A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India addressed whether the benefit of Section 5 read with Sections 2 and 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, could be applied to appeals against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The case arose after the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) filed a belated appeal, accompanied by a delay condonation application, against the acquittal of the appellant under Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962. The High Court allowed the application despite objections from the appellant. The Court concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applied to appeals under Section 378 CrPC, as no provision in the CrPC expressly excluded such application. This judgment clarified the interplay between the Criminal Procedure Code and the Limitation Act, 1963, affirming the appellate courts’ power to condone delay in appeals against acquittal.

Keywords:

Section 5 Limitation Act, Section 378 CrPC, Delay Condonation, Appeal against Acquittal, Customs Act Violation.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgment Cause Title:
Mohd Abaad Ali & Anr. v. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence

ii) Case Number:
Criminal Appeal No. 1056 of 2024

iii) Judgment Date:
20 February 2024

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale

vi) Author:
Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia

vii) Citation:
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 638 : 2024 INSC 125

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Section 378, CrPC, 1973
• Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963
• Section 135(1)(b), Customs Act, 1962
• Sections 2, 3, Limitation Act, 1963

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case:
None

x) Case Related to Law Subjects:
Criminal Law, Procedural Law, Customs Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The appellants were acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, in a case under Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962. Following the acquittal, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) filed a delayed appeal under Section 378 CrPC, accompanied by an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The delay, caused by procedural complexities, amounted to 72 days. The Delhi High Court accepted the condonation application, prompting the appellant to challenge the order under Section 482 CrPC. The High Court rejected the challenge without assigning reasons, escalating the matter to the Supreme Court.

The primary legal contention revolved around whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act could extend the limitation period for appeals against acquittal, particularly when the CrPC itself prescribed specific time limits.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

1. The appellants were accused under Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962, for involvement in smuggling activities.
2. The Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, acquitted the appellants in October 2012.
3. The DRI filed a delayed appeal in June 2013 before the Delhi High Court under Section 378 CrPC, alongside a delay condonation application.
4. The High Court condoned the delay, stating that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied.
5. The appellants argued that Section 5 was inapplicable due to the CrPC’s specific limitation provisions.
6. After the High Court rejected the appellants’ challenge under Section 482 CrPC, the issue reached the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Can Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, be invoked to condone delays in filing appeals against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC?
ii) Does Section 378 CrPC explicitly exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
iii) What is the impact of precedential judgments under both the old and new Limitation Acts on appeals in criminal cases?

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsel argued that Section 378(5) CrPC prescribes a fixed limitation period for filing appeals against acquittal, precluding the application of Section 5 Limitation Act, 1963.
ii) They relied on Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh [1964] 4 SCR 982, where the Court held that Section 5 of the old Limitation Act was inapplicable to appeals filed under the old Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.
iii) They submitted that Section 378(5) constitutes a special law, leaving no room for extension through general provisions of the Limitation Act.
iv) The language of Section 378(5) was argued to be explicit, mandatory, and prohibitive against condonation.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The respondent contended that Section 5 Limitation Act, 1963, applies unless expressly excluded by a special or local law, as per Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
ii) They cited Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392, distinguishing Kaushalya Rani, as the Limitation Act, 1963, unlike its predecessor, allows Section 5 to apply unless explicitly excluded.
iii) They emphasized the absence of exclusionary language in Section 378 CrPC, differentiating it from election law provisions (Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra).

H) JUDGEMENT

a. Ratio Decidendi
The Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to appeals under Section 378 CrPC, as the CrPC does not expressly exclude its application. It distinguished the restrictive language of earlier cases, emphasizing the broader scope of the 1963 Act.

b. Obiter Dicta
The Court noted that procedural laws should facilitate justice, not create insurmountable barriers. The absence of exclusionary language in Section 378 CrPC indicated legislative intent to permit condonation of delay.

c. Guidelines

1. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies unless expressly excluded.
2. Interpretation of procedural laws must align with principles of justice.
3. Precedents under the old Limitation Act, 1908, may not apply to cases governed by the 1963 Act.

I) CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS

The judgment reaffirmed that procedural laws aim to deliver substantive justice. By interpreting Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favor of condoning delays, the Court enhanced access to appellate remedies in criminal jurisprudence. However, clarity from the legislature on interplay between procedural codes and limitation laws could prevent future disputes.

J) REFERENCES

Important Cases Referred

1. Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh [1964] 4 SCR 982
2. Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392
3. Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra AIR 1974 SC 480
4. Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar (2004) 4 SCC 252

Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 378).
2. Limitation Act, 1963 (Sections 2, 3, 5, 29).
3. Customs Act, 1962 (Section 135).