This landmark judgment in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya ([1955] 2 SCR 1) is a seminal exposition on the procedural law and natural justice within the Indian judicial framework. The Supreme Court clarified the scope and application of Section 105 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, emphasizing that neither this provision nor any statutory finality clause can override the constitutional powers of judicial review under Article 226 and Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The case also provides a comprehensive analysis of the procedural mandates under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, especially relating to ex parte orders, adjournments, and the right to a fair hearing. The judgment reiterates that procedural laws are instruments to advance justice, not to frustrate it. The ruling expounded on the judicial discretion of tribunals, emphasizing that courts must not treat procedural lapses as grounds for punishment but should aim to balance the interests of justice, including that of parties and witnesses. The judgment was instrumental in correcting a legal misapprehension that restricted a party from appearing in further proceedings without setting aside an “ex parte order” even at adjourned hearings. It also set aside the orders of the Election Tribunal, directing it to properly exercise discretion under the law. The decision remains a cornerstone precedent in Indian administrative and election law jurisprudence.

Keywords: Natural Justice, Ex Parte Order, Judicial Discretion, Article 226, Election Tribunal, Procedural Law, Representation of People Act, Fair Hearing, CPC Interpretation, Judicial Review.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya

ii) Case Number:
Civil Appeal No. 214 of 1954

iii) Judgement Date:
22 March 1955

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
Justice Vivian Bose, Justice B. Jagannadhadas, and Justice Bhuvaneshwar Prasad Sinha

vi) Author:
Justice Vivian Bose

vii) Citation:
(1955) 2 SCR 1

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Article 226 and Article 136 of the Constitution of India

• Section 105 and Section 90(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951

• Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, especially Order 5, Order 8, Order 9, Order 15, and Order 17

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case:
Sewaram v. Misrimal (AIR 1952 Raj 12)

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:
Constitutional Law, Civil Procedure, Election Law, Administrative Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court delivered a landmark pronouncement to address whether an Election Tribunal, having proceeded ex parte against a party for non-appearance at an adjourned hearing, could lawfully deny the party further participation unless the “ex parte order” was first set aside. The broader issue involved the interpretation of Section 105 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 in light of Article 226 and Article 136 of the Constitution, examining the nature of judicial review against tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. The background arose from the procedural decisions taken by the Election Tribunal, Kotah, in disallowing the appellant’s counsel from participating in subsequent hearings due to absence during initial sessions scheduled at Udaipur. The case ultimately questioned the tribunal’s understanding and application of judicial discretion, procedural fairness, and the rights of litigants to a hearing.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, Sangram Singh, faced an election petition under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, filed by Bhurey Lal. Initial proceedings were held at Kotah where Sangram Singh, through counsel, participated, filed a written statement, and contested the case. Later, the Tribunal shifted the hearing venue to Udaipur for the petitioner’s evidence. The appellant or his counsel failed to appear on the first three days of the resumed hearing at Udaipur, prompting the Tribunal to proceed ex parte. When one of his three counsels, Mr. Bharatraj, appeared on the fourth day, the Tribunal denied participation, insisting that the ex parte order remained unless formally set aside. The appellant’s application to recall the ex parte order and seek permission to cross-examine earlier witnesses was rejected. The appellant approached the Rajasthan High Court under Article 226, which dismissed the petition citing the Tribunal’s discretion. However, the Supreme Court granted special leave to appeal under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether Section 105 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 bars judicial review of Election Tribunal orders under Article 226 and Article 136.
ii) Whether an ex parte procedural order can preclude a party from participating in subsequent adjourned hearings.
iii) Whether procedural non-compliance should necessarily lead to denial of the right to participate without a specific recall order.
iv) Whether the Election Tribunal failed to exercise judicial discretion in accordance with procedural law and principles of natural justice.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Sangram Singh argued that the tribunal misinterpreted the scope of its discretion. They submitted that Order 9 Rule 7 of CPC does not bar a party from appearing at adjourned hearings unless the ex parte order is recalled. The appellant had already entered appearance at earlier stages, filed a written statement, and was never delinquent in intention. They contended that refusal to permit further participation without setting aside a non-final procedural order violated the tenets of natural justice and deprived the appellant of a fair trial. They further argued that Section 105 of the Representation of the People Act could not override Article 226 or Article 136, and such statutory finality was subordinate to constitutional supremacy.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The respondent Bhurey Lal argued that the Tribunal’s refusal to entertain the appellant’s counsel was justified given repeated and unexplained absence. The petitioner emphasized the Tribunal’s power to proceed ex parte under Order 9 Rule 6(1)(a) and urged that the appellant had forfeited his right to contest by his own negligence. It was submitted that the Tribunal had acted within its statutory and procedural jurisdiction and therefore, no case of judicial review was made out. Furthermore, the High Court rightly refrained from re-appreciating facts or substituting its view for that of the Tribunal.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Article 226 – Power of High Courts to issue prerogative writs against authorities acting without or in excess of jurisdiction.
ii) Article 136 – Discretionary appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
iii) Section 105 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Finality clause for orders of Election Tribunals.
iv) Section 90(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Tribunal procedure to follow CPC “as nearly as may be”.
v) Order 9 Rule 6(1)(a) and Rule 7, Order 17 Rule 2 of CPC – Provisions on non-appearance and discretion at adjourned hearings.
vi) Order 5 Rule 1 & 5, Order 8 Rules 1 & 10, Order 15 Rule 3, and Section 32 CPC – Governing service, written statements, and consequences of absence.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that Section 105 does not oust judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136. It emphasized that only courts of constitutional jurisdiction can finally pronounce on the legality of acts done by tribunals of limited jurisdiction. The Tribunal wrongly believed it was powerless to allow further appearance without setting aside the ex parte order, thereby failing to exercise its judicial discretion. The Court ruled that appearance at an adjourned hearing must be allowed unless expressly barred by law, and participation can be regulated by discretion but not outright denied.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court observed that procedural laws are meant to advance justice, not to trap parties through technicalities. The Court underscored the inconvenience caused to witnesses and urged that their suffering should be taken into account while deciding adjournments and appearance-related matters. The judgment warned against courts becoming mechanical in denying participation, advocating flexibility and fairness.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Courts and tribunals must not deny participation on procedural technicalities unless law mandates it.

• An ex parte order at one hearing does not prevent appearance at a later stage unless prohibited.

• Courts should exercise judicial discretion based on justice, convenience of parties, and witness hardship.

• Procedural law must be read in light of natural justice and not as penal statutes.

• Tribunals must consider whether prejudice has occurred due to earlier absence before denying participation.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s intervention in this case reasserted its role as the ultimate guardian of constitutional and procedural justice. The judgment harmonized procedural discipline with natural justice, creating a balanced doctrine where rights of parties and public interest coexist. The exposition on the non-finality of tribunal decisions under legislative finality clauses reinforces constitutional supremacy over statutory exclusion. The ruling continues to influence election jurisprudence and remains a touchstone for interpreting procedural safeguards in administrative adjudication.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque, [1955] 1 SCR 1104
ii. Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh, [1955] 1 SCR 267
iii. Raj Krishna Bose v. Binod Kanungo, [1954] SCR 913
iv. Hariram v. Pribhdas, AIR 1945 Sind 98
v. Sewaram v. Misrimal, AIR 1952 Raj 12 (overruled)
vi. Venkatasubbiah v. Lakshminarasimham, AIR 1925 Mad 1274
vii. Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar, ILR 40 Mad 793
viii. T.M. Barret v. African Products Ltd., AIR 1928 PC 261
ix. Sahibzada Zeinulabdin Khan v. Sahibzada Ahmed Raza Khan, 5 IA 233

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Sections 90(2), 100, 105
ii. Constitution of India – Articles 226, 133, 136
iii. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Orders 5, 8, 9, 15, 17; Sections 27, 30, 32