by respondent No.2 and his relatives, including an earlier criminal case where the allegations were found to be false and another instance where High Court had quashed criminal proceedings. Applying the categories in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), the Court held the FIR allegations were absurd, inherently improbable and vitiated by mala fides and ulterior motive. The Court concluded continuation of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of process and quashed the chargesheet, summons and all proceedings arising therefrom. This decision illustrates the narrow but real scope for exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 226 to curb malicious private prosecution that masks civil disputes.
- [Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. The State of Maharashtra, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 388 : 2025 INSC 147](https://lawfoyer.in/ramu-appa-mahapatar-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-2025-2-s-c-r-388-2025-insc-147/): The present judgment concerns Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. The State of Maharashtra where the appellant was convicted for the murder of his live-in partner Manda on the basis of alleged extra-judicial confessions made to four lay witnesses and other circumstantial material. The Supreme Court re-examined the core question whether the extra-judicial statements, considered a weak species of circumstantial evidence, were voluntary, made in a fit state of mind, and sufficiently corroborated to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the appellant’s guilt. The Court carefully applied settled principles: (i) a conviction on circumstantial evidence requires a complete, gap-free chain of incriminating facts; (ii) extra-judicial confession is inherently weak and must be tested with greater care and caution; and (iii) if evidence fairly admits two inferences, the one favorable to the accused must be accepted. The record showed that key witnesses described the appellant as confused when he allegedly confessed; there was absence of blood-stains on his clothes, no forensic linkage of weapon to accused, and material omissions between statements under s.161 Cr.P.C. and in-court testimony. The Court found the confessions lacked credibility, suffered material contradictions, and were uncorroborated by other cogent circumstances. Suspicion against the appellant, however strong, could not substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the conviction under s.302 IPC was set aside and the appellant ordered released if not detained in other matters.
- [The Cosmos Co. Operative Bank Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1091 : 2025 INSC 243](https://lawfoyer.in/the-cosmos-co-operative-bank-ltd-v-central-bank-of-india-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-1091-2025-insc-243/): The Cosmos Co. Operative Bank Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1565 of 2025 (4 Feb 2025), addresses whether equitable mortgages are recognized in India under the rubric of a charge in Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and which of two rival banks held the first valid charge over a flat offered as security. The Supreme Court held that an equitable mortgage is enforceable in India as a charge under Section 100 TPA, though it ordinarily yields to a later bona fide transferee without notice and remains primarily a right in personam unless converted into a registered legal interest. The Court emphasized the distinction between an Indian mortgage by deposit of title-deeds (recognized as a legal mortgage under Section 58(f)) and the English concept of deposit creating merely an equitable mortgage; the former can confer a legal mortgage where the deposited instrument itself operates as a conveyance. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that Cosmos Co. Operative Bank Ltd. (the appellant) held the first valid charge because it possessed the share certificate of ownership for the apartment at the time its loan was advanced, whereas the Central Bank of India (respondent) only held unregistered agreements to sell which, though constituting an equitable charge, did not amount to a registered legal mortgage and were postponed to the appellant’s legal charge. The High Court and DRAT orders were set aside and the appeal allowed.
- [Shahjahan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1845 : 2025 INSC 528](https://lawfoyer.in/shahjahan-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-1845-2025-insc-528/): The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of Shahjahan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1845 : 2025 INSC 528, holding that the family- and high-court reasonings denying maintenance to the wife were unsustainable and that maintenance must be awarded from the date of filing. The Court rejected speculative findings of the Family Court — notably the assumption that a second marriage precludes dowry demands — as contrary to law and based on conjecture. It further held that the Family Court misread a compromise deed to impute an admission of misconduct by the wife where none existed. Applying the principle in Rajnesh v. Neha and emphasising the protective and remedial object of Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court directed payment of Rs. 4,000 per month to the appellant from the date of filing the maintenance petition and confirmed maintenance already awarded to the children from the same date (with the daughter’s arrears limited to her attaining majority). The judgment also reaffirmed the legal position that informal religious tribunals such as Court of Kazi, Dar-ul-Qaza or Sharia Courts have no coercive legal status; their decisions are enforceable only if voluntarily accepted and not in conflict with statutory law.
- [Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 404 : 2025 INSC 149](https://lawfoyer.in/airports-authority-of-india-v-pradip-kumar-banerjee-2025-2-s-c-r-404-2025-insc-149/): Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 404 : 2025 INSC 149, concerns the correctness of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in setting aside earlier orders that had upheld dismissal of an employee following criminal conviction and later departmental enquiry. The respondent, an Assistant Engineer (Civil) with the Airports Authority of India, was criminally tried on charges under Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 34 IPC; convicted by the trial court, he was dismissed by the Disciplinary Authority. The High Court later acquitted him on criminal appeal by giving benefit of doubt. Subsequent representations, departmental proceedings, and appellate administrative reviews led to repeated litigation; a Single Judge of the High Court ultimately upheld the disciplinary dismissal, but a later Division Bench set that aside. This Court examined: (i) whether the Division Bench could upset earlier concurrent findings that had attained finality; (ii) whether non-examination of the original complainant/decoy fatally vitiated the departmental enquiry; and (iii) the proper standard of proof and scope of intra-court writ appeals. The Supreme Court held the Division Bench’s interference unsustainable: departmental authorities had applied the preponderance of probabilities standard, relied on admissible departmental evidence including trap-party testimony and confessional statements permissible in domestic enquiries, and the Division Bench impermissibly re-appreciated facts without concluding the Single Judge’s view was perverse or legally erroneous. The appeal was allowed and the Division Bench judgment set aside.
- [Wahid v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 363 : 2025 INSC 145](https://lawfoyer.in/wahid-v-state-govt-of-nct-of-delhi-2025-2-s-c-r-363-2025-insc-145/): In Wahid v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, Criminal Appeal Nos. 201–202 of 2020, decided on 4 February 2025 by a two-judge Bench (Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Manoj Misra, JJ.), the Supreme Court examined whether convictions in a night-time robbery of passengers in a Gramin Sewa could stand when the FIR originally named unknown persons, the accused were not known to witnesses before the incident, no test identification parade was held, and the circumstances of arrest and recovery raised serious doubts. The Court accepted the prosecution’s evidence that a robbery had occurred, but held that proof of the fact of robbery was not enough to convict the appellants in absence of reliable linking material. The judgment carefully scrutinised (i) how the investigating agency obtained the clue leading to the accused, (ii) the manner of arrest, and (iii) modes of identification used by witnesses. Discrepancies in police testimony about where information was received, the improbability of four unrelated men being found together near a police station late at night with weapons matching descriptions in the FIR, the absence of diary entries, delayed in-court identifications (after months/years) and non-recovery of looted property led the Court to disbelieve the prosecution’s account of arrest and recovery. Applying the principle that in FIRs against unknown persons material collected during investigation assumes enhanced importance, and relying on the test of probability and corroboration, the Court set aside convictions and acquitted the appellants.
- [Union of India & Anr. v. Tarsem Singh & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 376 : 2025 INSC 146](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-anr-v-tarsem-singh-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-376-2025-insc-146/): The Supreme Court, by its order dated 04 February 2025 in Union of India & Anr. v. Tarsem Singh & Ors., considered whether the relief declared in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019 9 SCC 304) should operate prospectively or retrospectively in the context of acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956. The National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) sought a declaration that the outcome in Tarsem Singh be made prospective so as to foreclose reopening of acquisitions concluded between 1997 and 2015 where solatium and interest were not awarded because of the operation of s.3J of the NHAI Act. The Court rejected the plea for prospectivity, emphasising that prospectivity would perpetuate an unjust classification between two homogeneous classes of landowners (those acquired during 1997–2015 and others) and would thereby offend Article 14. The Court reiterated that s.3J—which excluded application of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to NHAI acquisitions and thereby denied solatium and interest—created unequal treatment that had been remedied by the judgment in Tarsem Singh. The Court held that granting prospectivity would nullify the remedial aim of Tarsem Singh; it would not amount to reopening settled cases in the sense of re-litigating merits or declaring past acquisitions void, but would require the grant of the statutory benefits of solatium and interest to affected landowners. The Miscellaneous Application was dismissed and directions issued to the Competent Authority to compute solatium and interest in accordance with Tarsem Singh.
- [Ashutosh Pathak v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1831 : 2025 INSC 534](https://lawfoyer.in/ashutosh-pathak-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-1831-2025-insc-534/): Ashutosh Pathak v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., SLP (Criminal) No.10852/2024 — Supreme Court (Dulia & Amanullah, JJ.), 04 Feb 2025. The petition challenged two interlocutory orders of the Trial Court: (i) partial allowance of a Section 311, CrPC application that summoned Vinay Kumar Pathak (V) but did not summon Kanak Lata Singh (K); and (ii) the closure of the defence’s opportunity to examine V after the defence failed to have him present when last opportunity was granted. The High Court dismissed the petition under Section 482, CrPC and this Court in turn refused special leave. The core legal questions were (a) the ambit and exercise of the court’s discretionary power under Section 311, CrPC when prosecution witness names appear in the prosecution list but are sought to be summoned later by the defence; and (b) whether the Trial Court misapplied principles of criminal procedure by closing the opportunity to examine a witness who had been arrayed as a prosecution witness but not examined by the State. The Court applied settled authorities (including Satbir Singh, Ratanlal, Vijay Kumar, Zahira Habibullah Sheikh, Umar Mohammad and Harendra Rai) to hold that: (i) Section 311 is a wide but cautious discretionary power to be employed only for the ends of justice; (ii) summoning a person at the belated stage is not automatic and must be justified, bearing in mind delay, prejudice and previous directions for expedition; (iii) the defence was given adequate opportunities and bore the primary onus to ensure presence of its witness; and (iv) successive and dilatory applications under Section 311 constituted an abuse of process. The High Court order was affirmed and special leave refused.
- [Godrej Projects Development Limited v. Anil Karlekar & Ors., 2025 INSC 143; 2 S.C.R. 343](https://lawfoyer.in/godrej-projects-development-limited-v-anil-karlekar-ors-2025-insc-143-2-s-c-r-343/): Godrej Projects Development Limited v. Anil Karlekar & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 3334 of 2023, decided 3 February 2025 by a Bench of B.R. Gavai and S.V.N. Bhatti, examines the lawfulness of a developer’s contractual forfeiture clause and the extent to which consumer fora may moderate such clauses under consumer-protection jurisprudence. The purchasers booked an apartment in 2014 and paid 20% of the Basic Sale Price (BSP) as earnest money under an Apartment Buyer Agreement that contained an express forfeiture clause (cl. 8.4) entitling the developer to forfeit the entire earnest money and interest on delayed payments on buyer default. After possession was offered in June 2017 the buyers cancelled (citing a market recession) and sought full refund; the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) allowed the complaint but reduced forfeiture to 10% of BSP and awarded simple interest @6% p.a. The Supreme Court upheld the NCDRC’s reduction to 10% of BSP (treating that as reasonable forfeiture consistent with NCDRC practice and the principles in Maula Bux), but held that awarding interest on the refundable balance was not justified given the buyers cancelled after possession was offered and might have re-deployed funds; accordingly the Court directed a concrete net refund (after accounting for interim refund already made). The judgment balances contractual sanctity (courts will enforce clear earnest-money clauses — Satish Batra, Desh Raj) with protection against one-sided, unconscionable standardized developer clauses that amount to unfair trade practice / unfair contract (per Pioneer Urban, Ireo Grace, and s.2(46) CPA 2019), and reaffirms NCDRC’s 10% practical rule while curtailing interest awards in the facts.
- [Gulshan Kumar v. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 313 : 2025 INSC 142](https://lawfoyer.in/gulshan-kumar-v-institute-of-banking-personnel-selection-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-313-2025-insc-142/): Gulshan Kumar v. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection & Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1018 of 2022, arises from the petitioner’s claim that benefits available to Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) were being denied to him as a Person with Disability (PwD) despite medical certification showing 25% permanent disability for Focal Hand Dystonia (writer’s cramp) and a NIMHANS recommendation for a scribe. The Supreme Court reviewed the statutory architecture of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016—particularly Sections 2(s), 2(r), 2(y), 16, 17—and prior precedents including Vikash Kumar v. UPSC and Avni Prakash v. NTA, to hold that reasonable accommodation is the central tenet and that denial of scribe/compensatory time to PwD candidates constitutes discrimination. The Court found defects in the Office Memorandum dated 10.08.2022 issued by the nodal Ministry (which attempted to operationalise the Court’s directions) and directed the nodal agency to re-notify uniform guidelines extending all examination-related benefits available to PwBDs to all PwDs (except reservation), introduce grievance mechanisms, extend scribe-certificate validity, incentivise/training for scribes, permit multiple exam-modes, and sensitise authorities. The Court also held that private/autonomous exam agencies are amenable to obligations under Articles 19/21 in appropriate circumstances, following Kaushal Kishor, and required strict compliance with Vikash Kumar and Avni Prakash.
- [The State of Jharkhand v. Sunny Kumar @ Sunny Kumar Sao, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 619 : 2025 INSC 153](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-jharkhand-v-sunny-kumar-sunny-kumar-sao-2025-2-s-c-r-619-2025-insc-153/): The present judgment of the Supreme Court in The State of Jharkhand v. Sunny Kumar @ Sunny Kumar Sao, Criminal Appeal No. 538 of 2025, examines the propriety of High Court bail granted in an offence under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) — specifically an offence punishable under Section 18 — where the accused, after obtaining bail, was subsequently arrested in another NDPS case. The Supreme Court, on an appeal filed by the State, set aside the High Court’s bail order dated 24.11.2022 and directed that the accused be taken into custody in relation to Case No. 231 of 2022, while simultaneously directing the trial court to expedite trial proceedings, preferably within four months. The Court’s reasoning rests on the nature of NDPS offences and the aggravating factor of the accused’s subsequent arrest in a similar narcotics offence while released on bail. The balance drawn by the Court weighs the danger of recidivism and the statutory scheme of NDPS against the bail entitlement; while the respondent contended recovery was of intermediate quantity and Section 37’s rigors were not attracted, the subsequent conduct (arrest in similar offence) informed the Court’s decision to withdraw liberty and remand. The order underscores the Supreme Court’s supervisory role in protective oversight of bail in narcotics matters and stresses expeditious trial as a companion directive to custodial remand.
- [Karuppudayar v. State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1381 : 2025 INSC 132](https://lawfoyer.in/karuppudayar-v-state-rep-by-the-deputy-superintendent-of-police-lalgudi-trichy-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-1381-2025-insc-132/): Karuppudayar v. State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy & Ors. examines whether the alleged caste-abuse inside a government Revenue Divisional Office amounts to an offence under Sections 3(1)(r) or 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 by reason of the words being spoken in “any place within public view.” The FIR avers that the accused entered the complainant’s chamber, asked about the complainant’s caste, called him “Parayan” and used vulgar caste-based epithets while the complainant was performing official duties; colleagues arrived only after the incident and pacified the accused. The Supreme Court reiterates the settled distinction between a “public place” and a “place within public view” (drawing on Swaran Singh and Hitesh Verma), holding that to be within public view the place must be so located that members of the public can witness or hear the utterance. On the FIR’s own averments the incident occurred within the four corners of the complainant’s office chamber and was not witnessed by members of the public at the time. Applying the principles in Bhajan Lal regarding quashing under Section 482 CrPC, the Court concludes that even accepting the allegations in the FIR as true they do not prima facie constitute an offence under Sections 3(1)(r) or 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act; the case therefore falls within the first category in Bhajan Lal and the proceedings are quashed.
- [Rakesh Kumar Charmakar & Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 252 : 2025 INSC 136](https://lawfoyer.in/rakesh-kumar-charmakar-ors-v-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-252-2025-insc-136/): The appeals examine entitlement to regular pay-scale by persons initially engaged as temporary/daily-wage employees under a Special Recruitment Drive, in light of the M.P. General Administration Department Circular No.192/601/1/S.R.D./84 dated 10.05.1984 (the 10.05.1984 Circular) and the M.P. Veterinary Department Contingency Paid Employees Recruitment & Conditions of Service Rules, 1979 (the 1979 Rules). The appellants were appointed as Part time Swachchkar following a district-level Selection Committee’s recommendation and Collector-prescribed daily rates. Earlier High Court decisions—most importantly Ram Naresh Prajapati & Ors. v. State of M.P.—had held that temporary employees recruited through Selection Committees and paid at Collector’s rates for three years are entitled to the revised/regular pay-scale under the 10.05.1984 Circular. The Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court granted relief to the present appellants on analogous grounds; the Division Bench reversed, distinguishing factual differences (no screening/upgrade to specific sanctioned designations in the appellants’ case). This Court analysed whether the factual distinction was material and whether appellants satisfied the conditions in the Circular and Rules. Holding that appellants were appointed against vacant and sanctioned posts albeit on temporary basis, and that they fulfilled Clause 6 of the Circular and the 1979 Rules, the Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench order and upheld the Single Judge’s grant of regular pay-scale (also referring to the 07.10.2016 circular regularising daily wagers). The judgment emphasises substance over form: designation as “part-time” does not defeat entitlement where appointment is against sanctioned vacancies following Selection Committee recommendation and Collector’s rate payment.
- [M/s C & C Constructions Ltd. v. IRCON International Ltd., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1413 : 2025 INSC 138](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-c-c-constructions-ltd-v-ircon-international-ltd-2025-1-s-c-r-1413-2025-insc-138/): The appeal arises from a challenge to an arbitral award rejecting delay-related monetary claims by M/s C & C Constructions Ltd. against IRCON International Ltd. relating to construction of three ROBs (LC-89, LC-228, LC-108). The contract’s General Conditions of Contract (GCC) clause 49.5 provides that delay by the employer/engineer shall not entitle the contractor to damages or compensation but only to reasonable extensions of time. The contractor repeatedly invoked clause 49 to seek extensions; respondent granted extensions (some initially with penalty, later waived) and secured from the contractor three written undertakings that it would not claim anything except escalation for extended periods. Two years after the last undertaking the contractor invoked arbitration claiming Rs.44.11 crores. The arbitral tribunal, and subsequently the Single Judge and Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, rejected the claims applying clause 49.5. The Supreme Court affirmed that (i) clause 49.5 plainly bars claims for damages arising from employer delay; (ii) the appellant’s conduct and express undertakings estop it from challenging clause 49.5; and (iii) an appeal under §37 is confined by the narrow grounds available under §34. The appeal was dismissed.
- [Sau. Jiya v. Kuldeep, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1398 : 2025 INSC 135](https://lawfoyer.in/sau-jiya-v-kuldeep-2025-1-s-c-r-1398-2025-insc-135/): The appeal arises from a decree of divorce granted by the Family Court, Nagpur and upheld by the Bombay High Court, concerning whether permanent alimony (one-time lump sum) should be awarded to the wife after dissolution under Section 13, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The marriage was short-lived (parties cohabited roughly two months), no children were born, and the husband subsequently remarried (2019). The sole live dispute before the Supreme Court was quantum of permanent alimony. The husband exhibited inconsistent disclosures regarding income and assets; the wife averred multiple income streams for him (gym, salaried work, rental receipts) while the husband claimed modest employment with limited monthly earning and personal liabilities. The Court applied the framework in Rajnesh v. Neha (2021) and Kiran Jyot Maini v. Anish Pramod Patel (2024) — examining status, reasonable needs, earning capacity, assets, standard of living, dependants and liabilities — and found the husband’s disclosure not bonafide. Balancing equity and non-punitive relief, the Court directed a one-time settlement of Rs. 10,00,000 as permanent alimony to extinguish present and future claims, to be paid within three months. The decree of divorce was left undisturbed.
- [Shripal & Anr. v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 1 S.C.R. 1427 : 2025 INSC 144](https://lawfoyer.in/shripal-anr-v-nagar-nigam-ghaziabad-1-s-c-r-1427-2025-insc-144/): This judgment addresses the legality of termination and the nature of engagement of long-service horticulture workers employed in the Horticulture Department of Ghaziabad Nagar Nigam. The central questions were whether the discontinuation of services during pending conciliation proceedings breached Section 6E and whether retrenchment formalities under Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were complied with; and, relatedly, whether the workers were de facto municipal employees or merely contractor-personnel. The Court examined documentary gaps (absence of contractor contracts, missing muster rolls), the pattern of direct supervision and wage disbursement, the perennial nature of horticultural work, and prior Labour Court awards. Relying on adverse inference from the Employer’s failure to produce records and on labour jurisprudence disfavoring perpetual temporaryization of permanent tasks, the Court held that termination without statutory compliance was illegal. The High Court’s limited remedy (future daily wages) was set aside to the extent it denied continuity and meaningful back wages. Directions were given for reinstatement, counting continuity from date of termination, payment of 50% of back wages, and a process for fair regularization. The decision clarifies limits of Uma Devi reasoning where long-term exploitative engagements exist and reaffirms protections under Sections 6E and 6N.
- [3-Day Workshop on Real Estate Project Management & Financing| Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Register by 27th October 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/3-day-workshop-on-real-estate-project-management-financing-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-27th-october-2025/): 3-DAY WORKSHOP ON REAL ESTATE PROJECT MANAGEMENT & FINANCING | Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Register by 27th October 2025
- [Kuldeep Singh v. The State of Punjab & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1392 : 2025 INSC 137](https://lawfoyer.in/kuldeep-singh-v-the-state-of-punjab-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-1392-2025-insc-137/): The appeal challenges the High Court’s refusal to quash FIR No. 148 of 2022 (Model Town P.S., Hoshiarpur) registered initially under Section 366, 376 and 506, Indian Penal Code, 1860 after the accused-appellant (Kuldeep Singh) contended that the alleged victim had solemnised marriage with him of her own free will. The investigation by a Special Investigation Team resulted in deletion of Section 366 IPC from the charge-sheet while retaining Sections 376 and 506 IPC. The accused invoked Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashment of all proceedings. Material on record included: (i) an order of the Punjab & Haryana High Court dated 21.06.2022 granting protection to petitioners who had filed jointly seeking shelter after a marriage said to be against family wishes; (ii) a written statement dated 01.08.2023 by the victim in a restitution petition that did not allege rape; and (iii) the SIT inquiry report which found that marriage was by consent. The Supreme Court, noting non-appearance of the complainant and victim before it and that the prosecution case post-charge-sheet survives only for Sections 376 and 506 IPC, observed that sexual intercourse with one’s own wife falls within Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC and therefore cannot constitute rape in law. Given the contemporaneous judicial record indicating free consent to marriage and absence of prima facie evidence of force, the Supreme Court concluded that no sustainable case under Section 376 IPC subsisted and quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings.
- [Karan Singh v. State of Haryana, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1370 : 2025 INSC 133](https://lawfoyer.in/karan-singh-v-state-of-haryana-2025-1-s-c-r-1370-2025-insc-133/): Karan Singh v. State of Haryana, CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1076 of 2014 ([2025] 1 S.C.R. 1370 : 2025 INSC 133) examines whether the prosecution discharged its burden to prove dowry death under Section 304-B IPC and cruelty under Section 498-A IPC where key prosecution witnesses made material omissions between their police statements and court testimony. The Supreme Court analysed the four essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC — death within seven years of marriage, occurrence otherwise than under normal circumstances, cruelty/harassment soon before death by husband/relatives, and that cruelty being for or in connection with a dowry demand — and emphasized that Section 113-B Evidence Act presumption only triggers after those facts are established. The Bench meticulously compared examination-in-chief with statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC and held that significant omissions and belatedly recorded statements (more than two months later) amounted to contradictions or afterthoughts. Absent specific, proximate acts of cruelty or harassment and reliable contemporaneous evidence of dowry demand, the Court found the material ingredients of Section 304-B and 498-A not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The convictions and sentences confirmed by the High Court were quashed and the appellant acquitted. The judgment cautions trial courts about reliance on moral conviction and stresses careful application of statutory presumptions and evidentiary rules.
- [Ashok Saxena v. The State of Uttarakhand Etc., (2025) 1 S.C.R. 1454 : 2025 INSC 148](https://lawfoyer.in/ashok-saxena-v-the-state-of-uttarakhand-etc-2025-1-s-c-r-1454-2025-insc-148/): Ashok Saxena v. The State of Uttarakhand Etc., (2025) 1 S.C.R. 1454 : 2025 INSC 148, addresses the applicability of the doctrine of transfer of malice under Section 301, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the scope of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC in a case where the accused entered a house armed with a knife intending to attack one person but a third person (the informant’s wife) intervened and died of a stab wound. The Trial Court had acquitted the accused; the High Court convicted him under Section 302 IPC. The Supreme Court, while accepting that the accused had no specific intention to kill the deceased, held that Section 301 IPC operates to transfer the culpable intention to the person accidentally killed and thus prima facie supports conviction for a higher offence. However, balancing the genesis of the occurrence and circumstances of sudden affray, the Court found the facts to fall within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC and accordingly modified the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I IPC. Sentencing was reduced to the period already undergone, having regard to the long delay since the incident (1992) and the advanced age of the accused (74 years). The judgment applies established precedents on transfer of malice while simultaneously demonstrating mercy in sentence framing where sudden fight and lack of specific intent to kill are made out on facts. Keywords: murder; culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended; transfer of malice; exception 4 to Section 300 IPC; Section 301 IPC.
- [M/s JM Laboratories and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1256 : 2025 INSC 127](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-jm-laboratories-and-others-v-state-of-andhra-pradesh-and-another-2025-1-s-c-r-1256-2025-insc-127/): The present judgment concerns M/s JM Laboratories and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another (Criminal Appeal No. 487 of 2025), where the Supreme Court set aside an order of a Magistrate that had summoned the appellants in proceedings under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 after a non-speaking summoning order was issued. The appellants were accused of manufacturing and distributing a drug declared “Not of Standard Quality” by the Government Analyst. Although multiple procedural and limitation objections were raised, the Supreme Court decided the appeal on the narrow but fundamental ground that the Magistrate’s order summoning the accused did not record any reasons and was therefore legally defective. The Court reiterated settled principles that issuance of process is not a mere formality and that under Section 204 CrPC the Magistrate must apply judicial mind and reflect in the order the reasons for forming an opinion that sufficient ground for proceeding exists. Reliance was placed on a line of precedents including Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI and other subsequent authorities. Because the summoning order (dated 19 July 2023) was wholly non-speaking and bereft even of perfunctory reasons, the High Court judgment dismissing the appellants’ Section 482 CrPC petition was quashed and the summoning order and proceedings arising therefrom were set aside. The decision emphasises procedural fairness at the initial stage of criminal proceedings and confirms that absence of minimal reasoning in an order issuing process renders the order vulnerable to quashing.
- [Jasminbhai Bharatbhai Kothari v. State of Gujarat, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1491 : 2025 INSC 172](https://lawfoyer.in/jasminbhai-bharatbhai-kothari-v-state-of-gujarat-2025-1-s-c-r-1491-2025-insc-172/): Jasminbhai Bharatbhai Kothari v. State of Gujarat, SLP (Criminal) Diary No. 45970 of 2023 (Judgment dated 30-01-2025) considers the proper scope and application of Order XXII, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 (hereafter SC Rules 2013) — specifically whether an interlocutory application for exemption from surrendering may be entertained in a Special Leave Petition (Criminal) where the impugned orders do not involve a sentence of imprisonment. The Bench (Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.) held prima facie that Order XXII, Rule 5 applies only where the appellant has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment; it does not extend to other contexts such as cancellation of bail, rejection of anticipatory bail, or denial of extension of interim/temporary bail. The Registry’s practice of accepting exemption-from-surrender applications in those broader categories was identified as erroneous. Precedents including Kapur Singh v. State of Haryana and chamber rulings such as Mahavir Arya were relied upon to demonstrate consistent treatment that the surrender/exemption machinery is engaged only when a sentence of imprisonment exists. Because the petitioner had sought such an interlocutory application which was registered and rejected in-chambers, the Court directed that the issue be placed before the Chief Justice for administrative clarification as to filing/scrutiny/numbering where Order XXII, Rule 5 is engaged. The SLP in question was dismissed as infructuous on the ground that the petitioner had surrendered (record as rectified subsequently to note petitioner was absconding), and pending applications stood disposed.
- [Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee Rep. by its Secretary Mr. R. Rajebdran v. The District Collector, Vellore District & Others, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1265 : 2025 INSC 131](https://lawfoyer.in/vellore-district-environment-monitoring-committee-rep-by-its-secretary-mr-r-rajebdran-v-the-district-collector-vellore-district-others-2025-1-s-c-r-1265-2025-insc-131/): Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee Rep. by its Secretary v. The District Collector, Vellore District & Others, Civil Appeal Nos. 1280–1281 of 2025 (decided 30 Jan 2025) concerns long-running environmental harm caused by tannery clusters discharging untreated/partially treated effluents into the Palar River and adjacent lands. The dispute arises from implementation of this Court’s directions in Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum (1996) and the consequent constitution of the Loss of Ecology (Prevention and Payment of Compensation) Authority (LoEA). The LoEA’s first award (7.3.2001) quantified compensation for harm up to 31.12.1998 and expressly kept liability open until ecological reversal; subsequent proceedings led to the LoEA determining Rs. 2,91,01,278 as payable to 1,377 additional affected individuals by order dated 24.08.2009. The High Court dismissed a PIL seeking state action to disburse and recover outstanding compensation and quashed a LoEA procedural order while upholding the 2009 award in separate petitions. This appeal tests (i) whether polluters’ liability is continuing until ecological restoration, (ii) the scope and enforceability of LoEA awards, (iii) the responsibility of State authorities where restoration schemes remain unimplemented, and (iv) remedial doctrines including polluter-pays, precautionary principle, public trust, and the emergent concept of ecocide. The Supreme Court affirms that liability continues until reversal of damage, recognises government responsibility under a Government-Pay pragmatic rule to avoid denying relief where administrative inaction persists, upholds the LoEA’s 2009 award, and issues detailed remedial directions to revive restoration, monitoring and recovery measures.
- [Smt. N. Usha Rani and Anr. v. Moodudula Srinivas, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1442 : 2025 INSC 129](https://lawfoyer.in/smt-n-usha-rani-and-anr-v-moodudula-srinivas-2025-1-s-c-r-1442-2025-insc-129/): The appeal in Smt. N. Usha Rani and Anr. v. Moodudula Srinivas ([2025] 1 S.C.R. 1442 : 2025 INSC 129) concerns entitlement to maintenance under Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 where the claimant (Appellant No.1) had a prior marriage that was not dissolved by decree but had been the subject of an executed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of separation. The Family Court granted maintenance to the wife and her child; the High Court set aside maintenance to the wife on the ground that her earlier marriage subsisted. The Supreme Court restored the Family Court award. The Court applied purposive and social-welfare focused construction of Section 125 CrPC, examined precedent on second-wife claims (including Rameshchandra Daga v. Rameshwari Daga (2005) 2 SCC 33, Vimala (K) v. Veeraswamy (K) (1991) 2 SCC 375, Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014) 1 SCC 188), and distinguished strict-interpretation authorities (e.g., Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav (1988) 1 SCC 530). The Court recorded two critical factual findings: the respondent knew of the claimant’s earlier marriage and had married her knowing that fact (twice), and the claimant produced an MoU establishing de facto separation and absence of maintenance from her first husband. On those facts the Court held that maintenance must not be denied since the legislative and constitutional purpose of Section 125 is to prevent destitution of women and children; to allow the respondent to enjoy matrimonial privileges while avoiding obligations would frustrate that purpose. The Family Court award was therefore restored.*
- [INOX Air Products Limited now known as INOX Air Products Private Limited and Another v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1235 : 2025 INSC 128](https://lawfoyer.in/inox-air-products-limited-now-known-as-inox-air-products-private-limited-and-another-v-the-state-of-andhra-pradesh-2025-1-s-c-r-1235-2025-insc-128/): INOX Air Products Limited now known as INOX Air Products Private Limited & Anr. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 486 of 2025 (judgment dated 30 January 2025) examines whether the sale of Nitrous Oxide I.P. by a licensed manufacturer to another firm — which did not hold a Form 20B licence for wholesale sale but did hold a Form 25 manufacturing licence — constituted an offence under s.18(a)(vi) read with r.65(5)(1)(b) punishable under s.27(d) of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940. The Drugs Inspector lodged a complaint after purchase bills showed supply chains from the appellant (manufacturer) through intermediary firms to a hospital. The Trial Court took the complaint on file and issued summons; the appellants sought quashing under s.482 CrPC in the High Court which dismissed their petition. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. The Court construed “manufacture” in s.3(f) as a wide, inclusive term (covering making, altering, finishing, packing, labelling, breaking up, etc.), and held that a license under Form 25 authorises manufacture and sale by way of wholesale dealing subject to sale-licence conditions — so sale by a Form 25 licensee to another Form 25 licensee (who repacks/fills smaller cylinders) did not automatically violate Form 20B conditions. Additionally, the Magistrate’s non-speaking order issuing process, lacking application of mind, meant the proceedings were vulnerable to quashing. The High Court’s contrary interpretation was held to be legally unsustainable. Appeal allowed; trial proceedings quashed.
- [Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1173 : 2025 INSC 126](https://lawfoyer.in/krishnadatt-awasthy-v-state-of-m-p-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-1173-2025-insc-126/): The appeal arises from the validity of appointments made in 1998 to the post of Shiksha Karmi (Grade III) in Janpad Panchayat, Gaurihar, Madhya Pradesh, where ten appellants (among 249 selectees) were alleged to be relatives of members of the Selection Committee. The Collector quashed the appointments without prior notice, concluding the recruitment was vitiated by bias / nepotism and relied on Section 40(c) and Section 100 of the Panchayat Raj Act Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993; the Commissioner in revision affirmed that order. Writs filed in the High Court failed; a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court produced a split verdict — one judge setting aside the selections for nemo judex breach, the other holding that the audi alteram partem violation (no notice/hearing) made the cancellation unsustainable. A larger Bench considered three core issues: (A) whether a reasonable likelihood of bias vitiated the selections; (B) whether denial of audi alteram partem requires demonstration of prejudice; and (C) whether an appellate/revisional process can cure an initial denial of hearing. The Bench held (i) on available facts — including a unanimous recusal resolution passed by the Janpad Panchayat and the fact that recused members did not award marks — a reasonable likelihood of bias could not be inferred; (ii) the Collector’s ex-parte cancellation without notice was a gross violation of audi alteram partem and such denial ordinarily cannot be cured by an appellate body, save in exceptional circumstances; and (iii) although defect at the initial stage vitiates the process, practical considerations (selection dating to 1998 and long continued service under interim orders) weighed against remanding the matter for fresh inquiry.
- [S. Vishnu Ganga & Ors. v. M/s Oriental Insurance Company Limited Rep. by Its Divisional Manager & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1163 : 2025 INSC 123](https://lawfoyer.in/s-vishnu-ganga-ors-v-m-s-oriental-insurance-company-limited-rep-by-its-divisional-manager-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-1163-2025-insc-123/): The present appeals arise from a challenge by the insurer to a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal award that had granted substantial compensation to the daughters of deceased partners of Sri Ganga Mills who died in a road accident. The Tribunal accepted the claimants’ evidence, relied on the Partnership Deed and the Mill’s Income Tax Returns, fixed a notional monthly income of Rs.60,000 for each deceased, applied appropriate multipliers and awarded Rs.58,24,000 (father) and Rs.93,61,000 (mother). The High Court reduced those awards drastically on the premise that the appellants had stepped into the business and therefore did not suffer the loss claimed. The Supreme Court restored the Tribunal’s award, holding that (i) stepping into ownership does not ipso facto negate the claim for loss of future earnings where lack of experience and maturity and probable reduction in profitability post-death are shown or reasonably inferable, (ii) Income Tax Returns and audited documents are reliable records to assess notional income, and (iii) appellate interference with a Tribunal’s liberal, fact-sensitive computation should be sparing and confined to cases of arbitrariness or manifest excess. The Court relied on its precedents including K Ramya v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., Amrit Bhanu Shali, and Pranay Sethi doctrines emphasizing just compensation under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The High Court’s approach was found inconsistent with settled law; the Tribunal’s methodology satisfied judicial conscience and was reinstated.
- [M/s Chatha Service Station v. Lalmati Devi & Ors, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 435 : 2025 INSC 468](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-chatha-service-station-v-lalmati-devi-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-435-2025-insc-468/): The Supreme Court in M/s Chatha Service Station v. Lalmati Devi & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 5089–5092 of 2025, affirmed the Tribunal’s direction that the insurer must pay-and-recover compensation awarded in motor-accident claims where the driver of an oil-tanker did not carry the statutorily required endorsement to drive a vehicle carrying dangerous or hazardous goods under s.11 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with r.9 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. The Court examined the object and syllabus of r.9, emphasising that the prescribed three-day course addresses professional driving skill (Parts A & B) as well as product safety and emergency procedures (Part C). Where the vehicle was carrying oil and the accident resulted from rash and negligent driving, the absence of the endorsement was not a mere formal or venial breach: the statutory training requirement bore on the driver’s competence and could be a contributory cause of the accident. The driver had no endorsement and a purported training certificate surfaced only at the appellate stage without explanation; the certificate’s veracity was treated with suspicion under Or.41 r.27, CPC. Reliance on High Court decisions treating the absence of endorsement as non-fundamental was rejected on textual and purposive grounds; Swaran Singh was distinguished on its facts. Appeals were dismissed and the pay-and-recover direction affirmed.
- [Mahabir & Ors. v. State of Haryana, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1105 : 2025 INSC 120](https://lawfoyer.in/mahabir-ors-v-state-of-haryana-2025-1-s-c-r-1105-2025-insc-120/): The Supreme Court in Mahabir & Ors. v. State of Haryana (Criminal Appeal Nos. 5560–5561 of 2024; judgment 29 Jan 2025) examined whether a High Court, sitting in revision under ss. 397/401 CrPC, could convert an acquittal into a conviction; whether the proviso to s. 372 CrPC confers an independent right on a victim to appeal; whether that proviso is an exception to s. 372 or a stand-alone substantive enactment; and whether the proviso operates retrospectively. The Court held that s. 401(3) CrPC expressly forbids a High Court from converting acquittal into conviction and that the procedural safeguard in s. 401(5) (treating revision as appeal) can be invoked only after a reasoned judicial order recording statutory satisfaction; that the proviso to s. 372 (inserted w.e.f. 31.12.2009) creates a substantive right in favour of the victim to appeal against acquittal/ lesser conviction/ inadequate compensation and is not merely an exception to the main provision but a stand-alone provision within Chapter XXXIX; and that this statutory right is prospective — it cannot be applied to orders of acquittal pronounced before the amendment. The High Court’s reversal of acquittal in CRR-194/2006 without adopting the s. 401(5) safeguards and without affording personal/pleader hearing was therefore held to be legally impermissible. The judgment further reinforces limitations on reliance upon unproved s. 161 statements as substantive evidence and criticises perfunctory cross-examination by public prosecutors, while also commenting on public-prosecutor appointments and the State’s liability for unlawful detention.
- [Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel & Ors, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1209 : 2025 INSC 125](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-tanvi-behl-v-shrey-goel-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-1209-2025-insc-125/): Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 9289 of 2019 (29 January 2025) addresses whether a State/UT may lawfully reserve postgraduate (PG) medical seats on the basis of domicile/residence within the State quota. The Supreme Court, following the trajectory of Jagadish Saran, Dr. Pradeep Jain, and the Constitution Bench in Saurabh Chaudri, reaffirmed that while institutional preference may constitute a permissible, reasonable classification under Article 14, domicile/residence-based reservation for PG medical courses is constitutionally impermissible. The Court explained the legal meaning of domicile—a national, not regional, concept in India—and cautioned against the loose popular use of the term when States intend to denote residence or permanent residence. The judgment preserved limited institutional preference seats (valid to a reasonable extent) but struck down the remaining seats reserved on residential criteria; those seats must be filled strictly on merit derived from the all-India NEET ranking. The Court also protected the interest of students already admitted under the impugned residential quota in equity. The decision reiterates that reservations may be tailored for local needs at the MBBS/UG level to a limited degree, but at higher, specialised levels (PG/MD/MS) merit predominates because of national interest in selecting the best talent.
- [Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1009 : 2025 INSC 115](https://lawfoyer.in/ivan-rathinam-v-milan-joseph-2025-1-s-c-r-1009-2025-insc-115/): The Supreme Court in Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph (Crim. App. No. 413 of 2025) addressed whether the statutory presumption of legitimacy under Section 112, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 conclusively determines paternity until displaced by proof of non-access, and whether a Family Court may reopen maintenance proceedings to determine paternity despite earlier civil determinations. The panel (Surya Kant, J.) held that legitimacy determines paternity under s.112 unless rebutted by cogent evidence of impossibility of access; access requires only a possibility/opportunity for intercourse, while non-access means impossibility. The Court emphasised that DNA tests may be ordered only if (i) the existing evidence shows insufficiency to decide legitimacy, and (ii) a proportionality/balance-of-interests test (including rights to privacy and dignity under Art. 21) favours such intrusive inquiry — together constituting an “eminent need.” The Family Court’s revival of a maintenance petition (2015) was held invalid where an earlier civil line of proceedings (culminating in a 2011 order) had already conclusively determined legitimacy: the second round of litigation was barred by res judicata. The Court thus set aside the High Court and Family Court orders, upheld the Munsiff/Sub-Judge findings that non-access was not shown, quashed the revived maintenance proceedings, and held the respondent to be presumed the legitimate son of Mr. Raju Kurian.
- [Chandrabhan Sudam Sanap v. The State of Maharashtra, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1041 : 2025 INSC 116](https://lawfoyer.in/chandrabhan-sudam-sanap-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-2025-1-s-c-r-1041-2025-insc-116/): Chandrabhan Sudam Sanap v. The State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No. 879 of 2019) concerns an appeal against conviction and death sentence imposed for the rape and murder of a 23-year-old woman (referred to as EA). The prosecution case rested almost entirely on circumstantial evidence — principally alleged last-seen CCTV footage from Lokmanya Tilak Terminus, witness sightings, statements of a so-called friend who gave an extra-judicial confession, and recovery of articles purportedly belonging to the deceased. The Trial Court and the High Court sustained conviction whereas the Supreme Court, after a detailed reappraisal, found the chain of circumstances incomplete and the evidence sketchy and disjointed. The Court emphasised the five golden principles for appreciation of circumstantial evidence (as in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda), registered serious infirmities in the handling and admissibility of electronic CCTV evidence in the absence of a Section 65-B(4) certificate, rejected weak extra-judicial confession evidence, and discarded unreliable identification and recovery evidence. On cumulative assessment the Court held the prosecution had not excluded every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and acquitted the appellant. The judgment underscores (i) strict compliance requirements for electronic evidence, (ii) the care required in last-seen and circumstantial cases, and (iii) caution in relying on extra-judicial confession and unsatisfactory recoveries, especially in capital cases.
- [Constable 907 Surendra Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 239 : 2025 INSC 114](https://lawfoyer.in/constable-907-surendra-singh-anr-v-state-of-uttarakhand-2025-2-s-c-r-239-2025-insc-114/): This case tests the boundary between presence and shared criminal intention under Section 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860 where a senior police officer (Head Constable Jagdish Singh) fired the fatal shot while three subordinate constables were in the same vehicle. The trial court convicted only the shooter and acquitted the three co-occupants after finding absence of evidence of prior meeting of minds or mental participation. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the co-occupants under ss.302/34 IPC, treating their presence in the car as sufficient to infer common intention. The Supreme Court allowed appeals by the three constables, affirmed the trial court, and quashed the High Court’s conviction. The Court reiterated settled principles: to fasten s.34 liability prosecution must prove pre-concert or prior meeting of minds and that the criminal act was in furtherance of that shared intention. Mere presence, rank relation, or following orders without evidence of shared plan or active participation cannot satisfy s.34 requirements. The Court also restated the narrow grounds on which an appellate court may disturb an acquittal — patent perversity, misreading/omission of material evidence, or when only one view (guilt) is possible. The judgment relies on earlier authorities such as Ezajhussain Sabdarhussain v. State of Gujarat, Jasdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, Gadadhar Chandra v. State of West Bengal and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka to delineate the outer limits of collective liability.
- [Pactum Concorde : Inter-Collegiate Mediation Competition (Virtual) | Organized by ADR Society, Thakur Ramnarayan College of Law | Register by 15th November 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/pactum-concorde-inter-collegiate-mediation-competition-virtual-organized-by-adr-society-thakur-ramnarayan-college-of-law-register-by-15th-november-2025/): Pactum Concorde : Inter-Collegiate Mediation Competition (Virtual) | Organized by ADR Society, Thakur Ramnarayan College of Law | Register by 15th November 2025
- [Gambhir Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 INSC 164; 1 S.C.R. 1508 (2025)](https://lawfoyer.in/gambhir-singh-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-2025-insc-164-1-s-c-r-1508-2025/): Gambhir Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal Nos. 850-851 of 2019 (Supreme Court, 28 Jan. 2025) examines whether the conviction and death sentence imposed for the brutal murders of six family members — the appellant’s brother, sister-in-law and four children — can stand when the prosecution’s case rests on circumstantial evidence. The trial advanced three principal incriminating circumstances: (i) last-seen theory, (ii) motive arising out of an alleged land dispute, and (iii) recoveries (weapons and blood-stained clothes) said to have been recovered at the accused’s instance. On re-appraisal the Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to prove any of these circumstances reliably. The testimony on motive was a bald assertion without documentary or corroborative proof; last-seen witnesses were either hearsay, inconsistent or apparently manufactured; the Investigating Officer’s evidence about disclosures and recoveries was riddled with procedural infirmities (non-production of disclosure statements, absence of signatures on recovery memos, failure to identify who pointed out which weapon). Forensic reports did not establish grouping of blood on weapons. The Court also criticized the lackadaisical investigation and casual recording of evidence by prosecution and trial court. Applying the well-settled tests for circumstantial cases in Sharad Birdhichand Sharda v. State of Maharashtra and Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held the chain of evidence incomplete and quashed the convictions and death sentence, acquitting the appellant.
- [Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 961 : 2025 INSC 109](https://lawfoyer.in/ramesh-baghel-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-others-2025-1-s-c-r-961-2025-insc-109/): Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, Civil Appeal No. 1235 of 2025, raises concentrated questions of religious equality, local administrative duty and the scope of rights connected with last rites — in particular whether an individual or community has an unfettered right to the place of burial, and what obligations a Gram Panchayat and the State owe when communal tensions impede burial within statutory timelines. The appellant, a third-generation Christian of the New Apostolic Church and son of a pastor who died on 7 January 2025, sought to bury his father in the village graveyard at Chhindwada where his family had been interred for generations; villagers objected and local authorities did not or could not prevent threats and obstruction. The High Court declined relief and suggested burial at a designated Christian graveyard at Karkapal (20–45 km away). The Supreme Court (Nagarathna, J. — majority) set aside the High Court order and permitted burial in the appellant’s private agricultural land at Chhindwada with police protection, while directing State authorities to demarcate Christian graveyards across the State within two months; Satish Chandra Sharma, J. recorded a dissent on remedy and would have directed burial at the Designated Christian Burial Ground at Karkapal with state logistical and security assistance. The majority emphasized breach of duties by the Gram Panchayat under the Chhattisgarh Gram Panchayat (Regulating Places for Disposal of Dead Bodies… ) Rules, 1999, and held that discrimination preventing burial on grounds of conversion/off-tradition violates Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution. The judgment balances Article 21/Article 25 protections for last rites with public-order considerations and affirms State duty to provide identified sites for all faiths.
- [K. Samba Moorthy v. Sanjiv Chadha & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 998 : 2025 INSC 110](https://lawfoyer.in/k-samba-moorthy-v-sanjiv-chadha-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-998-2025-insc-110/): This case examines whether an employee, whose promotion was kept in abeyance pending disciplinary proceedings and later cancelled, is entitled to retrospective promotion and full monetary consequences once the disciplinary proceedings are quashed for a procedural defect not attributable to him. The appellant, K. Samba Moorthy, had his result for promotion from MMG/Scale-II to MMG/Scale-III declared on 28.07.2001 but kept in abeyance because of a charge-sheet. After a disciplinary enquiry a minor penalty of reduction in pay for three years was imposed and the promotion was treated as cancelled (letter dated 30.08.2002). A Single Judge set aside the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of real likelihood of bias because the enquiry officer was junior and a competing candidate; the Single Judge awarded “all consequential benefits.” The Division Bench subsequently left the questions of law open when the employer appealed and the appellant retired in the interim. On a contempt petition for non-compliance, the Supreme Court held that payment of the reduced pay arrear (Rs. 19,446) did not fully comply. On the facts — where the defect in enquiry was not the employee’s fault, no fresh enquiry was ordered and the employer did not press the correctness of the Single Judge’s factual finding — the appellant was entitled to promotion effective 28.07.2001 with monetary benefits and interest at 6% p.a.; the Court partly allowed the appeal and directed compliance.
- [Somdatt Builders-NCC-NEC (JV) v. National Highways Authority of India & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 203 : 2025 INSC 113](https://lawfoyer.in/somdatt-builders-ncc-nec-jv-v-national-highways-authority-of-india-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-203-2025-insc-113/): Somdatt Builders-NCC-NEC (JV) v. National Highways Authority of India & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 203 : 2025 INSC 113, concerns the scope of judicial interference with arbitral awards and construction-contract interpretation of Clauses 51–52 (GCC) read with COPA where measured quantities exceeded Bill of Quantities (BOQ) estimates. The dispute arose from item 7.07 (geogrid) used in reinforced earth (RE) walls: actual geogrid requirement proved substantially higher than provisional BOQ quantities. The Dispute Review Board (DRB), and subsequently a majority Arbitral Tribunal of technical experts, concluded the excess was an automatic quantity outcome on final measurement (not a change in design) and ordered payment at BOQ rate for the full executed quantity. A Single Judge under s.34 upheld the award; a Division Bench reversed under s.37, invoking public policy/patent illegality and ordering re-negotiation. The Supreme Court restored the award, holding that (i) the view taken by technical fora was plausible and within their jurisdiction, (ii) courts’ review under s.34/s.37 is narrowly circumscribed and must not re-appraise merits, and (iii) public policy means fundamental policy of Indian law and cannot be invoked to convert a possible contractual interpretation into illegality. Emphasis was placed on the contractual text—Clauses 51.1, 51.2, 52.1, 52.2 and COPA provisos—and on restraint in appellate interference where an award has been affirmed under s.34.
- [Harshit Harish Jain & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 934 : 2025 INSC 104](https://lawfoyer.in/harshit-harish-jain-anr-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-934-2025-insc-104/): The appeal concerns whether the 24.04.2015 amendment to Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 — which reduced the period for claiming refund of stamp duty on a registered cancellation deed from two years to six months (counted from date of registration) — could be applied to bar a refund claim where the cancellation deed was executed on 17.03.2015 but registered only on 28.04.2015 (post-amendment). The appellants had paid ₹27,34,500 stamp duty under an Agreement to Sell (registered 18.09.2014), executed a cancellation on grounds of delay and developer default, applied for refund on 06.08.2016, and obtained an initial sanction from the CCRA (08.01.2018). The CCRA later recalled that order and rejected the refund as time-barred; successive statutory and writ proceedings followed, culminating in the High Court dismissing the writ petition. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the cause of action to claim a refund accrued on the date of valid execution of the cancellation deed (17.03.2015), so the appellants fell within the unamended two-year window and could not be defeated by a later curtailment of limitation. The Court further held that the CCRA had no statutory power to review/recall its earlier final order granting refund and therefore its recall-orders were invalid. Direction was given to refund the amount with simple interest at 6% p.a. from 08.01.2018 until payment, with higher punitive interest for further delay.
- [Call for Articles, Slogan Writing & Poster Making Competition by the Pro Bono Club, Faculty of Law, University of Lucknow in collaboration with We Youngsters Foundation [Submit by November 10, 2025]](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-articles-slogan-writing-poster-making-competition-by-the-pro-bono-club-faculty-of-law-university-of-lucknow-in-collaboration-with-we-youngsters-foundation-submit-by-november-10-202/): Call for Articles, Slogan Writing & Poster Making Competition by the Pro Bono Club, Faculty of Law, University of Lucknow in collaboration with We Youngsters Foundation [Submit by November 10, 2025]
- [Pactum Concorde: Inter-Collegiate Mediation Competition (Virtual) organised by Thakur Ramnarayan College of Law, Mumbai | Register by 15th November, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/pactum-concorde-inter-collegiate-mediation-competition-virtual-organised-by-thakur-ramnarayan-college-of-law-mumbai-register-by-15th-november-2025/): Pactum Concorde: Inter-Collegiate Mediation Competition (Virtual) organised by Thakur Ramnarayan College of Law, Mumbai | Register by 15th November, 2025
- [Call for Publications: Call for NLUADR Blog | Organized by Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CADR) at National Law University Delhi](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-publications-call-for-nluadr-blog-organized-by-centre-for-alternative-dispute-resolution-cadr-at-national-law-university-delhi/): Call for Publications: Call for NLUADR Blog | Organized by Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CADR) at National Law University Delhi
- [10th JUSTICE MURTAZA HUSAIN MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2025 | Organized by Unity Post Graduate College, Lucknow | Register by 10th November 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/10th-justice-murtaza-husain-memorial-moot-court-competition-2025-organized-by-unity-post-graduate-college-lucknow-register-by-10th-november-2025/): 10th JUSTICE MURTAZA HUSAIN MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2025 | Organized by Unity Post Graduate College, Lucknow | Register by 10th November 2025
- [S Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1147 : 2025 INSC 117](https://lawfoyer.in/s-shobha-v-muthoot-finance-ltd-2025-1-s-c-r-1147-2025-insc-117/): The Supreme Court in S Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1147 : 2025 INSC 117, considered whether a private non-banking finance company providing secured loans is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and therefore amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The Court upheld the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court and held that Muthoot Finance Ltd. is not a State or an instrumentality/agency of the State for purposes of Article 12. The Court applied a function-based test — examining whether the entity performs governmental or public duties, or is financed, controlled or owned by the State — and concluded that routine lending, even if regulated by the Reserve Bank of India, is essentially private and contractual in nature. The decision reiterates established principles that writ remedies extend to statutory bodies, instrumentalities of the State, or private bodies discharging a public duty (statutory or otherwise); but regulatory oversight by a statutory regulator does not convert a private company into a State. The Court relied on earlier precedents, including LIC of India v. Escorts Ltd., and English authorities recognizing that non-statutory bodies may attract public law remedies only where they perform public duties of a governmental character. The judgment confines extraordinary writ jurisdiction to those private entities whose functions possess clear public law character and reaffirms civil and contractual forums—including arbitration and statutory ombudsmen—as appropriate fora where no public law element exists.
- [M. Venkateswaran v. The State rep. by the Inspector of Police, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 231 : 2025 INSC 106](https://lawfoyer.in/m-venkateswaran-v-the-state-rep-by-the-inspector-of-police-2025-2-s-c-r-231-2025-insc-106/): This analysis examines M. Venkateswaran v. The State rep. by the Inspector of Police, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 231 : 2025 INSC 106, where the Supreme Court affirmed conviction under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 but intervened on sentence. The factual matrix centres on a marriage in 2006 that lasted three days and allegations of unlawful demand of 100 sovereigns of gold (with varying statements of 60/70/100 sovereigns) and attendant harassment. Trial court convicted the husband for s.498A IPC and s.4 DP Act and sentenced him to three years and one year respectively; the High Court confirmed conviction but reduced the 498A sentence to two years. This Court sustained the convictions on the basis that the essential elements of cruelty and coercion to meet dowry demands were established by prosecution witnesses, but invoked proportionality and mitigating considerations arising from (i) long pendency (nearly 19 years), (ii) the parties having moved on with lives (wife settled abroad), (iii) nominal custody already undergone (≈3 months), and (iv) the appellant’s willingness to render community service in IT. Relying on Samaul Sk. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (2021 INSC 429) as precedent for alternative relief, the Court substituted substantive imprisonment with time already undergone and directed payment of Rs. 3,00,000 as compensation to the de facto complainant, failing which the appellant must surrender to undergo remaining sentence. The uploaded judgment has been relied upon throughout.
- [Madhushree Datta v. The State of Karnataka & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 187 : 2025 INSC 105.](https://lawfoyer.in/madhushree-datta-v-the-state-of-karnataka-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-187-2025-insc-105/): The appeal challenges the High Court of Karnataka’s refusal to quash the chargesheet and criminal proceedings arising from incidents of 25 October 2013 where the complainant, a female employee, alleged forcible termination, seizure of her company laptop containing proprietary code, physical removal from office and use of “filthy language” by senior management. The prosecution framed charges under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509 and 511, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and lodged an FIR some 58 days after an earlier Non-Cognizable Report was recorded. The Supreme Court, on review of the complaint, FIR and chargesheet, held that the averments do not, even on their face, disclose the essential ingredients of ss. 323, 504, 506, 509 or 511 IPC. The Court analysed (i) the absence of any allegation that the appellants personally caused hurt necessary for s.323; (ii) the insufficiency of a bare claim of use of “filthy language” without contextual particulars or accompanying gestures to sustain s.504 or to outrage modesty under s.509; and (iii) that the alleged demand to “resign or be sent out” amounted to a civil dispute over termination rather than criminal intimidation under s.506. The judgment emphasises that an employer-employee dispute and delayed FIR, coupled with material discrepancies between complaint and chargesheet, suggest an attempt to criminalize a civil controversy and to convert a non-cognizable complaint into cognizable proceedings. Exercising its inherent power under s.482 Cr.P.C., the Court quashed the chargesheet and all proceedings against the appellants while preserving the parties’ rights in the pending labour reference.
- [Manish Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1497 : 2025 INSC 151](https://lawfoyer.in/manish-yadav-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2025-1-s-c-r-1497-2025-insc-151/): The appeal arises from an order of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad upholding the trial court’s summoning order against the appellant for offences under Sections 376, 323, 504, 506, IPC and under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter SC/ST Act). The core dispute concerns whether the complainant’s consenting intimate relations with the appellant were procured by a false promise of marriage such that consent was vitiated, and whether caste-based abuse sufficient to attract offences under the SC/ST Act was made out. The Supreme Court analysed the prosecutrix’s Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement and held that the early intimate encounters were consensual and not shown to be induced by a pre-existing dishonest promise to marry. Applying established precedents — Uday v. State of Karnataka, Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana and Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar — the Court emphasised the distinction between mere breach of promise and a bona fide false promise made to obtain sexual intercourse. The prosecution failed to establish mala fide intention or caste-based vilification in the complainant’s own recorded statement. Consequently, the Court concluded that continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of process and quashed the summoning order qua the appellant. This analysis rests on the criminal standard — proof beyond reasonable doubt of each ingredient — and the best evidence available on record, namely the complainant’s sworn statement.
- [Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 911 : 2025 INSC 100](https://lawfoyer.in/mohd-tahir-hussain-v-state-of-nct-of-delhi-2025-1-s-c-r-911-2025-insc-100/): This analysis examines Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 911 : 2025 INSC 100, a two-judge decision delivered on 22 January 2025 addressing whether purpose-based interim bail may be granted to an undertrial accused to contest and physically canvass in elections. The case arises from multiple FIRs linked to the Delhi riots of February 2020, including a charge of murder of an Intelligence Bureau official, and a pending PMLA matter. The Court split: Justice Pankaj Mithal (majority) held that interim bail for contesting or canvassing is impermissible because campaign activity is not a fundamental, constitutional, statutory or human right, and allowing such bail would produce systemic misuse and conflict with Section 62(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. He emphasized gravity of allegations, risk of witness tampering and the lack of legal footing for election-based interim release. Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah dissented in part, stressing constitutional jurisdiction to protect Articles 14 and 21 where prolonged custody and pendency render continued detention oppressive; he granted limited interim bail subject to strict conditions while cautioning that the order is fact-specific. The judgment reconciles competing values: electoral participation, statutory limits on prisoners’ voting, and constitutional protection of liberty where trials are unduly prolonged. This analysis follows the judgment in the provided file.
- [1ST LAW SEED MOOT PREMIER LEAGUE 2026 | Organized by Law Seed | Register by 31st December 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-law-seed-moot-premier-league-2026-organized-by-law-seed-register-by-31st-december-2025/): 1ST LAW SEED MOOT PREMIER LEAGUE 2026 | Organized by Law Seed | Register by 31st December 2025
- [M/s Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Limited v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council and Another, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 880 : 2025 INSC 91](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-tamil-nadu-cements-corporation-limited-v-micro-and-small-enterprises-facilitation-council-and-another-2025-1-s-c-r-880-2025-insc-91/): This appeal raises the constitutional and procedural question whether writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is available to challenge orders/awards passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act), notwithstanding the statutory regime prescribing conciliation, arbitration and restrictive pre-deposit requirements. The Supreme Court records conflicting precedents: a Two-Judge Bench in Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. treated certain MSEFC orders as not being awards and entertained writ relief; a Division Bench in Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. upheld the MSEFC’s statutory arbitration power including its ability to act after conciliation; and a Three-Judge Bench in M/s India Glycols Ltd. held writ petitions against MSEFC orders to be barred, directing the statutory route under Section 34 read with Section 19 (pre-deposit). The Court in this appeal (Sanjiv Khanna, CJI) recognises these tensions, reaffirms the fundamental character of Article 226 (part of the basic structure), and identifies established exceptions where writ jurisdiction may be exercised despite alternate remedies — (i) breach of natural justice or violation of fundamental rights; (ii) proceedings wholly without jurisdiction; (iii) challenge to the vires of legislation. Finding substantial divergence in precedents and reservations about the absolutist rule in India Glycols, the Court refers three precise questions — (i) whether India Glycols bars writs entirely; (ii) if not, when the alternative-remedy rule yields; and (iii) whether conciliators on MSEFC may act as arbitrators contrary to Section 80 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 — to a five-Judge Bench. The matter is thus directed to be placed for constitution of a larger Bench.
- [Thammaraya and Another v. The State of Karnataka, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 948 : 2025 INSC 108](https://lawfoyer.in/thammaraya-and-another-v-the-state-of-karnataka-2025-1-s-c-r-948-2025-insc-108/): Thammaraya and Another v. The State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 649 of 2013, decided by the Supreme Court on 22 January 2025 (reported as [2025] 1 S.C.R. 948 : 2025 INSC 108), examines the sufficiency of a prosecution founded entirely on circumstantial evidence and recoveries said to have followed disclosure statements under Section 27, Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The prosecution’s case alleged that the deceased, Shrishail, was murdered by three accused — Manoj (A-1), Thammaraya (A-2) and Basappa (A-3) — by strangulation, and that certain jewellery and other articles looted from the deceased were recovered pursuant to confessional disclosures. The High Court affirmed convictions under Sections 302 and 201, Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Section 34 IPC. On careful reappraisal, the Supreme Court emphasized the settled principles governing circumstantial cases (derived from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra), and analysed the prosecution’s proof of disclosure and recovery. The Investigating Officer’s testimony lacked the exact words of the disclosures, the panchnama and recovery memoranda were not proved, and crucially no Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the recovered objects was conducted. In light of these lacunae the Court held the chain of circumstances incomplete and incapable of excluding every hypothesis consistent with innocence. Consequently, convictions of Thammaraya (A-2) and Basappa (A-3) were quashed and they were acquitted; the appeal of Manoj (A-1) abated on his death. The judgment reinforces stringent standards for proving recoveries and Section 27 disclosures in circumstantial cases and underlines the evidentiary importance of TIP and properly drawn panchnamas.
- [Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1409 : 2025 INSC 141](https://lawfoyer.in/directorate-of-enforcement-v-subhash-sharma-2025-1-s-c-r-1409-2025-insc-141/): The Supreme Court, in Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma ([2025] 1 S.C.R. 1409; 2025 INSC 141), examined whether an arrest in proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 could be treated as illegal where the accused was not produced before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours, thereby violating Article 22(2) and Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court accepted the High Court’s factual finding that physical custody had been taken by the Enforcement Directorate at 11:00 a.m. on 5 March 2022, while the formal arrest memo recorded a later time and the accused was produced before the Magistrate well beyond the 24-hour window. Holding that the requirement of Article 22(2) is embodied in Section 57, Cr.P.C., and applies to PMLA proceedings by virtue of Section 65, PMLA, the Court held that continuation in custody after the 24-hour period vitiated the arrest and infringed the accused’s fundamental right to liberty under Article 21. Once an arrest is declared illegal on this ground, the judicial approach is to grant bail rather than insist on satisfying the PMLA “twin tests” under Section 45(1)(ii). The appeal by the Directorate was dismissed. The judgment reinforces procedural safeguards against prolonged executive detention, confirms the applicability of Section 57, Cr.P.C. to special statutes via Section 65, PMLA, and underscores that violation of Article 22(2) requires remedial judicial relief, including bail where appropriate.
- [Laxmi Das v. The State of West Bengal & Ors, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 825 : 2025 INSC 86](https://lawfoyer.in/laxmi-das-v-the-state-of-west-bengal-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-825-2025-insc-86/): Laxmi Das v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 825 : 2025 INSC 86, examines whether the acts and words attributed to the appellant — mother of the deceased’s lover — satisfy the ingredients of abetment of suicide under Section 306 read with Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court reiterates settled principles: to convict under Section 306 IPC there must be either direct or indirect instigation, or engagement in a conspiracy, or intentional aid such that the accused’s conduct bears proximate causal connection to the suicide and manifests a clear mens rea to abet. The bench, relying on precedents including Rohini Sudarshan Gangurde v. State of Maharashtra (2024), Prakash and Others v. State of Maharashtra (2024), Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) and Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2017), finds the materials against the appellant too remote, indirect and lacking the required proximate instigation. A mere expression of disapproval, or an angry remark such as “you need not be alive”, without positive acts or sustained conduct creating a situation where the deceased had no option but suicide, does not satisfy instigation. Consequently, the charges against the appellant under Sections 306 & 107 IPC are quashed while proceedings may continue against other accused where relevant. Keywords: Abetment of Suicide, Instigation, Mens Rea, Proximity, Section 306 IPC.
- [State of Punjab & Ors. v. M/s Om Prakash Brick Kiln Owner, Etc., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 859 : 2025 INSC 88](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-punjab-ors-v-m-s-om-prakash-brick-kiln-owner-etc-2025-1-s-c-r-859-2025-insc-88/): State of Punjab & Ors. v. M/s Om Prakash Brick Kiln Owner, Etc., Civil Appeal Nos. 10687–10694 of 2013; 21 January 2025 (Abhay S. Oka & Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.) addresses whether the State can lawfully levy royalty on excavation and removal of brick earth once that material has been declared a minor mineral under the Mines & Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957 and rules framed thereunder. The respondents (brick-kiln operators) sought permanent injunctions restraining the State from assessing or recovering royalty for earth excavated from leased private lands, relying on Section 42 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 and on alleged absence of State ownership in the Wajib-ul-arz. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court dismissed the suits; the High Court allowed them. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court, holding that once brick earth was notified as a minor mineral and the Punjab Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1964 (Rules 54A, 54B, 54C) provide for licensing, returns, assessment and recovery of royalty, the State is empowered to levy royalty on production and disposal irrespective of unresolved title questions. The Court emphasised that Rule 3 contains limited exemptions and that owners of the excavated lands were not shown to fall within those exemptions. The right to challenge quantum or assessment remains open through the statutory remedy (Rule 54F). The judgment confines itself to the levy right and expressly refrains from adjudicating land-ownership.
- [Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab and Others, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 804 : 2025 INSC 83](https://lawfoyer.in/bhupinderpal-singh-gill-v-state-of-punjab-and-others-2025-1-s-c-r-804-2025-insc-83/): This judgment examines disciplinary action initiated against Dr. Bhupinderpal Singh Gill, a Senior Medical Officer nearing retirement, who was charged under Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment & Appeal Rules, 1970) with (i) proceeding on leave without sanction, (ii) failing to comply with directions of the Election Commission, (iii) non-participation in the pulse polio programme and threatening a Senior Assistant, and (iv) non-compliance with superior officers’ orders. The Inquiry Officer found all charges proved except the alleged threat. The Disciplinary Authority imposed a 2% permanent cut in pension. A Single Judge dismissed the appellant’s writ; a Division Bench modified the punishment to 2% for five years. Before this Court the core questions were whether (a) findings were legally sustainable on the record, (b) principles of natural justice were observed, and (c) the Court could enlarge the scope despite limited notice at admission. Applying the established no-evidence and procedural-fairness tests (notably Union of India v. H.C. Goel and the constitutionalised natural-justice doctrine from Maneka Gandhi), the Court concluded there was no legal evidence to sustain crucial charges: the leave cancellation and assignment to election/pulse-polio duties were not proved, and the Inquiry Officer impermissibly relied on a perceived moral duty of a supervisory officer rather than charged misconduct. The Disciplinary Authority’s summary rejection of the appellant’s detailed response further vitiated the process. The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench and Single Judge orders, quashed the penalty, restored full pension with interest and awarded costs of Rs.50,000.
- [Jyostnamayee Mishra v. The State of Odisha & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 834 : 2025 INSC 87](https://lawfoyer.in/jyostnamayee-mishra-v-the-state-of-odisha-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-834-2025-insc-87/): Jyostnamayee Mishra v. The State of Odisha & Ors., SLP (C) No. 13984 of 2023 — Supreme Court (J. Rajesh Bindal) — 20 January 2025. The petitioner, a long-serving Peon appointed in 1978, sought appointment/promotional relief to the post of Tracer after repeated departmental requests and multiple proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal and the High Court. The Tribunal directed consideration for promotion; the State resisted; two persons had earlier been promoted as Tracer purportedly from the Peon cadre. The central legal questions were (i) whether a post which the relevant service rules require to be filled 100% by direct recruitment can be the subject of promotion claims by employees outside the feeder cadre and (ii) whether a vacancy intended for direct recruitment may be filled internally by departmental circulars rather than by public advertisement as mandated. The Court examined the Orissa Subordinate Architectural Service Rules, 1979 (the 1979 Rules) and held that all posts of Tracers under Categories I, II and III are to be filled by direct recruitment (Rule 5(1)(e)) and that the detailed method — including publishing an advertisement in local newspapers and the Orissa Gazette and conducting written tests/viva voce — is prescribed by Rule 7. As those procedures were not followed and the post is not a promotional post from Peon, the petitioner’s claim failed. The Court also reiterated that Article 14 of the Constitution does not permit negative equality — a litigant cannot seek to perpetuate an earlier departmental illegality (promotions granted in breach of rules). The judgment censures the State for casual, slipshod litigation management and directs administrative sobriety.
- [The State of Jharkhand & Others v. Vikash Tiwary @ Bikash Tiwary @ Bikash Nath, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 63 : 2025 INSC 79](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-jharkhand-others-v-vikash-tiwary-bikash-tiwary-bikash-nath-2025-2-s-c-r-63-2025-insc-79/): The appeal challenges the High Court’s quashing of the Inspector General of Prisons’ intra-State transfer memo dated 17.05.2023, which moved Vikash Tiwary (a life-convict) from Lok Nayak Jai Prakash Narayan Central Jail, Hazaribagh to Central Jail, Dumka. The prison authorities relied on a contemporaneous letter of the Jail Superintendent dated 16.05.2023 and a recommendation of the District Commissioner, citing imminent risk of gang war / untoward incident arising from co-confinement of two notorious inmates and shortage of kachpals to maintain vigilance. The High Court set the transfer aside after noting a character certificate dated 19.05.2023 and precedents guarding undertrial rights against prejudicial distant transfers. The Supreme Court, allowing the State’s appeal, held that the Inspector General of Prisons acted under Section 29 of the Prisoners Act, 1900 and applicable jail rules (Rule 770(b) of the adopted Jail Manual), and that administrative transfers to preserve security and life of inmates are permissible where reasoned, non-arbitrary grounds exist. The Court emphasized that transfer powers must not be exercised arbitrarily but observed that security concerns, shortages of supervisory staff, and multiple FIRs registered against the inmate supply a rational basis for transfer. The judgment also underscores the continuing constitutional obligation to protect prisoner dignity under Article 21, the need for prison reforms, and directs Jharkhand to adopt a Jail Manual conforming to the 2016 Model Prison Manual.
- [U. Sudheera & Others v. C. Yashoda & Others, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 92 : 2025 INSC 80](https://lawfoyer.in/u-sudheera-others-v-c-yashoda-others-2025-2-s-c-r-92-2025-insc-80/): U. Sudheera & Others v. C. Yashoda & Others, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 92 : 2025 INSC 80, examines whether a High Court, when confronted with a second appeal under Order XLI r/w Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may grant a temporary/ad interim order (for example, directing maintenance of status quo) before it has satisfied itself that the appeal involves a substantial question of law and before it has formulated such question as mandated by Section 100(4). The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal is predicated on the High Court being satisfied that a substantial question of law arises and upon formulation of that question; until those steps are taken the High Court lacks jurisdiction to pass an interim order that has the effect of preserving or altering rights in the dispute. The Court reiterated existing precedents (notably Ram Phal v. Banarasi; Raghavendra Swamy Mutt v. Uttaradi Mutt; Bhagyashree Anant Gaonkar v. Narendra @ Nagesh Bharma Holkar; Hemavathi & Others v. V. Hombegowda) that a second appeal cannot be admitted, heard on merits or accommodated by interim relief unless the statutory gateway — existence and formulation of a substantial question of law — is traversed. The order impugned (limited status quo directed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court without framing questions under Section 100) was set aside. The judgment stresses that the High Court’s inherent power under Section 151 CPC cannot be exercised to circumvent or nullify the mandatory scheme of Section 100.
- [Balbir Singh & Anr. v. Baldev Singh (D) Through His LRs. & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 781 : 2025 INSC 81](https://lawfoyer.in/balbir-singh-anr-v-baldev-singh-d-through-his-lrs-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-781-2025-insc-81/): This judgment addresses two narrow but significant questions arising from four connected suits for specific performance: (1) the legal consequence of the merger of a trial-court conditional decree with a later appellate decree rendered in regular second appeals; and (2) whether judgment-debtors could successfully seek rescission under Section 28, Specific Relief Act, 1963 on the ground that decree-holders failed to deposit the balance sale consideration within the 20-day period directed by the original trial decree. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s refusal to rescind, holding that once the High Court allowed the second appeals and restored the trial decree the operative decree became that of the appellate forum — the trial decree merged into the appellate decree — and execution of the appellate decree could not be defeated merely by pointing to the 20-day direction in the original trial decree where the High Court had not imposed any fixed time for deposit. The Court reiterated that Section 28 confers discretionary power on the court which passed the decree to extend time for deposit and to decide rescission applications, and, further, that extension of time under relevant rules (and under s.148, CPC paradigms) does not amount to modification of the decree. The Court distinguished Prem Jeevan v. K.S. Venkata Raman (2017) on its facts and relied upon established merger jurisprudence (e.g. Kunhayammed, Chandi Prasad, Shanthi) as well as Section 28 precedents (e.g. Sardar Mohar Singh, Bhupinder Kumar). The appeals were dismissed.
- [Mahendra Awase v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 80 : 2025 INSC 76](https://lawfoyer.in/mahendra-awase-v-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2025-2-s-c-r-80-2025-insc-76/): Mahendra Awase v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 80 : 2025 INSC 76, examines the threshold for attracting Section 306, Indian Penal Code (abetment of suicide) when the accused’s conduct consists of debt recovery demands and heated verbal exchanges. The Supreme Court reiterated settled principles that conviction under s.306 IPC demands proof of active abetment — either by instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid — and that casual, angry words or routine debt-collection activities do not automatically amount to instigation. The Court analysed the suicide note, contemporaneous audio transcripts, forensic confirmation of recordings, witness statements and the delay in lodging the FIR. Applying precedents such as Swamy Prahaladdas v. State of M.P., Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal, M. Mohan v. State and Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, the Court concluded that the appellant’s actions — demanding repayment, using threats of publicity and employing abusive language — did not evidence the mens rea or the sustained course of conduct necessary to leave the deceased with “no other option” but suicide. The Court emphasised that s.306 IPC has a high threshold, cautioned investigating agencies against mechanical use of the provision, and discharged the appellant, quashing proceedings in the Sessions Court.
- [Sunkari Tirumala Rao & Ors. v. Penki Aruna Kumari, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 902 : 2025 INSC 92](https://lawfoyer.in/sunkari-tirumala-rao-ors-v-penki-aruna-kumari-2025-1-s-c-r-902-2025-insc-92/): This case examines the narrow but important question whether partners of an unregistered partnership firm can maintain a bare suit for recovery of money against a co-partner. The Supreme Court (Pardiwala & Mahadevan, JJ.) dismissed the Special Leave Petition against the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s decision that the suit (for ₹30,00,000) instituted by a group of persons who held themselves out as partners was barred by Section 69(1) of the Partnership Act, 1932. The Trial Court had held the suit maintainable on the ground that partnership business had not commenced; the High Court reversed that finding, holding that once a partnership agreement exists (even if business has not commenced) the embargo in Section 69(1) applies unless the firm is registered. The Supreme Court reviewed the statutory text and precedents — notably Seth Loonkaran Sethiya v. Ivan E. John and Mukund Balkrishna Kulkarni v. Kulkarni Powder Metallurgical Industries — and held that the embargo is mandatory: a partner sues “as a partner” to enforce contractual rights and thus cannot bring a suit against another partner on behalf of the firm unless registration and register entry requirements are satisfied. The Court emphasised that the exception in Section 69(3) would have preserved a suit for dissolution and accounts, and therefore the petitioners’ appropriate remedy (given the parties’ allegations) was dissolution and rendition of accounts rather than a plain recovery suit. The appeal was dismissed.
- [Vijay @ Vijayakumar v. State represented by Inspector of Police, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 869 : 2025 INSC 90](https://lawfoyer.in/vijay-vijayakumar-v-state-represented-by-inspector-of-police-2025-1-s-c-r-869-2025-insc-90/): This judgment examines whether the appellant’s act of striking the deceased with a cement brick after an on-the-spot altercation falls within “grave and sudden provocation” under Exception 1 to Section 300, Indian Penal Code (IPC) so as to reduce the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part I IPC. The Trial Court accepted Exception 1 and convicted the appellant under Section 304 Part I; the High Court affirmed. Before this Court the appellant’s conviction was maintained but sentence reduced to time already undergone. The Court reiterates three core ingredients for Exception 1: (i) provocation must be both grave (tested objectively by the reasonable-man standard) and sudden (unexpected + brief interval between provocation and homicidal act); (ii) provocation must have deprived the accused of self-control; and (iii) the killing must have occurred while that deprivation continued. Reliance is placed on Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1942 A.C. 1 for the analytical framework. Applying these principles to the facts (late-night encounter beneath a bridge; alleged drunken state of deceased; abuse and a slap; appellant picked up a nearby cement brick and struck the deceased; no pre-planning; no weapon carried; post-incident attempt to burn the body alleged), the Court observes that while Exception 1 may be doubtful on strict analysis, the incident better fits within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC (absence of premeditation, no cruel or unusual manner, no undue advantage). The conviction is therefore sustained but the sentence is reduced to the period already served.
- [Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 110 : 2025 INSC 85](https://lawfoyer.in/biswajit-das-v-central-bureau-of-investigation-2025-2-s-c-r-110-2025-insc-85/): Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 110 : 2025 INSC 85 (Dipankar Datta & Manmohan, JJ.) examines whether the Supreme Court may expand the limited scope of notice issued when admitting a Special Leave Petition and, if satisfied on merits, entertain and decide points outside that limited notice — including recording an acquittal — under Article 136 and Article 142 of the Constitution read with Order LV Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. The Bench reviews precedents — notably Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt v. State of Gujarat, Kutchi Lal Raeshwar Ashram Trust, Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Coop. Credit Society Ltd., and the older Spring Meadows Hospital and Taherakhatoon — to articulate that where a limited notice was issued but later a patent infirmity or glaring procedural error affecting substantial justice is demonstrated, the Court retains discretion to enlarge scope at final hearing. On facts, the appellant — a Development Officer of LIC — was convicted under various provisions of the IPC and under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court upheld convictions on available evidence (including the filling of six blank cheques and witness testimony) but modified the sentence in the exercise of mercy and discretion, setting the remainder of imprisonment to the period already served. The judgment thus balances procedural restraint with a justice-oriented, liberal approach to expansion of scope where necessary to avoid miscarriage of justice.
- [Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1469 : 2025 INSC 139](https://lawfoyer.in/om-prakash-ambadkar-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-1469-2025-insc-139/): The appeal arises from an order of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Digras directing police investigation under Section 156(3), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on an application by an advocate alleging assault, abusive language and threats by a police officer, with offences framed under Sections 323, 294, 500, 504 & 506, Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Magistrate's direction was attacked under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court which affirmed the Magistrate. This Court examined whether the Magistrate applied judicial mind before issuing directions under Section 156(3) and whether the averments, on plain reading, disclosed the ingredients of the alleged offences. The Court held that a Magistrate must scrutinize whether the complaint, on its face, discloses cognizable offences and whether police assistance is necessary. Here the Magistrate acted mechanically and did not test if the essential ingredients of Section 294 (obscenity), Sections 504 & 506 (intentional insult and criminal intimidation) and Section 500 (defamation) were made out on the complaint. Applying settled precedents (notably Ramdev Food Products and N.S. Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha), the Court concluded that the allegations even if accepted did not disclose the essential elements of the offences charged, and that continuing investigation would amount to an abuse of process. The order directing investigation and the High Court order affirming it were set aside.
- [Dharmendra Kumar Singh & Ors. v. The Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 490 : 2025 INSC 72](https://lawfoyer.in/dharmendra-kumar-singh-ors-v-the-honble-high-court-of-jharkhand-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-490-2025-insc-72/): Dharmendra Kumar Singh & Ors. v. The Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 490 : 2025 INSC 72 decides the narrow but important question whether candidates who satisfy the minimum suitability threshold under a High Court’s promotional scheme for the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service can be excluded from promotion merely because they are placed lower in a subsequent merit list. The appellants were Civil Judges (Senior Division) who obtained the minimum 40 marks required by the suitability test under Rules 4 and 5 of the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services (Recruitment, Appointment and Condition of Service) Rules, 2001, yet were not promoted because juniors scored higher and a merit list was prepared. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the appellants’ marks were lower than the last selected candidate. This Court (Satish Chandra Sharma, J.) relied on the Three-Judge Bench decision in Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta & Anr. v. High Court of Gujarat & Ors. (2024) and reiterated that for the 65% merit-cum-seniority promotional quota the test is one of individual suitability and not a departmental competitive examination; once a candidate clears the suitability threshold, that candidate cannot be ignored merely for lower placement in a merit list unless the rules expressly require comparative assessment. Since appellants had subsequently been promoted, the remaining controversy was seniority and consequential service benefits. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court order, and directed notional promotion with consequential benefits (except back wages).
- [Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v. M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd & Anr., 2 S.C.R. 123 : 2025 INSC 73](https://lawfoyer.in/cuddalore-powergen-corporation-ltd-v-m-s-chemplast-cuddalore-vinyls-ltd-anr-2-s-c-r-123-2025-insc-73/): Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v. M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd & Anr., 2 S.C.R. 123 : 2025 INSC 73 — The Supreme Court clarified the true scope and working of Order II Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Ord. II r.2 CPC) in the context of a plaintiff who first sued for a permanent injunction to protect possession and thereafter instituted a second suit seeking specific performance and cancellation of a later-registered sale deed. The appellant (purchaser of the property) relied on Ord. II r.2 to contend that the second suit was barred because all available reliefs should have been included in the first suit; trial court and first appellate court rejected the second plaint, but the High Court restored it. The Supreme Court held that Ord. II r.2 bars a second suit only when the plaintiff, at the time of instituting the first suit, was entitled to and able to obtain the relief later claimed and deliberately omitted it (or failed to obtain leave under r.2(3)). Where a subsequent discrete event — here the quashing of a Government Order that had prevented registration — occurs after the first suit, a new cause of action may arise and Ord. II r.2 will not operate as a bar. The Court emphasized substance over form in identifying cause(s) of action, the need to read plaints as a whole before rejecting under Order VII r.11(d), and that the defence under Ord. II r.2(3) is a technical one which must be satisfactorily proved by producing earlier pleadings. On the facts, the quashing of the GO and the timing of the affected rights created a fresh cause of action permitting the second suit; the High Court’s restoration of the plaint was upheld and both suits were directed to be tried together.
- [Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India & Ors., 2025 2 S.C.R. 27; 2025 INSC 75](https://lawfoyer.in/rajeeb-kalita-v-union-of-india-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-27-2025-insc-75/): This judgment in Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India & Ors., Writ Petition (C) No. 538 of 2023 (decided 15 January 2025), recognizes access to functioning, gender-sensitive and accessible toilet facilities in judicial premises as an essential facet of Article 21 — the right to life and personal liberty — and as a constitutional duty under Part IV. The Court held that toilets/washrooms/restrooms are not mere conveniences but basic necessities integral to human dignity, health and the meaningful exercise of access to justice. After collecting affidavits from all High Courts and analysing national guidelines, statutory provisions (notably Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 and Rules, 2020), Supreme Court reports and international instruments, the Court recorded widespread infrastructural shortfalls — crumbling blocks, lack of water, non-functional fittings, absence of separate facilities for women, persons with disabilities and transgender persons and deficient maintenance/fund-transparency. Relying on precedents that develop Article 21 and Directive Principles, the Court issued structured remedial directions: (i) mandatory construction/availability of separate toilets for males, females, PwD and transgender persons in all courts/tribunals; (ii) constitution of a High Court-level committee under a Judge nominated by the Chief Justice to survey, plan and monitor implementation; (iii) allocation of funds by States/UTs; (iv) steps for accessibility, signage, sanitary dispensers, interim mobile/bio-toilet options, outsourcing maintenance where appropriate; and (v) filing of status reports within four months. The directions are framed to protect dignity, ensure non-discrimination and remove barriers to fair administration of justice.
- [Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 462 : 2025 INSC 55](https://lawfoyer.in/rina-kumari-rina-devi-reena-v-dinesh-kumar-mahto-dinesh-kumar-mahato-and-anr-2025-1-s-c-r-462-2025-insc-55/): Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 462 : 2025 INSC 55. The Supreme Court examined whether a decree for restitution of conjugal rights obtained by a husband automatically disentitles the wife from maintenance under Section 125(4), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court held that mere passing of a restitution decree and the wife’s non-compliance do not ipso facto attract the disqualification in Section 125(4). The entitlement to maintenance remains a fact-sensitive exercise; the Magistrate must assess whether the wife had sufficient and valid reasons to refuse cohabitation despite the decree. On the facts, the wife had suffered ill-treatment culminating in a miscarriage which the husband failed to address or even bear medical expenses for; the husband secured a restitution decree in April 2022 but made no genuine effort thereafter to execute the decree or reconcile, creating a stalemate reflecting lack of bonafides. The High Court’s reliance on the restitution decree to deny maintenance was reversed and the Family Court’s order directing maintenance of ₹10,000 per month (with arrears and an installment schedule) was restored. The judgment clarifies (i) the civil nature and social-welfare purpose of Section 125, (ii) the limited evidentiary effect of civil decrees in maintenance proceedings, and (iii) that refusal under Section 125(4) requires an absence of sufficient reason and is not established by mere non-compliance.
- [Dr. Sharmad v. State of Kerala & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 414 : 2025 INSC 70](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-sharmad-v-state-of-kerala-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-414-2025-insc-70/): Dr. Sharmad v. State of Kerala and Others, Civil Appeal No. 13422 of 2024 (decided 10 Jan 2025) examines whether a promotional appointment to Associate Professor, Department of Neurosurgery was valid where the candidate had completed the requisite physical teaching experience in the feeder post but had not completed five years after acquiring the M.Ch degree. The dispute turns on interpretation of the executive Recruitment Rules contained in G.O. dated 07.04.2008 (which governed recruitment in Branch-I Administrative Cadre and Branch-II Teaching Cadre) and whether the general qualification-experience rule in Rule 10(ab), Part II, Kerala State & Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 (KS & SSR) — which ordinarily requires experience after acquisition of the basic qualification — applies to promotional appointments under the special executive order. The Supreme Court held that a plain reading of the G.O. shows the executive deliberately required post-qualification experience in Branch-I posts but omitted those words for Branch-II, thereby implying exclusion (expressio unius). For that reason and because the G.O. of 07.04.2008 was a special rule superseding general rules, the appellant’s promotion (made on 06.02.2013) was lawful: he had requisite five years physical teaching experience as Assistant Professor on the date vacancy arose (13.11.2012). The High Court’s interference based on Rule 28(b)(1A) and Rule 10(ab) was therefore set aside; the Administrative Tribunal’s order dismissing the challenge was restored. The judgment clarifies interplay between special executive recruitment orders and general service rules; it confirms that ordinary presumption that experience means post-qualification experience may yield to clear express specification, particularly for promotions.
- [Prestige National Arbitration Competition 2025 | Organized by Prestige Institute of Management and Research, Department of Law, Gwalior | Last date to register by 1 Nov 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/prestige-national-arbitration-competition-2025-organized-by-prestige-institute-of-management-and-research-department-of-law-gwalior-last-date-to-register-by-1-nov-2025/): Prestige National Arbitration Competition 2025 | Organized by Prestige Institute of Management and Research, Department of Law, Gwalior | Last date to register by 1 Nov 2025
- [National Conference on Climate Change & Sustainable Development: Pathways to a Resilient Future | Organised by Bharath Institute of Law, BIHER (Deemed-to-be-University under Section 3 of UGC Act, 1956) | Last Date for Abstract Submission by October 15, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/national-conference-on-climate-change-sustainable-development-pathways-to-a-resilient-future-organised-by-bharath-institute-of-law-biher-deemed-to-be-university-under-section-3-of-ugc-act/): National Conference on Climate Change & Sustainable Development: Pathways to a Resilient Future | Organised by Bharath Institute of Law, BIHER (Deemed-to-be-University under Section 3 of UGC Act, 1956) | Last Date for Abstract Submission by October 15, 2025
- [Unlaw the Law: A Multispecies Reflection 2.0 | Organized by Awaaz Leadership Labs (ALL) | Event Date: October 12, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/unlaw-the-law-a-multispecies-reflection-2-0-organized-by-awaaz-leadership-labs-all-event-date-october-12-2025/): Unlaw the Law: A Multispecies Reflection 2.0 | Organized by Awaaz Leadership Labs (ALL) | Event Date: October 12, 2025
- [My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 729 : 2025 INSC 56](https://lawfoyer.in/my-preferred-transformation-hospitality-pvt-ltd-anr-v-m-s-faridabad-implements-pvt-ltd-2025-1-s-c-r-729-2025-insc-56/): This case examines whether an application under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is time-barred where the three-month prescribed period expired on a working day but the further 30-day condonable period lapsed during court vacation. The appellants received the signed award on 14.02.2022. Giving effect to this Court’s COVID-19 extension order, the statutory 3-month limitation ran out on 29.05.2022 (a working day) and the 30-day proviso period expired on 28.06.2022, which fell during the Delhi High Court summer vacation (04.06.2022–03.07.2022). The appellants filed their s.34 petition with a condonation application on the first day of reopening (04.07.2022). The High Court dismissed the s.34 petition as time-barred; the Division Bench dismissed the s.37 appeal. The Supreme Court (Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J., with Pankaj Mithal, J. supplementing) affirmed that the s.34 petition was barred. The Court held that the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to s.34(3) subject to express or necessary exclusions under s.29(2) and s.43(1) of the ACA; ss.4–24 of the Limitation Act are available “insofar as and to the extent” not excluded. s.4 of the Limitation Act (expiry on a day court closed) assists only where the prescribed period (the core 3 months) expires on a court holiday; it does not give relief where only the discretionary 30-day proviso expires on a holiday. Consequently s.10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is excluded by its proviso where the Limitation Act applies. The Court flagged concerns about the rigid interplay between limitation provisions and arbitration remedies and urged legislative clarity.
- [NBCC (India) Ltd. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 610 : 2025 INSC 54](https://lawfoyer.in/nbcc-india-ltd-v-the-state-of-west-bengal-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-610-2025-insc-54/): The appeal raises whether an MSME may invoke the remedy under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 to refer a dispute to the Facilitation Council when the enterprise was not registered under Section 8 of the Act before execution of the underlying contract. The Supreme Court (Pamidighantam S. Narasimha, J.; Pankaj Mithal, J. concurring) examined the text, context and purpose of Chapter V of the Act and the linked definitions to hold that Section 18 employs the words “any party to a dispute” and is an open-ended statutory remedy intended to promote effective access to justice for MSMEs. The Court rejected the narrow contention that “any party” must be read as meaning only a “supplier” who had filed a memorandum under Section 8(1) before contracting. The judgment analyses the repealed 1993 Act and the three-Judge decision in Shanti Conductors v. Assam State Electricity Board (on incidence of liability being the date of supply), distinguishes earlier single-judge and two-judge precedents under the 2006 Act (notably Silpi Industries and Mahakali Foods), and records the policy and practical reasons for refusing to make pre-contract registration a jurisdictional bar. Because the Court considered the precedential field unclear and of larger importance, it referred the question for authoritative pronouncement by a three-Judge Bench.
- [The State of West Bengal & Ors. v. PAM Developments Private Limited & Anr., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 772 : 2025 INSC 69](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-west-bengal-ors-v-pam-developments-private-limited-anr-2025-1-s-c-r-772-2025-insc-69/): The State of West Bengal & Ors. v. PAM Developments Private Limited & Anr., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 772 : 2025 INSC 69 concerns the scope of amendment of a plaint under Order VI Rule 17 CPC where subsequent events (additional debarment orders) post-date the filing of the suit. The central question was whether those subsequent debarment orders gave rise to a fresh cause of action or formed part of a continuous cause of action emanating from the original memo dated 08.03.2016 (and related show-cause notice). The High Court allowed the amendment and dispensed with service of notice under Section 80 CPC; the State challenged that order before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court, holding that (i) the subsequent debarment orders arose from the same genesis and therefore constituted a continuous cause of action; (ii) allowing the amendment did not change the nature or character of the suit and was necessary for complete adjudication; (iii) where an amendment merely supplements an existing cause of action, the prior notice requirement under Section 80 CPC does not get attracted. The Court applied principles of continuity of cause of action and limitation, rejected the contention that dismissal (as withdrawn) of an earlier amendment application amounted to abandonment under Order XXIII R.1 CPC, and held that the limitation clock was kept alive by interlocutory proceedings and the High Court’s order keeping legality of debarment open. The judgment emphasizes pragmatic adjudication and the duty to allow amendments essential for effective and complete resolution of disputes.
- [Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 657 : 2025 INSC 47](https://lawfoyer.in/goverdhan-anr-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-2025-1-s-c-r-657-2025-insc-47/): The appeal arises from conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860 of two brothers for the fatal assault of Suraj; their father was initially convicted but later acquitted by the High Court. The prosecution case rested primarily on the ocular account of the victim’s mother, Lata Bai (PW-10), supported by an FIR, contemporaneous medical notation and recovery-at-instance seizures (axes, pipe) said to have been produced by the appellants. The informant (Santosh, PW-6) who lodged the FIR turned hostile at trial; several non-official witnesses and seizure witnesses likewise recanted. The Trial Court convicted all three; the High Court affirmed the two sons’ convictions and acquitted the father. Before the Supreme Court the principal issues were (i) credibility of the sole eye-witness who was related to the deceased and whose s.161 CrPC statement was recorded belatedly; (ii) effect of hostile witnesses and non-recovery of the exact weapon used; and (iii) parity with the acquitted co-accused (father). Applying accepted principles about proof beyond reasonable doubt, assessment of demeanour and corroboration, the Court held PW-10’s evidence in substance reliable notwithstanding minor embellishments and delay in recording her s.161 statement; the FIR and medical record furnished corroboration and the Investigating Officer’s seizure memos were proved despite seizure witnesses turning hostile. The Court found motive and premeditation not proved but concluded the appellants caused death knowing their injuries were likely to be fatal; conviction changed from s.302 to Part I of s.304 IPC. Sentence was set off against ~10 years 3 months already undergone and a fine imposed.
- [Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 263 : 2025 INSC 95](https://lawfoyer.in/central-bank-of-india-anr-v-smt-prabha-jain-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-263-2025-insc-95/): This judgment considers whether Section 34 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (the SARFAESI Act) completely ousts civil-court jurisdiction to try suits that touch upon security enforcement measures taken by secured creditors. The dispute arose from a family inheritance where the plaintiff (wife) claimed a 1/3 share in land which her co-heir sold without partition; a subsequent buyer mortgaged the plot to the Bank and defaulted, whereupon the Bank took possession under Section 13. The plaintiff sued in the civil court for (i) a declaration that the antecedent sale deed was illegal; (ii) a declaration that the mortgage deed in favour of the Bank was illegal; and (iii) possession of the plot. The Bank moved under Order VII, r.11 CPC to reject the plaint on the ground that Section 34 ousted civil jurisdiction and that remedies lay before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The trial court rejected the plaint; the High Court restored it holding that the DRT could not determine title disputes between third parties and borrowers; the Bank appealed. The Supreme Court held that declarations regarding the antecedent sale and mortgage (reliefs 1 & 2) were not measures taken under Section 13(4) and therefore lay within civil jurisdiction; the DRT lacked power under Section 17 to adjudicate title or invalidate antecedent documents; as to possession (relief 3), under the unamended statutory language the DRT’s power under Section 17(3) was to restore possession to the person who had possession when the secured creditor took it (i.e., the borrower), not to hand possession to third parties who had no prior possession. Finally, the Court emphasised that partial rejection of a plaint under Order VII, r.11 CPC is impermissible: if any relief survives, the plaint must not be rejected.
- [Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. The State of Maharashtra, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 592 : 2025 INSC 93](https://lawfoyer.in/sadashiv-dhondiram-patil-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-2025-1-s-c-r-592-2025-insc-93/): Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. The State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 1718 of 2017, raised whether a Village Police Patil is a “police officer” within the meaning of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and whether the High Court rightly reversed a trial acquittal to convict the husband for the murder of his wife. The prosecution relied on four circumstantial strands: an alleged extra-judicial confession to the Village Police Patil, discovery of the alleged murder weapon, motive arising from suspicion of infidelity, and the accused’s exclusive knowledge as husband when the offence occurred within the family home. The Supreme Court held that a Police Patil under the Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967 cannot be equated with a police officer for the purposes of S.25, so an extra-judicial confession to him is admissible; nevertheless admissibility does not dispense with scrutiny of truth, voluntariness and precision of the confession. The Court found the purported confession vague and omnibus, panchas hostile and discovery inadequately proved by the Investigating Officer, and motive alone insufficient. The High Court’s reliance on the confession and invocation of S.106 without foundational facts was held to be erroneous; acquittal was restored.
- [Mamta Kaur v. State of Punjab, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 649 : 2025 INSC 49](https://lawfoyer.in/mamta-kaur-v-state-of-punjab-2025-1-s-c-r-649-2025-insc-49/): Mamta Kaur v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal No. 136 of 2025 (Supreme Court of India, 9 Jan. 2025) addresses the grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in relation to an FIR registered for an offence under Section 306, Indian Penal Code, 1860. The High Court had earlier rejected the appellant’s anticipatory bail application; on appeal the Supreme Court entertained the matter, noted compliance with an earlier interim direction (joined investigation), and recorded the State’s concession that no further custodial interrogation was required. In light of these factual developments the Court allowed the appeal and directed that, if arrested in relation to FIR No. 13 dated 14.02.2023 (P.S. Gharinda, District Amritsar), the appellant be released on bail subject to such terms as the trial court may impose, with liberty to the State to move for cancellation if conditions are breached. The decision proceeds on narrow grounds of changed circumstances — participation in investigation and absence of necessity for further custody — rather than laying down wide principles on anticipatory bail or the scope of Section 306 IPC. The operative order balances liberty against investigational needs and leaves supervisory and conditional details to the trial court.
- [Ram Pyarey v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 484 : 2025 INSC 71](https://lawfoyer.in/ram-pyarey-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-2025-1-s-c-r-484-2025-insc-71/): The appeal challenges concurrent convictions under Sections 306 and 498-A, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 4, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 of the appellant — the deceased’s brother-in-law — for alleged abetment of suicide and cruelty in connection with dowry demands. The prosecution case rested on the deceased setting herself ablaze on 27 September 1990 after alleged harassment and dowry demands by her husband and in-laws; a First Information Report was lodged by her father on the same day accusing four family members. The trial court acquitted the accused for Section 304B IPC (dowry death) but convicted for Sections 306 and 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act; the High Court affirmed. Before the Supreme Court the principal question was whether the conviction of the appellant could stand in the absence of cogent evidence tying him to harassment or instigation and whether Section 113A of the Evidence Act, 1872 (presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman) could be invoked. The Court held that Section 113A is not to be invoked mechanically; it requires cogent material showing cruelty or harassment by the accused. Where such evidence is absent, the Court cannot draw a presumption of abetment. Applying this principle the Supreme Court found no evidence that the appellant aided, instigated or abetted the suicide and set aside his conviction, discharging his bonds.
- [Inspector, Railway Protection Force, Kottayam v. Mathew K. Cherian & Anr., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 498 : 2025 INSC 51](https://lawfoyer.in/inspector-railway-protection-force-kottayam-v-mathew-k-cherian-anr-2025-1-s-c-r-498-2025-insc-51/): This analysis examines Inspector, Railway Protection Force, Kottayam v. Mathew K. Cherian & Anr., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 498 : 2025 INSC 51, decided by a two-judge Bench (Dipankar Datta and Prashant K. Mishra, JJ.) on 09 January 2025. The central question was whether the creation and use of fake or multiple IRCTC user-IDs to procure and supply railway e-tickets — by persons who are not railway servants or authorised agents — falls within the penal mischief of Section 143 of the Railways Act, 1989. The Court upheld a textual and purposive construction: Section 143(1)(a) proscribes the business of procuring and supplying railway tickets by anyone other than a railway servant or an authorised agent, and the statute does not limit the mode (physical or electronic) by which procurement/supply is effected. Applying settled canons of statutory interpretation, the Court rejected the Kerala High Court’s view that the pre-internet enactment of the Act rendered Section 143 inapplicable to e-ticketing, and held that the provision is broad enough to cover online procurement and sale. On facts the Court restored criminal proceedings against Mathew (an unauthorised operator alleged to have created hundreds of fraudulent IDs) while quashing proceedings against Ramesh (an authorised agent) because the statute, by its terms, does not penalise authorised agents for alleged contract or regulatory breaches; such breaches are civil or disciplinary. The decision balances literal reading with purposive application, stresses protection of the ticketing infrastructure from market hoarding and fraud, and circumscribes Section 143’s reach so that authorised agents are not criminalised for misconduct falling outside the statutory description.
- [State of Uttar Pradesh and Another v. R.K. Pandey and Another, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 403 : 2025 INSC 48](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-another-v-r-k-pandey-and-another-2025-1-s-c-r-403-2025-insc-48/): State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. v. R.K. Pandey & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 10212 of 2014 (Supreme Court; judgment dated 09 January 2025) addresses the enforceability of ex-parte arbitral awards where the employer denies the authenticity of the asserted arbitration agreement. The employee (Respondent No.1) claimed entitlement to a higher age of superannuation and, after a long-pending writ (withdrawn), initiated arbitration relying upon an alleged arbitration agreement dated 01.04.1957. Two ex-parte awards were procured by the employee through unilateral nomination of arbitrators and subsequently sought to be executed against the State and the Principal of GSVM Medical College. The executing courts declined to set aside the awards on limitation grounds. The Supreme Court, invoking principles of party autonomy, Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and precedents on fraud and impartiality of arbitrators, held that existence of a genuine arbitration agreement is sine qua non for arbitration; the purported agreement was neither on official records nor signed by the claimant and was pleaded belatedly. The unilateral self-appointment of arbitrators, absence of authenticated agreement, and indicia of sham proceedings rendered the awards null and void ab initio for want of jurisdiction and for being tainted by fraud. The Court set aside both awards, dismissed execution proceedings and awarded costs to the State.
- [Vijay Prabhu v. S.T. Lajapathie & Ors., 1 S.C.R. 718 : 2025 INSC 52](https://lawfoyer.in/vijay-prabhu-v-s-t-lajapathie-ors-1-s-c-r-718-2025-insc-52/): Vijay Prabhu v. S.T. Lajapathie & Ors., 1 S.C.R. 718 : 2025 INSC 52, considers the scope and exercise of judicial discretion under Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, when a party seeks specific performance of only a part of an agreement of sale. The plaintiff sued for specific performance and possession of immovable property under an agreement dated 07.11.2005, alternatively claiming damages. Trial Court found the plaintiff not ready and willing to perform his obligations, rejected specific performance and ordered refund of earnest money with interest. The High Court affirmed but examined whether the plaintiff could invoke Section 12(3) to obtain specific performance of a segregable portion, observing that Section 12(3) is discretionary, requires that the contract be capable of segregation and that the plaintiff must relinquish all claims to further performance and compensation. The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP, holding (i) courts may not grant specific performance of part of a contract except under Section 12(2), (3) or (4); (ii) Section 12(3)’s relief is discretionary and applies only where the contract permits segregation of rights; (iii) a plaintiff in default and not ready and willing cannot invoke Section 12(3); and (iv) relinquishment of claims for remaining performance may be made at any stage of litigation. The Court directed refund of the earnest money deposit with accumulated interest.
- [H. Guruswamy & Ors. v. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased By LRs., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 764 : 2025 INSC 53](https://lawfoyer.in/h-guruswamy-ors-v-a-krishnaiah-since-deceased-by-lrs-2025-1-s-c-r-764-2025-insc-53/): The appeal challenges the High Court of Karnataka’s order condoning roughly 2,200 days delay in an application for recall under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC, thereby setting aside the trial court’s dismissal of Misc. Case No. 223 of 2006. The dispute concerns long-running title and possession litigation over a By rasandra Bangalore property originating from suits in the 1970s and continuing into the 2000s. The trial court rejected the recall application on grounds of res judicata, prior adverse findings against the deceased respondent in earlier suits, and an inordinate six-year delay without sufficient cause; the High Court, however, condoned the delay and allowed the writ, reviving the proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court, restoring the trial court order and stressing that courts must not allow notions of liberal or justice-oriented approach to obliterate the law of limitation. The judgment underscores that (i) the length of delay is a weighty factor in condonation applications; (ii) courts must first scrutinize bona fides and sufficiency of explanation offered for delay before considering merits; (iii) when delay is deliberate or results from long inaction, equitable notions of substantial justice cannot trump limitation; and (iv) judicial conscience and restraint require careful evaluation of both delay and prior decisional history such as res judicata and earlier adverse findings. (Source judgment: H. Guruswa
- [Om Prakash @ Israel @ Raju @ Raju Das v. Union of India & Anr., 2025 1 S.C.R. 362 : 2025 INSC 43](https://lawfoyer.in/om-prakash-israel-raju-raju-das-v-union-of-india-anr-2025-1-s-c-r-362-2025-insc-43/): Om Prakash @ Israel @ Raju @ Raju Das v. Union of India & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 4229 of 2024, decided 8 January 2025 by M.M. Sundresh & Aravind Kumar, JJ., addresses the long-running failure of courts and executive authorities to apply juvenile-justice protections when a person accused of a 1994 homicide repeatedly asserted juvenility. The appellant originally gave inconsistent statements about age (a 2001 statement recording age as 20), was tried and sentenced (including death sentence later commuted), but subsequently—after ossification testing conducted under later rules—medical opinion indicated he was about 14 at the time of the offence. This Court held that the procedural safeguards and the substantive protective scheme embodied in Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2015 must be given full effect even after final disposal when the statutory procedure mandated for adjudication of juvenility has not been followed; courts must actively seek truth and cannot allow judicial mistakes to prejudice a person (principle actus curiae neminem gravabit). The conviction was left intact but the sentence insofar as it exceeded the maximum under the juvenile regime was set aside and the appellant ordered released if not otherwise held; directions were given for state rehabilitation assistance.
- [Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association v. Sri Bala & Co., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 542 : 2025 INSC 42](https://lawfoyer.in/indian-evangelical-lutheran-church-trust-association-v-sri-bala-co-2025-1-s-c-r-542-2025-insc-42/): The dispute concerns whether O.S. No. 49/2007 (second suit) for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 26.04.1991 was properly maintainable or whether the plaint ought to have been rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d), CPC as being barred by limitation. The respondent/plaintiff originally filed an unnumbered suit in 1993 for the same relief; that plaint was rejected on 12.01.1998 for non-payment of court fees. The respondent thereafter filed O.S. No.49/2007 in 2007 relying on Order VII Rule 13, CPC which preserves the right to present a fresh plaint after rejection. The defendant/appellant sought rejection of the second plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) on the ground that the suit was time-barred. The trial court and the High Court refused rejection, holding that limitation and extension issues raised mixed questions of fact requiring evidence. The Supreme Court examined whether the second suit fell within Article 113 (residuary three-year period) or Article 54 (specific performance) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and whether the admitted dates in the pleadings made the suit manifestly barred on the face of the plaint. Concluding that the right to sue for the second suit accrued on 12.01.1998 (date of rejection) and that no timely fresh suit was filed within three years thereafter, the Court held the second suit barred under Article 113 and allowed the appeal by rejecting the plaint. Key doctrinal touchstones analysed include the interplay of Order VII Rules 11 & 13, accrual of “right to sue”, and the narrower application of Article 54 to first suits for specific performance.
- [Bishwajit Dey v. The State of Assam, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 281 : 2025 INSC 32](https://lawfoyer.in/bishwajit-dey-v-the-state-of-assam-2025-1-s-c-r-281-2025-insc-32/): This judgment in Bishwajit Dey v. The State of Assam, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 281 : 2025 INSC 32, addresses whether a conveyance seized under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (the NDPS Act) can be released on superdari (interim custody) during pendency of trial. The vehicle in question—a commercial truck—was seized after two soap-box parcels containing heroin (24.8 gms) were found concealed in tarpaulin; the occupier who had the contraband was arraigned, whereas the registered owner and driver were not made accused in the charge-sheet. The State urged that the NDPS Act is a self-contained code and that interim release of conveyances would undermine confiscation policy and risk re-use. The Court analysed Sections 51, 52A, 60 and 63 of the NDPS Act alongside Sections 451 and 457 Cr.P.C., earlier precedents and the principle against absurd constructions. Distinguishing four factual scenarios of seizure (owner in possession; agent in possession; vehicle stolen; third-party occupant), the Court held there is no express bar in the NDPS Act to interim release of a seized vehicle. Where owner/agent is not charged (third-party occupant or stolen vehicle scenario), trial court may, in its discretion, release the conveyance on superdari subject to safeguards (videography, inventories, identification documents, restriction on transfer and undertaking / bond). The Court emphasised that retention in open police custody risks depreciation, and that conditional release balances evidentiary needs with protection of bona fide owners. The judgment directs the Special Court to release the truck on superdari with specified conditions.
- [The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v. Century Textiles & Ind. Ltd., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 313 : 2025 INSC 36](https://lawfoyer.in/the-municipal-corporation-of-greater-mumbai-ors-v-century-textiles-ind-ltd-2025-1-s-c-r-313-2025-insc-36/): The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 6667 of 2023, decided 7 Jan. 2025 (V. Nath & P. B. Varale, JJ.) addresses whether a lessee under a Poorer Classes Accommodation Scheme (PCAS) acquires an enforceable right to a conveyance on expiry of a fixed 28-year lease under the Bombay Improvement Trust Transfer Act, 1925 (the 1925 Act), and whether a writ filed after decades of inaction is barred by delay and laches. The Court held that neither the Board Resolution nor the lease deed or the statutory scheme imposed an automatic, unconditional duty to convey Block-A to the lessee on lease expiry; s.51(2) of the 1925 Act must be read harmoniously with s.48(a) so that conveyance becomes operative only where statutory prerequisites and contractual terms are satisfied. The Court also emphasised that the respondent’s prolonged inactivity (cause of action 1955; writ 2016) manifested inordinate delay and laches which the High Court failed adequately to consider. The appeal was allowed and the High Court order directing conveyance was set aside.
- [Abdul Nassar v. State of Kerala & Anr., 2 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 35](https://lawfoyer.in/abdul-nassar-v-state-of-kerala-anr-2-s-c-r-1-2025-insc-35/): Abdul Nassar v. State of Kerala & Anr., Criminal Appeal Nos. 1122–1123 of 2018 (Supreme Court of India, 7 Jan 2025) concerns conviction on the basis of circumstantial and scientific evidence for rape and murder of a nine-year-old girl. The trial court convicted the sole accused under Sections 376 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced him to death for murder; the High Court confirmed conviction and death sentence. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the accused died during pendency and the legal heirs sought continuation of appeals under Section 394(2) CrPC; the Court proceeded to adjudicate. The prosecution case depended on search by villagers leading to discovery of the child’s body concealed under clothes in a bathroom adjacent to the accused’s house, post-mortem showing 37 ante-mortem injuries and injuries to genitalia consistent with forcible penetrative sexual assault, seminial stains and semen on clothing and vaginal swab, DNA match between semen stains and the accused, recovery of the child’s belongings from the accused’s premises in pursuance of the accused’s disclosure, and movement of stones covering the septic tank. The Supreme Court affirmed that the prosecution had established an unbroken chain of incriminating circumstances — consistent only with guilt — applying the five 'panchsheel' principles from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda. The Court, while upholding conviction, critiqued earlier courts for insufficiently articulating inferential steps and set out detailed principles for judicial appreciation of circumstantial evidence.
- [The State of Punjab v. Hari Kesh, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 651 : 2025 INSC 50](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-punjab-v-hari-kesh-2025-1-s-c-r-651-2025-insc-50/): The appeal challenges the High Court of Punjab & Haryana’s order quashing the Sanction Order dated 19.11.2018 and setting aside consequent criminal proceedings under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in FIR No. 02 dated 10.01.2024 (Vigilance Bureau, Patiala Range). The Supreme Court reversed the High Court, restoring proceedings and holding that interference with a Special Judge’s order on sanction is barred by Section 19(3) of the Act unless the appellate/revisional court records that a failure of justice has in fact occurred. The Court relied heavily on State of Karnataka, Lokayukta Police v. S. Subbegowda (2023) and emphasised that competency of the authority to grant sanction is an “error” under the Explanation to Section 19(4), but that competency is ordinarily a matter of evidence for trial. Because the High Court neither recorded how any error occasioned a failure of justice nor addressed why the objection could not have been raised earlier, its quashing of the sanction and proceedings after the trial had commenced (several prosecution witnesses examined) amounted to a gross error. The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the High Court order and restored proceedings before the Special Court from the stage they were stopped, leaving open all contentions on merit to be raised during trial.
- [Bharat Aambale v. The State of Chhattisgarh, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1524 : 2025 INSC 78](https://lawfoyer.in/bharat-aambale-v-the-state-of-chhattisgarh-2025-1-s-c-r-1524-2025-insc-78/): Bharat Aambale v. The State of Chhattisgarh, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1524 : 2025 INSC 78 — Supreme Court (Pardiwala & Mahadevan, JJ.) considered whether conviction under s.20(b)(ii)(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 could be vitiated solely on account of alleged non-compliance with Section 52A (inventory, photographing, magistrate-certified sampling and disposal). The Court reviewed legislative history, Standing Orders and the NDPS Rules (2022), and surveyed prior decisions (notably Union of India v. Mohan Lal, Noor Aga, Jarooparam, Mangilal, Mohammed Khalid, Yusuf @ Asif, Simarnjit Singh, Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif). The bench held that Section 52A aims at safe disposal and introduces procedural safeguards but does not create an exclusive mode for proving possession; substantial compliance with the procedure suffices and mere procedural lapses will not automatically vitiate conviction unless they cause significant discrepancy that renders the prosecution’s case doubtful. The Court placed initial burden on accused to establish foundational facts of non-compliance on the preponderance of probabilities; once laid, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt either substantial compliance or that non-compliance did not affect its case. On facts the Court found sampling and inventorying adequately performed and other material supported recovery; appeal dismissed.
- [Jit Vinayak Arolkar v. State of Goa & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 230; 2025 INSC 31](https://lawfoyer.in/jit-vinayak-arolkar-v-state-of-goa-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-230-2025-insc-31/): The present analysis examines Jit Vinayak Arolkar v. State of Goa & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 393 of 2024, decided by the Supreme Court on 6 January 2025, wherein the Court set aside an FIR registered under Section 420, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and quashed proceedings against the appellant insofar as he was concerned. The dispute arises from competing proprietary claims over a coastal land parcel in Dhargalim Village, Pernem, Goa, and concerns sale deeds executed by the appellant as power of attorney and confirming party on behalf of two vendors. The complainant — the 4th respondent — had earlier instituted twelve declaratory suits claiming undivided ownership and only after two years lodged a criminal complaint alleging cheating and land-grabbing. The Supreme Court examined the ingredients of Section 415 IPC (cheating) and held that the complaint did not disclose how the appellant had deceived the complainant or caused harm to him; the purchasers under the sale deeds did not complain; and the complaint suppressed the pendency of civil suits and applications for interim relief. Relying on precedents including Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar and related decisions dealing with the boundary between civil title disputes and criminal liability, the Court concluded the matter was essentially civil and that invoking criminal law after a two-year gap amounted to an abuse of process. The FIR and consequential proceedings were therefore quashed only as against the appellant, without adjudicating the merits of the civil controversy.
- [Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau and Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 184 : 2025 INSC 30](https://lawfoyer.in/frank-vitus-v-narcotics-control-bureau-and-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-184-2025-insc-30/): The Supreme Court in Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau and Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 184 : 2025 INSC 30, examined whether the Civil Authority or a Foreign Registration Officer (appointed under Rule 3 of the Registration of Foreigners Rules, 1992) must be impleaded or given notice in every bail application moved by a foreign national under the Foreigners Act, 1946. The Court held that automatic impleadment or a mandatory notice requirement would be inappropriate because the statutory authorities under the Foreigners Act and the Foreigners Order, 1948 lack locus to oppose bail applications generally — save where the charge itself attracts the substantive penal provision in Section 14 of the Foreigners Act (i.e., where the allegation is that the foreigner committed an offence under that section). The Court emphasised the distinct and independent nature of the State’s powers under the Order (including power to restrict departure under Clause 5) vis-à-vis a judicial court’s power to grant bail. To balance administrative exigencies with judicial expedition, the Court directed that when bail is granted to a foreigner the trial court should mandate the State or prosecuting agency to promptly communicate the bail order to the relevant Registration Officer (Rule 3), who should thereafter intimate concerned civil authorities so that statutory restrictions, if any, may be timely considered and enforced. The decision aims to prevent routine procedural delay while preserving the ability of executive authorities to act under the Order and Rules.
- [Krishna Devi @ Sabitri Devi (Rani) M/s S.R. Engineering, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 81 : 2025 INSC 24](https://lawfoyer.in/krishna-devi-sabitri-devi-rani-m-s-s-r-engineering-2025-1-s-c-r-81-2025-insc-24/): Krishna Devi @ Sabitri Devi (Rani) v. Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 47 of 2025, addresses when the limitation period for challenging an arbitral award under Article 119(b), First Schedule, Limitation Act, 1963 begins to run — whether from formal service of notice of filing of the award or from the date the party becomes aware that the award has been made and is available. The dispute arose after an award dated 31.05.2022 in favour of the appellant was not immediately furnished because respondents had not paid the arbitrator’s balance fees. A District Court order dated 21.09.2022 directed respondents to pay the balance fee and stated that thereafter the award would be furnished; the appellant received a copy on 22.09.2022. Respondents, however, deposited the fee and received formal notice only on 18.11.2022 and filed objections on 22.11.2022. The appellant filed an application under Section 17, Arbitration Act, 1940 on 10.11.2022 to have judgment pronounced in terms of the award; the trial and High Courts deemed the application premature because they treated 18.11.2022 as the commencement of the 30-day limitation for objections. The Supreme Court, relying on precedents including Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti and Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. C.K. Ahuja, held that Section 14(2), Arbitration Act, 1940 requires that the parties become aware of the award’s filing and that formal service is not a prerequisite; substantive awareness suffices to start the limitation. The Court found respondents were aware by 21.09.2022, held limitation expired on 20.10.2022, declared the Section 17 application valid, set aside the High Court order and remitted for expeditious disposal.
- [Geetha V.M. & Ors. v. Rethnasenan K. & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 515 : 2025 INSC 33](https://lawfoyer.in/geetha-v-m-ors-v-rethnasenan-k-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-515-2025-insc-33-2/): This judgment addresses whether the option exercised by employees of the Directorate of Health Services (DHS) to join the Directorate of Medical Education (DME), pursuant to a governmental policy abolishing dual control, should be treated as (i) an absorption/transfer in public interest or (ii) a transfer on request attracting the proviso to Rule 27(a) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 (KS&SS Rules), and consequentially from which date their inter-se seniority in DME must be reckoned. The appellants were DHS employees whose posts (and liens) were shifted to DME by G.O. measures; they furnished options in prescribed form (Appendix II) and were absorbed into DME. The Division Bench treated those options as inter-departmental transfers on request and applied the proviso to Rule 27(a)—thereby fixing seniority from date of joining DME—whereas the Single Judge and this Court held that the transfers were transfers by absorption in public/administrative interest and, under Rule 27(a) read with Rule 27(c) and Rule-8 of Appendix I to the G.O., the absorbed employees retain seniority reckoned from their original appointment/first effective advice. The Supreme Court emphasised (i) the distinction between option and request, (ii) the scope of the proviso to Rule 27(a) (limited to transfers on request or mutual request), and (iii) the nature of absorption where the post itself moved and employees were absorbed as part of a policy decision to eliminate dual control. The Division Bench’s reversal of the Single Judge was set aside; the State directed to draw seniority lists preserving the absorbed employees’ earlier service for seniority purposes.
- [Geetha V.M. & Ors. v. Rethnasenan K. & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 515 : 2025 INSC 33](https://lawfoyer.in/geetha-v-m-ors-v-rethnasenan-k-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-515-2025-insc-33/): This judgment addresses whether the option exercised by employees of the Directorate of Health Services (DHS) to join the Directorate of Medical Education (DME), pursuant to a governmental policy abolishing dual control, should be treated as (i) an absorption/transfer in public interest or (ii) a transfer on request attracting the proviso to Rule 27(a) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 (KS&SS Rules), and consequentially from which date their inter-se seniority in DME must be reckoned. The appellants were DHS employees whose posts (and liens) were shifted to DME by G.O. measures; they furnished options in prescribed form (Appendix II) and were absorbed into DME. The Division Bench treated those options as inter-departmental transfers on request and applied the proviso to Rule 27(a)—thereby fixing seniority from date of joining DME—whereas the Single Judge and this Court held that the transfers were transfers by absorption in public/administrative interest and, under Rule 27(a) read with Rule 27(c) and Rule-8 of Appendix I to the G.O., the absorbed employees retain seniority reckoned from their original appointment/first effective advice. The Supreme Court emphasised (i) the distinction between option and request, (ii) the scope of the proviso to Rule 27(a) (limited to transfers on request or mutual request), and (iii) the nature of absorption where the post itself moved and employees were absorbed as part of a policy decision to eliminate dual control. The Division Bench’s reversal of the Single Judge was set aside; the State directed to draw seniority lists preserving the absorbed employees’ earlier service for seniority purposes.
- [Omi @ Omkar Rathore & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 266 : 2025 INSC 27](https://lawfoyer.in/omi-omkar-rathore-anr-v-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-anr-2025-1-s-c-r-266-2025-insc-27/): The judgment in Omi @ Omkar Rathore & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. considers the scope and limits of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 when the police investigation has named a person in the FIR but the investigating agency files a closure report / omits that person from the chargesheet. The Supreme Court affirms the High Court and trial court in holding that the power under Section 319 CrPC is an independent judicial power to summon any person not being the accused if, on the evidence led at trial, there emerges strong and cogent material that such person should be tried with the accused already before the court. The Court reiterates that materials in the chargesheet or case diary are not evidence; therefore the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer cannot be determinative of the court’s exercise of power under Section 319. The decision applies the test in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (constitutional bench standard) and follows S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak to confirm that a person named in the FIR but later dropped by police may still be summoned where trial evidence, including untested examination-in-chief of a complainant, furnishes cogent grounds. The Court also observes procedural propriety: closure reports must be promptly considered by the court and not left pending unduly. Primary record relied upon is the judgment and connected trial material as reproduced in the uploaded judgment file.
- [Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd. & Anr. v. Mathias Oram & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 158 : 2025 INSC 22](https://lawfoyer.in/mahanadi-coal-fields-ltd-anr-v-mathias-oram-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-158-2025-insc-22/): The judgment in Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd. & Anr. v. Mathias Oram & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 158 : 2025 INSC 22, addresses the limited scope of the Claims Commission constituted by this Court to determine compensation and ancillary Rehabilitation & Resettlement (R&R) benefits arising from large-scale land acquisition for coal development. The Court refused further extension of the Commission’s term and denied directions that would require the Commission to reopen finalized determinations or to prepare PAF/PDF lists for remaining villages beyond the specific, narrowly-prescribed reassessment mandated by earlier orders. The ruling reiterates that for four villages — Tumulia, Jhupuranga, Ratansara, Kiripsara — compensation must be re-determined only to the extent of the differential arising from the application of the First Schedule to the R&R Act, 2013 (i.e., market value, solatium and further interest), while determinations already approved by this Court for ten other villages have crystallised and cannot be reopened. The Court directed the Orissa High Court to promptly adjudicate a transferred challenge on methodology for Ratansara and required MCL to make payments after the High Court’s final order. The judgment emphasises finality, adherence to the Court’s earlier precise tasking of the Commission, and delineates administrative channels (nodal officers, Collector, statutory tribunals under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957) for any grievances. Keywords: Compensation claim; Claims Commission; Mahanadi Coalfields; R&R benefits; Gopalpur Model; R&R Act, 2013.
- [Serosoft Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Dexter Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 151 : 2025 INSC 26](https://lawfoyer.in/serosoft-solutions-pvt-ltd-v-dexter-capital-advisors-pvt-ltd-2025-1-s-c-r-151-2025-insc-26/): Serosoft Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Dexter Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 151 : 2025 INSC 26 examines the limits of High Court supervisory intervention under Article 227 in respect of interlocutory directions of an arbitral tribunal concerning opportunity for cross-examination. The dispute arose from a client services contract and focused on whether the claimant/respondent ought to be granted an additional chance to cross-examine the defendant/appellant’s witness RW-1 after the Arbitral Tribunal had refused further time on grounds of time-bound proceedings and lack of preparedness. The Supreme Court emphasized statutory restraint on judicial interference under Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and reiterated that intervention under Articles 226/227 is permissible only in exceptional circumstances where an order of the tribunal is perverse or the denial of a fundamental, effective opportunity to present one’s case is plainly established. The Court found that the tribunal had repeatedly provided extensive cross-examination time (exceeding twelve hours across sessions), had extended mandate by consent under Section 29A, and had discharged RW-1 after substantive questioning. The High Court’s direction to reopen cross-examination was set aside for lack of any demonstrated perversity or denial of a fair opportunity. The
- [Chief Revenue Controlling Officer Cum Inspector General of Registration & Ors. v. P. Babu, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 576 : 2025 INSC 44](https://lawfoyer.in/chief-revenue-controlling-officer-cum-inspector-general-of-registration-ors-v-p-babu-2025-1-s-c-r-576-2025-insc-44/): Chief Revenue Controlling Officer Cum Inspector General of Registration & Ors. v. P. Babu, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 576 : 2025 INSC 44, considers the scope and procedural limits of Section 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the Tamil Nadu Rules framed thereunder when a Registering Officer refers a registered instrument to the Collector on a “reason to believe” that the instrument is undervalued. The Court reiterates that the power to refer is not mechanical: a prima facie basis rooted in relevant material is a pre-condition to referral. Reason to believe demands more than a bare subjective inkling; it requires objective material that bears a rational connection to the belief. The Registering Officer may consult guideline registers but cannot conduct a roving valuation enquiry; if satisfied that undervaluation exists he must record the reasons that inform that satisfaction. The Collector, on receipt of a reference, is bound to follow the multi-step procedure in the Tamil Nadu Rules (Form I notice, provisional order with reasons, communication in Form II, opportunity for representations and a final order). Failure to record reasons at the stage of referral or to issue provisional orders and afford the statutorily mandated opportunities of hearing renders the valuation process and resultant demand for additional duty liable to be quashed. The High Court’s annulment of the enhanced valuation in this case is held to be legally sustainable. Keywords: reason to believe; Section 47-A; Stamp Act, 1899; Form I; Form II; provisional order; prima facie; undervaluation; natural justice; rules of procedure.
- [Mohammed Enterprises (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Farooq Ali Khan & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 177 : 2025 INSC 25](https://lawfoyer.in/mohammed-enterprises-tanzania-ltd-v-farooq-ali-khan-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-177-2025-insc-25/): The Supreme Court allowed the appeals challenging the Karnataka High Court’s decision to quash the Minutes of Meeting dated 11.02.2020 and set aside the resolution plan approved in the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) of Associate Decor Ltd. The High Court had interdicted the CIRP primarily on the ground that principles of natural justice were violated because a 24-hour notice was not given to one of the suspended directors before the 19th meeting of the Committee of Creditors (CoC). The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in exercising discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 because (i) there was inordinate delay and laches—the alleged breach occurred on 11.02.2020 but the writ was filed only on 04.01.2023; (ii) the respondent had already availed statutory remedies under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 including interlocutory applications before the Adjudicating Authority and NCLAT; and (iii) the IBC is a self-contained code with built-in safeguards and hierarchical remedies, with the Adjudicating Authority (and appellate forum) vested with the power to examine and correct irregularities under Section 60(5)(c). Relying on precedents such as Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta, and recent directions in CoC of KSK Mahanadi Power Co. Ltd. v. UP Power Corporation Ltd., the Court emphasised that unwarranted interlocution by High Courts with ongoing CIRP proceedings undermines the statutory regime and delays resolution. The appeals were allowed and the High Court order set aside, with directions to the Adjudicating Authority to resume and complete the CIRP expeditiously.
- [Sanjay Dutt & Ors. v. The State of Haryana & Anr., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 446 : 2025 INSC 34](https://lawfoyer.in/sanjay-dutt-ors-v-the-state-of-haryana-anr-2025-1-s-c-r-446-2025-insc-34/): The appeal challenges the cognizance taken by the Special Environment Court, Faridabad on a complaint alleging violation of Section 4 read with Section 19 of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 for uprooting and destroying trees using JCBs in Sector-113, Gurugram. The complaint named three company officers — Satpal Singh (Project Manager), Kamal Sehgal (General Manager) and Sanjay Dutt (Director) — though the licence for development had been granted in favour of a company. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether vicarious criminal liability could be fastened upon the directors/officers without specific statutory provision or precise allegations showing personal involvement and criminal intent. The Court held that in the scheme of the Act, 1900 vicarious liability does not automatically attach to company directors or office-bearers unless the statute so provides or the complaint pleads specific acts attributing personal culpability. Observing the complaint’s vagueness and absence of allegations that the appellants personally felled or ordered the felling, the Court found no prima facie case to issue process against them and quashed the complaint and the order taking cognizance. The judgment reiterates the cardinal criminal principle that penal vicarious liability requires either statutory backing or clear, particularised averments of a director’s personal role and mens rea before criminal proceedings can be sustained.
- [Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gagan Narang & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 239 : 2025 INSC 2](https://lawfoyer.in/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-v-gagan-narang-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-239-2025-insc-2/): The Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gagan Narang & Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 7463–7464 of 2023)1 examines whether a local authority (here, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi — MCD) could invoke Section 63 of the Electricity Act, 2003 to seek adoption of a tariff arrived at through a competitive bidding process for a Waste-to-Energy (WTE) project. The dispute arose after MCD, acting pursuant to duties under the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016 (Rule 15), conducted a tariff-based RfP for a 28 MW WTE plant at Narela-Bawana; after evaluation, a lowest bidder emerged (levelised tariff Rs. 7.380/KWh). DERC approved the bidding process and adopted the tariff, but APTEL set aside DERC’s orders on the narrow ground that Section 63 could be invoked only by distribution licensees or generating companies. The Supreme Court, allowing MCD’s appeals, held that Section 63’s plain language does not restrict invocation to Discoms or generators; Section 63 must be read harmoniously with Section 86(1)(b) (State Commission’s duty to regulate procurement and price) and other provisions (including Section 86(1)(e) and the Tariff Policy). The Court emphasised literal construction, rejected judicial addition of words to Section 63, and recognised that Rule 15 SWM Rules imposes statutory duties on local authorities to set up WTE facilities — obligations which coexist with the Electricity Act (Sections 174, 175). DERC’s approval — given after evaluating transparency, conformity certificates, financial evaluation and public interest — was affirmed and APTEL’s hyper-technical reversal was set aside.
- [Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit and Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 105 : 2025 INSC 20](https://lawfoyer.in/urmila-dixit-v-sunil-sharan-dixit-and-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-105-2025-insc-20-2/): Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 105 : 2025 INSC 20, concerns the scope and application of Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 where a senior citizen (mother) executed a registered gift deed in favour of her son subject to an undertaking that he would provide for her maintenance. The mother invoked Section 23, alleging the transferee failed to provide basic amenities and basic physical needs and that the relationship had broken down. Lower fora and a Single Judge of the High Court set aside the gift; a Division Bench reversed. The Supreme Court examined (i) interpretive principles applicable to beneficial welfare legislation, (ii) the two essentials distilled in Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi for invoking Section 23 — existence of a transfer subject to condition for maintenance and failure/refusal by the transferee — and (iii) whether a Tribunal can order eviction/restore possession when declaring a transfer void. Applying purposive construction and the legislative objects, the Court held the documents (gift deed and contemporaneous vachan patra) recorded the maintenance condition and that the condition was unfulfilled; further, Tribunals may order transfer of possession where necessary. The Division Bench view that Section 23 is strictly standalone and that absence of express clause in the registered deed defeated the claim was disapproved. The gift was quashed and possession ordered restored to the donor.
- [The State, Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. Satish Kumar & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 130; 2025 INSC 11](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-central-bureau-of-investigation-v-a-satish-kumar-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-130-2025-insc-11/): This analysis examines The State, Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. Satish Kumar & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 898 of 2024) focusing on territorial competence of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) post-bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh and the interplay between the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (DSPE Act), the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) and the Andhra Pradesh Re-Organisation Act, 2014. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s quashing of FIRs and related proceedings against Central Government employees accused under Section 7, PC Act, holding that (i) general consent granted by the undivided State of Andhra Pradesh in 1990 and extended by subsequent government orders continued to operate after bifurcation under the circular issued under Section 3 of the Re-organisation Act; (ii) statutes and executive instruments in force immediately before the appointed day are to be presumed to continue in each successor State until repealed or adapted; and (iii) where the accused are Central Government or Central undertaking employees charged under a Central Act, CBI’s power to register and investigate is saved and supported by the 1963 MHA Resolution establishing CBI functions. The Court relied on precedents including Kanwal Tanuj v. State of Bihar and Fertico Marketing & Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. CBI to reject the High Court’s view that absence of fresh state consent or fresh notification of a Special Court fatally vitiated proceedings. The result restored criminal proceedings and remitted trials to the Special Judge for CBI Cases, Kurnool.
- [Sri Mahesh v. Sangram & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 62 : 2025 INSC 14](https://lawfoyer.in/sri-mahesh-v-sangram-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-62-2025-insc-14/): This judgment examines the legal consequences of a post-humous adoption by a widow, focusing on the interplay between Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 12(c) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and the doctrine of relation-back. The dispute arose after the deceased owner’s two wives divided joint property by compromise; the first wife (who was issueless) later adopted the appellant. Subsequent to adoption, she executed a registered sale deed and a registered gift deed in respect of different parts of the suit property. The appellant claimed that by virtue of adoption he became the legal heir of the deceased and thereby entitled to a half-share, seeking to set aside both the sale and gift. The trial court upheld the adoption, declared the gift void (restoring the B and C schedule properties to the appellant), but upheld the sale deed. The High Court reversed the trial court only in respect of the gift, validating it and dismissing the suit. The Supreme Court, applying settled precedents (notably Shripad Gajanan Suthankar v. Dattaram Kashinath Suthankar and Kasabai Tukaram Karvar), affirmed that the adoption by a widow relates back to the date of the husband’s death but also reiterated that lawful alienations by the widow before adoption (or in certain circumstances after adoption but relying on prior vested rights) may bind the adopted son depending on the nature and capacity of the alienator. On facts, the sale deed (A schedule) was sustained but the gift (B and C schedules) was held invalid for lack of the legal prerequisites of a gift — most importantly absence of delivery/acceptance — and for being inconsistent with the evidential record. Consequently, the Supreme Court restored the trial court’s decree as to the gift and granted the appellant B and C schedule properties while confirming the sale.
- [Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-4 & Anr. v. M/s Jupiter Capital Pvt. Ltd., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 431 : 2025 INSC 38](https://lawfoyer.in/principal-commissioner-of-income-tax-4-anr-v-m-s-jupiter-capital-pvt-ltd-2025-1-s-c-r-431-2025-insc-38/): This judgment concerns whether a statutory reduction in share capital by a company — with consequent proportional diminution in a shareholder’s number of shares but with the face value per share unchanged — falls within the statutory ambit of “sale, exchange or relinquishment of the asset” in Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and therefore amounts to a transfer attracting capital gains tax under Section 45. The Supreme Court, relying on its earlier precedents (notably Kartikeya V. Sarabhai v. CIT and Anarkali Sarabhai v. CIT), holds that the reduction of share capital which extinguishes part of the shareholder’s bundle of rights is a species of relinquishment/extinguishment and thus a transfer under Section 2(47). Even though the shareholder continued to be a member post-reduction and percentage holding remained materially unchanged, the Court emphasised the substance over the form: the shareholder’s rights (dividend entitlement, capital entitlement on liquidation etc.) were proportionately extinguished and consideration was received — so the transaction falls within the inclusive definition of transfer and attracts capital gains treatment. The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the Revenue’s Special Leave Petition and affirmed the High Court and Tribunal decisions allowing the assessee’s capital loss claim.
- [Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana & Anr., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 117 : 2025 INSC 21](https://lawfoyer.in/daljit-singh-v-state-of-haryana-anr-2025-1-s-c-r-117-2025-insc-21/): Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 4359 of 2024, decided 2 January 2025, examines whether a proclamation under section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter Cr.P.C.) loses all legal consequences if the accused is subsequently acquitted of the underlying offence, and whether prosecution under section 174A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter IPC) can proceed once the section 82 proclamation is extinguished. The Supreme Court held that section 174A IPC constitutes an independent substantive offence: although proceedings under section 174A can only be initiated after a proclamation under section 82 Cr.P.C. has been published, they may continue even if the section 82 status is later nullified by subsequent developments (for example, acquittal in the original trial). However, the Court recognized judicial discretion: where the accused is acquitted of the underlying offence and the reasons warrant it, a court may close 174A proceedings in view of changed circumstances. On the facts, since the appellant was acquitted in the main proceedings and the disputed monetary claim had been satisfied, the Court quashed the High Court judgment, set aside the proclaimed offender order, and ordered closure of all criminal proceedings (including the FIR under section 174A IPC). The judgment balances the independence of the penal provision in section 174A with pragmatic considerations of fairness and utility where the original cause for the proclamation ceases to exist.
- [M/s Naresh Potteries v. M/s Aarti Industries and Another, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 40 : 2025 INSC 1](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-naresh-potteries-v-m-s-aarti-industries-and-another-2025-1-s-c-r-40-2025-insc-1/): The appeal examines whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”) filed by a manager holding a power of attorney satisfies the statutory requirement of Section 142 that cognizance be taken only on a complaint “made by the payee, or as the case may be, the holder in due course.” The trial court had summoned the accused on the basis of an affidavit under Section 200 Cr.P.C. filed by Neeraj Kumar, manager and authority-letter holder of M/s Naresh Potteries (the payee). The High Court, relying on A.C. Narayanan, quashed the summoning order on the ground that the power-of-attorney holder had not specifically averred personal knowledge of the underlying transactions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where a complaint is properly in the name of the payee (here the firm) and the representative (manager/power-of-attorney holder) is shown by documents (letter of authority, verifying affidavit, affidavit of evidence under Section 200 Cr.P.C.) to be in charge of day-to-day affairs and “well conversant with everyday affairs, financial transactions and sale-purchase of the firm”, the requirement of Section 142 is satisfied. The Court emphasised that explicit averment of knowledge must be gathered in context and need not follow a rigid formula; dismissal under inherent jurisdiction (Section 482 Cr.P.C.) is inappropriate where authorisation and prima facie knowledge appear on record and disputes on those aspects are matters for trial.
- [B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 12 : 2025 INSC 4](https://lawfoyer.in/b-n-john-v-state-of-u-p-anr-2025-1-s-c-r-12-2025-insc-4/): B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 50 of 2025 (02 Jan 2025) examines whether criminal proceedings under Sections 353 and 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 could be sustained where (a) the foundational written complaint required by Section 195(1) CrPC for offences in the range Sections 172–188 IPC was not filed before a Judicial Magistrate but addressed to an Executive (City) Magistrate, and (b) the FIR itself failed to disclose the essential ingredients of Section 353 IPC — namely assault or criminal force against a public servant — instead speaking only of a generic “disturbance”/“obstruction”. The Court canvasses the demarcation between cognizable and non-cognizable offences under Sections 154–156 and 155 CrPC, and reiterates that police cannot investigate a non-cognizable offence without magistrate direction. Finding that the complaint to the City Magistrate did not satisfy Section 195(1) and that the FIR did not prima facie disclose assault/criminal force under Section 353 IPC, the Supreme Court held the initial cognizance and consequent processes to be vitiated and quashed the proceedings. The judgment applies the Bhajan Lal quashing principles, stresses the difference between Executive and Judicial magistracy in the CrPC scheme, and rejects reliance on after-thought statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC to supply missing FIR ingredients.
- [Gopal Krishan & Ors. v. Daulat Ram & Ors., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 93 : 2025 INSC 18](https://lawfoyer.in/gopal-krishan-ors-v-daulat-ram-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-93-2025-insc-18/): The dispute concerns the validity of a Will dated 7 November 2005 executed by Sanjhi Ram (the Testator) who died on 8 November 2005. The Testator, owner of a one-fourth share in a parcel of land, left the share in favour of his nephew Gopal Krishan by the Will; thereafter Gopal Krishan conveyed the property to his sons and later sold it. Respondent-claimants challenged the Will as forged and fabricated, and sought declaration that the subsequent mutations and sale were void. The trial court rejected the Will; the lower appellate court reversed and held the Will genuine; the High Court in second appeal set aside that verdict, holding that the attesting witness’ deposition did not establish that the thumb-impression was affixed “by the direction of the testator” as required (per the High Court’s reading) under Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The Supreme Court examined the statutory text and precedents, emphasising the disjunctive quality of “or” in Section 63(c) and the settled rule that a witness who has seen the testator sign or affix his mark satisfies the statutory attestation requirement. The Court held that the testimony of the attesting witness (DW-1) that he saw the deceased affix his mark complied with Section 63(c) and therefore reinstated the lower appellate court’s decision validating the Will and upholding subsequent transactions. The judgment clarifies that the phrase “by the direction of the testator” applies where an attestor sees some other person sign the Will; it need not be read as an independent additional requirement where the witness directly sees the testator sign or affix his mark.
- [Kim Wansoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1 ; 2025 INSC 8](https://lawfoyer.in/kim-wansoo-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2025-1-s-c-r-1-2025-insc-8/): Kim Wansoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 2025 (2 Jan. 2025) considers whether the High Court should have exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash an FIR registered under Sections 406, 420, 323, 504, 506 and 120-B IPC against a foreign national who served as Project Manager of a contractor. The dispute arose from alleged non-payment by a chain of contractors/sub-contractors for manpower services amounting to about Rs. 9 crores; the complainant pleaded cheating and conspiracy after cheques were dishonoured and after one associated person’s death. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that quashing of criminal proceedings is ordinarily exercised under Section 482, Cr.P.C., but emphasised that the High Court may equally invoke Article 226 to prevent abuse of process or secure ends of justice, following the categories enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and subsequent precedents. On an evaluative reading of the FIR, the Court found that the allegations against the appellant were vague, did not disclose offences against him without addition to the recitals, and essentially sought criminal process as a vehicle for civil/money recovery. Relying on earlier authorities including Pepsi Foods Ltd., Eastern Spg. Mills, Golconda Linga Swamy, and Mohammad Wajid, the Court held that permitting trial would amount to abuse of process and miscarriage of justice. Consequently the FIR insofar as it named the appellant was quashed. Keywords: Article 226, Section 482 CrPC, quashing FIR, abuse of process, vague allegations.
- [Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and Others, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 190 : 2025 INSC 3](https://lawfoyer.in/bernard-francis-joseph-vaz-and-others-v-government-of-karnataka-and-others-2025-1-s-c-r-190-2025-insc-3/): Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz & Ors. v. Government of Karnataka & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2025 (02 Jan 2025). The appellants were owners of residential plots acquired under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 for the Bengaluru–Mysuru Infrastructure Corridor Project. A Preliminary Notification was issued on 29.01.2003, possession was taken (2005) but awards were not made for many years. In April 2019 the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) framed awards after relying on an Advocate-General’s opinion and judicial precedents, postponing the effective date for determining market value to a later year (2011) to mitigate injustice caused by delay. Project proponents challenged the 2019 awards and the High Court (Single Judge) quashed the awards for want of jurisdiction in shifting the notification date; the Division Bench treated the appellants’ appeal as premature. This Court (B.R. Gavai, J.) (i) held that SLAO had no power to unilaterally shift the date of preliminary notification, (ii) accepted that exceptional judicial exercise (under Article 142/226/32) can shift the date but only by the Court, (iii) found appellants had been deprived of property without prompt compensation contrary to Article 300-A, (iv) set aside the Division Bench order as premature and allowed the Writ Petition of appellants insofar as their claim to shift the date was concerned, and (v) directed the SLAO to pass fresh awards reckoning market value as on 22.04.2019 and to allow appellants all statutory benefits.
- [Three-Day Certificate Course on Maritime Law | Organized by The School of Legal Studies (SLS), the Cochin University of Science and Technology | Last date of Registration - October 13, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/three-day-certificate-course-on-maritime-law-organized-by-the-school-of-legal-studies-sls-the-cochin-university-of-science-and-technology-last-date-of-registration-october-13-2025/): Three-Day Certificate Course on Maritime Law | Organized by The School of Legal Studies (SLS), the Cochin University of Science and Technology | Last date of Registration - October 13, 2025
- [22nd LawFoyer Quiz on Indian Contract Act, 1872: Prizes worth Rs. 25K + | Cash Prizes, Smart Watch, Earbuds and much more | Bonuses for All Participants worth Rs. 5K+](https://lawfoyer.in/22nd-lawfoyer-quiz-on-indian-contract-act-1872-prizes-worth-rs-25k-cash-prizes-trophies-smart-watch-earbuds/): Download Final Answer Key -------------------------------------------- Check Results -------------------------------------------- Download E-Certificate -------------------------------------------- Dates Date of Quiz:- 21st September 2025 ( Sunday 7 Pm) Last Date to Apply:- 20th September 2025, 11:00 pm Result Declaration:- 27th September 2025 Prizes 1st Prize- Rs 5,000 + Smart Watch worth Rs. 5,000/- + Hardcopy Certificate of (Excellence & Participation) + Discounted Publication Opportunity
- [Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India and Others, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1331 : 2025 INSC 272](https://lawfoyer.in/radhika-agarwal-v-union-of-india-and-others-2025-2-s-c-r-1331-2025-insc-272/): The Supreme Court in Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India & Ors. (Writ Petition (Crim.) No. 336/2018; judgment dated 27 February 2025) upheld the constitutionality of the post-Om Prakash amendments to the Customs Act, 1962 and rejected challenge to arrest/summoning powers under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“GST Acts”). The Court held that the Finance Acts of 2012, 2013 and 2019 substantively altered s.104 of the Customs Act — creating clearly specified categories of cognizable and non-bailable offences — and therefore the earlier ratio in Om Prakash could not be mechanically applied to negate arrest powers granted by the amended statute. The majority framed rigorous safeguards that must precede any arrest by customs/GST authorities: the reasons to believe must be recorded in writing; the reasons must refer to material/evidence and show how statutory monetary thresholds are met; grounds of arrest must be furnished in writing to the arrestee before production before a Magistrate; and Code of Criminal Procedure provisions apply unless expressly excluded. The Court also rejected the challenge to legislative competence under Article 246-A, holding that powers to summon, arrest and prosecute tax evasion are ancillary to the power to levy GST. The separate opinion emphasised judicial restraint in reviewing arrests under special statutes, but insisted on strict statutory compliance and that judicial review be invoked where there is manifest arbitrariness or gross non-compliance.
- [Kanishk Sinha & Another v. The State of West Bengal & Another, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1405 : 2025 INSC 278](https://lawfoyer.in/kanishk-sinha-another-v-the-state-of-west-bengal-another-2025-2-s-c-r-1405-2025-insc-278/): The present judgment in Kanishk Sinha & Another v. The State of West Bengal & Another addresses whether the directions given by this Court in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh—that applications under Section 156(3), CrPC be accompanied by a sworn affidavit—operate retrospectively or only prospectively. The appellants, accused in two FIRs of falsification and associated offences, challenged the second FIR because the complaint presented to the Magistrate under Section 156(3), CrPC lacked the affidavit which Priyanka Srivastava later mandated. The Calcutta High Court held that the direction in Priyanka Srivastava would apply prospectively and therefore could not invalidate complaints filed in 2010–2011. Before the Supreme Court the appellants argued that judicial pronouncements are ordinarily retrospective unless expressly made prospective. The Court affirmed the High Court’s approach: although judicial decisions generally operate retrospectively, a judicial direction that is procedural and intended to curb future misuse (here, harassment by frivolous Section 156(3) petitions) may be given prospective effect to avoid unsettling past actions and to prevent undue hardship. The Court relied on the language and purpose of the Priyanka Srivastava directions, observing the phrase “a stage has come” and related measures (circulation to Chief Justices and Magistrates) as indicating an intent to regulate future conduct. The appeals were dismissed and the appellants were left free to seek discharge if charges were not yet framed.
- [M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1625 : 2025 INSC 274](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-a-p-electrical-equipment-corporation-v-the-tahsildar-ors-etc-2025-2-s-c-r-1625-2025-insc-274/): The Supreme Court in M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 4526–4527 of 2024; judgment dated 27 February 2025) addressed whether the State had taken actual physical possession of land declared surplus under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 before the State adopted the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. The appellant (now ECE Industries Ltd.) owned extensive holdings in Fatehnagar, Hyderabad, portions of which were declared excess. The Competent Authority issued notices under s.10(5) and purportedly an order under s.10(6), and a panchnama dated 08.02.2008 recorded possession taken by officials. The State adopted the Repeal Act effective 27.03.2008 (state adoption notified 22.04.2008), raising the critical question whether possession had in fact been taken prior to repeal so as to deprive the landholder of the remedial protection provided by s.3 of the Repeal Act. The Single Judge of the Telangana High Court held the s.10(6) order and panchnama to be void — finding dates and service defective and reliance on paper entries insufficient — and granted relief to the company. A Division Bench reversed. The Supreme Court restored the Single Judge: reiterating that vesting under s.10(3) is de jure and does not itself effect de facto possession; that the statutory procedure under s.10(5) (notice to surrender within 30 days) and, if necessary, s.10(6) (taking possession) must be strictly respected; that mere paper entries or post-repeal fabricated documentation cannot defeat the landholder’s right under s.3 of the Repeal Act; and that the onus lies on the State to prove cogently that physical possession was taken before repeal. The Court emphasised that where two reasonable views exist, a Single Judge’s considered view should normally prevail in intra-court appeals.
- [Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya v. Mahesh Prakash Ahuja & Anr, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1433 : 2025 INSC 282](https://lawfoyer.in/manoj-rameshlal-chhabriya-v-mahesh-prakash-ahuja-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-1433-2025-insc-282/): This case examines the standards a High Court must apply when deciding an application for leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against an acquittal. The appeal arises from the refusal by the Bombay High Court to grant leave in an acquittal appeal relating to an alleged homicidal death where the prosecution case depended largely on circumstantial evidence and an eyewitness (the deceased’s then-15-year-old son) turned hostile. The Supreme Court referred to and applied the principle in State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar (2008) and the doctrine of human fallibility as explained in Sita Ram v. State of U.P. (1979), holding that at the leave stage the High Court must apply its mind to whether a prima facie case or arguable points exist on the materials on record, without undertaking full re-appreciation of evidence. Where the material discloses need for deeper scrutiny or possible reappreciation the High Court must grant leave and decide the appeal on merits; conversely, if leave is refused the court must record reasoned application of mind addressing the relevant material. Applying these parameters, the Supreme Court found the High Court’s brief refusal inadequate and remitted the matter for admission and adjudication of the acquittal appeal on merits.
- [Pappammal (Died) Through LR R. Krsna Murtii v. Jothi & Anr, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1411 : 2025 INSC 277](https://lawfoyer.in/pappammal-died-through-lr-r-krsna-murtii-v-jothi-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-1411-2025-insc-277/): Pappammal (Died) Through LR R. Krsna Murtii v. Jothi & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1411 : 2025 INSC 277, concerns the narrow but important procedural question whether a legal heir may be impleaded as a defendant in a pending suit after substitution of another heir as plaintiff on the basis of a will. The original suit for declaration and recovery of possession was filed by Pappammal and prosecuted by her son as power agent; on her death the son produced a registered Will dated 13.06.2016 and sought substitution. This Court restored the substitution application and the Trial Court later allowed substitution. Thereafter the deceased’s daughter sought impleadment as defendant under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC, contending the Will was forged. Trial Court allowed impleadment and the High Court upheld that order; the son challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that substitution as plaintiff did not preclude other legal heirs from being made parties when their rights are in contest and that the object of trial procedure is to elicit truth by hearing all necessary parties. The bench relied on principles permitting courts to add or strike out parties and to try issues under relevant CPC provisions. The decision underscores the primacy of inclusion of necessary parties and the limited scope of substitution orders: substitution does not immunize a party from future contest or prevent impleadment of co-heirs who assert adverse claims.
- [The State of Chhattisgarh v. Ashok Bhoi Etc., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1785 : 2025 INSC 256](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-chhattisgarh-v-ashok-bhoi-etc-2025-2-s-c-r-1785-2025-insc-256/): The State of Chhattisgarh v. Ashok Bhoi Etc., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1785 : 2025 INSC 256 (27 February 2025) examines conviction and acquittal in a homicide prosecution founded entirely on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution’s case rested on the “last seen together” theory, recoveries allegedly made at the instance of an accused and incriminating calls demanding ransom. The High Court acquitted both respondents — one because the prosecution failed to connect him to the crime and the other because the circumstantial chain was incomplete and recovery evidence unreliable — and the State’s appeals were dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Court reiterates core principles applicable to circumstantial cases: (i) the prosecution must establish a complete and unbroken chain of facts from which guilt is the only reasonable inference; (ii) Section 106 of the Evidence Act shifts a burden of explanation where a person with special knowledge fails to explain incriminating circumstances, but that shift does not relieve the prosecution of proving the entire chain; (iii) last-seen evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to convict; (iv) recoveries made after a delay and without corroboration excite suspicion and may not inspire confidence. Applying these principles to the record, the Court found no reliable evidence linking Vikash Khubwani to the offence and insufficient cogent circumstances against Ashok Bhoi to exclude every other hypothesis. The High Court’s appreciation of evidence and law was affirmed and both appeals dismissed.
- [Sachin Jaiswal v. M/s Hotel Alka Raje & Other, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1396 : 2025 INSC 275](https://lawfoyer.in/sachin-jaiswal-v-m-s-hotel-alka-raje-other-2025-2-s-c-r-1396-2025-insc-275/): Sachin Jaiswal v. M/s Hotel Alka Raje & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 3269 of 2025, concerns whether immovable property initially purchased and titled in the name of one partner becomes partnership property under Section 14 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 when that partner, after formation of the firm, erects and operates a building for partnership business. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s finding that the late Bhairo Prasad Jaiswal had, by his conduct and express relinquishment, brought the land and the hotel building into the firm’s stock and that the property therefore belonged to M/s Hotel Alka Raje as property of the firm. The Court relied on settled principles that separate property may be converted into partnership property by the owner’s intention and conduct, that no formal instrument is necessary to bring property into firm stock, and precedent such as Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa and Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Chidambaram (Madras Full Bench). The Court rejected the appellant’s contention that title could not pass by way of a relinquishment deed without transfer under the Transfer of Property Act, holding that the decisive event was contribution to the partnership (and attendant relinquishment) after the firm’s constitution. Appeal dismissed.
- [Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another (Writ Pet. (C) No. 142 of 2024) (with W.P.(C) No.233/2024 and Suo Moto Writ (C) No.2/2023), [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1456 : 2025 INSC 289](https://lawfoyer.in/sarita-choudhary-v-high-court-of-madhya-pradesh-another-writ-pet-c-no-142-of-2024-with-w-p-c-no-233-2024-and-suo-moto-writ-c-no-2-2023-2025-2-s-c-r-1456-2025-insc-289/): The petitions challenge the termination of two women judicial officers — Sushri Sarita Choudhary and Sushri Aditi Kumar Sharma — from the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service during probation. Six women officers were terminated in May 2023; four were later reinstated after the Full Court reconsidered following directions from the Supreme Court, but the two petitioners remained terminated. The core legal question was whether these terminations were non-stigmatic terminations simpliciter (permissible for unsuitability on probation) or stigmatic (punitive) dismissals attracting Article 311 safeguards and principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court examined the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs), unit-value/disposal statistics, the timing and communication of adverse entries, the status of complaints lodged against the officers (many of which were closed or in abeyance), and the administrative process culminating in the Full Court and Government decisions. The Court held that adverse ACR remarks were in several instances not communicated in time, explanations were not considered or were rejected without expunction, and that surrounding circumstances indicated the terminations were effectively punitive and stigmatic. Applying precedents on probationers’ rights and the veil-lifting test where a termination cloaks punishment, the Court set aside the impugned resolutions, orders and termination letters insofar as the two petitioners were concerned, and ordered reinstatement with consequential benefits.
- [The Chief Manager, Central Bank of India & Ors. v. M/s Ad Bureau Advertising Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1445 : 2025 INSC 288](https://lawfoyer.in/the-chief-manager-central-bank-of-india-ors-v-m-s-ad-bureau-advertising-pvt-ltd-anr-2025-2-s-c-r-1445-2025-insc-288/): This analysis examines The Chief Manager, Central Bank of India & Ors. v. M/s Ad Bureau Advertising Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1445 : 2025 INSC 288, focusing on whether a borrower of a project loan qualifies as a consumer under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The dispute arose after Central Bank of India accepted a One-Time Settlement, issued No-Dues Certificates and filed a full-satisfaction memo under the RDDBFI Act, yet reportedly continued to classify and report the borrower as a defaulter to RBI/CIBIL, resulting in reputational and commercial losses for the borrower, including the loss of an Airports Authority of India advertising tender. The NCDRC found deficiency in service and awarded compensation of ₹75,00,000; the Supreme Court allowed the Bank’s appeal on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the borrower’s loan was availed for a commercial purpose with a dominant intention of profit generation and therefore did not fall within the statutory definition of consumer. The Court relied on precedents that require a close and direct nexus between the service availed and profit-generating activity (Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust v. Unique Shanti Developers; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harsolia Motors; Shrikant G. Mantri v. Punjab National Bank). The appeal on the quantum of compensation by the borrower was dismissed. This case clarifies the dominant-purpose test for consumer status in business-to-business loan transactions and emphasizes that self-branding or livelihood arguments cannot override an objective commercial nexus to profit generation.
- [Union of India Thr. I.O. Narcotics Control Bureau v. Man Singh Verma, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1534 : 2025 INSC 292](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-thr-i-o-narcotics-control-bureau-v-man-singh-verma-2025-2-s-c-r-1534-2025-insc-292/): The appeal challenges a High Court order that, while hearing a bail application, directed the Director, NCB to pay ₹5,00,000 as compensation for alleged wrongful confinement of the respondent for approximately four months. The Supreme Court considered whether a court exercising jurisdiction under Section 439, CrPC is empowered to award monetary compensation in the course of adjudicating a bail petition. Drawing on a consistent line of precedents restricting the ambit of Section 439 to questions of grant or refusal of bail and incidental conditions, the Court held that the High Court exceeded jurisdiction by converting a bail adjudication into a mini-trial and awarding compensation — especially where the bail petition had become infructuous because the respondent had already been released on the basis of a closure report. The bench emphasised that remedies for alleged wrongful detention lie in the appropriate fora and procedures (for example under constitutional writ jurisdiction or separate claims for compensation), and are not to be granted as part of deciding an infructuous bail petition. The impugned compensation order was therefore set aside while leaving open any statutory or constitutional remedies available to the respondent.
- [Call for Blogs | Labour & Employment Law Blog (LELB) | Organized by Centre for Labour Laws (CLL) at the National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-labour-employment-law-blog-lelb-organized-by-centre-for-labour-laws-cll-at-the-national-law-institute-university-nliu-bhopal/): Call for Blogs | Labour & Employment Law Blog (LELB) | Organized by Centre for Labour Laws (CLL) at the National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal
- [Sudershan Singh Wazir v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1416 ; 2025 INSC 281](https://lawfoyer.in/sudershan-singh-wazir-v-state-nct-of-delhi-ors-2025-2-s-c-r-1416-2025-insc-281/): Sudershan Singh Wazir v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., Criminal Appeal Nos. 536–537 of 2025 (Supreme Court, 28 Feb. 2025) examines whether a revisional court — exercising powers under ss.397 & 401 CrPC — can stay an order of discharge made under s.227 CrPC, and what safeguards must attend any such stay. The appellant, not named in the original FIR but arraigned in a later supplementary charge-sheet under ss.302, 201, 34, 120B IPC and ss.25, 27 Arms Act, was discharged by the Sessions Judge and released after furnishing bond. The State filed revision in the High Court which, by an ex parte interim order, stayed the discharge; thereafter the High Court directed surrender of the appellant to custody. The Supreme Court held that stay of a discharge order is a drastic step because a discharge places the person on a higher pedestal than even an acquittal. A stay that nullifies the practical effect of discharge ordinarily cannot be an interim relief in aid of final relief; it should be reserved for rare and exceptional cases where the discharge is ex facie perverse and only after affording the accused an opportunity to be heard. Instead of arrest/ custody, the Court emphasised s.390 CrPC remedies — direction to appear and be admitted to bail — as the proper protective device while revision is heard. The impugned ex parte stay and consequent surrender order were quashed; the appellant was directed to furnish bail under s.390 and the High Court to decide the revision on merits.
- [2nd Student Conclave on “ Sustainable Choices, Empowered Voices : Rethinking Consumption Through the Lens of Gen Z” | Organized by Delhi Metropolitan Education (DME), Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University (GGSIPU), New Delhi | Submission of Abstract - 26th October 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-student-conclave-on-sustainable-choices-empowered-voices-rethinking-consumption-through-the-lens-of-gen-z-organized-by-delhi-metropolitan-education-dme-guru-gobind-singh/): 2nd Student Conclave on “ Sustainable Choices, Empowered Voices : Rethinking Consumption Through the Lens of Gen Z” | Organized by Delhi Metropolitan Education (DME), Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University (GGSIPU), New Delhi | Submission of Abstract - 26th October 2025
- [Five-Day National Workshop on Write To Rise: A Virtual Programme On Research & Publication Skills | Lex Gazette Academy, Faculty Of Law, Vivekananda Global University, Jaipur | Last Date to Register - 11th October 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/five-day-national-workshop-on-write-to-rise-a-virtual-programme-on-research-publication-skills-lex-gazette-academy-faculty-of-law-vivekananda-global-university-jaipur-last-date-to-regist/): Five-Day National Workshop on Write To Rise: A Virtual Programme On Research & Publication Skills | Lex Gazette Academy, Faculty Of Law, Vivekananda Global University, Jaipur | Last Date to Register - 11th October 2025
- [Call For Papers: Aging In India & Japan Socio-Legal Issues and Measures Concerning Senior Citizens | Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Last Date Abstract Submission - October 12, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-aging-in-india-japan-socio-legal-issues-and-measures-concerning-senior-citizens-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-last-date-abstract-submission-october-12-2025/): Call For Papers: Aging In India & Japan Socio-Legal Issues and Measures Concerning Senior Citizens | Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Last Date Abstract Submission - October 12, 2025
- [C. Kamalakkannan v. State of Tamil Nadu rep. by Inspector of Police, C.B.C.I.D., Chennai, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 629 : 2025 INSC 309](https://lawfoyer.in/c-kamalakkannan-v-state-of-tamil-nadu-rep-by-inspector-of-police-c-b-c-i-d-chennai-2025-3-s-c-r-629-2025-insc-309/): This judgment concerns the conviction of C. Kamalakkannan under Sections 120B, 468, 471 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for his alleged role in preparing a postal cover that purportedly carried a forged marksheet. The trial court convicted on the basis of expert handwriting evidence and other material; the appellate courts affirmed. Before this Court the central contest was evidentiary: whether opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert may be acted upon without substantial corroboration and whether a photocopy/secondary evidence of a postal cover can stand when the original is not produced. Applying the principles in Murari Lal v. State of M.P. the Court reiterated that there is no inflexible rule requiring corroboration of a handwriting expert’s opinion but that courts must proceed with caution given the imperfect nature of handwriting identification. Crucially, the prosecution failed to exhibit or prove the original postal cover; the expert himself did not identify the particular cover received for examination. Non-production of the primary document rendered the expert’s opinion ineffective in law. The convictions were therefore quashed and the appellant acquitted.
- [Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P. and Another, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 303](https://lawfoyer.in/rajnish-singh-soni-v-state-of-u-p-and-another-2025-3-s-c-r-303/): Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P. and Another, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 303 (Hereinafter “the Judgment”) examines whether prolonged consensual sexual relations, begun after an initial alleged promise of marriage, can sustain criminal liability for rape where the prosecutrix later contends her consent was vitiated by a false promise. The Supreme Court, after reviewing the FIR, statements and investigation, and applying precedent (notably Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana and Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka), held that the material facts demonstrated a long-standing consensual relationship spanning approximately sixteen years and that the complainant had frequently represented herself as the appellant’s wife. The Court therefore concluded that the requisite causal link — that the sexual relations were purely traceable to a false promise of marriage and were maintained throughout by a misconception of fact — was lacking. The impugned criminal proceedings under Sections 376, 384, 323, 504 and 506 IPC were quashed as an abuse of process. This analysis is based exclusively on the judgment and record provided.
- [The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 341 : 2025 INSC 306](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-goa-anr-v-namita-tripathi-2025-3-s-c-r-341-2025-insc-306/): The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi raises the narrow but significant question whether a commercial laundry/dry-cleaning operation falls within the statutory definitions of “manufacturing process” and “factory” under the Factories Act, 1948, thereby attracting licensing, registration and penal consequences under the Act. Following an inspection of respondent’s premises (a central processing unit supported by collection centres) the inspector found more than nine workers employed, use of power-driven machinery, absence of approved plans, and lack of factory licence/registration under applicable Goa Factories Rules, 1985. The JMFC issued process; the High Court quashed the complaint principally on the ground that washing/dry-cleaning did not amount to a manufacturing process (adopting reasoning akin to Central Excise jurisprudence requiring transformation into a new marketable commodity). The Supreme Court, applying the plain meaning of the statutory definition, the mischief and objects of the Act (a welfare statute), and binding interpretations which require liberal construction for social legislation, reversed the High Court. The Court held that “washing, cleaning” are expressly included in Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948 and that the respondent’s activities—use of power, central processing unit and employment threshold—brought the premises within Section 2(m). The High Court’s reliance on an exigent notion of transformation (from Central Excise law) was rejected as inapplicable. The complaint and the JMFC order issuing process were restored.
- [Shabeen Ahmad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 367 : 2025 INSC 307](https://lawfoyer.in/shabeen-ahmad-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-367-2025-insc-307/): The appeals concern challenge to four High Court orders that granted bail to members of the deceased bride’s matrimonial family accused under Sections 498A and 304B IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The deceased, Shahida Bano, married on 07.02.2022 and died under highly suspicious circumstances on 22.01.2024. The post-mortem found asphyxia due to ante-mortem strangulation and multiple ante-mortem contusions, while witnesses and recorded statements speak of escalating dowry demands (initially a “Bullet” motorcycle and later a car) and persistent harassment. The Sessions Court had refused bail to the in-laws; the High Court granted bail to all four. The Supreme Court (Vikram Nath, J.) after close scrutiny held that where a young bride dies within the seven-year period with forensic and testimonial material indicating violent assault and persistent dowry demands, a stricter judicial scrutiny is required before releasing accused on bail. Applying that approach, the Court found a strong prima facie case against the parents-in-law and cancelled their bail while upholding bail granted to the sisters-in-law whose roles appeared less direct. The judgment underscores that bail orders in dowry death cases must register the gravity of the offence and the social message courts send; mechanical application of usual bail parameters without engaging with the material on record may be interfered with by a superior court.
- [IGNITAC'25: The 2nd Ignatius Trial & Advocacy Competition | Organized by St. Xavier's University, Kolkata | Register By October 3rd, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/ignitac25-the-2nd-ignatius-trial-advocacy-competition-organized-by-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-deadline-to-register-is-october-3rd-2025/): IGNITAC'25: The 2nd Ignatius Trial & Advocacy Competition | Organized by St. Xavier's University, Kolkata | Deadline to register is October 3rd, 2025
- [In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services (Suo Motu W.P. (C) No.2 of 2024), [2025] 4 S.C.R. 222 : 2025 INSC 300](https://lawfoyer.in/in-re-recruitment-of-visually-impaired-in-judicial-services-suo-motu-w-p-c-no-2-of-2024-2025-4-s-c-r-222-2025-insc-300/): The Supreme Court in In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services (Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.2 of 2024; judgment dated 03 March 2025) addressed whether visually impaired persons may be excluded from recruitment to judicial services by rule or medical opinion, and whether procedural requirements and cut-offs that operate equally on able-bodied and disabled candidates amount to indirect discrimination contrary to the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 and the constitutional equality guarantee. The Court held that visually impaired candidates who possess the requisite educational qualifications cannot be declared per se “not suitable” for judicial office; the exclusion in *r.*6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Services Rules, 1994 (as amended 2023) to the extent it excludes blind/low-vision persons was struck down. The Court emphasised the principle of reasonable accommodation under the RPwD Act and international instruments (UNCRPD), rejected reliance on non-speaking medical opinions to deny opportunity, and recognised that PWd/PwBD are to be treated as a distinct class deserving meaningful procedural adjustments (including relaxation of qualifying marks and a separate cut-off/merit list) so as to ensure substantive equality. The Court also struck down parts of *r.*7 (three years’ practice or 70% in first attempt) insofar as applied to PwD candidates, permitted relaxation of minimum marks where statutory/administrative power to relax exists, and directed declaration/maintenance of separate cut-offs and merit lists for PwD at every stage. Remedies were ordered for specific appellants and broader directions given to High Courts to adjust selection processes in light of the judgment.
- [Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 377 : 2025 INSC 299](https://lawfoyer.in/sharmila-velamur-v-v-sanjay-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-377-2025-insc-299/): Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 1037 of 2025 (Supreme Court of India, 3 March 2025) examines whether Aadith Ramadorai (“A”), a 22-year-old US citizen with Ataxic Cerebral Palsy and mild intellectual disability, possesses legal capacity to make independent, long-term decisions (notably residence) and whether his best interests are served by permitting him to remain in India with his father. The High Court (Madras) had dismissed a habeas corpus petition after a brief oral interaction with A and concluded he was consensually living with his father; the appellant-mother challenged that finding. The Supreme Court ordered and relied on a multidisciplinary assessment by NIMHANS, Bengaluru and prior evaluation by an Idaho Evaluation Committee. Those expert reports concordantly found that A functions at an 8–10 year-old cognitive level, has significant deficits in higher-order decision-making (financial, long-term residence, safety), and therefore lacks capacity to make legally binding complex decisions. The Court held that the High Court erred in discarding specialist reports based on a short interaction. Applying the doctrine of parens patriae and prioritising the best interest and welfare of A, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment, held A incapable of independent decisions, placed him under the sole custody/guardianship of the mother (who had earlier been appointed full guardian by an Idaho Court), and directed repatriation to the US with specific supervisory directions.
- [Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 325 : 2025 INSC 314](https://lawfoyer.in/saranga-anilkumar-aggarwal-v-bhavesh-dhirajlal-sheth-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-325-2025-insc-314/): Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 4048 of 2024; judgment dated 04.03.2025) raises whether execution/enforcement of penalty orders passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission under Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 can be stayed by an interim moratorium triggered under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (part III personal guarantor moratorium). The appellant — a real estate developer and personal guarantor facing insolvency proceedings — sought stay of 27 penalty orders and related execution actions on the ground that an application under Section 95 IBC had been filed and interim moratorium under Section 96 IBC had commenced. The NCDRC refused the stay; this Court affirmed that consumer-forum penalties are regulatory/compensatory in nature, fall within the excluded debts ambit (see Section 79(15) IBC), and are distinct from debts subject to moratorium protection. The Court distinguished Section 138 NI Act proceedings (where dishonour presupposes debt) from Section 27 CP Act enforcement and relied on precedents such as State Bank of India v. V. Ramakrishnan and Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd. to hold that the interim moratorium under Section 96 does not automatically stay regulatory or penal enforcement under consumer law. Appeal dismissed; decree-holders to enforce penalties within eight weeks.
- [K.S. Mehta v. M/s Morgan Securities and Credits Pvt. Ltd., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 315](https://lawfoyer.in/k-s-mehta-v-m-s-morgan-securities-and-credits-pvt-ltd-2025-4-s-c-r-1-2025-insc-315/): The appeals arise from orders of the High Court of Delhi refusing to quash criminal complaints under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (the NI Act), where two non-executive directors of M/s Blue Coast Hotels & Resorts Ltd. were arrayed as accused for dishonour of two post-dated cheques issued in purported repayment of an Inter-Corporate Deposit (ICD). The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that mere directorship — particularly a non-executive, independent directorship restricted to governance oversight under SEBI/Listing requirements — is insufficient to attract vicarious penal liability under Section 141 unless the complaint contains specific, unambiguous averments showing that the director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. The Court applied settled precedents requiring strict construction of penal vicarious liability and found absence of material linking the appellants to issuance or signing of the cheques, board approval attendance not amounting to control over financial operations, and ROC/CGR records corroborating non-executive status. In consequence the Court quashed proceedings against the appellants.
- [Siddharth Dalmia & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 197 : 2025 INSC 351](https://lawfoyer.in/siddharth-dalmia-anr-v-union-of-india-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-197-2025-insc-351/): In Siddharth Dalmia & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 197 : 2025 INSC 351, the petitioners moved the Court under Article 32 claiming that private hospitals compel patients to purchase medicines, devices and consumables exclusively from hospital-affiliated pharmacies at inflated prices, thereby violating the right to life under Article 21 and the Directive Principles embodied in Articles 38, 39 and 47. The petition highlighted non-disclosure of prices and the regulatory lacuna insofar as many consumables fall outside the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 definition. The Union and several States responded that price control and access to affordable medicines are addressed by mechanisms such as the Drug Price Control Order, 2013, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA), Jan Aushadhi/Amrit Drug Stores and various State schemes; additionally, the matter of public health falls under the State List (List II, Seventh Schedule). After hearing, the Court recognized that access to medical facilities is integral to Article 21 but concluded that comprehensive regulation of private hospital economic activity is essentially a policy matter for the States. The Court therefore declined to issue coercive directives against private hospitals, and instead directed all State Governments to consider the problem and take appropriate policy decisions in light of local conditions. The Court did not adjudicate merits and disposed the writ petition. Keywords: Public Interest, Private hospitals, Unreasonable charges, State List, Right to life.
- [2-Day Online Workshop on “Preventing Sexual Harassment at Home, Workplace & in Public Spaces” | Organized by Legal Aid Clinic, NLIU Bhopal | 4th – 5th October 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/2-day-online-workshop-on-preventing-sexual-harassment-at-home-workplace-in-public-spaces-organized-by-legal-aid-clinic-nliu-bhopal-4th-5th-october-2025/): 2-Day Online Workshop on “Preventing Sexual Harassment at Home, Workplace & in Public Spaces” | Organized by Legal Aid Clinic, NLIU Bhopal | 4th – 5th October 2025
- [Suresh v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 317 : 2025 INSC 318](https://lawfoyer.in/suresh-v-state-rep-by-inspector-of-police-2025-3-s-c-r-317-2025-insc-318/): The appeal challenges the Madras High Court order upholding the trial conviction and life sentence of the appellant for an offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860. The prosecution case pleaded that on 12.09.2008 the appellant poured kerosene on his wife and set her alight; the victim succumbed to burn injuries thereafter. The trial conviction rested primarily on a statement recorded by a Judicial Magistrate on 18.09.2008 treated as a dying declaration, and on depositions of the deceased’s parents. Material contradictions, however, appear on the face of the record: contemporaneous statements made on 12.09.2008 to the duty doctor and to the police indicated an accidental kitchen fire; the Judicial Magistrate did not elicit the reason for the change of statement nor examine the deceased about prior inconsistent statements; the medical evidence did not support an external assault before burning nor detect kerosene smell when the victim reached hospital; seizure witnesses turned hostile and the Observation Mahazar suffered delay and weaknesses. Applying the settled principle that a dying declaration may convict alone only where its quality is unimpeachable and where corroboration exists when inconsistencies arise, the Supreme Court found the subsequent dying declaration unreliable in the factual matrix and held that the appellant must be given the benefit of reasonable doubt. The appeal was allowed and the appellant acquitted.
- [Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v. Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 450 : 2025 INSC 325](https://lawfoyer.in/smt-lavanya-c-anr-v-vittal-gurudas-pai-since-deseased-by-lrs-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-450-2025-insc-325/): This judgment concerns contempt proceedings arising from an undertaking given by the defendants’ counsel on 11 July 2007 and reiterated on 13 August 2007 that the defendants would not alienate the suit schedule property. The Trial Court recorded that undertaking as an order on 17 November 2007 and extended it periodically. Despite that, sale deeds in respect of parts of the subject property were executed between November 2007 and December 2011. An interlocutory application under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A CPC (filed in 2011) alleging wilful disobedience was dismissed by the Trial Court for want of proof; the High Court, on appeal, held that the defendants had disobeyed the undertaking/order and imposed punitive measures (detention of one contemnor for three months, attachment of the subject property, and compensation of ₹10,00,000). The Supreme Court examined (i) maintainability of proceedings under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, (ii) the fiduciary/agency nature of the advocate–client relationship and authority to give undertakings, and (iii) whether the appellants’ plea that the undertaking was given without authority absolved them. The Court affirmed the High Court’s finding of contempt, observing that if the clients believed the undertaking lacked authority they should have promptly sought discharge of the order rather than wait four-and-a-half years. In view of the contemnor’s age, the three-month confinement was deleted, but attachment and compensation were confirmed and enhanced to ₹13,00,000 with simple interest @6% from 2 August 2013. (Source: judgment file).
- [Patel Babubhai Manohardas & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 432 : 2025 INSC 322](https://lawfoyer.in/patel-babubhai-manohardas-ors-v-state-of-gujarat-2025-3-s-c-r-432-2025-insc-322/): This appeal arose from conviction under Sections 306 and 114, Indian Penal Code, 1860 of four persons accused of having abetted the suicide of Dashrathbhai Karsanbhai Parmar by alleged blackmail and extortion through compromising photographs and videos. The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for five years; the High Court affirmed. On special leave, this Court examined the evidentiary matrix: timing and manner of lodging the complaint, credibility and internal consistency of principal eyewitnesses, presence or absence of corroborative physical evidence (recovery of ornaments, cheques, cheque-books, passbook, or the container of the poison), the provenance and treatment of the alleged suicide note, and the reliance on handwriting-expert opinion not tested in-court. The majority conclusion was that the prosecution case suffered from an unexplained twenty-day delay in lodging the complaint, material contradictions in the testimony of key witnesses (notably PW-2, PW-6, and PW-7), lack of recovery of alleged ill-gotten gains and absence of any trace of the poison at the scene, and an infirmity in treating the handwriting expert’s report as conclusive without producing the expert for cross-examination. Even if the suicide note were genuine, the record lacked any proximate positive act by the accused amounting to instigation or abetment close to the suicide so as to leave the deceased with no reasonable alternative but to take his life. The appeal was allowed and convictions set aside.
- [Sita Ram & Anr. v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 204 : 2025 INSC 359](https://lawfoyer.in/sita-ram-anr-v-the-state-of-himachal-pradesh-2025-4-s-c-r-204-2025-insc-359/): The appeal arises from the High Court of Himachal Pradesh reversing the trial court’s acquittal and convicting Sita Ram and Onkar Singh for offences arising out of a single nocturnal assault on Prem Lal that occurred on 16 November 2000. The deceased himself lodged the First Information Report at the police station after the assault, was medically examined, later admitted to hospital with a fissured skull fracture, suffered gastroenteritis during treatment and died nine days later on 25 November 2000. The post-mortem attributed death to asphyxia, while medico-legal exposition in the judgment links the skull injury to subsequent hypoxic-ischemic brain injury and aspiration leading to asphyxia. The High Court convicted Sita Ram under Section 304 IPC and Onkar Singh under Sections 323 and 451 IPC, sentencing them to imprisonment; this Court in appeal upheld the High Court’s findings on culpability but substantially reduced sentences on mitigating grounds. The judgment affirms (i) that a FIR made by the injured person may be admissible under Section 32, Evidence Act as a statement relating to the circumstances of the transaction resulting in death even if not made in expectation of imminent death; (ii) medico-legal causation may permissibly connect head injury to eventual asphyxia and hypoxic brain injury when the chain of events is medically plausible; and (iii) a credible dying-type statement, once held believable, need not be disregarded for lack of oath or cross-examination.
- [Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 540 : 2025 INSC 329](https://lawfoyer.in/periyammal-dead-through-lrs-ors-v-v-rajamani-anr-2025-3-s-c-r-540-2025-insc-329/): Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr., Civil Appeals Nos. 3640–3642 of 2025 (J. J.B. Pardiwala and Pankaj Mithal) examines the scope of Section 47 CPC read with Order XXI, Rules 35, 97–103 CPC when a decree-holder’s attempt to obtain possession is resisted by third-party occupants who claim to be cultivating tenants protected under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955. The core questions were (i) whether the executing court and High Court erred in upholding objections by respondent-occupants who claimed possessory rights as cultivating tenants, and (ii) whether those occupants could claim protection under the 1955 Act such that the decree would be a nullity for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court analysed the special code in Order XXI (esp. Rr.97 & 101) which empowers the executing court to determine, in execution proceedings themselves, all questions relevant to adjudication of resistance or dispossession — including questions of right, title or interest — and contrasted that procedural competence with the general provision in s.47 CPC. The Court found that the occupants (respondent Nos.1 & 2) had remained passive through the main suit and subsequent appeals, failed to produce cogent documentary proof of bona fide status as cultivating tenants, and that there was material to infer collusion between the vendors and these occupants to frustrate execution. The High Court’s refusal to permit amendments to the execution petition and its acceptance of the occupants’ objections were held to be erroneous; the appeals were allowed and directions were given for possession to be delivered to decree-holders within two months.
- [Call for Blogs | Call for Submissions - FairSquare | Organized by Competition Law Society of the National Law University, Delhi](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-call-for-submissions-fairsquare-organized-by-competition-law-society-of-the-national-law-university-delhi/): Call for Blogs | Call for Submissions - FairSquare | Organized by Competition Law Society of the National Law University, Delhi
- [Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 419 : 2025 INSC 327](https://lawfoyer.in/joyi-kitty-joseph-v-union-of-india-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-419-2025-insc-327/): Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India & Ors. concerns the validity of a preventive detention under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA). The detenu was accused of heading an organized syndicate smuggling foreign-origin gold into India, receiving consignments through carriers, transmitting consignments to commission agents and effecting cash sales without invoices. The detention order invoked clauses (i)–(iv) of s.3(1), COFEPOSA. The High Court upheld the detention; the Supreme Court granted leave and examined three main contentions: (i) omnibus pleading under multiple clauses showing non-application of mind; (ii) failure to place pending bail-cancellation application before detaining authority; and (iii) irrelevance / absence of a live link with earlier NDPS conviction. The Court accepted the material showing a chain of smuggling activities covering smuggling, abetment, transport/concealment and dealing and thus the factual basis for clauses (i)–(iv) was sustained. However, the Court found a distinct procedural/consideration lapse: the detaining authority did not advert to the bail order and its conditions and did not record any subjective satisfaction explaining why those conditions were insufficient to prevent further smuggling. Because preventive detention is an extreme, liberty-curtailing measure requiring closest scrutiny of the material and of the detaining authority’s subjective satisfaction, silence on whether the bail conditions were inadequate vitiated the detention. The detention was accordingly quashed and the detenu ordered released.
- [Vijay Bahadur v. Sunil Kumar & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 11 : 2025 INSC 332](https://lawfoyer.in/vijay-bahadur-v-sunil-kumar-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-11-2025-insc-332/): Vijay Bahadur v. Sunil Kumar & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 14311 of 2024 ([2025] 4 S.C.R. 11 : 2025 INSC 332) addresses whether a subordinate authority was justified in ordering a recount of ballot papers in a Gram Pradhan election where an unexplained numerical disparity of 19 votes existed between (a) the number orally communicated at the close of counting by the Presiding Officer and (b) the consolidated total shown in Form 46. The contest was closely fought (margin 37 votes) and the petitioning candidate alleged tampering, cancellation of votes in his favour, disappearance of the Presiding Officer’s diary and use of police to remove agents — facts accepted as raising prima facie suspicion by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who ordered recounting under Section 12-C of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. The Allahabad High Court quashed the recount order on the ground that the petition lacked documentary support and that secrecy of the ballot could not be lightly disturbed. The Supreme Court, after surveying established authorities on inspection/recount (notably Ram Sewak Yadav v. Hussain Kamil Kidwai, Vadivelu v. Sundaram, Suresh Prasad Yadav v. Jai Prakash Mishra and related precedents), held that where material facts are pleaded and contemporaneous records are missing or unexplained, and where multiple contestants support scrutiny, an order for recount is justified to protect the integrity of the electoral process. The High Court’s order was set aside and the Magistrate’s interlocutory order restored, directing recount after hearing parties.
- [Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 502 : 2025 INSC 338](https://lawfoyer.in/yuvraj-laxmilal-kanther-anr-v-state-of-maharashtra-2025-3-s-c-r-502-2025-insc-338/): Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra examines whether the trial court and the High Court were justified in refusing to discharge two accused persons under Section 227 CrPC where two employees died after being electrocuted and falling from an iron ladder while working on a shop signboard. Appellant No.1 was a contractor engaged in interior decoration and Appellant No.2 was the store operations manager of the lessee company. The investigating agency charged the appellants under Sections 304A/182/201 read with Section 34 IPC, but the Magistrate committed the case for trial under Section 304 Part II IPC; the Sessions Court and High Court treated the material as sufficient to proceed and dismissed discharge applications. The Supreme Court analysed the mens rea requirement of Section 304 Part II IPC — namely the presence of knowledge that the act was likely to cause death but absence of intention to cause death — and held that the record did not disclose either intention or the requisite knowledge. The Court emphasised that at the discharge stage (under Section 227 CrPC) the test is whether there are sufficient materials to justify a trial, not a threadbare or conclusive evaluation of prosecution evidence. Applying that test, the Court found no prima facie case under Section 304 Part II or even Section 304A on the facts, distinguishing Keshub Mahindra v. State of M.P. on its peculiar and catastrophic facts. The orders of the Trial Court and High Court were set aside and the appellants discharged.
- [State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 598 : 2025 INSC 334](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-assam-ors-v-arabinda-rabha-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-598-2025-insc-334/): State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 598 : 2025 INSC 334 (Dipankar Datta & Manmohan, JJ.) examines the legality of a successor Government’s decision to cancel a select list prepared for 104 posts of constables in the Assam Forest Protection Force after a PCCF note flagged systemic anomalies. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court erred in substituting its view for executive choice and whether the cancellation was vitiated by Wednesbury unreasonableness or disproportionality. The Court analysed precedent on (i) absence of indefeasible right arising from mere empanelment; (ii) circumstances where cancellation is justified because irregularities are systemic and irreparable; and (iii) interplay between Wednesbury reasonableness and the doctrine of proportionality. The PCCF’s note (4.7.2016) described district-wise skewed selections, violation of reservation principles, and instances of non-meritorious inclusions — facts the successor Government relied on to cancel the list and issue fresh advertisement. The Court held that where an executive, acting bona fide and on cogent material, concludes that a process has lost legitimacy (systemic violation of reservation and merit), judicial interference is not warranted merely because some irregularities could be individually corrected. The High Court’s orders directing continuation of the earlier process were characterized as appellate intervention rather than permissible judicial review. The Supreme Court quashed the High Court judgments, upheld the cancellation, granted liberty to re-advertise and directed that respondents, if they reapply, be considered with specified relaxations. Keywords: Service Law; Selection; Cancellation of select list; Wednesbury unreasonableness; proportionality; Assam Forest Protection Force; Article 226; policy decision; recruitment for public employment.
- [Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 490 : 2025 INSC 335](https://lawfoyer.in/gyanendra-singh-raja-singh-v-state-of-u-p-2025-3-s-c-r-490-2025-insc-335/): Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 1257 of 2025, concerns the appropriate forum of conviction and quantum of sentence where the same set of acts attract offences both under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The appellant, father of a minor girl, was convicted by the trial court under ss. 376(2)(f) & 376(2)(i), IPC and ss. 3/4, POCSO Act and sentenced to life imprisonment; the High Court affirmed conviction but interpreted the life term under ss. 376(2)(f) & (i) to mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life. This appeal raised two discrete legal questions: (i) whether the special statute (POCSO) ousts or overrides conviction under the general penal provisions when there is an overlap; and (ii) whether the High Court was empowered in an appeal filed by the appellant to increase the rigour of sentence from a discretionary life term to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life. The Supreme Court held that s. 42, POCSO Act governs choice of punishment where an act attracts punishment under both statutes — the court must apply the law prescribing the greater punishment — and that s. 42A (non-derogation/overriding clause) cannot be read to nullify s. 42. Consequently convictions under ss. 376(2)(f) & (i), IPC alongside ss. 3/4, POCSO Act were justified. However the Court found the High Court’s enhancement (life till natural life) unwarranted in appeal by the convicted accused and accordingly restored the trial court’s life sentence for ss. 376(2)(f) & (i) without the caveat of remainder of natural life while reviving the trial court’s life sentence under ss. 3/4, POCSO Act.
- [The Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 469 : 2025 INSC 348](https://lawfoyer.in/the-auroville-foundation-v-natasha-storey-2025-3-s-c-r-469-2025-insc-348/): The Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey (Civil Appeal No. 13651 of 2024; 2025 INSC 348; [2025] 3 S.C.R. 469) examines two intertwined questions: (i) the applicability of the equitable doctrine of clean hands and non-suppression of material facts to writ petitions under Article 226, and (ii) the statutory scope of the Residents’ Assembly under the Auroville Foundation Act, 1988—specifically whether the Assembly or an individual resident has any vested right to membership of committees or councils that the Governing Board constitutionally forms for implementing the approved Master Plan. The litigation history shows serial petitions by disgruntled residents that challenged Governing Board office orders reconstituting the Auroville Town Development Council (ATDC). The High Court allowed the respondent’s second writ petition without addressing preliminary objections about nondisclosure of an earlier dismissed petition. The Supreme Court reversed: it held that a litigant invoking extraordinary jurisdiction must come with clean hands and disclose material prior proceedings; suppression of that fact is an abuse of process warranting dismissal without examining merits. On substance the Court analysed the Act and Rules and concluded that the Governing Board alone exercises general superintendence, direction and management of the Foundation and may constitute committees and determine their composition; neither the Act nor the Rules confer a statutory right on the Residents’ Assembly or on individual residents to be members of committees constituted by the Governing Board. The impugned Standing Order No.1/2022 was held valid; the High Court’s order was set aside and costs of ₹50,000 imposed on the respondent. Keywords: clean hands, non-suppression of material facts, Residents’ Assembly, Governing Board, Auroville Master Plan, abuse of process, Article 226, Standing Order No.1/2022.
- [The Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody & Ors., [2025] 3 S.C.R. 516 : 2025 INSC 347](https://lawfoyer.in/the-auroville-foundation-v-navroz-kersasp-mody-ors-2025-3-s-c-r-516-2025-insc-347/): The Supreme Court in The Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody & Ors. examined whether the National Green Tribunal (NGT) exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing directions restraining and regulating road-construction activity by the Auroville Foundation and by directing preparation of a new township plan and appointment of a joint committee under the precautionary principle. The NGT had found a possibility of environmental harm from tree-felling and ordered: (a) suspension of further cutting until environmental clearance; (b) limited permission to complete the Crown Road subject to inspection and recommendations of a Joint Committee; and (c) replanting at a 1:10 ratio. The Supreme Court analysed the NGT’s jurisdiction under Sections 14, 15 and Schedule I of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, and the statutory history of Auroville including its Master Plan approved in 2001 and given statutory force by government notices and the Auroville Foundation’s Standing Orders. The Court held that NGT jurisdiction attaches only where a substantial question relating to environment arises out of implementation of enactments listed in Schedule I. Here, no specific violation of any Schedule-I enactment was pleaded and the NGT itself held the disputed area was not a forest under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. Consequently the NGT misapplied the precautionary principle, intruded into town-planning decisions finalised by competent authority, and directed actions beyond its statutory competence. Orders of the NGT were quashed and appeals allowed.
- [Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement & Anr., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 71 : 2025 INSC 349](https://lawfoyer.in/pradeep-nirankarnath-sharma-v-directorate-of-enforcement-anr-2025-4-s-c-r-71-2025-insc-349/): The appeal challenges the High Court’s dismissal of a criminal revision seeking discharge of Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma in a prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). The prosecution alleges that the appellant, while serving as a Collector, misused his official position to effect land allotments and related transactions that produced illicit gains which were thereafter concealed, layered and integrated through banking and hawala channels. The appellant’s core contention is twofold: (i) many of the predicate acts pre-dated the PMLA or the inclusion of the alleged predicate offences in the PMLA Schedule, rendering PMLA inapplicable; and (ii) the material fails to make out a prima facie case warranting continuation of proceedings at the Section 227 CrPC stage. The respondent (Enforcement Directorate) relies on the well-settled doctrine that money-laundering is a continuing offence and that the relevant date for PMLA liability is when the accused deals with proceeds of crime, not when the predicate offence occurred. On the record, courts below found prima facie material showing concealment, utilisation and fresh transactions linked to proceeds, and concluded that aggregate proceeds exceed applicable monetary thresholds. The Supreme Court, relying on prior precedent including Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary v. Union of India and on the statutory scheme (notably Section 3 PMLA and Section 24 PMLA), upheld the trial court’s refusal to discharge and dismissed the appeal, holding that (i) money-laundering may extend beyond the date of the predicate offence as a continuing crime; (ii) the monetary threshold was prima facie met; and (iii) interference at the preliminary stage was not warranted given the gravity and economic magnitude of allegations.
- [Vishnoo Mittal v. M/s Shakti Trading Company, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 41 : 2025 INSC 346](https://lawfoyer.in/vishnoo-mittal-v-m-s-shakti-trading-company-2025-4-s-c-r-41-2025-insc-346/): The appeal challenges the High Court’s refusal to quash Section 138 proceedings instituted against a former director after an insolvency commencement date and the consequent moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The appellant drew multiple cheques on behalf of the corporate debtor which were dishonoured before the insolvency commencement date (07.07.2018). The demand notice under Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) was, however, served on the appellant on 06.08.2018 — after the moratorium declared on 25.07.2018 and after appointment of an Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) who assumed control under Section 17, IBC. The High Court relied on P. Mohan Raj v. M/s Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. to hold that moratorium immunity applies only to the corporate debtor and not to natural persons who remain liable under Chapter XVII of NI Act. The Supreme Court distinguished P. Mohan Raj on its facts: there, cause of action under Section 138 arose before moratorium; here, the statutory cause of action (i.e., expiry of 15 days after demand) fell after imposition of moratorium and after the IRP had taken over management and bank operations. The Court emphasized that dishonour alone does not complete the offence under Section 138 — the cause of action crystallizes only after the obligatory notice and 15-day payment window lapse. Given Section 17 reposed management and banking control in the IRP and given that creditors were invited to file claims before the IRP, proceedings against the former director were quashed under the exercise of Section 482, CrPC.
- [Shivaleela & Others v. The Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Others., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 63 : 2025 INSC 357](https://lawfoyer.in/shivaleela-others-v-the-divisional-manager-united-india-insurance-co-ltd-others-2025-4-s-c-r-63-2025-insc-357/): This analysis examines Shivaleela & Ors. v. The Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 3840–3841 of 2025 (Judgment dated 17 March 2025), as set out in the uploaded judgment. The central question was the correct assessment of the deceased’s monthly income for quantum of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act after death in a road accident. The MACT originally fixed notional income at Rs.10,000/- per month and awarded total compensation of Rs.25,49,000/-; the High Court reduced this to Rs.8,000/- per month and to Rs.20,61,320/-. On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the material on record — depositions of PW3 (milk-vending evidence and passbook entries), PW4 (tractor-trailer hiring), PW5 (bank manager re loan for agriculture of Rs.4,20,000/-), and PW6 (wholesale purchaser of banana crop showing receipts up to Rs.5,00,000/- in a short span) — and concluded both forums had erred on the lower side. Considering the deceased’s active role in agriculture, hiring/driving and milk-vending and the joint-family realities (parents elderly), the Court adopted a forward-looking welfare approach and fixed a notional monthly income at Rs.15,000/-, added 40% for future prospects, deducted 1/5th for personal/living expenses, applied multiplier 16, and increased interest to 7.5% p.a. from the date of filing; total compensation was computed at *Rs.35,66,600/-. This analysis follows only the uploaded judgment and cites the same document where relied upon.
- [Gangubai Raghunath Ayare v. Gangaram Sakharam Dhuri (D) Thr. LRs and Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 184 : 2025 INSC 355](https://lawfoyer.in/gangubai-raghunath-ayare-v-gangaram-sakharam-dhuri-d-thr-lrs-and-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-184-2025-insc-355/): Gangubai Raghunath Ayare v. Gangaram Sakharam Dhuri (D) Thr. LRs & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 3183 of 2009) deals with the consequences of non-joinder of necessary parties in a suit brought for administration of a deceased’s estate where an ancillary prayer effectively sought partition/possession. The plaintiff (a daughter and co-heir) sued after learning that her brother Vishnu had purportedly obtained relinquishments and sold ½ of the suit property to the 2nd defendant. The Trial Court declined to entertain the administration suit as non-maintainable because certain heirs (children of Vishnu who died during pendency) were not impleaded, yet it declared the sale void and directed delivery of possession to the plaintiff. On first appeal the High Court reversed the Trial Court’s decree insofar as it set aside the sale and granted possession, holding that the sale was valid to the extent of Vishnu’s undivided share and that possession could not be decreed without impleading proper co-owners and/or partition proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court: (i) the principal prayer for administration being non-maintainable precluded conferring consequential partition/possession relief without proper parties; (ii) the sale deed executed by Vishnu is valid only to the extent of his undivided 1/5th share (as he became entitled on the death of the widow), and (iii) the plaintiff’s possession should not be disturbed until lawful partition. The Court relied on principles of necessary parties, Order I CPC, and Section 44, Transfer of Property Act and followed precedents emphasising that reliefs must be within pleadings, fees and proper parties.
- [Bank of India & Ors. v. Muthyala Saibaba Suryanarayana Murthy & Anr., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 120 : 2025 INSC 373](https://lawfoyer.in/bank-of-india-ors-v-muthyala-saibaba-suryanarayana-murthy-anr-2025-4-s-c-r-120-2025-insc-373/): Bank of India & Ors. v. Muthyala Saibaba Suryanarayana Murthy & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 3829 of 2025 (Supreme Court, 18 March 2025) addresses whether a High Court Division Bench was justified in setting aside a Single Judge’s dismissal of a writ petition by a retired employee who sought belated acceptance of an option to join the Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Scheme, 1995. The Bank issued Circular No.104/645 on 24.08.2010 inviting eligible retired employees to opt between 1.9.2010 and 30.10.2010 pursuant to a settlement dated 27.4.2010 between IBA and unions. The respondent retired in 2000, was abroad when the circular issued, returned to India on 1.9.2010, underwent a short surgery in early October, and only on 19.3.2011 (four months after the deadline) submitted forms seeking to join the pension scheme. The Single Judge dismissed the challenge, finding the Bank’s refusal reasonable; the Division Bench allowed the appeal on compassionate grounds. The Supreme Court restored the Single Judge’s order, holding that (i) wide publicity was shown to have been given and no cogent proof was produced that communication to retirees was deficient; (ii) beneficial policies prescribing time-limits cannot be extended indefinitely at a litigant’s convenience; (iii) absence of a legally protected right or judicially enforceable claim precluded mandamus; and (iv) high courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 will not rescue the tardy, indolent or lethargic. The judgment relies on principles in Calcutta Port Trust v. Anadi Kumar Das and Mani Subrat Jain v. State of Haryana, and emphasises certainty in collective settlements and the need to respect prescribed windows for exercising options.
- [Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal & Others., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 50 : 2025 INSC 361](https://lawfoyer.in/parminder-singh-v-honey-goyal-others-2025-4-s-c-r-50-2025-insc-361/): The appeal concerns enhancement of compensation payable to Parminder Singh, a 21-year-old veterinary student and State-level volleyball player, who sustained quadriplegia after being struck by a car on 3 June 2014 and was medically declared 100% disabled. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded ₹5,16,000; the High Court enhanced the award to ₹15,25,600 by applying a multiplier of 18 but fixing monthly income at ₹5,600 and failing to allow future prospects. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence of the claimant’s age, sporting background and technical training, took judicial notice of minimum wages and the lifelong impact of 100% permanent disability, and increased the notional monthly income to ₹7,500 with 40% future prospects (making effective monthly income ₹10,500). The Court additionally awarded lump sums for attendant charges, special diet, pain and suffering, physiotherapy, future medical expenses and loss of marriage prospects, and directed payment by direct bank transfer from the insurer. Total compensation fixed at ₹36,84,000. The judgment also issues practice-directions to streamline disbursal in motor accident matters by requiring bank particulars at the pleadings stage and permitting direct transfer to claimants’ accounts, citing precedents on direct payment in acquisition/compensation matters.
- [State (CBI) v. Mohd. Salim Zargar @ Fayaz & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 156 : 2025 INSC 376.](https://lawfoyer.in/state-cbi-v-mohd-salim-zargar-fayaz-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-156-2025-insc-376/): This appeal under Section 19 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 challenges orders of the Special Court acquitting the respondents for offences relating to the kidnapping and subsequent killings of two university functionaries and, in a connected matter, the alleged kidnapping-murder of the General Manager of HMT, Srinagar. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on confessional statements recorded under Section 15 TADA by a Superintendent of Police and on weak ocular testimony; the weapon (AK-47) was not recovered though forensic examination confirmed cartridges as from an AK-47. The Special Court rejected the confessions as inadmissible and held the prosecution had not proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal the State contended the confessions complied with statutory and Rule-15 safeguards and, if voluntary, could be sole basis for conviction. The Supreme Court analysed Section 15 TADA and Rule 15, surveyed controlling precedents including Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab and subsequent authorities, and found pervasive non-compliance with mandatory procedural safeguards: absence of contemporaneous question–answer records, non-mention of time/place, no evidence of adequate reflection time, discrepancies in dates, recording in fortified camps/JICs and prior rejection of one confession in an earlier trial (invoking issue-estoppel). The Court held the confessions vitiated and, in the absence of reliable ocular or corroborative material (and non-recovery of the weapon), affirmed the acquittals.
- [Chandra Shekhar Singh and Others v. The State of Jharkhand and Others., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 129 ; 2025 INSC 372.](https://lawfoyer.in/chandra-shekhar-singh-and-others-v-the-state-of-jharkhand-and-others-2025-4-s-c-r-129-2025-insc-372/): Chandra Shekhar Singh & Ors. v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 129 ; 2025 INSC 372, examines whether the word degree in the Food Safety and Standard Rules, 2011 and the Jharkhand recruitment advertisement for Food Safety Officer (FSO) can be confined to an undergraduate qualification or whether it embraces postgraduate (and doctoral) qualifications. The appellants — holders of Master’s degrees in Microbiology and Food Science & Technology — were shortlisted after the written exam but later disqualified by the recruiting authority on the ground that the advertisement required a degree at the graduate level only (with an express exception for Master’s degree in Chemistry). The High Court sustained the disqualification. This Court analysed the statutory matrix — notably ss.37, 91 and 94 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 and s.22(3) of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 — and the text of Rule 2.1.3 of the FSS Rules 2011. Applying the golden rule of interpretation and relying on the definitional clarity in s.22(3) UGC Act that degree means Bachelor’s, Master’s and Doctorate degrees, the Court held that the unqualified term degree in the rule and the advertisement includes postgraduate qualifications unless expressly excluded. The special mention of Master’s in Chemistry operates as a positive specification for that subject rather than a limitation excluding Master’s degrees in other listed subjects. The Court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court orders and directed appropriate remedial measures (including creation of supernumerary posts or consideration from interview-stage), while protecting the seniority of earlier selected candidates.
- [State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamlal & Ors., 4 S.C.R. 144; 2025 INSC 377](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-madhya-pradesh-v-shyamlal-ors-4-s-c-r-144-2025-insc-377/): The appeal arises from the High Court of Madhya Pradesh’s judgment dated 24 August 2017 which reduced the Trial Court’s conviction under Section 302 IPC to the second part of Section 304 IPC and directed that the accused be released having already undergone sentence, subject to a fine and compensation. The incident took place on 1 November 1989 when the respondents, allegedly as an unlawful assembly, attacked several persons including the deceased Laxman, resulting in multiple injuries; the deceased died on 15 November 1989. Medical evidence recorded lacerations to the skull and face but the post-mortem attributed death to asphyxia with the precise cause “difficult to give a definite reason”; viscera reports were negative for poison. Considering the long delay in disposal, the advanced age of several accused (some between seventy and eighty years), and the medical uncertainty linking injuries to death, the High Court converted the conviction to Section 304 (second part) and imposed fines/compensation. The State challenged that conversion as legally impermissible since the injuries were grievous and, the appellants argued, causally connected to death. The Supreme Court, after examining witness and medical evidence, upheld the High Court’s re-classification and relief on the twin grounds of serious doubt on homicidal causation and the exceptional facts of protracted pendency and aged accused, while advertently recommending priority for certain old pending criminal appeals.
- [M/s Faime Makers Pvt. Ltd. v. District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies(3), Mumbai & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 331 : 2025 INSC 423](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-faime-makers-pvt-ltd-v-district-deputy-registrar-co-operative-societies3-mumbai-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-331-2025-insc-423/): Faime Makers Pvt. Ltd. v. District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies(3), Mumbai & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 331 : 2025 INSC 423. The dispute concerns the Competent Authority’s power under Sections 5 and 11 of the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats Act, 1963 to grant a unilateral assignment of leasehold rights after an earlier order had dismissed a society’s application and granted liberty to re-apply only after resolving specific legal complications in an appropriate civil forum. The Competent Authority initially (22.02.2021) rejected the society’s claim because of factual and title complications and directed that those matters be litigated in a civil court; that order attained finality. The society nevertheless filed a second application (24.03.2021) and the Competent Authority allowed unilateral assignment by order dated 05.10.2021. The High Court upheld that second order. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the earlier order did not grant unconditional liberty to re-apply; the doctrine of res judicata binds quasi-judicial authorities and a coordinate/quasi-judicial body cannot unilaterally take a contrary view to a predecessor’s final determination unless set aside by a competent forum. Consequently, the 05.10.2021 order was quashed and the appeal allowed.
- [Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 436 : 2025 INSC 424](https://lawfoyer.in/ramayana-ispat-pvt-ltd-anr-v-state-of-rajasthan-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-436-2025-insc-424/): Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 7964–7966 of 2019 (01 Apr. 2025), examines the validity of the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms & Conditions for Open Access) Regulations, 2016 in light of the Electricity Act, 2003. The principal controversies were: (i) whether a State Commission may regulate intra-state aspects of open access even when power originates outside the State; (ii) whether scheduling constraints (notably Regulation 26(7) requiring 24-hour advance intimation) and penal norms for deviations amount to an unreasonable fetter on the statutory right of open access under s.42; (iii) whether Regulation 21 discriminates against captive power plants (CPPs); and (iv) whether the Regulations effectively foreclose open access. The Supreme Court upheld RERC’s Regulations, stressing that the distribution-level delivery, end-use and intra-state grid management are decisive for State regulation; that scheduling rules and deviation penalties are proportionate tools to preserve grid stability and prevent gaming; and that differential treatment of CPPs is justified by differing roles and obligations. The Court relied on the statutory scheme — especially ss.42, 79, 86, 181 of the Electricity Act, 2003 — and precedent (notably Energy Watchdog v. CERC) to read a partition of competence where CERC governs inter-state transmission while State Commissions retain regulatory control over intra-state aspects of open access even when supply originates externally.
- [Rakesh Bhanot v. M/s. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 573 : 2025 INSC 445](https://lawfoyer.in/rakesh-bhanot-v-m-s-gurdas-agro-pvt-ltd-2025-4-s-c-r-573-2025-insc-445/): Rakesh Bhanot v. M/s. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 573 : 2025 INSC 445, examines whether the interim moratorium that arises on filing an application under Section 94 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) crystallised in Section 96 bars or stays criminal prosecution under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act). The appellants, who faced complaints for cheque dishonour, sought ad-interim protection from criminal proceedings by invoking the interim moratorium available on initiation of personal insolvency proceedings. The trial courts and multiple High Courts refused to stay the NI Act prosecutions; these orders were challenged before the Supreme Court. The majority held that the moratorium provisions are directed to stay civil proceedings aimed at recovery of debts and to preserve assets for resolution or liquidation. The moratorium under Sections 96/101 cannot be stretched to shield individuals from personal criminal liability arising from issuance and dishonour of cheques. Reliance on prior pronouncements that moratorium under Section 14 protects only the corporate debtor and does not absolve natural persons was affirmed and extended to the personal insolvency context. The Court emphasised the distinct objects of the IBC (debt resolution and asset maximization) and the NI Act (deterrence and protection of cheque credibility), observing that extinguishment or restructuring of debt under IBC does not automatically extinguish personal penal liability of directors/signatories. The appeals and connected writs were dismissed, holding that interim moratorium cannot be used as a shield against prosecution under Section 138 NI Act.
- [Amresh Shrivastava v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 488 : 2025 INSC 417](https://lawfoyer.in/amresh-shrivastava-v-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-488-2025-insc-417/): This analysis examines Amresh Shrivastava v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. where the Supreme Court considered whether disciplinary proceedings could be sustained against a Tehsildar for a land settlement order passed under §57(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, and whether an inordinate delay (approximately 14 years) in issuing a chargesheet justified quashing departmental action. The Court revisited the exceptions laid down in Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan and held those six situations to be guiding principles, not rigid bars. Applying those principles to the facts, the Court found the impugned order to be a wrongful but bona fide quasi-judicial act, with no material indicating extraneous influence, corruption, or deliberate favouritism. Consequently the order did not attract disciplinary sanction. On delay, the Court recognized that prejudice from unexplained, inordinate delay—where the department knew of the alleged misconduct yet remained inactive—can bar proceedings; but it left open that where the department genuinely lacked knowledge or where delay is warranted by other considerations, delay alone will not defeat disciplinary action. The appeal was allowed and the Single Judge’s order quashing the chargesheet was restored. This judgment balances protection for quasi-judicial independence and public accountability, reiterating that mere error of judgment cannot be equated with misconduct unless supported by cogent material.
- [Satbir Singh v. Rajesh Kumar and Others, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 416](https://lawfoyer.in/satbir-singh-v-rajesh-kumar-and-others-2025-5-s-c-r-1-2025-insc-416/): This judgment examines the correctness of a High Court order setting aside a Sessions Judge’s order that summoned four persons as additional accused under Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to stand trial with the principal accused for offences under Sections 323, 324, 307, 506 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and Section 25, Arms Act, 1959. The factual matrix concerns a violent post-volleyball altercation in which the appellant, an Army serviceman, sustained two knife injuries — one of which was life-threatening. The Sessions Judge allowed an application by the injured witness (examined as PW-1) to summon his alleged assailants after finding materials in his examination-in-chief and other papers raising a satisfaction greater than a prima facie view. The High Court, on revision, overturned that order largely on the basis of investigative reports by Deputy Superintendents of Police and the lack of medical corroboration for injuries said to be inflicted by some of the proposed additional accused. The Supreme Court, applying the law laid down in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab and subsequent authority, holds that the High Court erred in taking a hands-on revisional stance; the Sessions Judge’s conclusion was a plausible one falling within the discretionary envelope for exercise of Section 319 and ought not to have been reversed. The matter is remitted to proceed to trial; the Court clarifies that no expression here is an opinion on guilt. Keywords: Section 319 CrPC; summoning additional accused; medical corroboration; revisional jurisdiction; Hardeep Singh test.
- [Zulfiquar Haider & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 205 : 2025 INSC 480](https://lawfoyer.in/zulfiquar-haider-anr-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-205-2025-insc-480/): Zulfiquar Haider & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 4590 of 2025 (decided 1 Apr. 2025) examines the legality of summary demolition of residential structures by the Prayagraj Development Authority (PDA) under Section 27 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 (“1973 Act”). The Court held the PDA’s action arbitrary and violative of the right to shelter under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, because the statutory and procedural safeguards required before demolition were not observed. The judgment reads Section 43(1)(d)(ii) of the Act purposively: “if such person cannot be found” means after genuine, multiple, on-ground attempts to effect personal service over more than one day; only thereafter may authorities resort to affixation and registered post — and ordinarily both methods should be employed given the drastic consequences of demolition under Section 27. The Court relied on its earlier In Re: Directions in the matter of demolition of structures and directed strict compliance with those directions, set aside the High Court order, quantified costs (₹10,00,000 per appeal) against the PDA, and left open remedies for the appellants including compensation claims. This decision reinforces procedural due process, natural justice and the requirement of reasonable notice before deprivation of shelter.
- [Kishore Chhabra v. The State of Haryana & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 327 : 2025 INSC 419](https://lawfoyer.in/kishore-chhabra-v-the-state-of-haryana-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-327-2025-insc-419/): This appeal concerns an owner-occupier, Kishore Chhabra, whose land at Sultanpur, Sonipat was included in a Section 4 notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Land Acquisition Collector passed an award stating possession had been taken and the land vested in the Government. The appellant repeatedly sought release of his land; earlier writ proceedings failed. Primary legal questions were whether (a) the appellant possesses a valid Change of Land Use (CLU) for running a factory said to exist since 1970; (b) the appellant was discriminated against compared to other landowners whose lands were released; and (c) delay, laches or res judicata barred relief. The State relied on absence of CLU, deemed possession, and planning exigencies including expenditure on sector infrastructure and an earmarked green belt. The Court held that the area fell within a controlled area under the Punjab Scheduled Roads & Controlled Areas Restrictions of Unregulated Development Act, 1963 and a CLU was a statutory prerequisite to validate a factory; no CLU had been produced. Discrimination claims failed on materials showing differing facts and prior CLU-grant timelines in other releases. Delay and res judicata were rejected on the facts. However, on the peculiar factual matrix — the appellant’s asserted continuous physical possession and operation of a factory which the State did not satisfactorily controvert — the Court, exercising powers under Article 142, directed that compensation be calculated under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 as of its commencement date. This remedy was granted as a case-specific equitable disposition and not as precedent.
- [Piramal Capital and Housing Finance Limited (Formerly DHFL) v. 63 Moons Technologies Ltd. & Others, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 344 : 2025 INSC 421](https://lawfoyer.in/piramal-capital-and-housing-finance-limited-formerly-dhfl-v-63-moons-technologies-ltd-others-2025-4-s-c-r-344-2025-insc-421/): The Supreme Court considered a cluster of appeals arising from the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL) after the Reserve Bank of India superseded its board and initiated insolvency proceedings. The core questions were whether the Committee of Creditors (CoC) and NCLT could approve a Resolution Plan (RP) that (a) allowed the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) to appropriate recoveries arising from Section 66 (fraudulent/wrongful trading) applications, (b) provided a distribution mechanism that did not repay fixed depositors in full, and (c) excluded ex-promoters (whose board was superseded by RBI) from CoC participation and access to RPs. The Court held that Section 66 claims (fraud/wrongful trading) are conceptually different from avoidance claims under Sections 43–50 and that where applications under both Chapters III and VI are filed the Adjudicating Authority must distinguish and decide each under the relevant statutory heads. The Supreme Court restored the NCLT’s approval of the RP (upholding the CoC’s commercial wisdom) but clarified that (i) recoveries from Sections 43, 45, 50 (avoidance) shall enure to the CoC, and (ii) recoveries from Section 66 applications shall go to the SRA as agreed in the RP; and directed the NCLT to decide the pending avoidance and Section 66 applications on their merits. The Court also held that neither the RBI Act nor NHB Act mandates full repayment of deposits in the insolvency resolution; and that superseded directors (vacated on supersession) cannot claim CoC participation or pre-approval access to RPs.
- [The Secretary, All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society (AISSMS) and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 342 : 2025 INSC 422](https://lawfoyer.in/the-secretary-all-india-shri-shivaji-memorial-society-aissms-and-ors-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-and-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-342-2025-insc-422/): The Secretary, All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society (AISSMS) v. The State of Maharashtra, Civil Appeal Nos. 4564–4567 of 2025 (2025 INSC 422), addresses whether teachers appointed to technical institutes after the AICTE notification of 15.03.2000 but who failed to acquire Ph.D. within the period mandated by later regulations are entitled to upward movement under the AICTE 2010 pay-structure notification — specifically placement in the Pay Band Rs. 37,400–67,000 with AGP Rs. 9,000 and re-designation as Associate Professor. The Supreme Court parsed the sequence of AICTE instruments (2000, 2005, 2010 and the 2016 clarificatory note) and held that incumbent Assistant Professors in the 2010 notification can only include (a) those appointed before 15.03.2000 when Ph.D. was not essential; (b) those appointed after 15.03.2000 who already had Ph.D. at appointment; or (c) those appointed after 15.03.2000 who obtained Ph.D. within the seven-year window prescribed by the 2005 notification. Teachers who were appointed post-2000, lacked Ph.D. at appointment and failed to secure it within seven years cannot claim the 2010 benefits. The Court emphasized deference to expert academic bodies like AICTE and its statutory mandate under Section 10 and Section 23 of the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987, subject to judicial review only where the expert prescription is arbitrary or illegal. Directions were given to pay arrears to those entitled, with interest, and to consider future upward requests once Ph.D. is acquired, while preserving institutional verification procedures.
- [Shri. Masaidevi Vividh Karyakari Sahakari Seva Sanstha Maryadit Warewadi v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 409 : 2025 INSC 436](https://lawfoyer.in/shri-masaidevi-vividh-karyakari-sahakari-seva-sanstha-maryadit-warewadi-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-409-2025-insc-436/): Shri. Masaidevi Vividh Karyakari Sahakari Seva Sanstha Maryadit Warewadi v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 409 : 2025 INSC 436, concerns the threshold question whether the State correctly directed registration of a Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society (PACCS) despite a Scrutiny Committee’s finding that the proposal lacked economic/financial viability mandated by statutory provisions and State Government Resolutions. The Scrutiny Committee rejected the registration application for multiple deficiencies absence of verifiable bank undertakings, inadequate documentary proof of crop areas and member-wise loan transfers, and a lack of share capital satisfying the Government’s requirement. The State, on appeal, allowed registration relying on practical difficulties of villagers and undertakings to raise capital later. The High Court set aside the State’s order holding that the State had ignored mandatory policy pre-requisites and unlawfully interfered with the expert Committee’s findings. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court, emphasising that economic viability is a pre-requisite under ss.4 & 6 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and related Government Resolutions (23.09.2013; 14.02.2017). The Court held that administrative discretion to relax conditions cannot be exercised arbitrarily in appeal to nullify eligibility criteria set by Government Resolutions; such relaxation requires a formal Government Resolution. The Scrutiny Committee’s rejection was justified and the State’s order was quashed.
- [Jomon K.K. v. Shajimon P. & Ors. Etc., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 369 : 2025 INSC 425.](https://lawfoyer.in/jomon-k-k-v-shajimon-p-ors-etc-2025-5-s-c-r-369-2025-insc-425/): The appeal concerns whether an applicant holding a Syrang’s licence (a higher certificate) but not a current Lascar’s licence could validly be considered for direct recruitment to the post of Boat Lascar under the Special Rules of 1975 for the Kerala State Water Transport Subordinate Service (Operating Wing). The KPSC advertised possession of a current Lascar’s licence as an essential qualification; nevertheless, candidates holding Syrang (and other superior) licences were allowed to appear and one such candidate (the appellant) secured top place and was appointed, after which petitions were filed challenging inclusion of ineligible candidates. The Kerala Administrative Tribunal set aside inclusion of candidates lacking a current Lascar’s licence and directed recasting of the ranked list; the KPSC thereafter cancelled the appellant’s appointment. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s writ petitions and this Court affirmed. The majority held that the statutory scheme and Rule 6 create a distinct class limited to holders of a current Lascar’s licence; “current” denotes a subsisting, operative certificate at the last date for receipt of applications. Allowing holders of Syrang’s licence to compete without public notice would deny equality of opportunity to similarly or better qualified persons who did not apply and would distort the feeder-promotion architecture and nature of duties. Non-joinder was addressed but the appellant’s delay and conduct (responding to show-cause rather than promptly challenging the Tribunal order) precluded relief. Exercise of Article 142 to salvage an irregular appointment was declined. Reliance and discussion were confined to authorities and provisions appearing on record.
- [M/s Ferro Concrete Construction (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 529 : 2025 INSC 429](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-ferro-concrete-construction-india-pvt-ltd-v-the-state-of-rajasthan-2025-4-s-c-r-529-2025-insc-429/): This appeal examines whether a contractual clause which provides that “the contractor shall not be entitled to claim any interest upon any payment, any arrears or upon any balance, which may be found due to him at any time” operates as an express ouster of an arbitrator’s power to award pendente lite interest under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The arbitrator had awarded 15% p.a. pendente lite interest from the date of reference; the District Judge reduced the rate to 9% and the High Court upheld that order. The Supreme Court revisited settled precedents under the 1940 Act, contrasted them with the approach under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and applied the test of strict construction developed by earlier constitutional and larger benches. Holding that a general bar on claiming interest on amounts payable under a contract does not, without more, constitute an express bar on the arbitrator’s power to award pendente lite interest, the Court set aside the High Court’s decision. Taking account of delay, payments already made, and post-award interest already paid, the Court granted 9% p.a. pendente lite interest from 18.12.1991 to 07.03.1995. The judgment reiterates that under the 1940 Act an express and clear ouster must be shown before denying an arbitrator the power to award pre-reference or pendente lite interest, whereas the 1996 Act (s.31(7)) gives greater primacy to party autonomy.
- [Ashok Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 504 : 2025 INSC 427](https://lawfoyer.in/ashok-singh-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2025-4-s-c-r-504-2025-insc-427/): The appeal challenges the High Court’s acquittal of the drawer-signatory of a dishonoured cheque for offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The complainant claimed he advanced Rs. 22,00,000 as a loan and relied on a cheque dated 17.03.2010 which, when presented, was returned with endorsement “payment stopped by drawer”. Trial and first-appeal courts found a legally enforceable debt and convicted the accused. The High Court set aside conviction primarily because the complainant had not produced documentary evidence of the source of funds (bank withdrawal particulars) and because the partnership-firm drawer was not arrayed. This Court reversed the High Court: it held that the statutory presumption under Sections 118 and 139 in favour of the payee signatory once the cheque, its genuineness and dishonour are proved, is not displaced by the mere absence of documentary evidence about the payee’s source of funds unless the accused raises such specific defence. The Court also explained that where the signatory is the person in charge of a partnership firm, prosecution need not separately arraign the firm. Because the accused’s explanation (cheque lost; stop-payment) was demonstrably inconsistent (police intimations dated 2011 though back-dated 12.03.2010), the presumption survived. Considering age and antecedents, the Court modified the sentence to a monetary fine of Rs. 32,00,000 payable within four months, failing which the original sentence would revive. Key authorities relied upon include Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel, Sunita Palita, Aneeta Hada, S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant.
- [The Management of Worth Trust v. The Secretary, Worth Trust Workers Union, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 360 : 2025 INSC 432](https://lawfoyer.in/the-management-of-worth-trust-v-the-secretary-worth-trust-workers-union-2025-5-s-c-r-360-2025-insc-432/): The appeal concerns whether Workshop for Rehabilitation and Training of the Handicapped Trust (WORTH) — originally Swedish Red Cross Rehabilitation Trust — which combines charitable rehabilitation with commercial manufacturing, falls within the exemptions of Section 32 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 and thereby escapes liability to pay statutory bonus to factory workmen. The Tribunal had held the Union’s claim for bonus and ex-gratia partly justified, awarding the minimum statutory bonus (8.33%) and recognising prior ex-gratia payments. The High Court affirmed the Tribunal but permitted adjustment of bonus by deducting amounts paid ex-gratia. On challenge, the Supreme Court analysed the Bonus Act’s scheme and the Factories Act, 1948 definition of “factory”, concluded that factories operated by the trust attract the Bonus Act, and rejected the trust’s contention that it is an institution akin to the Indian Red Cross Society or an institution established not for purposes of profit under Section 32(v)(a) & (c). The Court held that the character of the employing unit (running manufacturing units generating surplus) and the fact that employees work in factories bring them within the Bonus Act irrespective of the parent trust’s charitable objects; ex-gratia charity does not supplant the statutory right to bonus. The appellant was directed to pay bonus from 1996–97 till date, subject to set-off of earlier ex-gratia.
- [Maukam Singh & Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 336 : 2025 INSC 435](https://lawfoyer.in/maukam-singh-others-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2025-4-s-c-r-336-2025-insc-435/): The case arises from an altercation at the house of Than Singh over the worship at a deity installed on disputed land, where the appellants allegedly entered armed, assaulted the family and caused the death of the grandfather and injuries to three grandchildren. The Trial Court convicted three accused under Sections 302, 323 and 324 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment (for s.302) and terms for the offences relating to bodily injury; the High Court confirmed conviction and sentence. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the central questions were whether ocular testimony of injured relatives can sustain a conviction for murder, whether the injuries and medical opinion permit only a lesser conviction (culpable homicide not amounting to murder under s.304 Part II) or whether the ingredients of s.302 were proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Court analysed the credibility of eyewitnesses (all grandchildren and all themselves injured), motive and premeditation (entry armed with deadly weapons to the victim’s house), medical evidence (fatal head injury that could be inflicted by a hard blunt object or by a fall) and inconsistencies between Section 161 statements and trial depositions. The Court held that relationship of witnesses to the deceased does not ipso facto render them interested; the contemporaneous injuries to these eyewitnesses and corroboration by a neighbour made their testimony reliable. Considering the overt acts, the deadly nature of weapons, the assailants being aggressors who trespassed and the fatal blow to a vital part of the body, the Court concluded that the prosecution proved murder under s.302 and dismissed the appeal.
- [Smt. Uma Devi & Ors. v. Sri. Anand Kumar & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 521 : 2025 INSC 434](https://lawfoyer.in/smt-uma-devi-ors-v-sri-anand-kumar-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-521-2025-insc-434/): This appeal examines whether the High Court erred in remanding a partition suit to trial when the trial court had dismissed the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation and did not disclose a cause of action. The plaintiffs grandchildren of the original owner filed a partition suit in 2023 seeking shares in ancestral property allegedly denied to them. Defendants relied on an oral family partition of 1968 followed by registered sale deeds executed in 1978 and corresponding mutations in revenue records. The trial court, on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint and its annexures, concluded that the suit was prima facie barred by limitation and that the registered documents constituted constructive notice, and therefore allowed defendants’ application under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC. The High Court reversed, finding triable issues and remanding for trial. The Supreme Court, applying settled principles on rejection of plaint and constructive notice from registered documents, held that when the plaint and documents attached demonstrate a hopelessly barred suit, dismissal under Order VII, Rule 11 is permissible. The High Court’s remand was set aside and the trial court’s order restoring finality was upheld. (Source: judgment record).
- [The Superintending Engineer, Operation, TSSPDCL & Ors. v. Ch. Bhaskara Chary, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 543 : 2025 INSC 428](https://lawfoyer.in/the-superintending-engineer-operation-tsspdcl-ors-v-ch-bhaskara-chary-2025-4-s-c-r-543-2025-insc-428/): The Superintending Engineer, Operation, Telangana State Southern Power Distribution Company Ltd. & Ors. v. Ch. Bhaskara Chary concerns entitlement to regular appointment from a quota created for ex-casual labourers under an administrative policy. The appellant authority repeatedly rejected the respondent’s claim for appointment to the post of Lower Division Clerk (LDC) on multiple grounds — alleged forgery of service certificate, failure in typewriting and absence of vacancy — despite the respondent appearing higher in the published seniority list of qualified candidates. The High Court directed reconsideration and ordered that the respondent be considered for appointment pari passu with candidates placed lower in the list but earlier regularized; the division bench upheld that order. The Supreme Court examined whether the list before the High Court was a mere list of eligible candidates or a seniority/gradation list, whether the respondent was entitled to parity with appointed candidates who had fewer man-days, and whether factual issues of certificate genuineness and vacancy could be finally resolved by the Court at the interlocutory stage. The Court found the list to be a seniority list, noted admissions in the appellant’s affidavit that less-tenured candidates were regularized, and held that the respondent’s case must be reconsidered on par with those candidates while permitting the authority to examine other factual aspects and pass appropriate orders. The matter was remitted for fresh consideration within a prescribed time.
- [Vinay Aggarwal v. The State of Haryana and Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 497 : 2025 INSC 433](https://lawfoyer.in/vinay-aggarwal-v-the-state-of-haryana-and-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-497-2025-insc-433/): This judgment concerns an appeal against a Punjab & Haryana High Court order directing the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to take over the investigation arising from FIR No.215/2022 registered at P.S. Sector-20, Panchkula, under various penal provisions including ss.120B, 177, 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 IPC. The complainant sought a transfer of investigation under Section 482 CrPC, alleging that the accused impersonated an Inspector General (IB) and extorted large sums, and further asserting that some local police officers were acquainted with and possibly in collusion with the accused. The High Court (Single Judge) ordered CBI investigation; the accused challenged that order before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court (Dhulia, J.) held that the High Court erred in directing a CBI probe on the basis of vague and bald allegations unsupported by material. Reiterating the principles in State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights and following Minor Irrigation & Rural Engg. Services, U.P. v. Sahngoo Ram Arya, the Court emphasized that constitutional courts possess power to direct CBI inquiries but must exercise that extraordinary jurisdiction sparingly and only where prima facie material warrants it. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, allowed the appeal and dismissed the contempt petition against CBI after accepting an unconditional apology; it limited its observations strictly to the question of directing CBI investigation.
- [Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. & Anr.,[2025] 5 S.C.R. 446 : 2025 INSC 472](https://lawfoyer.in/kashmiri-lal-sharma-v-himachal-pradesh-state-electricity-board-ltd-anr-2025-5-s-c-r-446-2025-insc-472/): Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. & Anr., Civil Appeal Nos. 4761–4762 of 2025 (3 Apr. 2025) addresses two connected questions: (i) whether an Office Memorandum dated 29.03.2013 (which extended the age of superannuation from 58 to 60 years) that on its face applied to the visually impaired category could be read down to benefit all benchmark disabilities listed under the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016; and (ii) whether the State could validly withdraw that OM by another OM dated 04.11.2019, and if so, what effect that rescission would have on a person already claiming the benefit. The Supreme Court held that the question of extension to other disabilities was settled by Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab (the Court endorsed the High Court’s view that confining extension solely to visually-impaired employees would be discriminatory and that equivalent benefit ought to be available to other benchmark disabilities under the 1995/2016 enactments). However, the Court also held that change in service conditions which has not been incorporated into service rules/regulations can be rescinded by the competent authority invoking the power (and in light of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act). Because no judicial order had by then vested a right in the appellant, the rescission dated 04.11.2019 removed entitlement beyond that date. The appellant was therefore entitled to continuation only up to 04.11.2019 along with wages and consequential pensionary impacts for the period 01.10.2018–04.11.2019.
- [UCO Bank & Anr. v. Vijay Kumar Handa, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 389 : 2025 INSC 442](https://lawfoyer.in/uco-bank-anr-v-vijay-kumar-handa-2025-5-s-c-r-389-2025-insc-442/): UCO Bank & Anr. v. Vijay Kumar Handa, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 389 : 2025 INSC 442. The dispute centres on entitlement to retiral/terminal benefits where an employee was subjected to disciplinary proceedings for riotous, disorderly and indecent behaviour within bank premises. The disciplinary authority found the respondent guilty and imposed dismissal, while the appellate authority modified the penalty to removal from service with terminal benefits (specifically permitting pension/provident/gratuity “as would be due otherwise”) and clarified no disqualification for future employment. An industrial dispute produced a Labour Court award substituting reinstatement with 75% back wages; the High Court struck down that award and restored the appellate order. Subsequently the respondent sought release of pensionary benefits; the High Court directed the bank to process pension benefits, a decision affirmed by the Division Bench. The Supreme Court, applying the Bipartite Settlement (1966) as amended (notably Clause 6(b)) and following precedent in Bank of Baroda v. S.K. Kool (2014) held that where an employee removed under Clause 6(b) is otherwise eligible for superannuation benefits under applicable regulations, he is entitled to receive those benefits. The appellate order substituting dismissal by removal with terminal benefits had not been challenged and attained finality; therefore the respondent’s claim for pension stood on that order and binding Bipartite/Regulatory interplay. Appeal dismissed.
- [2nd Kautilya Society, HNLU Essay Writing Competition, 2025 | Organized by HIDAYATULLAH NATIONAL LAW, RAIPUR - Kautilya Society & the Centre for WTO & WIPO Studies, SLT | Submission Deadline 25th October, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-kautilya-society-hnlu-essay-writing-competition-2025-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-raipur-kautilya-society-the-centre-for-wto-wipo-studies-slt-submission-deadline-25/): 2nd Kautilya Society, HNLU Essay Writing Competition, 2025 | Organized by HIDAYATULLAH NATIONAL LAW, RAIPUR - Kautilya Society & the Centre for WTO & WIPO Studies, SLT | Submission Deadline 25th October, 2025
- [State (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 617 : 2025 INSC 456](https://lawfoyer.in/state-nct-of-delhi-v-rajeev-sharma-2025-4-s-c-r-617-2025-insc-456/): State (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma, Criminal Appeal No. 608 of 2021 (Supreme Court, 3 April 2025) examines whether the phrase “imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years” in proviso (a)(i) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. embraces offences which prescribe only a maximum sentence of greater than ten years but contain no statutory minimum. The appellant–State challenged the High Court's grant of statutory/default bail to the respondent, who was accused under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 read with Section 120B IPC, on the ground that investigation had not been completed within sixty days. The Supreme Court reiterated the binding ratio of Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam and later M. Ravindran, holding that the statutory phrase must be read to refer to offences which are statutorily punishable with a minimum of ten years — i.e., the words “not less than” impose a minimum threshold. Where the statute prescribes only a maximum (for example, Section 3 OSA prescribing up to 14 years but no minimum), the offence falls outside the clause (i) category and thus attracts the sixty-day default-bail regime under proviso (a)(ii). On the facts, since the investigation exceeded sixty days, default bail was properly granted by the High Court.
- [M/s R. K. Transport Company v. M/s Bharat Aluminum Company Ltd. (BALCO), [2025] 5 S.C.R. 401 : 2025 INSC 438](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-r-k-transport-company-v-m-s-bharat-aluminum-company-ltd-balco-2025-5-s-c-r-401-2025-insc-438/): The appeal concerns whether the limitation rules in the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and how the three-month period in Section 34(3) is to be computed when the terminal day falls on a court holiday. The arbitral award in favour of the appellant was signed and delivered on 09.04.2022; the respondent filed a Section 34 application on 11.07.2022. Lower courts reached conflicting conclusions on whether the application was time-barred. The Chhattisgarh High Court allowed the respondent’s Section 37 appeal and held the Section 34 application was within time by applying Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act to exclude the day of receipt and Section 4 to treat filing on the next working day as timely because the terminal day fell on a court holiday. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court, reiterating that the statutory phrase “three months” in Section 34(3) means three calendar months (not 90 days) and that the applicability of provisions of the Limitation Act must be tested provision-by-provision against the language and object of Section 34(3). The Court held that Section 12(1) applies to Section 34(3) so that computation begins the day after receipt; since the three-month period expired on a Saturday (court holiday), Section 4 *applies and filing on the next working day (11.07.2022) was within time. The appeal was dismissed and the High Court’s order stayed only as an interim measure regarding deposit/execution.
- [New Mangalore Port Trust & Anr. v. Clifford D Souza Etc. Etc., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 177 : 2025 INSC 440](https://lawfoyer.in/new-mangalore-port-trust-anr-v-clifford-d-souza-etc-etc-2025-5-s-c-r-177-2025-insc-440/): The appeal concerns whether recovery proceedings initiated under section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 against licensees for arrears of revised licence fees were barred by limitation, and whether an acknowledgment in writing extended limitation under section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The New Mangalore Port Trust (NMPT) issued retrospective tariff notifications (effective 20.02.2007 by TAMP Order dated 23.07.2010) and thereafter served demand notices for arrears. Licensees challenged retrospective application before a Single Judge (dismissed) and filed intra-court appeals that were admitted and remained pending. NMPT issued fresh demands (15.01.2015) and statutory show-cause notices under s.7(3) (12.08.2015); Estate Officer passed an order under s.7(1) (21.07.2016). The District Judge quashed recovery proceedings as time-barred; the High Court affirmed. Before the Supreme Court the core questions were: (a) whether the Limitation Act applies to PP Act proceedings (answer: yes, following New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram), and (b) whether the licensees’ written replies amounted to acknowledgments under s.18 thereby resetting limitation. The Court held that s.18 applied: the licensees’ communication of 04.02.2015 (and subsequent replies) effectively acknowledged the claim insofar as they admitted the tariff and only disputed retrospective effect because of pending intra-court appeals. Given that acknowledgment, limitation was extended and the High Court order was set aside; the writ petitions were restored to be heard after decision of the pending intra-court appeals.
- [Jogeswar Sahoo & Ors. v. The District Judge, Cuttack & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 13 : 2025 INSC 449](https://lawfoyer.in/jogeswar-sahoo-ors-v-the-district-judge-cuttack-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-13-2025-insc-449/): The dispute concerns whether recovery of amounts credited to Stenographer Grade-I and Personal Assistant employees pursuant to a retrospective promotion/appointment can be enforced after their superannuation, and without affording them any opportunity of hearing. The District Judge, Cuttack, by Office Order No. 63 dated 10.05.2017, granted retrospective promotions w.e.f. 01.04.2003 and credited specific sums to the appellants’ accounts under implementation of the Shetty Commission recommendations. Six years later and three years after the appellants had retired, respondent authorities issued orders directing recovery of those credited amounts on the ground that the District Judge’s extension was based on an erroneous interpretation and was not approved by the High Court. The appellants challenged recovery before the High Court; the writ petition was dismissed. This Court examined settled precedents that deny recovery where excess payments are not traceable to fraud or misrepresentation by the employee and have resulted from an employer’s wrong application or interpretation of rules/orders. Applying the equitable doctrine developed in Sahib Ram, Shyam Babu Verma, Union of India v. M. Bhaskar, V. Gangaram and the recent Thomas Daniel judgment, the Court held that recovery under the facts — delayed by years, imposed after retirement of ministerial (non-gazetted) employees, and issued without any hearing — would cause undue hardship and is therefore unsustainable. The recovery orders were set aside.
- [Sangita Sinha v. Bhawana Bhardwaj and Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 551 : 2025 INSC 450](https://lawfoyer.in/sangita-sinha-v-bhawana-bhardwaj-and-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-551-2025-insc-450/): The appeal concerns whether a suit for specific performance of an Agreement to Sell can be sustained where, before the suit, the vendor sent a cancellation letter together with partial refunds (demand drafts and returned cheques), and the purchaser later encashed the demand drafts during the pendency of the suit. The Supreme Court analysed (i) existence of a valid and subsisting contract, (ii) the dual elements of readiness and willingness required for specific performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and (iii) the consequences of acceptance of a vendor’s repudiation by the buyer. The Court held that readiness (capacity to perform) and willingness (intention to perform) are separate; continuous readiness and willingness from contract formation until decree is a condition precedent to relief. Encashment of the demand drafts was treated as acceptance of the seller’s repudiation, demonstrating absence of willingness and effectively cancelling the Agreement. Because the buyer neither sought a declaratory decree setting aside the cancellation nor disclosed the cancellation in the plaint, the suit for specific performance was not maintainable. The Court set aside prior decrees in favour of the buyer, declared the sale deed null and void, and directed refund of amounts as determined.
- [Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 458 : 2025 INSC 467](https://lawfoyer.in/rajiv-ghosh-v-satya-naryan-jaiswal-2025-5-s-c-r-458-2025-insc-467/): The dispute concerns a title suit for recovery of possession where the defendant (son of the deceased regular tenant) in his written statement made admissions that materially conceded the plaintiff’s essential factual case. The plaintiff sought relief under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for a decree on admissions. The trial court allowed the application and decreed eviction; the High Court affirmed; this Special Leave Petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court examined scope, object and exercise of discretion under Order XII, Rule 6(1) & (2) CPC, the significance of the words “in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing” after the 1976 amendment, and the interplay with Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. The Court reiterated that Rule 6 is enabling, discretionary and permissive — use of “may” confers a broad, case-sensitive power to enter judgment on admissions without waiting for adjudication of other issues — but that a court may nevertheless refuse to decide on admissions if the circumstances make it unsafe to do so. Given the defendant’s clear and unequivocal admissions — namely that Ranjan Ghosh was sole tenant, that he died on 13.07.2016, that the plaintiff is the owner and rent was paid until May 2021 — the Court held that the defendant fell within Section 2(g) and the trial court/High Court did not err in decreeing possession under Order XII, Rule 6. Remedies to vacate were afforded with a limited time period.
- [Free Webinar on "Careers in Law in Madhya Pradesh" | Organized by Law Firm Ready | Date of the event - 14 September 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/free-webinar-on-careers-in-law-in-madhya-pradesh-organized-by-law-firm-ready-date-of-the-event-14-september-2025/): Free Webinar on "Careers in Law in Madhya Pradesh" | Organized by Law Firm Ready | Date of the event - 14 September 2025
- [Call for Papers: LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research [ISSN No:- 2583-7753] | Vol 3 Issue 3 | Get Free CrossRef DOI, E-Certificate of Publication, & Indexing in 300+ International Libraries and Databases including Stanford, Harvard, Oxford, LSE, IIM Bangalore, HeinOnline, EuroPub & many more, RPRI– PIF 6.07: Submit Manuscript by Oct 31](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research-issn-no-2583-7753-vol-3-issue-3-get-free-crossref-doi-e-certificate-of-publication-indexing-in-300-internat/): Call for Papers: LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research [ISSN No:- 2583-7753] | Vol 3 Issue 3 | Get Free CrossRef DOI, E-Certificate of Publication, & Indexing in 300+ International Libraries and Databases including Stanford, Harvard, Oxford, LSE, IIM Bangalore, HeinOnline, EuroPub & many more, RPRI– PIF 6.07: Submit Manuscript by Oct 31
- [2-Day Advanced Certification Workshop Supercharging Litigation and Academics with AI](https://lawfoyer.in/workshop-legal-ai-for-law-students-and-legal-professionals/): Introducing 2-Day Advanced Certification Workshop on Supercharging Litigation and Academics with AI | 18th to 20th September, 2025 (7 PM) “AI will not replace Lawyers, but Lawyers using AI will!” Nowadays, every professional is using AI for improving efficiency but only 1% know the right method of using AI for practical legal work! Even the
- [Sohom Shipping Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 33 : 2025 INSC 453](https://lawfoyer.in/sohom-shipping-pvt-ltd-v-m-s-the-new-india-assurance-co-ltd-anr-2025-5-s-c-r-33-2025-insc-453/): This analysis examines Sohom Shipping Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 2323 of 2021 (judgment dated 07 April 2025), where the Supreme Court addressed the validity, interpretation and materiality of a special warranty in a voyage insurance policy requiring that the “voyage should commence & complete before monsoon sets in”. The dispute arose after the insured barge Srijoy II sailed on 06.06.2013, encountered bad weather and engine failure a day later, and was ultimately lost. The insurer repudiated the claim on the ground that the assured had breached the special warranty by sailing after monsoon/foul-season had begun. The NCDRC accepted the insurer’s position, applying the doctrine of uberrima fides and finding non-disclosure / want of good faith. The Supreme Court reversed: it treated the special warranty as capable of a literal meaning (to be read against the timing indicated in the DGS circular), rejected a finding of ambiguity adequate to invoke contra proferentem, but held that the warranty was non-material and could not be treated as a condition precedent to liability because, given the voyage route and policy period, strict enforcement would produce an absurdity that would nullify the insurance’s commercial purpose. The Court remanded the matter to NCDRC to determine quantum and to consider other discrete allegations (forgery, breach of classification conditions) on their own proof.
- [K. Gopi v. The Sub-Registrar & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 47 : 2025 INSC 462](https://lawfoyer.in/k-gopi-v-the-sub-registrar-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-47-2025-insc-462/): The Supreme Court in K. Gopi v. The Sub-Registrar & Ors., (2025) examined whether a registering officer may refuse registration of a transfer instrument on the ground that the presentant has failed to produce documents proving the vendor’s title. The dispute arose after a sale deed dated 2 September 2022 presented for registration was refused by the Sub-Registrar for want of proof of title; subsequent departmental and judicial proceedings culminated in challenge before the Supreme Court. The Court analysed Rule 55A of the Tamil Nadu Registration Rules (which required production of the previous original deed and an encumbrance certificate within ten days) against the statutory scheme of the Registration Act, 1908, including Sections 22-A, 22-B (as incorporated by the State amendment) and the rule-making power under Section 69. The Court held that the registering officer has no adjudicatory function to determine title; registration must follow where formalities are complied with and parties admit execution. Consequently Rule 55A(i) — insofar as it empowers refusal of registration for failure to produce title documents — was declared ultra vires the 1908 Act. The High Court orders premised on Rule 55A were quashed and the appellant was permitted to lodge the deed for registration on procedural compliance.
- [Jaspal Singh Kaural v. The State of NCT of Delhi & Anr., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 23 : 2025 INSC 457](https://lawfoyer.in/jaspal-singh-kaural-v-the-state-of-nct-of-delhi-anr-2025-5-s-c-r-23-2025-insc-457/): The appeal challenges the Delhi High Court’s order setting aside the Sessions Court’s discharge of the appellant in FIR No. 281/2021 (registered at PS Sagarpur) alleging offences under Section 376 and Section 506, Indian Penal Code, 1860. The complainant asserted that she entered into a sexual relationship with the appellant on his promise to marry and to take care of her children, thereafter obtaining divorce from her husband in reliance on those assurances; when the appellant allegedly refused to marry and threatened her children she lodged the FIR. The Sessions Court discharged the accused under Section 227, CrPC, treating the relationship as consensual and finding no material showing dishonest inducement or criminal intimidation. The High Court reversed and ordered framing of charge. The Supreme Court, relying heavily on Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT) of Delhi and related precedents, confined its review to the narrow question whether material on record at the stage of Section 227 warranted discharge. Holding that a “mini-trial” is impermissible at the charge-framing stage and that mere breach of a marriage promise does not necessarily convert consensual sex into rape, the Court found no prima facie material to sustain Sections 376/506 and reinstated the Sessions Court order, terminating criminal proceedings. Emphasis was placed on: (i) distinction between false promise (made from outset to procure consent) and breach of promise; (ii) prolonged consensual relationship as evidencing absence of force or deceit; and (iii) limited scope of appellate/revisional interference at charge-framing stage.
- [Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal & Anr., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 425 : 2025 INSC 458](https://lawfoyer.in/biswajyoti-chatterjee-v-state-of-west-bengal-anr-2025-5-s-c-r-425-2025-insc-458/): This analysis examines Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1842 of 2025 (judgment dated 07 April 2025) where the Supreme Court considered whether allegations in an FIR (registered 14.12.2015) amounted to offences under Sections 376(2)(f), 417 and 506 IPC and whether the accused-appellant should have been discharged under Section 227 CrPC. The complainant alleged that while matrimonial proceedings with her husband were pending (2014), she entered into a relationship with the appellant — then an ACJM and later a retired judicial officer — who promised marriage once her divorce was finalised, provided financial support (rented accommodation, school fees, bank transfers) and introduced an advocate who handled her litigation; after divorce the appellant allegedly avoided her and threatened to harm her son. The prosecution relied on the complainant’s Section 164 CrPC statement, witness statements (security guard and driver), CFSL/CDR material and a charge-sheet filed after CID investigation. The appellant argued the relationship was consensual, the complainant knew he was separated, no fraudulent inducement was made and promises to marry cannot be equated to a false fact vitiating consent. The Court analysed precedent on consent, misconception of fact and false promise to marry, notably Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and Uday v. State of Karnataka, found inconsistencies in the complainant’s narrative, and concluded that even accepting allegations at face value the physical relationship was most probably consensual and not procured by a false promise to marry; further, material for offences under Sections 417/506 IPC was inadequate. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court order refusing discharge and terminated proceedings at the stage of charge.
- [Neha Chandrakant Shroff & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 616 : 2025 INSC 484](https://lawfoyer.in/neha-chandrakant-shroff-anr-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-616-2025-insc-484/): Neha Chandrakant Shroff & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 5098 of 2025, raises whether a High Court should have exercised writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to direct restoration of possession of two flats originally handed over to the Police Department in 1940 on an oral/temporary basis. The High Court dismissed the writ petition because no written requisition or lease deed existed and because an alternative statutory remedy was available; it treated the Department’s occupation as permissive and relegated the claimants to pursue a suit or statutory remedy. The Supreme Court reversed. Emphasizing that exclusion of writ jurisdiction by existence of an alternative remedy is discretionary and not mandatory, the Court held that the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction cannot be fettered where continuing occupation since 1940 and non-payment of rent for many years resulted in injustice. The Court directed the State to hand over vacant, peaceful possession within four months and to pay arrears of rent. The judgment records the Court’s view that facts of 1940 (colonial context) and the prolonged 84-year occupation and 18-year non-payment of rent make judicial exercise of writ jurisdiction appropriate. This decision reaffirms that constitutional remedies are available where institutional delay or inequity would render statutory processes ineffectual or oppressive.
- [M/s Chatha Service Station v. Lalmati Devi & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 435 : 2025 INSC 468](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-chatha-service-station-v-lalmati-devi-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-435-2025-insc-468-2/): This analysis examines M/s Chatha Service Station v. Lalmati Devi & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 5089–5092 of 2025, decided by the Supreme Court on 08 April 2025, concerning the insurer’s pay-and-recover liability when the driver of an oil tanker lacked the statutory endorsement required to operate vehicles carrying dangerous and hazardous goods under Section 11 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with Rule 9 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. The Tribunal had awarded compensation to claimants for deaths caused by rash and negligent driving; it directed the insurer to pay the awards and recover from the owner and driver because the driver did not possess the requisite endorsement. The High Court affirmed and the owner appealed only against the pay-and-recover direction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that Rule 9 prescribes a three-part syllabus (Parts A, B and C) where Parts A and B expressly concern advanced and defensive driving skills for drivers of specially designed tankers, and Part C deals with product safety and emergency procedures. The Court found the absence of the endorsement was not a venial or purely technical breach: it bore on the driver’s entitlement to operate that class/description of vehicle and could be causally linked to the accident where evidence points to rash driving by a driver unendorsed for hazardous goods carriage. The Court also refused to admit a training certificate produced for the first time on appeal under Order 41 Rule 27, CPC, observing absence of explanation and suspicious features in the document. The decision clarifies the disjunctive meaning of “class” and “description” in Section 11, reiterates the effective licence/duly licensed distinction as in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, and confirms insurer liability to pay and recover where non-endorsement is material and contributory.
- [State of Karnataka v. Sri Channakeshava H.D. & Anr., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 608 : 2025 INSC 471](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-karnataka-v-sri-channakeshava-h-d-anr-2025-4-s-c-r-608-2025-insc-471/): The Supreme Court allowed the State of Karnataka’s appeal against the Karnataka High Court which had quashed FIR No.54/2023 registered at Karnataka Lokayukta Police, Bangalore, under Section 13(1)(b) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereafter PC Act) in a disproportionate-asset prosecution against Sri Channakeshava H.D. The High Court premised quashing on the absence of a preliminary enquiry conducted by the Superintendent of Police (SP) before directing registration of the FIR, relying on the value of a “preliminary enquiry” in corruption matters as discussed in Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. The Supreme Court held that no statutory provision under Sections 13 or 17 PC Act makes a preliminary enquiry mandatory; the second proviso to Section 17 merely fixes the rank of the officer (SP) whose order is necessary for investigation of offences under clause (b) of Section 13(1). Where a detailed and reasoned source report disclosing prima facie disproportionate assets is before the superior officer, the requirement of a fresh/formal preliminary enquiry may be relaxed. On the facts — specifically a source report dated 05.10.2023 finding prima facie disproportionate assets of Rs. 6,64,67,000/- during 11.11.1998–30.09.2023 and the SP’s order dated 04.12.2023 — the Court held the SP had applied his mind and lawfully directed FIR registration; quashing was thus improper. Appeal allowed; impugned high court order set aside.
- [Annaya Kocha Shetty (Dead) through LRs v. Laxmibai Narayan Satose since Deceased through LRs & Others, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 58 : 2025 INSC 466](https://lawfoyer.in/annaya-kocha-shetty-dead-through-lrs-v-laxmibai-narayan-satose-since-deceased-through-lrs-others-2025-5-s-c-r-58-2025-insc-466/): The central controversy concerns whether an agreement of conducting dated 16.08.1967 created a leave-and-license/tenant-like relationship (thereby attracting section 15A of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947) or whether it merely conferred a right to conduct the Hotel business of the owner. The plaintiff alleged deemed tenancy and sought injunctions; the trial court found in the plaintiff’s favour on the footing that occupation and the contractual terms established a leave-and-license; the appellate bench reversed, treating the written agreement and contemporaneous receipts as documentary proof of a conducting relationship; the High Court in revision affirmed the appellate court. The Supreme Court examined rules of contract construction, the bar on extrinsic oral evidence under sections 91–92 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the scope of provisos to section 92, and the significance of contemporaneous documentary material (royalty receipts, registration certificate photocopy) and the absence of any clause transferring occupation. The Court held that the document, read literally and purposively, evidenced an agreement to conduct the hotel business and not a grant of tenancy; oral evidence was inadmissible as no proviso to section 92 applied; photocopied registration certificate and royalty receipts did not transform the plaintiff’s status into a deemed tenant. The appeal was dismissed with costs. The judgment reiterates the primacy of written terms, cautions against meandering pleadings (inviting the use of Order VI, Rule 16 CPC), and summarises rules of deed construction — literal, golden and purposive — while emphasizing cautious resort to surrounding circumstances when ambiguity exists.
- [Rakesh Kumar Verma v. HDFC Bank Ltd., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 78 : 2025 INSC 473](https://lawfoyer.in/rakesh-kumar-verma-v-hdfc-bank-ltd-2025-5-s-c-r-78-2025-insc-473/): The Supreme Court considered whether contractual exclusive jurisdiction clauses in appointment letters/employment agreements — specifying the Bombay/Mumbai courts — prevent employees from instituting civil suits in fora where they work or reside (Patna, Delhi). Two parallel suits, arising from terminations for alleged fraud/misconduct, were before different High Courts. The Patna High Court upheld the clause; the Delhi High Court rejected the bank’s revisional challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed that exclusive jurisdiction clauses are valid provided three mandatory criteria are satisfied: (i) the clause does not absolutely restrain access to courts in violation of Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872; (ii) the court designated must be competent under statutory rules (e.g., Section 20 CPC); and (iii) the parties must have manifested ad idem in conferring jurisdiction on that forum. Applying binding precedents — including Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and earlier rulings on forum-selection clauses — the Court held the Mumbai courts were competent and the parties had agreed to Mumbai as exclusive forum; thus suits in Patna and Delhi were instituted in an incompetent forum. The Court set aside the Delhi High Court order, affirmed Patna HC on law but remediated procedure (directing return of plaint under Order VII, Rule 10 CPC rather than rejection under Order VII, Rule 11), and permitted plaintiffs to present fresh suits or withdraw/amend as necessary. The decision reiterates that employment contracts are ordinary contracts for this purpose and unequal bargaining power alone does not render forum-selection clauses invalid.
- [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Sunita Sharma and Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 603 : 2025 INSC 469](https://lawfoyer.in/new-india-assurance-co-ltd-v-smt-sunita-sharma-and-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-603-2025-insc-469/): New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Sunita Sharma and Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 603 : 2025 INSC 469, examines the proper manner of dealing with amounts payable to dependents under the Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the Dependents of Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 (for brevity, Rules of 2006) when computing compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The central issue was whether and to what extent sums receivable under the Rules of 2006 must be deducted from awards made by Claims Tribunals under the Motor Vehicles Act. The High Court below deducted only fifty per cent of the amounts payable under the Rules of 2006. This Court considered the binding three-Judge Bench decision in Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shashi Sharma, (2016) 9 SCC 627, and the subsequent pronouncement in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Birender (2020 SCC Online SC 28), which require that amounts equivalent to pay and allowances or ex-gratia financial assistance under similar compassionate-assistance rules be excluded from the heads of loss of income awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act, while other heads such as future prospects, escalation, and statutory benefits (pension, PF, life insurance) remain separately claimable. The Supreme Court allowed the insurer’s appeal, set aside the High Court's order insofar as it deducted only fifty per cent of the Rules of 2006 payment, and directed that the full compensatory amount under the Rules of 2006 be taken into account for deduction — but ordered that no recovery be effected if such amounts have already been paid to the claimants.
- [The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Gopu & Anr., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 169 : 2025 INSC 511.](https://lawfoyer.in/the-new-india-assurance-co-ltd-v-gopu-anr-2025-5-s-c-r-169-2025-insc-511/): The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Gopu & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 5300 of 2025, raises a focused question of limitation law in the context of enhancement of compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded Rs. 6,53,000 to the legal representatives (husband and two minor children) of a woman who died in a 2000 motorcycle accident. No cross-appeal for enhancement was taken by the father (natural guardian) though he participated in related litigation. Nearly ten years later (2016), the children alone filed an appeal in the High Court seeking enhancement; the High Court allowed enhancement to Rs. 14,95,000. On challenge before this Court the central legal theme was whether Sections 5, 6 (Limitation Act, 1963) and related doctrines could validate the delayed appeal by erstwhile minors. The Court held that Section 6 (legal disability) applies only to suits or applications for execution of a decree and not to appeals; Section 5 (sufficient cause) could not rescue the unexplained, long delay especially when the natural guardian had consciously not appealed earlier. Reliance was placed on precedent distinguishing suits/applications from appeals and on the legislature’s deliberate exclusion of certain proceedings from condonation. The High Court judgment enhancing compensation was therefore set aside.
- [Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda (and connected SLPs), [2025] 5 S.C.R. 485 : 2025 INSC 477](https://lawfoyer.in/serious-fraud-investigation-office-v-aditya-sarda-and-connected-slps-2025-5-s-c-r-485-2025-insc-477/): Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda (Criminal Appeal No. 1872 of 2025; decided 9 April 2025) examines whether High Court orders granting anticipatory bail to accused persons in a large-scale SFIO prosecution ought to stand where the accused repeatedly avoided process, against the background of offences under Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the mandatory twin conditions under Section 212(6). The appeals arise from an SFIO private complaint (COMA/5/2019) concerning alleged massive siphoning and illegal lending from Adarsh Credit Cooperative Society Ltd. to group companies, involving crores of rupees. The Special Court took cognizance, issued bailable warrants, and—when execution failed—issued multiple non-bailable warrants and initiated proclamation proceedings under Section 82 CrPC. Despite rejection of anticipatory bail by the Special Court, several accused obtained High Court orders in March–April 2023. The Supreme Court analysed (i) the discretionary scope in issuing summons/vouchers under Section 204 CrPC, (ii) the exceptional nature of Section 438 CrPC relief and settled jurisprudence that economic offences form a distinct class, and (iii) the mandatory nature of Section 212(6) twin conditions that require an opportunity to the Public Prosecutor and satisfaction of the court about reasonable grounds to believe innocence and non-likelihood of offending while on bail. Observing that the High Court orders ignored the Special Court’s detailed proceedings, the issuance of non-bailable warrants, and the initiated proclamation proceedings, the Court held those orders perverse and untenable, set them aside and directed surrender before the Special Court, while leaving merits of the prosecution undecided. The judgment emphasises that courts must weigh non-execution of process and concealment seriously when considering anticipatory bail in serious economic offences and follow the statutory (and jurisprudential) safeguards before granting exceptional relief.
- [Prabhjot Kaur v. State of Punjab and Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 193 : 2025 INSC 479](https://lawfoyer.in/prabhjot-kaur-v-state-of-punjab-and-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-193-2025-insc-479/): Prabhjot Kaur v. State of Punjab and Ors., Civil Appeal No. 5132 of 2025 raises the narrow but constitutionally significant question whether the State and its instrumentalities may alter reservation/eligibility criteria once the recruitment process — marked by the issuance of an advertisement calling for applications — has commenced. The factual matrix is simple: initial advertisement (Advt. No.08 dated 04.06.2020) was withdrawn after the Punjab Civil Services (Reservation of Posts for Women) Rules, 2020 were notified; a fresh advertisement (Advt. No.14 dated 11.12.2020) followed which, in implementation of the 2020 Rules, created a horizontal SC Sports (Women) seat for a DSP post. A subsequent roster amendment and a later government-issued 100-point roster (dated 29.01.2021) led certain State functionaries to contend that the DSP seat should not have been earmarked exclusively for SC Sports (Women). The private respondent (male) challenged the reservation of the DSP post for women but did not challenge the advertisement in its entirety; he participated in the selection process and sought relief only after merit lists were declared. The Single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court upheld the advertised eligibility and held that once Advt. No.14 (11.12.2020) fixed the rules of the game, later changes (including roster points finalized after the last date for applications) could not be allowed to alter rights which had already crystallized. The Division Bench remanded the matter for reconsideration because of contradictory departmental stands and the Chief Secretary’s view that the advertisement contained an error. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, reaffirmed the principle that the recruitment process commences with advertisement and cannot be tinkered with mid-process (following K. Manjusree v. State of A.P. and the Constitution Bench conclusion in Tej Prakash Pathak v. High Court of Rajasthan), and held that Advt. No.14 and the 2020 Rules governed candidate entitlements; consequently the DSP post reserved for SC Sports (Women) must be filled by the qualified woman candidate and the private respondent cannot be appointed to that post. This judgment reiterates the salutary rule against changing eligibility criteria once recruitment begins, emphasizes the primacy of an unchallenged advertisement, and circumscribes retrospective application of later roster arrangements to applicants who had already relied upon and participated under the earlier notice.
- [Neha Enterprises v. Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, 5 S.C.R. 475 : 2025 INSC 476](https://lawfoyer.in/neha-enterprises-v-commissioner-commercial-tax-lucknow-uttar-pradesh-5-s-c-r-475-2025-insc-476/): The judgment in Neha Enterprises v. Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh addresses whether a selling dealer who effected direct sales to a manufacturer-exporter under the State notifications (via Form-E) and thereby qualified for exemption under section 7(c) of the Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2008 can nonetheless claim input tax credit on purchase tax paid in relation to that turnover. The factual matrix is tightly drawn: the dealer recorded sales of Rs. 1,89,35,100/ to a manufacturer-exporter, claimed input tax credit of Rs. 6,42,260/, was initially allowed the credit by the assessing officer, and thereafter had the credit reversed under section 28 with concurrent upholding by the appellate authority, the Tribunal and the High Court. The Supreme Court, after examining the statutory scheme — notably section 7(c) (power to exempt specified sales or purchases by notification) read with the input credit provisions under section 13 and the explicit embargo in section 13(7) — concluded that where sale of goods by a dealer is exempt under clause (c) of s.7, the statutory bar in s.13(7) operates to deny input tax credit to the selling dealer; therefore the reversal of credit was warranted and the appeal was dismissed. The Court declined to import an overarching purposive exception that would allow input credit in aid of the policy to promote exports, placing primacy on the statutory text, the separate architecture for levy/exemption and credit, and the language of the proviso that explicitly curtails credit in the circumstances under consideration.
- [Pinki v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 522 : 2025 INSC 482](https://lawfoyer.in/pinki-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2025-5-s-c-r-522-2025-insc-482/): Pinki v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1927 of 2025 (decided 15 Apr. 2025) is a leading Supreme Court pronouncement addressing the exercise of judicial discretion in grant of bail in large-scale interstate child-trafficking matters, the societal interest in protecting children, and systemic directions to strengthen investigation, prosecution and victim-rehabilitation. The appeals arose from orders of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad which released thirteen accused charged under ss. 363, 311 and 370(5) IPC in three related FIRs concerning a trafficking racket that abducted, bought and sold infants and young children across states. The Supreme Court examined the factual matrix, the role of each accused, the High Court’s reasons for bail (non-naming in FIR, disclosure by co-accused, absence of recovered victim from a particular accused, parity with co-accused, absence of antecedents or tampering evidence), and found the High Court’s approach callous in light of the gravity, pattern and modus operandi of the offence. The Court set aside the impugned bail orders, directed surrender and remand to judicial custody, mandated expedited committal and trial timetables (charges to be framed quickly; trials preferably day-to-day; completion within six months), required appointment of special public prosecutors and police protection for victims, and issued country-wide administrative directions including study and implementation of the BIRD anti-trafficking recommendations and suspension of hospital licence where newborns are trafficked. The judgment balances Article 21 liberty considerations with collective societal interest, emphasises that bail is not to become a tool permitting accused to abscond, and issues systemic remedial directions to curb child-trafficking and to protect recovered children and their families.
- [Nyaya Shastra Virtual Symposium 2025 | Nyaya Shastra | Last Date for Research Paper Submission 15th September 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-shastra-virtual-symposium-2025-nyaya-shastra-last-date-for-research-paper-submission-15th-september-2025/): Nyaya Shastra Virtual Symposium 2025 | Nyaya Shastra | Last Date for Research Paper Submission 15th September 2025
- [ACCORDIA 2025 International Arbitration Moot Court Competition | Dexon Global Centre for Legal Studies, Policy and Research in collaboration with Nottingham Law School, UK | Registration deadline - October 20, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/accordia-2025-international-arbitration-moot-court-competition-dexon-global-centre-for-legal-studies-policy-and-research-in-collaboration-with-nottingham-law-school-uk-registration-deadline-oc/): ACCORDIA 2025 International Arbitration Moot Court Competition | Dexon Global Centre for Legal Studies, Policy and Research in collaboration with Nottingham Law School, UK | Registration deadline - October 20, 2025
- [Mrs. Varshatai w/o. Sh. Sanjay Bagade v. The State of Maharashtra through its Secretary, Ministry of Law and Judiciary, Mantralaya, Mumbai and Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 625 : 2025 INSC 486.](https://lawfoyer.in/mrs-varshatai-w-o-sh-sanjay-bagade-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-through-its-secretary-ministry-of-law-and-judiciary-mantralaya-mumbai-and-ors-2025-4-s-c-r-625-2025-insc-486/): The Supreme Court in Mrs. Varshatai w/o. Sh. Sanjay Bagade v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 5187–5188 of 2025 (15 April 2025), addressed whether the display of Urdu on the signboard of the Municipal Council, Patur (Akola district) violated statutory or constitutional prescriptions after enactment of the Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022. The appellant, a former municipal council member, challenged the council’s resolution that displayed the municipal name in Marathi at the top and Urdu beneath, contending that official work and public-facing displays must be exclusively in Marathi in view of the 2022 Act and related government directions. The Collector initially allowed the appellant’s Section 308 challenge but on revision the Divisional Commissioner set aside the Collector’s order and the High Court (Nagpur Bench) upheld the Municipal Council’s action; subsequent legislative change prompted renewed proceedings. The Supreme Court examined the amended procedure under Section 308 of the Maharashtra Municipal Council, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Township Act, 1965, the scope and effect of the 2022 Act, and constitutional principles concerning official languages—notably Article 345, Article 351 and the placement of Marathi and Urdu within Schedule VIII. The Court affirmed the High Court’s conclusion: the 2022 Act does not prohibit display of an additional Schedule VIII language on signboards so long as Marathi remains the official language for the specified purposes; the municipal purpose here was communication to a multilingual local population. The judgment also engages an extended cultural and constitutional argument: language is communication and culture, not religion; Urdu is an indigenous Indo-Aryan language with historical adoption by several States as an official or secondary official language; prejudice against Urdu stems from misconception. The appeals were dismissed. This analysis relies exclusively on the judgment as supplied.
- [Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 217 : 2025 INSC 491.](https://lawfoyer.in/satish-chander-sharma-ors-v-state-of-himachal-pradesh-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-217-2025-insc-491/): This analysis examines Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 179 of 2018), decided by the Supreme Court on 16 April 2025 (Ujjal Bhuyan, J.), and addresses (i) whether State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood was rendered per incuriam, (ii) whether that decision binds the present petitioners, and (iii) whether a writ under Article 32 can be used to directly or collaterally challenge a Supreme Court judgment. The petitioners — retired officers of the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Development Corporation Limited — sought pensionary benefits under the Himachal Pradesh Corporate Sector Employees (Pension, Family Pension, Commutation of Pension and Gratuity) Scheme, 1999 (the 1999 Scheme) but were excluded by the repeal notification dated 02.12.2004, which saved those who had already retired between 01.04.1999 and 02.12.2004. The High Court in P.D. Nanda v. State of H.P. had read down the repeal to include similarly situated employees; a subsequent two-judge Bench in Rajesh Chander Sood reversed that view and upheld the cut-off date. The petitioners in the present case argued that Rajesh Chander Sood ignored binding precedents and was therefore per incuriam. The three-Judge Bench systematically rejects the per incuriam plea, affirms the competence of the State to fix the cut-off date in light of administrative review and financial viability considerations, and—crucially—reiterates the settled principle that Supreme Court judgments passed under Article 136 cannot be collaterally attacked by proceedings under Article 32; review and curative petitions remain the proper remedies. The decision emphasizes finality of lis and the limits of judicial re-opening of concluded litigation.
- [Sushila & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 161 : 2025 INSC 505](https://lawfoyer.in/sushila-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-161-2025-insc-505/): This analysis examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Sushila & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 2020 of 2025 (dated 16 April 2025), with focus on the correctness of quashing proceedings when relatives of a husband are roped into a dowry/498A complaint long after an ex-parte divorce decree. The bench considered whether the High Court erred in disposing of a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. without adjudicating merits and whether there was a prima facie basis to continue proceedings against five relatives where the factual matrix prima facie implicated only the husband. The Supreme Court, drawing on prior precedents such as Geeta Mehrotra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. and Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Anr., underscored well-settled principles that vague, bald or generalised allegations against the husband’s family in matrimonial cases cannot sustain criminal process absent specific, particularised allegations of active participation. Where the marriage stood dissolved by a decree dated 31.05.2012 and the complaint was filed years later, the Court found no reasonable basis for the relatives to have caused cruelty or demanded dowry during the subsistence of marriage; the only solitary mention of relatives related to an incident on 16.08.2015 after divorce. The Supreme Court therefore held that continuing trial against those relatives would be vexatious and an abuse of process and accordingly quashed the complaint against the appellants. This headnote is based on the Court’s reasoning and the judgment record.
- [S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 627 : 2025 INSC 493](https://lawfoyer.in/s-c-garg-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2025-5-s-c-r-627-2025-insc-493/): This analysis examines the Supreme Court’s decision in S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 438 of 2018, delivered on 16 April 2025, which quashed criminal proceedings instituted against the appellant for offences under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, arising from a dispute that had earlier led to conviction and subsequent compromise in Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 proceedings. The Court held that the later prosecution was impermissible because it sought to rely upon facts which had already been used by the respondent as a defence in the earlier NI Act litigation and therefore attracted the doctrine of res judicata as binding in the circumstances; the judgment emphasised that the doctrine of vicarious criminal liability under Section 141 of the NI Act presupposes that the company itself committed the offence and, consequently, where the company was not arraigned as an accused, prosecution of its officers in isolation was unsustainable. The Court further directed that where an accused impugns a prosecution as frivolous or vexatious, the magistrate and higher courts must scrutinise the FIR and attendant circumstances closely and, if necessary, look beyond the bare averments to the broader record to detect abuse of process. The result was quashing of Criminal Case No. 7489 of 2002 (Crime No. 13 of 1998) pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad. This decision synthesises precedents on res judicata in criminal matters (notably Pritam Singh and related authority), the limits of vicarious liability under the NI Act (including Aneeta Hada and its progeny), and the court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent malicious, vexatious or multiplicative litigation.
- [The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar & Another, 2025 5 S.C.R. 94 : 2025 INSC 490 ](https://lawfoyer.in/the-correspondence-rbanms-educational-institution-v-b-gunashekar-another-2025-5-s-c-r-94-2025-insc-490/): The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar & Another (Civil Appeal No. 5200 of 2025) is a Supreme Court decision addressing the scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC in suits founded solely on agreements to sell and the legal consequences when such suits are pressed against third parties who claim independent title and long possession. The Court examined whether a plaint based on an agreement to sell — where the vendors are not parties, the purchaser has not obtained a registered sale deed, and only an advance (allegedly in cash) was paid — discloses a cause of action against a defendant who has been in continuous possession of the property for over a century. The Bench reiterated settled principles under Section 54 and Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the law on part-performance, and the well-settled test for rejection of plaint under Order VII r.11(a) & (d) CPC, holding that an agreement to sell confers only personal rights against the vendor (and limited protection under s.53-A in specified circumstances) and does not create enforceable rights against third parties in possession or ownership. The Court found multiple incurable defects in the plaint — lack of privity with the vendor, absence of possession by plaintiffs, omission of vendors as parties, failure to seek declaratory relief when title is in dispute, and suspicious cash payment above statutory caps — and therefore held the plaint liable to be rejected under Ord. VII r.11(a) & (d). The Court further issued directions for courts, registrars and income-tax authorities to notify and verify large cash consideration claims in civil filings to guard against evasion of s.269ST of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
- [Adavya Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Vishal Structurals Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 243 : 2025 INSC 507](https://lawfoyer.in/adavya-projects-pvt-ltd-v-m-s-vishal-structurals-pvt-ltd-ors-2025-5-s-c-r-243-2025-insc-507/): A focused analysis of Adavya Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Vishal Structurals Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 5297 of 2025) examining the threshold questions of joinder, Section 21 notice, Section 11 applications and the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter ACA) in the context of an LLP arrangement. The Supreme Court clarified that while a notice invoking arbitration under Section 21 is mandatory because it fixes the commencement date of arbitration (which in turn governs limitation and the applicable statutory/arbitral regime), the non-service of such notice on certain persons does not ipso facto deprive the arbitral tribunal of jurisdiction to implead them, provided they are parties to the arbitration agreement or have otherwise manifested consent to be bound by it. The Court reiterated the limited, prima facie scope of the referral court under Section 11 (confined to existence/formal validity of an arbitration agreement under Section 11(6A)), and affirmed that determination of who is a party to the arbitration agreement — including non-signatories — is a core jurisdictional question for the tribunal under Section 16 (kompetenz-kompetenz). Applying the Discovery/Group of Companies factors and the tests articulated in Cox & Kings and related precedents, the Court found that respondent nos. 2 and 3 (the LLP and its CEO) by conduct and contractual role were bound by the LLP Agreement’s arbitration clause and could therefore be impleaded; the High Court order dismissing the appellant’s Section 37 challenge was set aside and the arbitral proceedings ordered to continue with impleading of respondent nos. 2 and 3.
- [N. Eswaranathan v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 128 : 2025 INSC 509](https://lawfoyer.in/n-eswaranathan-v-state-represented-by-the-deputy-superintendent-of-police-2025-5-s-c-r-128-2025-insc-509/): This analysis critically examines the Supreme Court’s common-order in N. Eswaranathan v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, SLP (Crl.) No. 6029 of 2025, delivered by a two-judge Bench (Hon’ble Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma) on 17 April 2025, focusing on the disciplinary and procedural dimensions raised by misconduct of advocates before the Court. The judgment addresses the filing of a second Special Leave Petition after an earlier SLP had been dismissed with directions for surrender, the affidavits and applications filed by the Advocate-on-Record (AOR) and his colleague containing incorrect or incomplete statements, the failure of the petitioner to comply with judicial directions, the role of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 (notably Order IV, Rule 10), and the application of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 principles. A divergence of views between the two members of the Bench on whether to accept the unconditional apology tendered by the errant advocates produced a split result, the ultimate procedural outcome being a reference to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders. The judgment navigates precedent including Mohit Chaudhary, Advocate, In Re (Three-Judge Bench), Bhagwan Singh v. State of U.P., Saumya Chaurasia v. Directorate of Enforcement, and other authorities on duty of advocates as officers of the Court. The majority view (per Bela M. Trivedi, J.) records serious findings of misuse of process, misleading the Court and concludes with limited disciplinary measures — temporary removal of the AOR from the Register and costs against the colleague-advocate — while the concurring opinion of Satish Chandra Sharma, J. favours acceptance of the unconditional apology subject to a warning. This analysis dissects the factual matrix, legal issues framed in question form, contentions raised by the parties, statutory and rule-based provisions engaged, detailed exposition of the reasoning, ratio decidendi, obiter dicta, the practical guidelines drawn by the Court, and considered commentary on the jurisprudential and disciplinary implications for the Bar and the Bench.
- [State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 275 : 2025 INSC 555](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-uttar-pradesh-through-principal-secretary-department-of-panchayati-raj-lucknow-v-ram-prakash-singh-2025-5-s-c-r-275-2025-insc-555/): State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh raises multi-fold questions about the sanctity of disciplinary procedures under the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 and the constitutional protection of a government servant under Article 311. The case examines whether a disciplinary order premised upon an enquiry in which no departmental witnesses were examined and no document was formally proved can sustain punishment; whether reliance by the disciplinary authority on an enquiry report that the delinquent officer never received vitiates proceedings; and whether an enquiry may be continued after a tribunal-ordered time-limit has lapsed without express permission. The Supreme Court, after analysing the factual matrix — including the preliminary audit reports (dated 16 Jan 2006 and 23 Feb 2006), the initial chargesheet (24 Aug 2006), the Enquiry Officer’s report(s) and the sequence of litigation before the Tribunal and the High Court — concluded that the enquiry was carried out in clear disregard of the statutory rules and settled principles of natural justice, particularly the requirement to furnish the enquiry report to the charged officer prior to final action as entrenched in B. Karunakar. The Court emphasised that documents not proved in accordance with procedures (and not spoken to by competent witnesses) cannot be permitted to form the basis of a finding of guilt, and that automatic invocation of a ‘prejudice’ test to salvage a procedural breach would defeat the protective purpose of the rule. The Court further held that the tribunal-imposed time-limit could not be ignored and that, given the long delay, earlier opportunities, and the risk of unavailability of witnesses, remittance for a fresh enquiry would be unjust; consequently the orders of punishment were set aside and full retiral benefits ordered.
- [Raju @ Umakant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 615](https://lawfoyer.in/raju-umakant-v-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2025-6-s-c-r-1-2025-insc-615/): Raju @ Umakant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 2377 of 2025, concerns conviction for Sections 366, 376(2)(g) and 342 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The appellant was held guilty of abducting and wrongfully confining the prosecutrix and of participating in a gang-rape along with co-accused Jalandhar Kol. The Supreme Court, after reviewing ocular, medical and documentary material and the reasoning of the courts below, upheld convictions under Sections 366, 376(2)(g) and 342 IPC, but set aside the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act due to absence of evidence that caste identity was a ground for the offence. The Court analysed the scope of Explanation 1 to Section 376(2)(g) and reiterated that in gang-rape prosecutions proof of common intention suffices to convict all participants even if direct proof that each individual completed the sexual act is absent. The Court relied on the prosecutrix’s credible and consistent testimony, dispensed with need for corroboration, and applied Section 114A, Evidence Act presumptions regarding absence of consent. The judgment clarified the threshold for invoking Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act in the light of Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh and subsequent amendment to Section 3(2)(v) (2016), emphasizing that where there is no evidence that caste identity operated as one of the grounds for the crime, the special-act conviction cannot stand. Sentence was modified to equalise punishment under Section 376(2)(g) with the co-accused — ten years’ rigorous imprisonment plus fine — while other sentences were left undisturbed.
- [K.R. Suresh v. R. Poornima & Ors., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 22; 2025 INSC 617](https://lawfoyer.in/k-r-suresh-v-r-poornima-ors-2025-6-s-c-r-22-2025-insc-617/): This analysis examines the Supreme Court’s judgment in K.R. Suresh v. R. Poornima & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 5822 of 2025, which raises two tightly related legal questions: (i) whether an amount described in an Advance Sale Agreement (ATS) as “advance money” was properly treated as earnest money capable of lawful forfeiture on the purchaser’s default; and (ii) whether a plaintiff who seeks specific performance but fails to plead an alternative relief for refund under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 can obtain refund of that deposit. The Court held that the sum of Rs. 20,00,000 paid on execution of the ATS bore the characteristics of earnest money — it was paid at contract formation, intended as security for performance, and was to be adjusted against the sale price if the transaction completed — and therefore could be forfeited on the purchaser’s failure to pay the balance within the stipulated four months. The Court further held that an alternative prayer for refund under Section 22(1)(b) is not a relief that a court may grant suo motu; it must be specifically claimed or properly amended into the plaint (though amendments may be allowed at any stage in an “appropriate case”). The Court applied established principles distinguishing advance and earnest deposits, surveyed authorities on the permissible extent of forfeiture (and the interplay with Section 74, Indian Contract Act, 1872), and concluded that the forfeiture was lawful and not unconscionable on the facts. The appeal was dismissed.
- [Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi), [2025] 6 S.C.R. 64 : 2025 INSC 618](https://lawfoyer.in/aman-bhatia-v-state-gnct-of-delhi-2025-6-s-c-r-64-2025-insc-618/): This analysis examines the Supreme Court’s judgment in Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi) (Criminal Appeal No. 2613 of 2014), decided 2 May 2025. The central legal question addressed is whether a licensed stamp vendor falls within the statutory definition of “public servant” under Section 2(c)(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) and, if so, whether the evidence in the trap operation established demand and acceptance of illegal gratification under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the PC Act beyond reasonable doubt. The Court adopts a purposive construction of “public servant” emphasizing public duty and the Government’s mode of remunerating vendors through a discount authorised by the Delhi Province Stamp Rules, 1934. The Court holds that stamp vendors, who procure stamps at a government-authorised discount and sell at face value, are remunerated by the Government for performing a public duty and therefore fall within Section 2(c)(i). However, on the evidentiary plane the Court finds material inconsistencies in prosecution witnesses and insufficient proof of demand and meeting of minds required for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d); accordingly the conviction is set aside. This result separates (i) the interpretive holding—broad application of PC Act to stamp vendors—and (ii) the evidentiary outcome—acquittal for failure of proof in the particular trap operation.
- [Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 12658 of 2025, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 156 : 2025 INSC 627](https://lawfoyer.in/special-leave-petition-civil-no-12658-of-2025-2025-6-s-c-r-156-2025-insc-627/): This analysis examines Santosh Devi v. Sunder, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 12658 of 2025, decided by a Bench of J. J.B. Pardiwala and J. R. Mahadevan on 2 May 2025, where the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP against concurrent findings of the trial and two appellate courts that the plaintiff’s suit for declaration, cancellation of sale deed No. 638 dated 26.05.2008 and rectification of mutation No. 5340 dated 29.08.2008 was barred by limitation. The Court reaffirmed settled principles on onus of proof in cases attacking registered documents, the strict requirement of particulars when alleging fraud to invoke Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the procedural obligation under Order VII, Rule 6, CPC to plead the grounds of exemption from limitation with specificity. The judgment underscores that mere general averments of fraud in the plaint are legally insufficient to attract the benefit of Section 17; the plaintiff must demonstrate that fraud kept her out of knowledge of the right to sue, not merely that the transactional fraud existed. The decision reiterates the presumption of authenticity of registered instruments (see Prem Singh v. Birbal), places the initial onus on challengers of registration, and clarifies that Order VII, Rule 6 is not a substantive remedy but a procedural mandate to plead exemption grounds. The Court consequently found no error in the High Court’s dismissal of the second appeal and dismissed the SLP.
- [Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 100 : 2025 INSC 619](https://lawfoyer.in/shanmugam-lakshminarayanan-v-high-court-of-madras-2025-6-s-c-r-100-2025-insc-619/): This analysis examines Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras, Criminal Appeal No. 5245 of 2024, decided by the Supreme Court on 2 May 2025, concerning criminal contempt arising from the fabrication and presentation of forged High Court interim orders to obstruct execution of a decree. The central issues are whether the appellants were proved guilty of criminal contempt beyond reasonable doubt for either creating or using fabricated High Court orders, and whether the proceedings were time-barred under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The judgment painstakingly traces the investigative and procedural chronology: the fake orders were produced before the executing bailiff on 17 April 2018, the decree-holder lodged complaints and filed W.P. No. 22410 of 2018 (filed 20 August 2018), the Single Judge directed placement before the Division Bench on 5 September 2018, but the contempt petition was not numbered until 2022 because the writ bundle was misplaced in the High Court Registry. On the facts as established by CBCID investigation, confessions, voice samples, recovered digital materials and FSL reports, the High Court convicted Contemnors C3, C4 and C7 for creating/using forged orders and sentenced them to six months’ simple imprisonment; the Supreme Court affirmed conviction but reduced sentence to one month. The Court applied settled principles from Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and earlier precedents on limitation and the nature of criminal contempt, emphasising that utilisation of a fabricated order, when known to be false or used to confer undeserved benefit, constitutes contempt even if the contemnor is not the fabricator. This analysis relies exclusively on the judgment record supplied.
- [Shubhkaran Singh v. Abhayraj Singh & Ors., 6 S.C.R. 601 : 2025 INSC 628](https://lawfoyer.in/shubhkaran-singh-v-abhayraj-singh-ors-6-s-c-r-601-2025-insc-628/): This analysis examines Shubhkaran Singh v. Abhayraj Singh & Ors., Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 12012–12013 of 2025, decided by a two-Judge Bench (J. J.B. Pardiwala and J. R. Mahadevan) on 5 May 2025. The core legal question is whether the High Court was justified in rejecting an application under Order 18, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to recall and re-examine witnesses. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the power to recall and further examine witnesses under Order 18, Rule 17 CPC is primarily a court’s tool to clarify ambiguities and elicit explanations necessary for adjudication, and not an instrument for parties to fill gaps in their case. Read with Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the rule confers on the trial court an exclusive right to put questions to recalled witnesses; questions or cross-examination by parties are subject to the court’s leave. The Court emphasized that recall under Order 18, Rule 17 should be exercised sparingly and in exceptional circumstances, and, where necessary for fairness, courts may employ their inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC to permit a party to recall a witness for cross-examination. The judgment relies on and follows precedents including Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar v. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate and K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, and cites Sultan Saleh Bin Omer v. Vijayachand Sirmal in support. The appeals were dismissed, reinforcing the narrow, clarificatory scope of Order 18, Rule 17 CPC and warning against its routine use to prolong litigation.
- [Powergrid Corporation of India Limited v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 123 : 2025 INSC 626.](https://lawfoyer.in/powergrid-corporation-of-india-limited-v-central-electricity-regulatory-commission-ors-2025-6-s-c-r-123-2025-insc-626/): This analysis examines Powergrid Corporation of India Limited v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors., as reported in [2025] 6 S.C.R. 123 : 2025 INSC 626, focusing on the legal treatment of claims for additional capitalisation arising from replacement of damaged Inter-connecting Transformers (ICTs), the scope of a transmission licensee’s self-insurance reserve for losses from fire and machinery breakdown, and the consequence of denial of decapitalisation/capitalisation on availability certificates issued by the Northern Regional Power Committee (NRPC). The Supreme Court considered whether the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity and the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) erred in law by rejecting Powergrid’s claim that replacements constituted admissible additional capital expenditure under Regulation 53 of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2004 and whether the appellant’s internal self-insurance reserve covered replacement costs of the ICTs that were burnt due to internal faults. The Court analysed the text and scheme of Regulation 53, the Notes appended thereto (in particular Note 2), the regulatory distinction between operation & maintenance and additional capitalisation, and established precedent on proximate cause in insurance law—most notably New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Zuari Industries Ltd. The Court affirmed the view that replacement of damaged ICTs due to failure and fire must ordinarily be treated as part of operation and maintenance and, where a self-insurance reserve exists covering fire and machinery breakdown risks, the net cost ought to be met from that reserve; consequently claims under Regulation 53 for additional capitalisation were not tenable and directions for revised availability certificates were unnecessary. The analysis below follows the judgment’s reasoning closely and situates it within statutory and precedential contours.
- [The Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Limited v. Smt. Honnamma & Ors., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 141 : 2025 INSC 625](https://lawfoyer.in/the-royal-sundaram-alliance-insurance-company-limited-v-smt-honnamma-ors-2025-6-s-c-r-141-2025-insc-625/): The Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Limited v. Smt. Honnamma & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 6336 of 2025, raises the question whether an insurer of a prime mover (tractor) can be fastened with liability for death caused when a trailer attached to the insured tractor upturned and a person on the trailer died. The MACT had awarded Rs.9,50,000 and held that the risk of an employee on the trailer was not statutorily covered; the High Court enhanced compensation to Rs.13,28,940 and fastened liability on the insurer of the tractor. The insurer appealed. The Supreme Court examined statutory contours of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, prior precedent on trailer risk and scope of insurer’s contractual/statutory liability, and the factual matrix showing the tractor as the root cause. The Court emphasized that where an insured motor vehicle acts as the root cause of a chain of events — for example, a tractor pulling a trailer which then upturns — liability for the resulting death may attach to the insured tractor and its insurer because the chain of events is inseparable and results from the insured vehicle’s use. The Court balanced the welfare object of the MV Act with contractual limits of insurer liability and held that the insurer should not be forced to pay beyond the policy limits or statutory maximum; however, the insurer remains liable at least for the amount already awarded by the MACT. The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the insurer’s appeal subject to liberty to recover any differential amount from the owner, and directed compliance with the enhanced award. This analysis proceeds from the judgment uploaded and relied upon for all factual and legal citations.
- [Rajendra Anant Varik v. Govind B. Prabhugaonkar, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 303 : 2025 INSC 633](https://lawfoyer.in/rajendra-anant-varik-v-govind-b-prabhugaonkar-2025-6-s-c-r-303-2025-insc-633/): The present analysis examines Rajendra Anant Varik v. Govind B. Prabhugaonkar (Criminal Appeal No. 2476 of 2025), decided by the Supreme Court of India on 06 May 2025, where the central dispute concerned conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and whether the complainant’s unlicensed money-lending activity under the Goa Money-Lenders Act, 2001 operated as a bar to prosecution. The trial Court convicted the accused for bouncing a cheque and awarded compensation and costs. The First Appellate Court reversed that conviction on the ground that the complainant was engaged in money-lending without statutory licence, thereby disentitling him from prosecuting under the NI Act. The High Court, however, set aside the acquittal and restored the conviction and sentence. Before the Supreme Court the accused-appellant challenged the High Court order. The Supreme Court found that the High Court failed to address the applicability of the Goa Act, which could constitute a valid defence for the accused; it further noted that the accused had paid the cheque amount and the court-imposed costs. Exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court compounded the offence and acquitted the accused subject to payment of the amounts already deposited. This judgment highlights procedural and substantive interplay between regulatory statutes governing money-lending and the penal provisions of the NI Act, underscores the remedial flexibility of Article 142 to achieve justice where monetary restitution has been made, and demonstrates judicial care in assessing whether a charging party’s statutory non-compliance can vitiate a prosecution under a distinct penal code.
- [Gopal Govind Lakade & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 307 : 2025 INSC 658](https://lawfoyer.in/gopal-govind-lakade-anr-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-anr-2025-6-s-c-r-307-2025-insc-658/): This analysis examines the Supreme Court’s order in Gopal Govind Lakade & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 2483 of 2025), focusing on the High Court’s summary dismissal of a criminal application seeking quashing of a complaint without issuing notice to the opposite party. The Supreme Court found the impugned order to be procedurally impermissible because the Division Bench of the High Court recorded that it was “not inclined even to issue notice in this matter” without assigning reasons or permitting the respondents an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court emphasised foundational tenets of natural justice and the appropriate exercise of a High Court’s powers when called upon to quash criminal proceedings: either reasons must be recorded for not issuing notice, or notice must be issued and the matter decided after hearing both sides on merits. Finding neither step taken, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and remanded the criminal application for fresh disposal on merits. This decision reaffirms the duty of higher courts to ensure procedural fairness, particularly in applications under the High Court’s supervisory/quashing powers, and highlights that summary dismissals that preclude adversarial participation require clear, recorded justification. The analysis below closely follows the judgment text and reasoning as reflected in the court’s short but decisive order.
- [Saroj Salkan v. Huma Singh & Ors., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 210 : 2025 INSC 632](https://lawfoyer.in/saroj-salkan-v-huma-singh-ors-2025-6-s-c-r-210-2025-insc-632/): The Supreme Court of India in Saroj Salkan v. Huma Singh & Ors., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 210 : 2025 INSC 632, upheld dismissal of a partition suit at the stage of framing issues by invoking Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), clarifying that the provision empowers a court, on its own motion, to render judgment on admissions, including dismissal, without a party’s application. The Court treated prior declaratory decrees between family members over four suits (1972–1985) as binding, held that the appellant could not go behind them, and found that the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended in 2005) preserved partitions before 20 December 2004. The claim concerning C-38, Anand Niketan was time-barred; the Barota land controversy belonged to the Sonepat forum under Section 16 CPC and, in any event, stood governed by earlier decrees and a Will dated 03 November 1987. The judgment affirms that inadequate pleadings on the creation of an HUF and coparcenary, and admitted documents, can justify non-framing of issues and a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The Court distinguished the retroactive reach of Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma by applying the saving clause for genuine earlier partitions and treated declaratory decrees grounded in consensus as recognition of partition. Appeal dismissed.
- [Harjinder Singh v. The State of Punjab & Anr., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 168; 2025 INSC 634](https://lawfoyer.in/harjinder-singh-v-the-state-of-punjab-anr-2025-6-s-c-r-168-2025-insc-634/): In Harjinder Singh v. The State of Punjab & Anr., the Supreme Court restored the Trial Court’s order summoning respondent no. 2 under s. 319 CrPC to face trial with co-accused for abetment of suicide under s. 306 read with s. 34 IPC, reversing the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s interference under s. 482 CrPC. The Court emphasised that alibi is a defence whose burden lies on the accused; unproved parking slips, OPD cards, chemist bills, CCTV grabs cannot defeat sworn ocular evidence at the summoning stage. The Court read s. 319 CrPC purposively, following Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, and clarified that once live evidence stronger than mere suspicion surfaces during trial, the court “must act”. On facts, the alleged 08:30 a.m. taunt on 10.05.2016—that the victim and his family “should die of shame” following a grievous acid attack on 13.03.2016—could, if proven, constitute the psychological build-up punishable as abetment to suicide; the 90-km Jagowal–Chandigarh travel window did not, on its face, neutralise involvement. The decision preserves the Trial Court’s ability to evaluate alibi and mens rea at trial, cautions against elevating investigative opinions over court-tested evidence, and prevents a truncated trial where a seemingly complicit participant is excluded. The Court distinguished the limited function of s. 319 from a merits determination and expressly kept all observations confined to that question, while referring to Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh for guidance on s. 306 IPC.
- [Ramkirat Munilal Goud v. State of Maharashtra Etc., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 513; 2025 INSC 702](https://lawfoyer.in/ramkirat-munilal-goud-v-state-of-maharashtra-etc-2025-6-s-c-r-513-2025-insc-702/): The Supreme Court of India in Ramkirat Munilal Goud v. State of Maharashtra allowed the criminal appeals and set aside the conviction and death sentence imposed for the rape and murder of a child aged 3 years and 9 months. Proceeding on a record built entirely on circumstantial evidence—last seen together, extra-judicial confession, and an FSL soil-similarity opinion—the Court found the investigation shabby, perfunctory, and tainted. The statements of key “last seen” witnesses were recorded belatedly; their conduct was unnatural; and their depositions bore wholesale improvements. The supposed confession surfaced only after leading questions and contradicted the witness’s earlier s. 164 CrPC statement. The recoveries were doubtful; the DNA and serology reports were inconclusive; and the soil-similarity opinion lacked source-specificity. Reiterating the Sharad Birdhichand Sharda tests for conviction on circumstantial evidence, the Court held the chain incomplete and exonerated the appellant after twelve years’ incarceration, including six years under a confirmed threat of capital punishment. The judgment sharply censures investigative lapses, draws adverse inferences for withholding material scientific reports, and underscores that courts cannot bridge evidentiary gaps with conjectures merely because the crime is heinous. Held: conviction and sentence unsustainable; appeals allowed; appellant acquitted.
- [Siddhi Sandeep Ladda v. Consortium of National Law Universities and Another, [2025] 7 S.C.R. 55; 2025 INSC 714](https://lawfoyer.in/siddhi-sandeep-ladda-v-consortium-of-national-law-universities-and-another-2025-7-s-c-r-55-2025-insc-714/): The Supreme Court of India scrutinised the Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) 2024–25 evaluation controversies and intervened in six disputed questions, balancing its usual restraint in academic matters with the compelling need to safeguard candidates’ rights. Recording “deep anguish” at the Consortium of National Law Universities’ “callous and casual” question-setting, the Court endorsed limited, question-wise correction and deletion rather than wholesale re-assessment. It recognised that the reading-material model permits a test-taker using only logic and the supplied text to answer, and then applied that benchmark to: award marks to candidates selecting either option (c) or (d) for Question 56 on environmental duties; uphold option (b) as correct for Question 77 on voidable contracts; affirm option (c) for Question 78 on void agreements; delete Question 88 given parity with a previously deleted, near-identical item; and delete Questions 115 and 116 because they required excessive computation and cross-referencing errors undermined fairness. The Court relied on Articles 48A, 51A(g), and 21 to locate a shared State-citizen environmental duty and cited Disha Panchal v. Union of India to emphasise remedial oversight of entrance examinations. It directed the Consortium to amend the key, revise mark sheets, republish lists, and commence counselling within two weeks of the order dated 7 May 2025. The ruling refines the standard for judicial intervention in high-stakes competitive exams, insisting on accuracy, internal coherence, and candidate equity without supplanting academic autonomy.
- [Paritala Sudhakar v. State of Telangana, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 180 : 2025 INSC 655](https://lawfoyer.in/paritala-sudhakar-v-state-of-telangana-2025-6-s-c-r-180-2025-insc-655/): The Supreme Court of India in Paritala Sudhakar v. State of Telangana set aside concurrent convictions under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, extending benefit of doubt due to material contradictions and a doubtful prosecution narrative surrounding demand and acceptance. The prosecution trap turned on an unusual mode of “acceptance” by placement of tainted currency inside a rexine bag affixed to the petrol tank of the accused officer’s motorcycle, with phenolphthalein (pH) hand-wash tests returning negative for the accused. The Court underscored that demand is sine qua non for the Section 20 presumption; where demand itself is unproven, the presumption does not arise. The Bench drew strength from Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh on the treatment of contradictions, Krishnegowda v. State of Karnataka on trustworthiness of testimony, and Om Parkash v. State of Haryana on limits of the Section 20 presumption, while noting investigative deficits against the “triple test” often invoked in trap cases: prior verification, use of a shadow witness, and successful hand-wash test. The statements of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW7, and DW1 were assessed together, revealing inconsistencies about who saw what, when the notes were placed, and whether the accused was present. On this evidentiary canvas, the narrative failed to inspire confidence beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was allowed; convictions and sentences were quashed; fine, if deposited, directed to be refunded.
- [Renuka Prasad v. The State represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police, [2025] 7 S.C.R. 160; 2025 INSC 657](https://lawfoyer.in/renuka-prasad-v-the-state-represented-by-assistant-superintendent-of-police-2025-7-s-c-r-160-2025-insc-657/): In Renuka Prasad v. The State represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police, the Supreme Court of India set aside a High Court conviction under s.302 read with s.120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860, restoring the Trial Court’s acquittal where 71 of 87 witnesses, including the eye-witnesses, turned hostile. The Court held that the High Court impermissibly built guilt on the testimony of investigating officers that merely echoed s.161, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 statements, contrary to s.162 CrPC. It reiterated that what surfaces in investigation must be proved at trial by admissible evidence and cannot be substituted by an investigating officer’s narrative or by “voluntary statements” of accused barred by ss.25–26, Indian Evidence Act, 1872, save the narrow carve-out of s.27 Evidence Act which is confined to information distinctly relating to a discovered fact. On facts, alleged recoveries of cash, clothes, and machetes were either unlinked to the crime or flowed from a co-accused’s disclosure that did not connect the objects to the assailants. The alleged sites of conspiracy and money transfer pointed out by A1 yielded no discovery and were therefore inadmissible. The Court emphasized that TIP failures and in-court non-identification by PW8 (the deceased’s son) and other proximate witnesses left the prosecution without foundational proof. Relying on Pulukuri Kottaya, Kashmira Singh, Haricharan Kurmi, Chandrappa, and allied precedents, the Court concluded that there were not even “two views” from the evidence; only one—the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Convictions based on IO testimony founded on s.161 statements and on inadmissible confessional material were declared unsustainable.
- [IGNITAC'25- 2nd Ignatius Trial & Advocacy Competition | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier's University, Kolkata | Register by 3rd October 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/ignitac25-2nd-ignatius-trial-advocacy-competition-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-9th-to-11th-of-october-2025/): IGNITAC'25- 2nd Ignatius Trial & Advocacy Competition | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier's University, Kolkata | 9th to 11th of October 2025
- [C.T. Kochouseph v. State of Kerala and Another Etc., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 310 : 2025 INSC 661](https://lawfoyer.in/c-t-kochouseph-v-state-of-kerala-and-another-etc-2025-6-s-c-r-310-2025-insc-661/): The Supreme Court of India in C.T. Kochouseph v. State of Kerala and Another Etc. addressed the constitutional validity and scope of Section 5A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 and Section 7A of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, provisions which impose purchase tax in specific circumstances. The appellants challenged these sections on the grounds that they were in the nature of excise duty, consignment tax, or inter-State levy, and thus ultra vires the Constitution. The Court rejected these contentions, holding that the provisions are self-contained charging sections, validly enacted under the legislative competence of the State. The judgment clarified that the purchase tax applies only in situations where sales tax was not collected at the point of sale due to exemptions, and therefore the levy does not amount to double taxation. Importantly, the Court distinguished between “taxable goods,” “taxable persons,” and “taxable events,” observing that exemptions granted to sellers from sales tax liability do not exempt purchasers from liability under Sections 5A/7A when statutory conditions are satisfied. Upholding precedents such as State of Tamil Nadu v. M.K. Kandaswami (1975) 4 SCC 745 and Hotel Balaji v. State of A.P. (1993 Supp 4 SCC 536), the Court reaffirmed that the levy is not a consignment or inter-State tax, but a tax on purchases within the State. The Court also noted that while the issue has lost practical significance after the enactment of VAT (2005) and GST (2017), its resolution was necessary for legacy disputes. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, and the validity of purchase tax under both Kerala and Tamil Nadu Acts was upheld as constitutionally sound and within the legislative power of the States.
- [Vijay Kumar Joshi v. Akash Tripathi & Ors., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 402 : 2025 INSC 670](https://lawfoyer.in/vijay-kumar-joshi-v-akash-tripathi-ors-2025-6-s-c-r-402-2025-insc-670/): The Supreme Court of India in Vijay Kumar Joshi v. Akash Tripathi & Ors. examined the entitlement of pensionary benefits for employees of Co-operative Societies absorbed into the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board (MPSEB). The central issue revolved around whether service rendered in Co-operative Societies prior to absorption should count towards qualifying service for pension under the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Pension) Rules. The Court acknowledged that once employees were absorbed into MPSEB, functional integration mandated parity in pension entitlements with regular employees of MPSEB. However, the Court clarified that qualifying service would commence only from the date of absorption, not from earlier service in the Societies, as such service was not under State rules. The Court relied upon precedents like Panchraj Tiwari v. MPSEB (2014), M.P. Poorva Kshetra Vidyut Vitaran Co. Ltd. v. Uma Shankar Dwivedi (2018), and Brajendra Singh Kushwah v. MPSEB to hold that absorbed employees cannot be treated as a separate class and must receive pension, but strictly from the date of absorption. By invoking Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court sought to avoid inequitable treatment among similarly placed employees. The decision modifies the Full Bench ruling of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and provides a uniform solution ensuring absorbed employees’ entitlement to pension without counting pre-absorption service.
- [NDA Securities Ltd. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 360 : 2025 INSC 676](https://lawfoyer.in/nda-securities-ltd-v-state-nct-of-delhi-anr-2025-6-s-c-r-360-2025-insc-676/): This case revolves around the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the legal limits of such jurisdiction when a criminal investigation remains pending. The appellant, NDA Securities Ltd., alleged fraudulent trading activities caused by impersonation and manipulation in the stock market transaction that resulted in a loss of Rs. 15.90 lakhs. The Bombay Stock Exchange withheld the payout of the said funds, suspecting fraudulent activity. Respondent no. 2, alleged as the primary beneficiary of the fraudulent scheme, sought release of the amount. While both the Magistrate Court and the Revisional Court rejected his claim, the High Court of Delhi allowed his petition under Section 482 CrPC and directed release of funds against a guarantee. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court had transgressed its jurisdiction by intervening at an interim stage, especially when the primary accused remained absconding and the investigation incomplete. The Court emphasized that Section 482 CrPC cannot be invoked to conduct a “mini-trial” or to give a premature clean chit to an accused when investigation is pending. Stressing that respondent no. 2 was the direct beneficiary of the fraudulent transaction, the Court held that release of funds would frustrate investigation and prejudice the appellant. Consequently, the impugned High Court order was set aside, and the withheld funds were directed to remain with BSE until trial conclusion.
- [Harpreet Singh Talwar @ Kabir Talwar v. The State of Gujarat through National Investigation Agency, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 291 : 2025 INSC 662](https://lawfoyer.in/harpreet-singh-talwar-kabir-talwar-v-the-state-of-gujarat-through-national-investigation-agency-2025-6-s-c-r-291-2025-insc-662/): The case of Harpreet Singh Talwar @ Kabir Talwar v. The State of Gujarat through National Investigation Agency (2025) arises from one of the largest heroin seizures in Indian history, involving approximately 2,988.21 kilograms of heroin-laced talc stones smuggled into India through Mundra Port, Gujarat. The appellant, arraigned as Accused No. 24, was alleged to have played a central and coordinating role in the cross-border narcotics smuggling operation executed by Afghan-based syndicates in conspiracy with domestic actors. The prosecution attributed to him meetings in Dubai with a principal foreign conspirator, creation of shell firms like M/s Magent India under proxy names, orchestration of consignment clearances through intermediaries, fabrication of invoices to disguise transactions, and barter-style exchange of goods. He was charged under Sections 8(c), 21(c), 23(c), 29 of the NDPS Act; Sections 17, 18, 22C of the UAPA; and Section 120B IPC. The appellant sought regular bail contending absence of direct recovery, lack of credible evidence, and violation of his Article 21 rights due to prolonged custody. Conversely, the prosecution emphasized the appellant’s integral role, risk of witness tampering, prior antecedents, and flight risk, invoking the rigors of Section 43D(5) UAPA. The Supreme Court held that while no narcotics were directly recovered from the appellant’s consignment, the circumstantial evidence, protected witness statements, and documentary linkages prima facie demonstrated complicity. In light of the gravity of charges, risk to witnesses, and the stage of trial, the Court denied bail, allowing him to renew his prayer after six months or substantial progress of trial.
- [Deep Shikha & Anr. v. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 365 : 2025 INSC 675](https://lawfoyer.in/deep-shikha-anr-v-national-insurance-company-ltd-ors-2025-6-s-c-r-365-2025-insc-675/): The case Deep Shikha & Anr. v. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors., decided by the Supreme Court of India on 13 May 2025, revolves around the determination of rightful compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The appellants, being the married daughter and the aged mother of the deceased victim, had approached the Tribunal seeking compensation for the death of Smt. Paras Sharma in a road accident caused by the rash and negligent driving of a Rajasthan Roadways bus. The Tribunal granted compensation of Rs. 15,97,000/- jointly in their favour, holding them to be legal heirs and dependents. However, on appeal, the Rajasthan High Court drastically reduced the daughter’s compensation to Rs. 50,000/- under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act and denied the mother any compensation on the ground of lack of dependency. The Supreme Court, while upholding the High Court’s reasoning regarding the married daughter’s lack of dependency, faulted the High Court for denying compensation to the deceased’s mother, who, being aged and without income, was clearly dependent on her daughter. The Court emphasized the reciprocal duty of children to maintain parents under Indian law and jurisprudence, thereby restoring and enhancing compensation to Rs. 19,22,356/- in favour of the mother. The ruling clarifies the jurisprudential position that a married daughter, unless financially dependent, cannot claim loss of dependency but parents of the deceased enjoy a legitimate right to compensation. Reliance was placed on Manjuri Bera v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Pranay Sethi, and Sarla Verma to determine principles of dependency, computation of income, future prospects, and consortium. This judgment reinforces the humanitarian and social obligations embedded in motor accident compensation law, balancing strict statutory interpretation with equitable considerations for dependents.
- [Tushar Himatlal Jani v. Jasbir Singh Vijan & Ors., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 414 : 2025 INSC 663](https://lawfoyer.in/tushar-himatlal-jani-v-jasbir-singh-vijan-ors-2025-6-s-c-r-414-2025-insc-663/): The case Tushar Himatlal Jani v. Jasbir Singh Vijan & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 6636 of 2025, decided on 13 May 2025 by the Supreme Court of India, pertains to the restoration of an interim injunction granted in favour of Respondent No.1 during the pendency of a tenancy-related dispute before the Small Causes Court, Mumbai. The Supreme Court had to determine whether the Bombay High Court was justified in restoring interim protection that restrained the Appellant from dispossessing the Respondent or creating third-party interests over 550 square feet of disputed premises within a property measuring 22,000 square feet. The Court examined the settled principles of granting interim injunctions—prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. The Court held that Respondent No.1 failed to establish a prima facie case as his tenancy rights were still pending adjudication before the Small Causes Court. The balance of convenience favoured the Appellant, as the injunction was paralyzing a large-scale redevelopment project for a negligible portion of land. Further, irreparable injury was found to be caused to the Appellant, since contractual obligations and redevelopment rights were indefinitely stalled. The Court emphasized that Respondent No.1’s claims required full trial scrutiny and could not be pre-emptively protected through interim orders. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, but in the interest of equity, directed the Appellant to reserve one unit of 550 square feet in the redeveloped property until the tenancy suit was conclusively adjudicated. The judgment underscores judicial restraint in interfering with redevelopment projects through interim orders where tenancy rights are disputed, and reinforces the principle that injunctions must balance equities without unduly prejudicing legitimate proprietary rights.
- [Call for Papers: National Seminar on Music and Copyright in the Digital Era: Navigating Innovation, Protection, and Policy | Organized by National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal | Submit Abstract by September 15, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-national-seminar-on-music-and-copyright-in-the-digital-era-navigating-innovation-protection-and-policy-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-nliu-bhopal-submit-abst/): Call for Papers: National Seminar on Music and Copyright in the Digital Era: Navigating Innovation, Protection, and Policy | Organized by National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal | Submit Abstract by September 15, 2025
- [Contemporary International Trade and Changing Global Legal Order- A Discussion | Organized by UPES Dehradun, School of Law | 6th September 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/contemporary-international-trade-and-changing-global-legal-order-a-discussion-organized-by-upes-dehradun-school-of-law-6th-september-2025/): Contemporary International Trade and Changing Global Legal Order- A Discussion | Organized by UPES Dehradun, School of Law | 6th September 2025
- [Jawala Real Estate Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Haresh, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 193 : 2025 INSC 669](https://lawfoyer.in/jawala-real-estate-pvt-ltd-anr-v-haresh-2025-6-s-c-r-193-2025-insc-669/): The Supreme Court of India in Jawala Real Estate Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Haresh (2025) addressed a prolonged dispute concerning the allotment, cancellation, and substitution of a residential apartment under the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA). The appellant-developer had allotted an apartment in 2013 to the respondent-buyer upon part-payment of consideration. However, disputes arose due to the developer’s failure to provide necessary documents and the buyer’s withholding of the balance payment. Despite interim restraint orders from the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC), the developer alienated the originally allotted apartment to a third party, complicating the proceedings. The NCDRC initially set aside the cancellation and directed execution of the sale agreement. Later, when substitution of a similar apartment was sought, the Commission declined citing contempt. On appeal, the Supreme Court allowed substitution but the implementation was delayed due to disagreements over documents, clearances, and payments. The Court was ultimately tasked with determining the exact amount payable by the buyer, balancing equities between both parties who had contributed to delay and hardship. The Court directed the respondent to pay Rs. 1,40,71,000/- towards all outstanding dues, taxes, and charges up to the date of possession, along with liability for future dues post-handover. The ruling underscores judicial emphasis on equitable adjustment, compliance with MOFA, and balancing of consumer rights with developer’s obligations, while condemning willful disobedience of judicial orders.
- [Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 253 : 2025 INSC 672](https://lawfoyer.in/thirunagalingam-v-lingeswaran-anr-2025-6-s-c-r-253-2025-insc-672/): The present case concerns the condonation of an extraordinary delay of 1116 days in filing an appeal under Order XLI Rule 3A read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 against an ex parte decree. The appellant, Thirunagalingam, sought specific performance of a sale agreement executed in 2015. Despite due service of summons and filing of written statements, the respondents ceased to appear before the Trial Court, resulting in an ex parte decree against them. The respondents later attempted to set aside the decree under Order IX Rule 13 CPC with applications for condonation of delay, which were rejected up to the Supreme Court in SLP Nos. 2054–55 of 2022. Undeterred, the respondents initiated a second round of litigation by filing a delayed appeal accompanied by a condonation application of 1116 days. The First Appellate Court dismissed the condonation plea, but the High Court allowed it upon payment of Rs. 1 lakh. The Supreme Court, however, found that the respondents merely repeated the same grounds already dismissed earlier. The Court ruled that condonation of delay cannot be granted as an act of judicial generosity, especially where the explanation lacks bona fides and amounts to abuse of process. The judgment clarified that N. Mohan v. R. Madhu was inapplicable since summons in the present case were duly served, unlike in N. Mohan. The Court reaffirmed principles laid down in Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar and Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, emphasizing that limitation laws, though harsh, must be strictly applied. The Court held that repeated pleas based on identical grounds previously rejected cannot be entertained. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and dismissed the condonation application, thereby restoring finality to the ex parte decree.
- [Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 382 : 2025 INSC 671](https://lawfoyer.in/rajesh-chaddha-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-2025-6-s-c-r-382-2025-insc-671/): The Supreme Court in Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2025] 6 S.C.R. 382, dealt with the conviction of the appellant under Section 498A, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 4, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, which had been upheld by the Allahabad High Court in its revisionary jurisdiction. The Court critically examined whether vague and omnibus allegations without specific instances of cruelty or demand of dowry could sustain a conviction under these penal provisions. It observed that the prosecution evidence was primarily based on the complainant-wife and her father’s depositions, devoid of medical corroboration, time, place, or date-specific incidents. Allegations of miscarriage and physical assault were unsupported by any documentary evidence, thereby weakening the prosecution’s case. The Court highlighted the increasing misuse of Section 498A and provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, cautioning against the malicious roping in of family members in matrimonial disputes. The FIR lodged by the complainant was also viewed as retaliatory, given it was filed subsequent to the husband’s divorce petition. Ultimately, the Court set aside the conviction, acquitting the appellant of all charges, reiterating that protective legislations cannot be allowed to become tools of harassment.
- [Office for Alternative Architecture v. IRCON Infrastructure and Services Ltd., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 395 : 2025 INSC 665](https://lawfoyer.in/office-for-alternative-architecture-v-ircon-infrastructure-and-services-ltd-2025-6-s-c-r-395-2025-insc-665/): The case Office for Alternative Architecture v. IRCON Infrastructure and Services Ltd., decided by the Supreme Court of India on 13 May 2025, concerns the scope of judicial intervention under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The primary issue was whether, at the stage of appointing an arbitrator, the Court is limited to examining only the existence of an arbitration agreement, or whether it may also determine the arbitrability of specific claims. The Delhi High Court had earlier bifurcated the appellant’s claims, holding certain claims as non-arbitrable under Clause 50 and 50.2 of the contract. The appellant argued that such exclusions fall within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle laid down in In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2023 INSC 1066), which clarified that under Section 11(6A) the referral court must restrict itself to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement, leaving questions of arbitrability to the arbitral tribunal. The Court disapproved of the High Court’s approach of segregating arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims. Relying on SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning (2024 INSC 532), the Court emphasized that judicial interference at the referral stage must be minimal. By setting aside the Delhi High Court’s order, the Supreme Court restored the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to determine the issue of arbitrability of claims, thus reinforcing the doctrine of competence-competence and the legislative intent of limiting judicial scrutiny under Section 11.
- [P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi v. State Represented by the Inspector of Police SPE/CBI/ACB/Chennai, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 372 : 2025 INSC 674](https://lawfoyer.in/p-shanthi-pugazhenthi-v-state-represented-by-the-inspector-of-police-spe-cbi-acb-chennai-2025-6-s-c-r-372-2025-insc-674/): The Supreme Court in P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi v. State Represented by the Inspector of Police SPE/CBI/ACB/Chennai reaffirmed the principle that abetment of corruption-related offences under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 can be committed not only by public servants but also by non-public servants. The appellant, an Assistant Superintendent at Chennai Port Trust, was convicted for abetting her husband, a Divisional Manager in United India Insurance Co. Ltd., in amassing disproportionate assets during the check period between 2002 and 2009. The Supreme Court relied heavily on the precedent laid down in P. Nallammal v. State (1999) 6 SCC 559, which clarified that any person—whether a public servant or not—who assists a public servant in concealing or holding disproportionate assets would be guilty of abetment under Section 109 IPC read with Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the 1988 Act. The Court rejected the appellant’s contention that she could not be convicted merely because her husband later remarried, observing that the material point was her active role in facilitating the concealment of illicit wealth during the relevant period. The Court upheld concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court that substantial disproportionate assets were held in the appellant’s name, and thus, her conviction stood justified. This ruling reiterates the judiciary’s strong stance against corruption and affirms that indirect participation in corruption, even through passive concealment, falls squarely within the ambit of abetment under anti-corruption law.
- [M/s Harcharan Dass Gupta v. Union of India, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 422 : 2025 INSC 689](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-harcharan-dass-gupta-v-union-of-india-2025-6-s-c-r-422-2025-insc-689/): The Supreme Court in M/s Harcharan Dass Gupta v. Union of India addressed the interplay between the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (Development) Act, 2006 (MSMED Act) and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The central issue was whether the contractual stipulation fixing Bengaluru as the seat of arbitration could override the jurisdiction of the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) under Section 18(4) of the MSMED Act, when the supplier was registered in Delhi. The appellant, a registered MSME, had invoked the Delhi Facilitation Council against the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). The Delhi Facilitation Council referred the dispute to arbitration through the Delhi Arbitration Centre. However, the Karnataka High Court upheld ISRO’s objection, holding that since the contract fixed Bengaluru as the arbitral seat, the Delhi Arbitration Centre lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision, holding that Section 18(4) of the MSMED Act overrides any contractual stipulation regarding the seat of arbitration. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind the MSMED Act was to protect MSMEs from delayed payments and to provide a specialized forum. Consequently, once the statutory mechanism under Section 18 is invoked, it prevails over private contractual agreements. The Court relied heavily on its earlier ruling in Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods Pvt. Ltd. (2023) 6 SCC 401, which affirmed the overriding effect of the MSMED Act over the Arbitration Act. The ruling reinforces the principle that special legislation prevails over general law and clarifies that in MSME disputes, the jurisdiction of the Facilitation Council is determined by the supplier’s location, irrespective of any contrary contractual clause. The arbitral proceedings were restored under the aegis of the Delhi Arbitration Centre.
- [Call for Papers - 9th Edition of our Annual Legal Conference | Organized by SVKM's Pravin Gandhi College of Law | Submit Abstract by 10th September 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-9th-edition-of-our-annual-legal-conference-organized-by-svkms-pravin-gandhi-college-of-law-submit-abstract-by-10th-september-2025/): Call for Papers - 9th Edition of our Annual Legal Conference | Organized by SVKM's Pravin Gandhi College of Law | Submit Abstract by 10th September 2025
- [Vijaya Bank & Anr. v. Prashant B Narnaware, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 240 : 2025 INSC 691](https://lawfoyer.in/vijaya-bank-anr-v-prashant-b-narnaware-2025-6-s-c-r-240-2025-insc-691/): The Supreme Court of India in Vijaya Bank & Anr. v. Prashant B Narnaware addressed the validity of Clause 11(k) of an employment contract requiring an employee to serve a minimum tenure of three years, failing which Rs. 2 lakhs would be payable as liquidated damages. The respondent resigned before completing the mandated period, paid the amount under protest, and sought refund through a writ petition. The High Court struck down the clause as violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and Sections 23 and 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The Supreme Court reversed this finding, holding that restrictive covenants operative during the subsistence of an employment contract do not constitute a restraint of trade under Section 27 of the Contract Act. Relying on precedents like Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. Century Spinning (1967) and Superintendence Co. v. Krishan Murgai (1981), the Court clarified that restrictions meant to further the employment relationship, such as requiring minimum tenure, are not invalid. The Court further analyzed whether such a clause was opposed to public policy under Section 23 of the Contract Act. Drawing from Central Inland Water Transport v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986), the Court acknowledged concerns about unequal bargaining power in standard form contracts. However, it emphasized the changed realities of a deregulated economy, the need for public sector banks to retain skilled workforce, and the legitimacy of liquidated damages to cover the high costs of recruitment. The Court concluded that the clause was reasonable, not unconscionable, and not against public policy. Accordingly, it upheld the employer’s right to enforce the clause, set aside the High Court’s ruling, and allowed the appeal.
- [The State of Telangana & Ors. v. Dr. Pasupuleti Nirmala Hanumantha Rao Charitable Trust, [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 679](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-telangana-ors-v-dr-pasupuleti-nirmala-hanumantha-rao-charitable-trust-2025-7-s-c-r-1-2025-insc-679/): The Supreme Court of India in The State of Telangana & Ors. v. Dr. Pasupuleti Nirmala Hanumantha Rao Charitable Trust dealt with a significant question relating to the nature of government land alienation and the applicability of Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The issue centered on whether the District Collector’s alienation order dated 08.02.2001 constituted a sale or a conditional allotment, and whether restrictions imposed under the statutory scheme were valid or void under Section 10 TPA. The case emanated from the High Court’s ruling, which had held the transaction as a sale on market value, thereby granting the Trust absolute ownership rights, free from restrictions. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the High Court’s interpretation. It held that the land in question was government poramboke land, and the Trust had only received a conditional allotment under the statutory scheme framed by the Telangana Land Revenue Act and the Alienation of State Lands Rules, 1975. The Court emphasized that allotments under such schemes were distinct from ordinary private sales, as they were guided by considerations of public purpose and were enforceable through specific conditions. Thus, the applicability of Section 10 TPA was excluded in such cases, as the State cannot be equated to a private party in an inter vivos transaction. Further, the Court observed that the Trust had fraudulently violated the allotment conditions by cutting a colony named Eden Orchard on the land and selling plots to third parties. Such conduct was termed a “fraud on the statute.” The Supreme Court reaffirmed that alienations under statutory schemes must strictly adhere to public interest and cannot be converted into private profiteering ventures. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the High Court’s order was set aside.
- [Tukesh Singh & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 266 : 2025 INSC 683](https://lawfoyer.in/tukesh-singh-ors-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-2025-6-s-c-r-266-2025-insc-683/): The case of Tukesh Singh & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh revolved around the evidentiary value of eyewitness testimony, particularly the consequences of eyewitnesses failing to identify the accused in open court. The prosecution alleged that the accused, with a common object and armed with deadly weapons, committed the murder of two individuals and attempted to kill others who were injured witnesses. Both the Trial Court and the High Court convicted the accused under Sections 147, 148, 302, 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. However, the Supreme Court meticulously re-evaluated the depositions of eyewitnesses and observed major inconsistencies and omissions. The Court emphasized that identification of the accused in court is of paramount importance—mere narration of names in depositions without linking them to the accused present in court is insufficient. The failure of the prosecution witnesses to identify the accused fatally undermined the prosecution’s case. Further, the absence of a Test Identification Parade (TIP), material contradictions in testimonies, and belated recording of witness statements cumulatively weakened the case. Applying principles from precedents such as Sudhir v. State of M.P., Kuldip Yadav v. State of Bihar, and Nand Lal v. State of Chhattisgarh, the Court held that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction was quashed, and the accused were acquitted, reaffirming the golden principle of criminal jurisprudence that benefit of doubt must go to the accused.
- [Nagarajan & Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 471 : 2025 INSC 703](https://lawfoyer.in/nagarajan-anr-v-the-state-of-tamil-nadu-2025-6-s-c-r-471-2025-insc-703/): The Supreme Court in Nagarajan & Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu (Criminal Appeal No. 1390 of 2025) dealt with a significant question concerning the applicability of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 in prosecutions under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PoFA), specifically during the period between the insertion of Section 20AA in 1976 and the repeal of PoFA in 2006 by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSS Act). The appeals stemmed from convictions relating to offences of food adulteration committed in 2001 and 1985. The appellants sought either the benefit of probation or the mollification of sentences under the new FSS Act framework. The Court, through Justice Dipankar Datta, held that Section 20AA expressly excluded the application of probation for food adulteration offences, thereby rendering the Probation Act inapplicable. It also held that the savings clause in Section 97 of the FSS Act prevented retrospective application of reduced penalties. However, applying precedents such as C. Mohammed v. State of Kerala and A.K. Sarkar & Co. v. State of West Bengal, the Court exercised judicial discretion to convert custodial sentences into fines, noting discrepancies in analytical reports and the long passage of time since the offences. This judgment harmonises principles of statutory interpretation, legislative intent, and judicial equity, underscoring that while food adulteration is a grave offence against public health, justice demands proportionality in sentencing.
- [Eby Cherian v. Jerema John, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 202 : 2025 INSC 709](https://lawfoyer.in/eby-cherian-v-jerema-john-2025-6-s-c-r-202-2025-insc-709/): The case Eby Cherian v. Jerema John deals with the critical issue of interim custody of a minor child amid matrimonial discord. The appellant–father, engaged in rotational overseas assignments, sought a definitive interim custody and visitation schedule, opposing the Family Court’s directive requiring fresh interlocutory applications (IAs) each time he visited India. The High Court upheld the arrangement but provided ad hoc relief for limited dates. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. The Court emphasized that meaningful contact with both parents is integral to a child’s welfare and that the burden of repeated applications undermines both the non-custodial parent’s rights and the child’s best interests. Relying on the principle of child welfare as paramount under Section 17 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Court restructured the interim arrangement. It directed a standing schedule for custody during weekends, vacations, and festivals, supplemented by regular video interactions, thus balancing stability with parental access. The Court categorically held that piecemeal orders erode the predictability essential for a child’s holistic development. The judgment underscores that procedural technicalities must not impede substantive justice in custody matters, aligning with precedents such as Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal (2009) 1 SCC 42 and international instruments like the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.
- [National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors., [2025] 7 S.C.R. 252 : 2025 INSC 694](https://lawfoyer.in/national-spot-exchange-limited-v-union-of-india-ors-2025-7-s-c-r-252-2025-insc-694/): The judgment in National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors. is a watershed ruling addressing the complex interplay between central and state legislations concerning the rights of secured creditors, depositors, and investors when fraudulent financial defaults take place. The dispute emanated from the infamous National Spot Exchange Limited (NSEL) scam, involving fraudulent defaults of approximately ₹5,600 crores. The central question was whether secured creditors could assert priority over assets attached under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) and the Maharashtra Protection of Investors and Depositors Act, 1999 (MPID Act), relying on the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (RDB Act). Additionally, the Court examined whether properties attached under the MPID Act could be utilized for execution of decrees despite moratorium provisions under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The Supreme Court held that secured creditors cannot claim priority of interest over properties attached under the MPID Act. The deposits of duped investors do not constitute a “debt” under Section 26E of SARFAESI Act, and hence such provisions do not apply. The Court upheld the competence of the State Legislature under Article 246 of the Constitution to enact the MPID Act, reaffirming the federal distribution of legislative powers. Importantly, the Court clarified that no repugnancy exists between MPID and IBC, since they operate in distinct fields, and the moratorium under Section 14, IBC does not override the vesting of attached properties under MPID. The judgment strikes a balance between investor protection and creditor rights, reaffirming that MPID Act, enacted in public interest, overrides creditor claims in cases of fraudulent financial establishments. The Court’s invocation of Article 142 to constitute a committee for centralized execution of decrees reflects judicial pragmatism in ensuring holistic and equitable justice. This ruling has significant implications for banking law, insolvency law, federalism, and financial fraud recovery jurisprudence.
- [M/s Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited v. Union of India & Anr., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 431 : 2025 INSC 696](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-dhanbad-fuels-private-limited-v-union-of-india-anr-2025-6-s-c-r-431-2025-insc-696/): The Supreme Court in M/s Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited v. Union of India & Anr. addressed the interplay between Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The primary issue was whether a commercial suit filed without pre-institution mediation, as mandated under Section 12A, must be dismissed outright or whether courts can instead hold such proceedings in abeyance and direct parties to mediation. The Court traced the legislative intent behind Section 12A, introduced in 2018 to promote mediation as a compulsory step prior to litigation unless urgent interim relief is sought. It emphasized that Section 12A is mandatory in nature, as previously settled in Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd. (2022) 10 SCC 1. However, the Court reiterated that the consequence of rejection for non-compliance applies only prospectively to suits filed on or after 20 August 2022. Since the Union of India had instituted the money suit in August 2019, prior to the Patil Automation ruling, the plaint could not be rejected. The Court upheld the High Court’s direction to keep the suit in abeyance and refer parties to time-bound mediation under the Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement Rules, 2018 (PIMS Rules). It clarified that the doctrine lex non cogit ad impossibilia applied, as mediation infrastructure was not fully functional at the time of filing. Importantly, the Court defined the contours of “urgent interim relief” and cautioned against its misuse as a mere pretext to bypass Section 12A. This decision harmonises procedural law with substantive justice, balancing strict compliance with legislative mandate and pragmatic flexibility in cases predating Patil Automation.
- [Hansura Bai & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 280 : 2025 INSC 711](https://lawfoyer.in/hansura-bai-anr-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-anr-2025-6-s-c-r-280-2025-insc-711/): The judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in Hansura Bai & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 2647 of 2025) examines the principles of fair investigation in custodial death cases and the protection of key witnesses. The Court was confronted with the custodial death of a young man, Deva Pardhi, during illegal detention and brutal torture by local police officials. Despite clear evidence and a magisterial inquiry confirming custodial torture, no police official had been arrested for over eight months. Compounding the injustice, the sole eyewitness, Gangaram Pardhi—the victim’s uncle—was implicated in multiple criminal cases, evidently to silence him and prevent deposition. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh had refused to transfer investigation or grant him bail, though it acknowledged threat perceptions and shifted him to Gwalior Central Jail for security. The Supreme Court invoked the maxim nemo judex in causa sua to hold that the local police could not fairly investigate their own misconduct. Relying upon precedents like Narmada Bai v. State of Gujarat and R.S. Sodhi v. State of U.P., the Court directed transfer of investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) for ensuring credibility, transparency, and justice. It also emphasized the Witness Protection Scheme, 2018, holding the State responsible for Gangaram Pardhi’s safety in and outside prison. Further, liberty was granted to him to directly move the High Court for bail in all false cases instituted post the custodial death incident. The judgment reinforces the constitutional mandate of fair investigation under Article 21 and reflects judicial concern for protecting victims’ rights against State excesses. It sets significant guidelines on custodial death investigations, witness protection, and the judiciary’s supervisory role in cases where the State machinery itself is implicated.
- [Mohit Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 499 : 2025 INSC 704](https://lawfoyer.in/mohit-kumar-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-ors-2025-6-s-c-r-499-2025-insc-704/): The Supreme Court in Mohit Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. dealt with the legality of the Uttar Pradesh Police Recruitment and Promotion Board’s insistence on candidates submitting Other Backward Class (OBC) certificates strictly in the prescribed State format for availing reservation benefits in recruitment to posts of Sub-Inspector, Platoon Commander, and Fire Officer. The controversy arose when candidates, including Mohit Kumar and Kiran Prajapati, submitted OBC certificates issued in the Central Government format instead of the format mandated by the recruitment notification. Despite belonging to recognized OBC communities and possessing valid certificates, their candidature under the reserved category was rejected, and they were treated as general candidates. The Court held that although no statutory mandate directly required a certificate in the exact format prescribed, the recruitment notification’s terms were binding and mandatory. Once a recruitment process is initiated, equal treatment of all aspirants demands strict adherence to prescribed norms. Non-compliance with the specified format, even if the candidate substantively belonged to an OBC category, justified treating them as unreserved candidates. The Court further observed that recruitment authorities are the best judges of their requirements and that courts should not interfere unless there is arbitrariness or violation of constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 or 16. This decision harmonized previous conflicting High Court rulings and underscored the principle that recruitment rules cannot be diluted by judicial sympathy. The Court distinguished precedents like Dolly Chhanda v. Chairman, JEE, Ram Kumar Gijroya v. DSSSB, and Karn Singh Yadav v. GNCTD, clarifying that procedural requirements tied to reservation eligibility cannot be relaxed if explicitly set out in recruitment notifications. The appeals were accordingly dismissed in respect of Mohit Kumar but allowed against Kiran Prajapati, thereby reinforcing uniform application of rules.
- [Hakim v. State of NCT of Delhi and Anr., [2025] 7 S.C.R. 27 : 2025 INSC 728](https://lawfoyer.in/hakim-v-state-of-nct-of-delhi-and-anr-2025-7-s-c-r-27-2025-insc-728/): The Supreme Court of India in Hakim v. State of NCT of Delhi and Anr. (Criminal Appeal Nos. 5303–5304 of 2024) dealt with the conviction of two appellants under Section 326A IPC (voluntarily causing grievous hurt by acid). The prosecution alleged that the victim was accosted near a railway crossing, held by Accused No.1 and Accused No.3, while Accused No.2 poured acid on her. The Trial Court convicted all three, awarding life imprisonment to Accused Nos.1 and 2 and ten years’ imprisonment to Accused No.3. The Delhi High Court affirmed the conviction, reducing only Accused No.3’s sentence. The appellants sought interference under Article 136 of the Constitution, contending that the prosecution failed to prove the injuries were caused by acid, there was no evidence of source procurement, and there was delay in witness statements. The Court rejected these arguments, relying on consistent medical testimony and ocular evidence, holding that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court clarified the scope of interference under Article 136, emphasizing that concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed unless perverse, unsupported by evidence, or contrary to natural justice. While affirming conviction, the Court modified the sentence of Accused No.1 considering his advanced age and ailments, reducing it to ten years rigorous imprisonment, at par with Accused No.3. However, it declined leniency for Accused No.2, noting that as an advocate he had betrayed his professional and social duty. This judgment reiterates principles of sentencing proportionality, victim protection, and restricted appellate interference under Article 136, while balancing mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
- [Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 545 : 2025 INSC 734](https://lawfoyer.in/shaurabh-kumar-tripathi-v-vidhi-rawal-2025-6-s-c-r-545-2025-insc-734/): The Supreme Court of India in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal (Criminal Appeal No. 2688 of 2025) addressed the critical issue of whether the High Court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to quash proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The dispute arose after the Madhya Pradesh High Court had dismissed the appellants’ petitions under Section 482 CrPC, ruling that such proceedings were of a civil nature and hence not subject to inherent powers. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act—though predominantly civil—are entertained by Magistrates functioning as criminal courts, thus falling within the ambit of Section 482 CrPC. The Court drew a distinction between the civil reliefs under the Act and the procedural jurisdiction of criminal courts, emphasizing that High Courts indeed retain inherent powers to quash such proceedings in appropriate circumstances. However, in view of the object of the DV Act—namely, providing protective, compensatory, and restorative remedies to women subjected to domestic violence—the Court mandated that the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction should be cautious, reserved only for cases of manifest illegality or abuse of process. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and restored the appellants’ petitions for reconsideration. This ruling harmonizes the DV Act with principles of criminal procedure, affirming the balance between safeguarding women’s rights and preventing misuse of judicial processes.
- [Gopal Dikshit v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., [2025] 7 S.C.R. 14 : 2025 INSC 731](https://lawfoyer.in/gopal-dikshit-v-united-india-insurance-company-ltd-2025-7-s-c-r-14-2025-insc-731/): The Supreme Court in Gopal Dikshit v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. (Civil Appeal No. 6623 of 2025, decided on 19 May 2025) addressed the repudiation of an insurance claim under a House Holder Insurance Policy on grounds of alleged continuous seepage. The appellant’s premises in New Delhi, insured for ₹1.50 crores, suffered extensive basement damage after heavy rainfall between 25 August and 31 August 2016. The first surveyor’s report attributed the damage to heavy rains and subsequent flooding. However, the insurer, dissatisfied with this report, commissioned a second survey which concluded the loss resulted from seepage—an exclusion under the policy. Based on this, the insurer repudiated the claim, and the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) dismissed the appellant’s complaint. The Supreme Court held that the first survey, conducted immediately, comprehensively attributed the loss to rainfall-induced flooding. Certificates from consulting engineers supported this finding. The belated second survey, deviating without cogent justification, was found arbitrary and unreliable. The Court set aside the NCDRC order and directed reconsideration for determination of compensation payable to the insured. The ruling reinforces judicial scrutiny on insurer’s reassessment tactics and the sanctity of contemporaneous survey findings.
- [Rofiqul Hoque v. The Union of India & Ors., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 569 : 2025 INSC 730](https://lawfoyer.in/rofiqul-hoque-v-the-union-of-india-ors-2025-6-s-c-r-569-2025-insc-730/): The Supreme Court in Rofiqul Hoque v. Union of India & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 2686 of 2025, addressed the interplay between inclusion of a person’s name in the draft NRC and a prior declaration of foreigner status under the Foreigners Act, 1946. The appellant, declared a foreigner by the Foreigners Tribunal, argued that his subsequent inclusion in the draft NRC validated his Indian citizenship. The Court rejected this contention, reiterating that under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, the burden rests upon the proceedee to prove citizenship. The appellant’s documentary evidence—primarily voter lists and a school leaving certificate—was held unreliable due to inconsistencies, lack of authentication, and contradictions regarding residence and familial lineage. The Court emphasized that once a Foreigners Tribunal has declared a person to be a foreigner, such declaration cannot be nullified by administrative inclusion in the NRC, citing Abdul Kuddus v. Union of India (2019). The Court also reaffirmed principles from Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India (2005) regarding the mandatory burden of proof. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed, solidifying the doctrine that quasi-judicial declarations of foreigner status prevail over administrative compilations like the NRC. This judgment underscores the binding nature of Foreigners Tribunal declarations, the evidentiary rigour required of alleged citizens, and the supremacy of judicial determinations over administrative inclusions.
- [A.M. Kulshrestha v. Union Bank of India and Ors., [2025] 7 S.C.R. 42 : 2025 INSC 744](https://lawfoyer.in/a-m-kulshrestha-v-union-bank-of-india-and-ors-2025-7-s-c-r-42-2025-insc-744/): The Supreme Court in A.M. Kulshrestha v. Union Bank of India & Ors. (2025) dealt with the legality of disciplinary proceedings initiated against a senior bank officer at the verge of retirement, where the bank issued a charge sheet without obtaining the mandatory first-stage advice from the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) under Regulation 19 of the Union of India Officer Employees’ (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976. The appellant, after 34 years of unblemished service, was suspended on allegations of casual sanctioning of credit proposals. The bank itself admitted that the case involved a vigilance angle and referred the matter to the CVC, but proceeded to serve an ante-dated charge sheet before receiving the Commission’s advice. The Supreme Court quashed the charge sheet and the disciplinary proceedings, terming the bank’s actions mala fide, arbitrary, and in violation of its own sworn undertakings before the High Court. The Court further held that once the bank admitted the necessity of consulting the CVC, it could not bypass the advice. While quashing the proceedings, the Court directed release of all retiral benefits to the appellant, except back wages.
- [Smt. Shaifali Gupta v. Smt. Vidya Devi Gupta & Ors., [2025] 7 S.C.R. 69 : 2025 INSC 739](https://lawfoyer.in/smt-shaifali-gupta-v-smt-vidya-devi-gupta-ors-2025-7-s-c-r-69-2025-insc-739/): The present case arises from Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4673 of 2023, wherein the Supreme Court of India was called upon to determine the maintainability of a suit for partition, possession, declaration, mandatory and permanent injunction filed by a mother and her younger son against the elder son and his family. The dispute primarily revolved around whether the properties in question constituted Joint Hindu Family (JHF) properties or were benami properties within the meaning of Sections 2(8), 2(9) and 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. The subsequent purchasers of some of the disputed properties, defendant nos. 5 and 6, had filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred under the Benami Act. Both the trial court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court rejected their application, holding that the determination of whether the properties were benami or joint family properties was a mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, emphasizing that the plaintiffs’ pleadings described the suit properties consistently as joint family acquisitions and not as benami holdings. The Court reiterated that rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC is permissible only where, from the plaint itself, it is clear that the claim is barred by law, and not where factual adjudication is required. Importantly, the Court held that defendant no. 2 (Shaifali Gupta), not having filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 nor challenged the trial court’s rejection earlier, had acquiesced to jurisdiction and could not later claim to be aggrieved. The Court also clarified that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which confers absolute ownership upon property held by a female Hindu, does not bar suits for partition. Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions, affirming that the parties were free to contest the matter on merits.
- [Ramji Prasad Jaiswal @ Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and Ors. v. State of Bihar, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 582 : 2025 INSC 738](https://lawfoyer.in/ramji-prasad-jaiswal-ramjee-prasad-jaiswal-and-ors-v-state-of-bihar-2025-6-s-c-r-582-2025-insc-738/): The Supreme Court of India in Ramji Prasad Jaiswal @ Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and Ors. v. State of Bihar (Criminal Appeal No. 490 of 2025, decided on 20 May 2025) examined whether the appellants’ trial stood vitiated due to a breach of Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The appellants were convicted under Sections 420, 468, 471, and 120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The prosecution alleged that they conspired with a bank manager and others to cause wrongful loss to the State Bank of India by presenting forged bills and transport receipts. The crux of the appeal rested upon the improper and mechanical examination of the accused under Section 313, CrPC, wherein only four general questions were asked without bringing to their notice the incriminating circumstances recorded in evidence. The Court held that such omission constituted a breach of audi alteram partem and caused serious prejudice. The trial was declared vitiated as the evidence used for conviction had not been put to the appellants for explanation. Additionally, the third appellant was found to be a juvenile at the time of the offence; thus, his conviction was set aside under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. The Court relied upon precedents such as Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, Dharnidhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Raj Kumar Singh alias Raju v. State of Rajasthan, and Raj Kumar alias Suman v. State (NCT of Delhi) to emphasize that incriminating material must be specifically put to the accused. Ultimately, the conviction and sentence of all appellants were set aside, and they were acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt due to the procedural lapses.

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- [#Amish Devgan](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/amish-devgan-2/)
- [#Amish Devgan v. Union Of India](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/amish-devgan-v-union-of-india-2/)
- [#LAXMI V. UNION OF INDIA](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/laxmi-v-union-of-india/)
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- [#SAVELIFE FOUNDATION](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/savelife-foundation/)
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- [#MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI v. ANKITA SINHA & ORS](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/municipal-corporation-of-greater-mumbai-v-ankita-sinha-ors/)
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- [#Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/arnab-ranjan-goswami-v-union-of-india/)
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- [#RANDHIR SINGH V. UNION OF INDIA](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/randhir-singh-v-union-of-india/)
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- [#SANKARI PRASAD VS. UNION OF INDIA](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/sankari-prasad-vs-union-of-india/)
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- [#PEOPLE’S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES VS. UNION OF INDIA](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/peoples-union-for-civil-liberties-vs-union-of-india/)
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- [#State (Through CBI) vs Santosh Kumar Singh](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/state-through-cbi-vs-santosh-kumar-singh/)
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- [#Priyadarshani Mattoo](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/priyadarshani-mattoo/)
- [#Priyadarshani Mattoo case](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/priyadarshani-mattoo-case/)
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- [#State v. Sidhartha Vashisht](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/state-v-sidhartha-vashisht/)
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- [#Indra Sawhney v. Union of India & others](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/indra-sawhney-v-union-of-india-others/)
- [#MOHAMMAD SALIMULLAH](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/mohammad-salimullah/)
- [#MOHAMMAD SALIMULLAH V.UNION OF INDIA](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/mohammad-salimullah-v-union-of-india/)
- [#KEHAR SINGH](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/kehar-singh/)
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- [#K. SATWANT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/k-satwant-singh-v-state-of-punjab/)
- [#K. SATWANT SINGH](https://lawfoyer.in/tag/k-satwant-singh/)
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