YUSUF ABDUL AZIZ vs. THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND HUSSEINBHOY LALJEE.

Case Analysis

YUSUF ABDUL AZIZ vs. THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND HUSSEINBHOY LALJEE.

April 21, 2025

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The landmark decision in Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. The State of Bombay and Husseinbhoy Laljee [1954 AIR 321, 1954 SCR 930] stands as a seminal Supreme Court judgment interpreting Article 14 and Article 15 of the Indian Constitution in the context of Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalized adultery exclusively for men. The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of Section 497 IPC, asserting that it contravened the equality clause under Article 14 and non-discrimination clause under Article 15(1), as it exempted women from criminal liability in cases of adultery. The Court, however, upheld the provision, emphasizing the special protection allowed for women under Article 15(3). The case provided clarity on gender-based classifications in penal law and served to affirm Parliament’s power to enact protective legislation for women, even when it appears unequal to men. The judgment reflects the Court’s deference to legislative wisdom in matters concerning public morality and gender justice, while also interpreting constitutional provisions in a harmonious and purposive manner.

Keywords: Adultery, Article 14, Article 15(3), Gender Discrimination, Indian Penal Code, Constitutional Validity

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. The State of Bombay and Husseinbhoy Laljee

ii) Case Number:
Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 1951

iii) Judgement Date:
10 March 1954

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
Mehr Chand Mahajan C.J., Mukherjea, S.R. Das, Vivian Bose, and Ghulam Hasan, JJ.

vi) Author:
Justice Vivian Bose

vii) Citation:
AIR 1954 SC 321; 1954 SCR 930

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

Article 14 – Right to Equality
Article 15(1) and 15(3) – Prohibition of Discrimination and Special Provisions for Women
Section 497 – Indian Penal Code, 1860

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case (if any):
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Gender Justice

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This case arose against the backdrop of India’s evolving constitutional jurisprudence post-independence. With the Constitution in force, several penal provisions enacted during colonial rule faced constitutional scrutiny. Section 497 IPC, which criminalized adultery by punishing only the male involved in an extramarital affair, was seen by the petitioner as discriminatory. The provision stated that only a man who engages in sexual intercourse with another man’s wife, without the husband’s consent, is guilty of the offence. It further declared that the woman shall not be punishable as an abettor, regardless of her willingness. This gendered distinction prompted the petitioner to argue that it violated the equality before law and equal protection of laws under Article 14, and constituted sex-based discrimination under Article 15(1). However, the Supreme Court held otherwise, invoking Article 15(3) which allows for special provisions for women. The Court emphasized that legislative measures for women’s protection cannot be invalidated solely because they appear to favour women over men.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, Yusuf Abdul Aziz, was charged with committing adultery under Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code. A complaint was filed by Husseinbhoy Laljee, the husband of the woman with whom Yusuf allegedly had consensual extramarital relations. During the pendency of the prosecution, the appellant moved the Bombay High Court to quash the proceedings on the ground that Section 497 violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. He claimed the section was discriminatory since it punished only the man and granted immunity to the woman involved in the offence. The High Court rejected this contention but granted a certificate under Article 132(1) and Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution to enable the matter to be brought before the Supreme Court. Consequently, the matter was heard by a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court to assess the constitutional validity of the impugned provision in light of the equality and non-discrimination clauses of the Constitution.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code is unconstitutional as it violates Article 14 (equality before law) and Article 15(1) (non-discrimination based on sex) of the Indian Constitution.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The counsel, A.A. Peerbhoy, argued that Section 497 is unconstitutional because it penalizes only the man, while exempting the woman who is an equal participant in the offence. This creates an arbitrary and unreasonable classification on the basis of sex, which is explicitly prohibited by Article 15(1). The argument stressed that the right to equality under Article 14 is violated as similarly situated persons—man and woman participating in adultery—are treated unequally. The provision is not based on any intelligible differentia, nor does it have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The learned counsel further asserted that the protection under Article 15(3) could not be extended to grant a license to women to commit criminal offences, as this would violate the basic structure of justice and fairness contemplated under Part III of the Constitution. They contended that if the intent was to provide beneficial discrimination, it could not manifest as immunity from criminal liability. The petitioner relied on general principles of criminal law that maintain parity in liability for equal participation in a crime, referencing Mohd. Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, AIR 1985 SC 945, although that came later, the principle of equal legal responsibility was emphasized even then.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

M.C. Setalvad, the then Attorney General of India, argued that Section 497 does not offend Articles 14 or 15. He emphasized that Article 15(3) empowers the State to make special provisions for women, and Section 497 is one such provision. It aims to protect women from the social consequences of being branded criminals for adulterous relations. The provision assumes that women may be victims of male dominance and are thus granted statutory immunity. Setalvad submitted that sex is a reasonable ground of classification, especially when backed by constitutional authorization under Article 15(3). Therefore, Section 497 is not arbitrary but is an instance of legislative classification with constitutional sanction. The respondent contended that the law’s design is rooted in social policy and public morality, and judicial interference in such domains must be minimal unless the classification is manifestly arbitrary. He cited State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318, wherein the Court upheld a law that made special classifications when supported by policy considerations and legislative intent.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 497, Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Adultery
Article 14, Constitution of India – Equality before law
Article 15(1) and 15(3), Constitution of India – Non-discrimination and Special Provisions for Women
Article 132(1) and Article 134(1)(c) – Appeals to Supreme Court

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) Justice Vivian Bose, writing for a unanimous Bench, held that Section 497 does not offend Article 14 or 15. The Court observed that the classification based on sex is constitutionally permissible under Article 15(3), which empowers the State to make special provisions for women. The Court opined that the impugned section is not discriminatory but protective. It does not grant women a license to commit adultery but merely prevents their criminal prosecution under Section 497. The Court further clarified that such a legislative protection for women is consistent with the principles of justice and equality, and must be interpreted in harmony with Articles 14 and 15. Justice Bose emphasized that the provision prohibiting punishment does not amount to legalizing the act for women, hence does not violate equality.

b. OBITER DICTA

i) The Court observed that even if the petitioner were not a citizen, it was unnecessary to adjudicate on his right to invoke Articles 14 and 15, since the case could be disposed of on other substantive grounds. This indicated that even non-citizens might have access to constitutional remedies depending on the nature of the right invoked, although the judgment refrained from conclusively deciding on this point.

c. GUIDELINES

The Court did not explicitly lay down guidelines. However, the following inferences can be drawn:

Laws differentiating based on sex are valid if justified under Article 15(3).
Gender-based immunity from prosecution, when constitutionally authorized, does not violate Article 14.
Judicial review in matters involving moral and social policy must respect legislative domain unless the classification is manifestly arbitrary.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision in Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay cemented the principle that protective discrimination for women, even in criminal law, is constitutionally valid when it is supported by Article 15(3). While critics argue that such exemptions undermine the notion of equal responsibility, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on gender-sensitive legislation reflects a progressive and paternalistic approach toward women’s legal status at that time. However, in 2018, in the landmark ruling in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39, the Supreme Court finally struck down Section 497 as unconstitutional, stating it was based on patriarchal assumptions and violated Articles 14, 15, and 21. Thus, this 1954 judgment, though valid at the time, has been rendered obsolete in light of evolving constitutional morality. Still, its doctrinal and historical relevance remains crucial for understanding the interpretation of protective discrimination and constitutional classification under Indian jurisprudence.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred