IN RE THE EDITOR PRINTER AND PUBLISHER OF “THE TIMES OF INDIA” AND IN RE ASWINI KUMAR GHOSE AND ANOTHER vs. ARABINDA BOSE AND ANOTHER [1953] 1 S.C.R. 215 1952 INSC 74 (WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)/160/1952)

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in In re The Editor, Printer and Publisher of “The Times of India” (1953) [Contempt of Court Proceedings] addressed the important question of fair criticism versus contempt of court in the context of judicial decisions. The controversy arose from a leading article published in the Times of India, which criticized the Supreme Court’s decision in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose and Another ([1953] S.C.R. 1). The article suggested that the Court’s judgment was influenced by extraneous considerations and not entirely rooted in legal principles, thereby imputing improper motives to the judges. The Supreme Court, while upholding the right to free and fair criticism, emphasized that such criticism must not undermine the dignity and authority of the judiciary. The Court observed that attributing motives to judges constitutes a grave contempt, as it has the potential to erode public confidence in the administration of justice. However, the proceedings were dropped following an unconditional apology and an undertaking by the Editor, Printer, and Publisher to publish their regret widely. The decision is a significant precedent that balances the freedom of the press with the necessity to protect the judiciary from scurrilous attacks and maintains the sanctity of justice.

Keywords: Contempt of Court, Judicial Criticism, Supreme Court, Press Freedom, Public Confidence, Apology, Administration of Justice, Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, Dual System, Dignity of Judiciary.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: In re The Editor, Printer and Publisher of “The Times of India” ii) Case Number: Petition No. 160 of 1952 iii) Judgement Date: 12th December 1952 iv) Court: Supreme Court of India (Original Jurisdiction) v) Quorum: Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea, Das, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, and Bhagwati JJ. vi) Author: Mehr Chand Mahajan, J. vii) Citation: [1953] S.C.R. 215 viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Contempt of Courts Act, 1952; Constitution of India, Article 129 and Article 19(1)(a); relevant Supreme Court Rules. ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case (if any): None x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law (Contempt), Media Law, Public Law, Law of Torts

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court initiated contempt proceedings against the Editor, Printer, and Publisher of the Times of India for publishing a leading article titled “A Disturbing Decision” on 30th October 1952. This article criticized the Supreme Court’s majority judgment in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose and Another ([1953] S.C.R. 1), wherein the Court abolished the dual system of advocates and attorneys in the original sides of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts. The article’s critical comments were perceived as imputing improper motives to the judges, suggesting that their decision was influenced by non-legal considerations. The Court took exception to these aspersions as they threatened the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The background involves a balancing act between the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and the necessity to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice—a recurring tension in Indian constitutional and media jurisprudence[1].

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 30th October 1952, the Times of India published an editorial criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision regarding the dual system for advocates and attorneys. The article questioned the propriety of the Court’s reasoning and implied that the Court may have been influenced by considerations outside the bounds of law. Specifically, the article commented on the “tell-tale note at the top of the rules framed by the Supreme Court” and suggested that “to achieve a dubious or even a laudable purpose by straining the law is hardly edifying.” The Attorney General for India, acting as amicus curiae, initiated contempt proceedings, contending that the editorial went beyond legitimate criticism and amounted to a direct attack on the impartiality of the judiciary. The contemners (Editor, Printer, and Publisher) appeared before the Court, acknowledged their lapse, and tendered an unconditional apology, expressing regret and offering to publicize their apology[2].

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the editorial published in the Times of India amounted to fair criticism or crossed the threshold into contempt of court by attributing improper motives to judges of the Supreme Court.

ii. Whether the apology tendered by the Editor, Printer, and Publisher was sufficient to purge the contempt and whether proceedings should be dropped in light of the apology and undertaking[3].

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The Attorney General for India, appearing as amicus curiae, argued that while the right to criticize judicial decisions is a protected facet of the freedom of speech, such criticism must not transgress the limits of decency and legality. He submitted that the editorial did not merely critique the Court’s reasoning or outcome but went further to insinuate that the Supreme Court’s judges were guided by extraneous, non-legal motives. This, he contended, had the potential to undermine public faith in the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary, which is a cornerstone of the rule of law[4]. He relied on precedents such as Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 10, where the Supreme Court emphasized that any act which scandalizes the court or lowers its authority constitutes contempt. The Attorney General also referred to Andre Paul v. Attorney-General of Trinidad (A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 141), where the Privy Council held that criticism is permissible provided it does not impute improper motives or impair the administration of justice.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

Counsel for the Editor, Printer, and Publisher of the Times of India submitted that the editorial intended only to engage in fair criticism of the Supreme Court’s judgment, not to cast aspersions on the integrity or impartiality of the judges. They argued that a robust and free press is essential to democracy, and honest, reasoned criticism of judicial pronouncements promotes public understanding of the law and accountability of the judiciary. They conceded, however, that in retrospect, the language of the article may have exceeded the limits of propriety. They expressed deep regret and offered an unconditional and unqualified apology, coupled with an undertaking to give wide publicity to their apology as an assurance against future lapses[5].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Article 129 of the Constitution of India vests the Supreme Court with the power to punish for its contempt[6]. ii. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India guarantees freedom of speech and expression, subject to reasonable restrictions including contempt of court[7]. iii. Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 provides the statutory framework for the offence of contempt and the procedures for its adjudication. iv. Supreme Court Rules concerning contempt proceedings and enrolment of advocates and attorneys.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The Supreme Court, per Mahajan J., held that while fair criticism of judicial decisions is permissible and indeed healthy for the democratic process, criticism which attributes improper motives to judges or casts aspersions on their integrity constitutes gross contempt. The Court observed, “If an impression is created in the minds of the public that the judges of the highest court in the land act on extraneous considerations in deciding cases the confidence of the whole community in the administration of justice is bound to be undermined and no greater mischief than that can possibly be imagined.” The Court cited with approval the principle laid down in Andre Paul v. Attorney-General of Trinidad (A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 141), that criticism must abstain from imputing improper motives to those in the administration of justice and must be made bona fide, without malice[8]. The Supreme Court discharged the contempt rule upon acceptance of the unconditional apology and the undertaking to publish the apology widely, emphasizing that it is not over-sensitive to criticism but will intervene where there is a clear danger to the administration of justice.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court opined that “justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary men,” reiterating the importance of public criticism, but drawing a red line at scurrilous attacks that undermine the public trust in the judiciary[9].

c. GUIDELINES 

  • Fair criticism of judicial decisions is permissible, provided it is bona fide and does not impute motives to judges.

  • The judiciary is not immune to scrutiny or criticism but will act decisively where the authority or integrity of the institution is threatened.

  • Unconditional and unqualified apologies, accompanied by sincere undertakings to avoid future lapses, may suffice to purge contempt.

  • The Court will issue contempt notices only in grave and serious cases, where there is a real risk of damage to the public perception of the judiciary.

  • The press should exercise restraint and responsibility in criticizing judicial decisions, always refraining from personal attacks or imputing motives.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment draws a critical line between permissible criticism and contempt of court. It affirms the fundamental role of the press in democratic accountability, while ensuring the independence and integrity of the judiciary. The Court’s measured approach—accepting an unconditional apology and discharging the proceedings—illustrates a judicious exercise of its contempt powers, upholding both judicial dignity and freedom of expression. The principle laid down continues to be cited in subsequent cases dealing with contempt of court and criticism of judicial institutions, such as E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar (1970) 2 SCC 325, and Arundhati Roy, In Re (2002) 3 SCC 343, reinforcing the delicate balance between judicial authority and the freedom of the press.

 

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