GODAVARI PARULEKAR vs. STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS

Case Analysis

GODAVARI PARULEKAR vs. STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS

April 19, 2025

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment in Godavari Parulekar v. State of Bombay and Others ([1953] SCR 210) represents a landmark ruling by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India addressing the constitutional validity of Section 11-A of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 as amended by the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952. The petitioner, a political activist, challenged the legality of her continued detention, asserting that it violated Articles 14 and 22(7)(b) of the Constitution of India. The main contention was that her detention exceeded the permissible limits under the amended statutory scheme, and that the impugned provision created discriminatory classifications based on the date of confirmation of detention orders.

The Hon’ble Court, through Justice Vivian Bose, upheld the constitutional validity of the impugned provision, holding that the classification of detainees based on the date of confirmation of detention orders was reasonable and not violative of the equality clause. It further ruled that the statutory phrase “unless a shorter period is specified in the order” should be construed literally and not deemed to include periods that had lapsed under previous legislative arrangements. The Court also reaffirmed its position in Shamrao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana & Others ([1952] SCR 683), thereby strengthening the jurisprudential foundation of preventive detention under Indian constitutional law.

Keywords: Preventive Detention, Article 14, Article 22(7)(b), Constitutionality, Reasonable Classification, Detention Order, Habeas Corpus

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Godavari Parulekar v. State of Bombay and Others

ii) Case Number: Petition No. 399 of 1952

iii) Judgement Date: 5th December 1952

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Patanjali Sastri C.J., Mukherjea J., Chandrasekhara Aiyar J., Vivian Bose J., Ghulam Hasan J.

vi) Author: Justice Vivian Bose

vii) Citation: [1953] SCR 210

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

Article 14, Article 22(7)(b) of the Constitution of India
Section 11-A of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950
Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Preventive Detention

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This case arose in the post-independence era when the Indian Government had enacted the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 to maintain public order and state security. Amid political unrest and socio-political mobilization, preventive detention became a commonly exercised state power. The petitioner, Godavari Parulekar, a known political worker and social reformer, was detained under this legislation. Her detention was challenged on the basis of procedural and constitutional lapses arising from the amendments to the said legislation, specifically targeting the second amendment of 1952, which introduced Section 11-A.

Section 11-A allowed the Government to extend the maximum period of detention under certain classifications and conditions. The petitioner contended that the amendment led to unconstitutional discrimination and also infringed on the limitations provided under Article 22(7)(b). The case presented critical constitutional questions regarding permissible classifications under preventive detention law and the limits of legislative discretion in matters of personal liberty and state security.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Godavari Parulekar, was detained under an order dated 16th October 1951 issued by the District Magistrate, Thana under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The detention order did not specify any period of detention. It was later confirmed on 4th January 1952, again without stating any duration. Her earlier detentions were not relevant to the present proceedings.

The legal challenge began when the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952 was enacted, inserting Section 11-A into the principal Act. Section 11-A(1) prescribed a maximum detention period of 12 months from the date of detention. However, Section 11-A(2) divided detainees into two classes: those whose detention orders had been confirmed before 30th September 1952, and those after. For the former, the detention would continue till 1st April 1953 or twelve months from the date of detention, whichever was later, unless a shorter period was specified in the order.

The petitioner claimed that, since her detention order did not specify a period, and earlier amendments would have led to her release on 31st March 1952 or 30th September 1952, these dates should be “read into” her detention order, thereby limiting her detention duration.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether Section 11-A of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended, violated Article 14 of the Constitution by creating an unreasonable and arbitrary classification among detainees?

ii) Whether Section 11-A(2) infringed Article 22(7)(b) by permitting varying periods of detention within the same class of cases?

iii) Whether the petitioner’s detention, which did not specify any period, could be deemed to contain a shorter period due to earlier amendments and hence fall outside the scope of Section 11-A(2)?

F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The petitioner’s counsel argued that the new provision under Section 11-A(2) unfairly created a distinction between detainees based solely on the date of confirmation of their detention orders. They contended this classification violated the equality clause under Article 14 because it resulted in unequal treatment of similarly situated persons. A person detained on 16th October 1951, like the petitioner, would now face 17.5 months of detention, whereas a person detained on 1st September 1952 would serve only 6 months of detention. This disparity, without any rational nexus to the object of the legislation, was said to be arbitrary and unconstitutional[1].

They further argued that under Article 22(7)(b), Parliament could prescribe a maximum detention period for each class, but it could not create sub-classifications within the same class to allow different maximum durations. This interpretation, they claimed, defeats the safeguard intended by the Constitution to protect the right to liberty in preventive detention[2].

Additionally, they asserted that since her detention order did not explicitly mention a duration, but earlier legislative provisions had limited such detentions till 31st March 1952 or 30th September 1952, those dates should be deemed to be “specified shorter periods” within the meaning of Section 11-A(2). This implied limitation, they argued, excluded her from the extended period created by the amendment[3].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

The Attorney General of India, M.C. Setalvad, argued that Section 11-A(2) represented a reasonable classification based on the date of confirmation of the detention orders. This classification was necessary due to the series of legislative amendments extending the validity of the original Act and required adjusting the detention periods accordingly. The objective was administrative convenience and legal consistency, which served a legitimate state interest and passed the test of reasonable classification under Article 14[4].

He further contended that Article 22(7)(b) empowered the Parliament to prescribe maximum periods “in any class or classes of cases” and the amendment validly created two classes—before and after 30th September 1952. The differentiation was not arbitrary, as the law had undergone several extensions and reforms, making it essential to draw a cut-off date for operational purposes[5].

The respondents also rejected the petitioner’s contention that a shorter period must be deemed “specified” due to expiry dates in earlier laws. They emphasized that the words “unless a shorter period is specified in the order” must be interpreted literally, and in this case, the detention order was silent. The Court could not read into the order a period that was not actually mentioned[6].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Article 14 – Equality before law: Prohibits the State from denying any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws.

ii) Article 22(7)(b) – Permits Parliament to prescribe by law the maximum period for which a person may be detained under preventive detention.

iii) Section 11-A of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (as amended by Act LXI of 1952) – Governs the maximum period for detention orders confirmed before and after 30th September 1952.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Court held that Section 11-A(2) did not violate Article 14 or Article 22(7)(b). The classification based on the date of confirmation of detention orders was held to be reasonable and constitutionally valid. The Court followed the principle laid down in Shamrao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana ([1952] SCR 683), which upheld a similar classification between cases considered and not considered by Advisory Boards[7].

The Court also clarified that a maximum period can be prescribed either by fixing an outer limit or allowing discretion, and in such cases, variation in the actual length of detention is inevitable. It emphasized that Article 14 does not guarantee equal results but equal treatment under the law[8].

b. OBITER DICTA

i) The Court remarked that Government is not obligated to detain every person for the maximum permissible period. It has discretion to modify or revoke detention orders based on changing circumstances and administrative needs. The presence of this discretion further weakens the claim of arbitrariness[9].

c. GUIDELINES

The phrase “unless a shorter period is specified in the order” must be interpreted strictly and literally.
Classification of detainees based on date of confirmation is legally permissible if it serves a reasonable legislative purpose.
Government’s discretion in duration of detention within a maximum period does not violate Article 14.
Mere difference in detention periods does not amount to unconstitutional discrimination.