A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
The landmark case of Chilukuri Venkateswarlu v. Chilukuri Venkatanarayana decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in 1953 stands as a crucial precedent in the interpretation of Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It deals primarily with the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during lawful wedlock. The apex court clarified that this presumption is conclusive unless non-access between the parties at the relevant time can be clearly proved. It rejected the application of English common law doctrines that prohibited spouses from testifying about non-access to establish illegitimacy. The case involved a child born to a legally wedded wife who claimed a share in ancestral property. The husband denied paternity, citing alleged non-access and unchastity of his wife. The trial court ruled in favour of the child. However, the Madras High Court reversed the verdict. The Supreme Court overturned the High Court judgment, reaffirming the legal sanctity of Section 112 and upholding the child’s legitimacy and right to property. This judgment reinforces the evidentiary standard required to rebut presumptive legitimacy, emphasizing clear and satisfactory proof of non-access, and marks a watershed moment in Indian personal and evidentiary law.
Keywords: Presumption of legitimacy, Indian Evidence Act, Section 112, Non-access, Marital intercourse, Supreme Court, Family law, Illegitimacy, Conclusive proof, Partition suit.
B) CASE DETAILS
i) Judgement Cause Title
Chilukuri Venkateswarlu v. Chilukuri Venkatanarayana
ii) Case Number
Civil Appeal No. 73 of 1953
iii) Judgement Date
December 8, 1953
iv) Court
Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum
B.K. Mukherjea, N.H. Bhagwati, and B. Jagannadhadas, JJ.
vi) Author
Justice B.K. Mukherjea
vii) Citation
AIR 1954 SC 176; [1954] SCR 424
viii) Legal Provisions Involved
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Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
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Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 (UK)
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Karapaya v. Mayandi, 12 Rang. 243 (PC)
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any)
None specifically overruled but English common law doctrines on spousal testimony rejected.
x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Family Law, Evidence Law, Civil Procedure, Property Law
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The judgment arises from a property dispute involving a minor child born within a lawful marriage. The child, represented by his maternal uncle, claimed a half share in ancestral joint family property, contending legitimacy as the son of Defendant No. 1 and his lawfully wedded wife, Defendant No. 2. The father, Defendant No. 1, disowned paternity alleging non-access and accused the wife of unchaste conduct. The trial court ruled in favor of the child, finding the denial of paternity unsubstantiated. However, the Madras High Court reversed this decision, relying on circumstantial evidence of separation. The Supreme Court scrutinized the findings and legal interpretation under Section 112, which creates a conclusive presumption of legitimacy, displaceable only by clear proof of non-access. The Court emphasized that neither estrangement nor later hostility can nullify this statutory presumption without direct or reliable circumstantial evidence that access was impossible during conception. The Court also clarified that English common law rules prohibiting spousal testimony to bastardize a child had no application in India.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
Defendant No. 1 married three times. His first wife died, leaving a son. He then married Defendant No. 2 in 1930. For nearly a decade, they lived harmoniously but had no children. Around 1940, Defendant No. 2 fell ill and was hospitalized at Guntur. After her return, she stayed briefly with her father. Meanwhile, Defendant No. 1’s only son died, prompting him to marry a third wife in August 1940. This created tension in the household. Defendant No. 2 moved to her father’s home and filed a suit for maintenance, claiming neglect. Subsequently, the parties settled, and Defendant No. 1 executed two documents: one providing annual maintenance (Exhibit P-5) and another gifting a house for her residence (Exhibit P-6). These acts implied continued conjugal relations and affection.
Despite this, Defendant No. 1 later claimed Defendant No. 2 never returned and had an illicit relationship with a man named Venkanna. He filed a suit in 1944 to cancel the deeds, alleging the plaintiff (child) was not his son. The trial court rejected this claim, finding no proof of non-access or unchastity. The High Court reversed, accepting the husband’s version of separation and inferring non-access. The Supreme Court re-evaluated the facts, emphasizing the need for clear and cogent proof to rebut legitimacy.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i. Whether the child born during the lawful wedlock was the legitimate son of Defendant No. 1 under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act?
ii. Whether there was conclusive proof of non-access between Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 2 at the time of conception?
iii. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the trial court’s finding based on speculative inferences rather than conclusive evidence?
F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the child was born during a subsisting marriage, and hence enjoys a conclusive presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned counsel, B. Somayya, argued that non-access had not been proved either directly or circumstantially. The execution of maintenance and settlement deeds (Exhibits P-5 and P-6) and the subsequent receipt (Exhibit D-3) indicate continued affection and interaction between the couple. The wife lived in the mud-terraced house granted to her, and her husband visited her. No credible witness testified to complete severance of relations. The story of unchastity involving another man was wholly disbelieved by both courts, rendering the husband’s assertion of non-access speculative and insufficient. Counsel emphasized that even circumstantial proof must satisfy a high evidentiary threshold to dislodge the presumption.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the husband had no contact with Defendant No. 2 after she received maintenance and shifted to her separate residence. The High Court relied on circumstantial evidence, including the absence of any post-October 1942 cohabitation, to support the claim of non-access. The respondent argued that the advance payment of annual maintenance in October 1942 and the grant of exclusive residence was indicative of final separation. It was also contended that the subsequent conduct of Defendant No. 2, including her continued stay at her father’s home after childbirth, implied that marital relations had ceased.
H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i. Section 112, Indian Evidence Act, 1872:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/493596/
Provides that a child born during the continuance of a valid marriage shall be conclusively presumed to be legitimate unless it is shown that the parties had no access during the period of conception.
ii. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 (UK):
This Act abrogated the English common law rule that barred husband and wife from testifying to non-access.
I) JUDGEMENT
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i. The Supreme Court held that Section 112 creates a conclusive presumption of legitimacy for a child born during valid wedlock. The burden of proving non-access lies squarely on the party denying paternity. Mere estrangement, ill-feeling, or subsequent hostility cannot displace this presumption. In this case, the High Court relied on speculation and the husband’s statements made two years later, which do not constitute valid proof. The Court clarified that both direct and circumstantial evidence of non-access must be “clear and satisfactory” to rebut legitimacy, which was not present here.
b. OBITER DICTA
i. The Court observed that English common law, which prohibits spouses from testifying about non-access, does not apply in India. Indian law has not adopted such a bar. Further, the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 in the UK had already removed this restriction, making its import to India irrelevant.
c. GUIDELINES
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Section 112 creates a conclusive presumption that must be strictly construed.
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Proof of non-access must be “clear and satisfactory.”
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Either direct or circumstantial evidence is permissible, but it must convincingly establish impossibility of access.
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Speculative reasoning or inferences drawn from subsequent conduct are inadmissible in rebutting presumption.
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Spousal testimony is permissible in Indian courts to prove or disprove access.
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Statements made post-dispute are not admissible against the interests of the child in legitimacy disputes.
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Maintenance and residential agreements do not necessarily imply separation, especially when the couple continued to interact.
J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The Supreme Court’s ruling reinforces the strong presumption of legitimacy in Indian law. It offers clarity on the evidentiary burden and rejects colonial-era doctrines that impair spousal agency in paternity disputes. The judgment protects children born within marriages from being disinherited based on speculative or hostile claims of illegitimacy. The apex court prudently distinguishes between legal presumptions and factual inferences, upholding statutory intent and judicial integrity. It remains a touchstone case for interpreting Section 112, balancing family law rights, evidence jurisprudence, and social policy on child welfare.
K) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
i. Karapaya v. Mayandi, 12 Rang. 243 (PC)[1]
ii. Russell v. Russell, [1924] AC 687 (UK)[2]
iii. Re J (Paternity: Evidence of Husband), [1952] 1 All ER 1228[3]
b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Section 112, Indian Evidence Act, 1872
ii. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 (UK)