A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The case of Dr. Babu Ram Saksena v. The State, reported in 1950 SCR 573, presented a pivotal question on the intersection of international treaty obligations and municipal extradition laws in post-independence India. The matter involved the arrest and extradition of a public servant under the Indian Extradition Act, 1903 for offences committed during his tenure in a princely state, Tonk, which had merged into the Indian Union. The appellant challenged the legality of the extradition warrant, relying on the 1869 extradition treaty between the British Government and the Tonk State, which did not include the offences of cheating and extortion—charges now levied against him.

The crux was whether this treaty, preserved temporarily by a Standstill Agreement, continued to override Section 7 of the Extradition Act, 1903, even after the political integration of Tonk into the United State of Rajasthan. The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the treaty’s historical presence, emphasized the primacy of municipal law in regulating extradition post-merger. The bench unanimously concluded that either the treaty no longer existed or, even if it did, the broader extradition powers under Section 7 did not derogate from treaty provisions under Section 18.

This ruling became critical in clarifying the applicability of pre-independence treaties in the context of sovereignty transition, state mergers, and the continuity of legal norms in a post-colonial constitutional regime.

Keywords: Extradition Law, Treaty Law, State Merger, Indian Penal Code, Municipal Law vs Treaty, Indian Extradition Act 1903, Princely States, Standstill Agreement, Sovereignty Transition, International Law

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Dr. Babu Ram Saksena v. The State

ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 1949

iii) Judgement Date: 5th May 1950

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Harilal Kania C.J., Saiyid Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, and Sudhi Ranjan Das, JJ.

vi) Author: Patanjali Sastri, J. and B.K. Mukherjea, J.

vii) Citation: (1950) SCR 573

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Section 7, Section 18 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903

• Sections 491 and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure

• Sections 383 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code

• Article 7 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947

• 1869 Extradition Treaty between the British Government and the Tonk State

• Standstill Agreement, 1947

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None mentioned

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:

• Constitutional Law

• Criminal Law

• Public International Law

• Administrative Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The present appeal arose against the order of the Allahabad High Court which dismissed a habeas corpus petition filed by Dr. Babu Ram Saksena, a member of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service, challenging the legality of his arrest under an extradition warrant issued by the Regional Commissioner of the United State of Rajasthan. The appellant had served in the erstwhile princely state of Tonk in an administrative capacity in 1948. Post-accusations of cheating and extortion, he was arrested in Nainital under Section 7 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903. He contended that the 1869 Extradition Treaty governed extradition between Tonk and the British Government, and since this treaty did not cover the offences he was accused of, the warrant was illegal.

This legal battle occurred in the unique transition period of India’s constitutional history, wherein former princely states were being integrated into the Indian Union under instruments like the Instrument of Accession and the Standstill Agreement. The appellant’s counsel invoked the non-derogation clause under Section 18 of the Extradition Act, claiming that Section 7 could not override treaty limitations.

The court had to address complex constitutional and international law questions regarding the continuity of treaties, the extent of municipal legislative power, and the legal status of princely state treaties post-accession and merger into the Indian Union.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, Dr. Babu Ram Saksena, was a senior member of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service. In 1948, he was deputed to serve in Tonk, then a princely state. During his tenure, he allegedly assisted the Nawab of Tonk in securing a payment of ₹14 lakhs from the state treasury to settle the Nawab’s personal debts. In return, the Nawab is said to have paid ₹3 lakhs to the appellant in instalments. These transactions allegedly involved elements of threat, deception, and fraudulent inducement, leading to accusations of cheating under Section 420 IPC and extortion under Section 383 IPC.

After reverting to service in Uttar Pradesh and residing in Nainital, Dr. Saksena was arrested on 23rd May 1949 under an extradition warrant issued by the Regional Commissioner of the United State of Rajasthan under Section 7 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903. The warrant directed his arrest and delivery to the District Magistrate of Tonk for trial. The appellant secured bail but challenged the legality of the warrant through a habeas corpus petition under Sections 491 and 561-A CrPC before the Allahabad High Court, which dismissed it.

He then approached the Supreme Court by special leave, contending that the Extradition Treaty of 1869 governed such matters and that Section 18 of the 1903 Act preserved treaty superiority. As cheating and extortion were not included in the treaty’s list of “heinous offences”, extradition for such charges, he argued, was impermissible.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the Extradition Treaty of 1869 between the British Government and Tonk State continued to remain in force post-accession and merger?

ii. Whether Section 7 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903 could be invoked for offences not covered by the treaty in light of Section 18 of the Act?

iii. Whether the extradition warrant and arrest under such circumstances were legal and constitutional?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The appellant, represented by Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar, contended that Section 18 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903 clearly stipulated that treaty obligations shall not be derogated by the Act. He argued that the 1869 Extradition Treaty between the British Government and the Tonk State, though originally lapsed under Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, was preserved through a Standstill Agreement dated 8th August 1947.

This treaty, they emphasized, only authorized extradition for “heinous offences”, which did not include cheating (Section 420 IPC) and extortion (Section 383 IPC). By invoking the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, he argued that the listing of certain offences implied exclusion of all others from extradition.

Further, it was contended that the reciprocity principle was inherent in any extradition treaty. Allowing extradition for unlisted offences would violate this reciprocity and confer an undue advantage upon Tonk’s successor—i.e., the United State of Rajasthan. The appellant also claimed that such a surrender would infringe upon the liberty of an Indian citizen, thereby inviting judicial scrutiny under habeas corpus.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

Attorney-General M.C. Setalvad, appearing for the Union, presented three counterarguments:

1. The Standstill Agreement was a temporary arrangement, overridden by the Instrument of Accession signed by Tonk on 16th August 1947, and further nullified by the Merger Covenant of 30th March 1949 forming the United State of Rajasthan.

2. After the merger, the Tonk State ceased to exist as a sovereign entity Therefore, any treaty obligations like the 1869 Extradition Treaty became non-enforceable, as they depended on the continued political identity of Tonk.

3. Even assuming the treaty survived, Section 7 of the Extradition Act did not “derogate” from the treaty. Instead, it supplemented the extradition framework by allowing surrender for more offences than those listed. The Attorney-General stressed that the treaty conferred no personal rights upon Indian citizens, and thus, no question of infringement of personal liberty arose.

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. Section 7 of the Extradition Act is valid for additional offences beyond treaty scope

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Patanjali Sastri and Justice B.K. Mukherjea, delivered concurrent but distinct judgments, each affirming the legality of the appellant’s arrest under Section 7 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903. The majority opinion clarified that even assuming the 1869 Extradition Treaty survived, Section 7 did not “derogate” from it within the meaning of Section 18. Instead, it supplemented the treaty by authorizing extradition for a broader range of offences, thereby not curtailing but expanding the power of the Indian government to surrender fugitives.

The Court emphasized that no treaty right existed under the 1869 Treaty that barred such extradition. The treaty only created a limited obligation on both states but not a right in favour of individual citizens to resist extradition for unlisted offences. The Court relied on Regina v. Wilson (3 Q.B.D. 42), where Cockburn C.J. noted that extradition treaties do not create rights in individuals, only obligations between sovereign states[1].

In rejecting the argument that reciprocity must be absolute in all treaty implementation, the Court cited Wheaton’s International Law and observed that some nations, including England historically, have extradited fugitives without any treaty. The doctrine of reciprocity was seen as a policy consideration, not a binding legal restraint[2].

The judges also referred to the Fourth Edition of Wheaton’s International Law, confirming that extradition could exist even without a treaty where domestic law permitted it. Therefore, the Court found no basis for invalidating the warrant under Section 7 merely because the offences of cheating and extortion were not in the 1869 treaty.

b. OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)

i. Treaty enforcement is contingent on the continued sovereignty of the contracting parties

Justice Mukherjea further observed that even if a treaty like the 1869 Extradition Treaty were considered binding under the Standstill Agreement, it would not remain enforceable after the Tonk State lost its sovereignty due to the merger into the United State of Rajasthan.

He elaborated that when a State ceases to exist as a sovereign entity through voluntary absorption or amalgamation, its treaties stand automatically extinguished, especially those involving political and reciprocal arrangements, such as extradition. He drew from Hyde’s International Law (Vol III, p. 1529-1533) and also referred to the Terlinden v. Ames (184 U.S. 270) decision, which held that only those treaties survive amalgamation where the executing authority remains unimpaired. In the present case, as Tonk could no longer act independently, the treaty lost its validity[3].

This obiter has broader implications in public international law and Indian constitutional law. It affirms that treaty continuity requires continuity of sovereignty, and in merged states, old treaty obligations may lapse unless expressly carried over.

c. GUIDELINES (IF ANY – WRITE IN DETAIL AND IN POINTERS AS THE CASE MAYBE)

The Court did not explicitly frame guidelines. However, from the ratio and obiter, the following legal principles and implicit guidelines emerge:

1. Treaties lapse with the extinction of the sovereignty of one of the contracting states unless expressly preserved.

2. Section 7 of the Extradition Act, 1903, authorizes extradition for offences listed in the Act, irrespective of treaty limits, so long as it does not conflict with any treaty provision.

3. Section 18 of the Act should not be interpreted to mean that a treaty restricts the sovereign’s ability to extradite for additional offences if the treaty does not explicitly forbid it.

4. Extradition treaties confer obligations between states, not enforceable rights upon individuals.

5. Municipal law prevails where no enforceable treaty exists.

These principles have since guided Indian extradition jurisprudence.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This landmark decision clarified the constitutional and legal framework of extradition during a transformative period in Indian statehood. It acknowledged the legal implications of political reorganization and stressed the distinction between treaty obligations and domestic law enforcement mechanisms. The Supreme Court rightly prioritized effective enforcement of municipal criminal law over the technical remnants of a colonial treaty that no longer served the sovereign interests of a unified India.

The Court approached the matter with caution, acknowledging the potential political sensitivity but confined its ruling to the legal domain. The judgment significantly expanded the scope for extradition within India by emphasizing that statutory law could stand independently of outdated treaty constraints, especially in the absence of contrary provisions.

Furthermore, it addressed the growing need to harmonize international legal doctrines, like reciprocity and sovereignty, with national legislation and evolving constitutional frameworks. By refusing to allow treaties of colonial vintage to undermine the criminal process, the Court laid down a progressive precedent, pivotal for modern Indian jurisprudence on extradition and federal criminal cooperation.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Regina v. Wilson, (3 Q.B.D. 42)

2. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (U.S. Supreme Court)

3. Lazard Brothers v. Midland Bank Ltd., (1933) A.C. 289

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Extradition Act, 1903 – especially Sections 7 and 18

2. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 383 (Extortion) and 420 (Cheating)

3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 – Sections 491 and 561-A

4. Indian Independence Act, 1947 – Section 7

5. [Standstill Agreement, 1947] – as a continuation of pre-independence treaties temporarily

6. [Instrument of Accession] – Tonk State’s surrender of sovereignty and merger into Rajasthan