A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE 

This landmark case, Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras (1950) SCR 594, marked one of the earliest and most significant interpretations by the Supreme Court of India on the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The petitioner, a journalist and editor of the magazine Cross Roads, challenged an order issued by the Madras Government banning the circulation of the journal in the State, invoking powers under Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. The Court invalidated this restriction, holding it to be unconstitutional as it exceeded the reasonable limitations allowed under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The judgment clarified the narrow scope of restrictions permissible under Article 19(2), stating that only those restrictions directly related to undermining the security of the State or its overthrow are legitimate. Broader justifications like “public order” or “public safety” do not meet this constitutional test. This decision also underscored that the Supreme Court cannot refuse relief under Article 32 merely because High Courts have concurrent jurisdiction under Article 226, reaffirming the role of the Supreme Court as the ultimate protector of fundamental rights. The case set foundational standards for press freedom and constitutional interpretation of civil liberties in India.

Keywords: Article 19(1)(a), Freedom of Speech, Public Order, Security of the State, Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, Article 32, Fundamental Rights, Supreme Court of India, Press Freedom, Constitutional Law.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras
ii) Case Number: Petition No. XVI of 1950
iii) Judgement Date: 26th May, 1950
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum: Harilal Kania C.J., Saiyid Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea, and Das JJ.
vi) Author: Patanjali Sastri, J. (Majority); Fazl Ali, J. (Dissenting)
vii) Citation: (1950) SCR 594
viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2) of the Constitution of India

• Article 13(1)

• Article 32

• Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949
  ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None
  x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Media Law, Public Law, Fundamental Rights

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The judgment arose at a pivotal moment in India’s constitutional history—barely months after the Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950. The case addressed essential themes concerning press freedom, state authority, and judicial protection of civil liberties. The petitioner, Romesh Thappar, a left-leaning journalist, faced censorship when the Madras Government banned the circulation of his publication in the State, citing public safety and public order concerns under a colonial-style legislation. This action was challenged before the Supreme Court by invoking Article 32, asserting a violation of the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a).

The respondents raised a procedural objection arguing that Thappar should have approached the Madras High Court under Article 226, which the Court emphatically rejected. The bench clarified the status of Article 32 as itself being a fundamental right, reinforcing the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty to act as guardian of fundamental rights. The Court also scrutinized the scope of reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), particularly whether restrictions for public order or public safety could fall under the term “security of the State”. The verdict distinguished between these phrases and established stringent standards for curtailing freedom of speech.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Romesh Thappar, was the editor, printer, and publisher of an English-language weekly journal titled Cross Roads, based in Bombay. The journal carried political commentary that was often critical of prevailing government policies, especially of southern State governments and Central leadership. On 1st March 1950, the Government of Madras, by Order No. MS 1333, issued a notification under Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, banning the entry and circulation of Cross Roads within the State. The reason cited was that such action was necessary for “securing the public safety and the maintenance of public order.”

The petitioner moved the Supreme Court directly under Article 32, seeking writs of prohibition and certiorari. He argued that the Madras Government’s action infringed upon his freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a), and that Section 9(1-A) of the said Act was unconstitutional under Article 13(1) as it contravened fundamental rights. The State raised a preliminary objection on procedural grounds, contending that the petitioner should have approached the High Court under Article 226 before invoking the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 32.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the petitioner could directly approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 without first resorting to the High Court under Article 226.

ii) Whether Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 is void under Article 13(1) of the Constitution for violating Article 19(1)(a).

iii) Whether “public order” or “public safety” fall within the ambit of “security of the State” as used in Article 19(2).

iv) Whether the impugned law can be partially upheld if it is unconstitutional in part.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The petitioner’s legal team led by C.R. Pattabhi Raman argued that the impugned order completely contravened the freedom of speech and expression granted under Article 19(1)(a). They contended that Section 9(1-A) was vague and overbroad, allowing executive overreach under the vague pretext of public safety. The counsel stressed that the Constitution permitted restrictions only when speech posed a danger to the security of the State, and the words “public order” and “public safety” did not meet this strict test.

They submitted that “liberty of circulation is as essential as the liberty of publication,” citing Ex parte Jackson (96 US 727) and Lovell v. City of Griffin (303 US 444). They also pointed to the exclusion of the word sedition from Article 19(2) during Constitution drafting to show that mere disaffection or criticism of government policy cannot justify curtailment of free speech unless it threatens the State’s very existence.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

The Advocate-General of Madras, K. Rajah Ayyar, contended that the petition should be dismissed on procedural grounds, as the petitioner had an alternate remedy under Article 226 through the Madras High Court. He likened the situation to criminal revision or bail matters where judicial propriety demands first approaching subordinate forums. He relied on American decisions like Urquhart v. Brown (205 US 179) and Hooney v. Kolohan (294 US 103).

On merits, he argued that Section 9(1-A) did not violate the Constitution because public order and safety are legitimate concerns under “security of the State.” He relied on Rex v. Wormwood Scrubbs Prison [1920] 2 KB 305 to argue that even interna rebellion could be treated as a threat to security. He insisted that the Act aimed to maintain social stability, which should fall under permissible limitations of Article 19(2).

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India – Freedom of speech and expression
ii) Article 19(2) – Permissible restrictions
iii) Article 32 – Right to constitutional remedies
iv) Article 13(1) – Invalidity of pre-Constitutional laws inconsistent with fundamental rights
v) Section 9(1-A), Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 – Empowered State to prohibit circulation of documents for public order