A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This landmark judgment in The State of Bombay v. R.S. Nanji [1956 SCR 18] reaffirms and deepens the Indian jurisprudence on the interpretation of the term “public purpose” under requisition laws. The Supreme Court held that requisitioning premises to house a government corporation officer constitutes a legitimate public purpose. The case scrutinized the constitutional propriety of exercising powers under Section 5(1) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, in light of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court took a pragmatic approach to the concept of “public purpose,” emphasizing the wider community interest over narrow individual claims. The Court further established that government instrumentalities, like the State Road Transport Corporation, form an essential part of the State’s public utility services and the provision of adequate housing for their officers was intrinsic to maintaining their operational efficiency. Thus, the Court overturned the High Court’s decision and reaffirmed the State’s right to requisition property under constitutional safeguards, introducing nuanced clarity to the constitutional law governing property rights, public interest, and administrative authority.

Keywords: Public Purpose, Requisition, Bombay Land Requisition Act, State Road Transport Corporation, Article 226, Fundamental Rights, Housing Accommodation, Constitutional Interpretation

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
The State of Bombay v. R.S. Nanji

ii) Case Number
Civil Appeal No. 235 of 1954

iii) Judgement Date
17 January 1956

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
S.R. Das (Acting C.J.), Bhagwati, Jagannadhadas, B.P. Sinha, and Jafer Imam JJ.

vi) Author
Justice Jafer Imam

vii) Citation
AIR 1956 SC 294, 1956 SCR 18

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Section 5(1), Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948

• Section 19(1)(c), Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950

• Article 226, Constitution of India

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any)
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Constitutional Law, Property Law, Administrative Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The dispute arose from the State of Bombay’s requisition of premises under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 for accommodating an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation (SRTC). The respondent, R.S. Nanji, contested the move via Article 226 before the Bombay High Court, which invalidated the requisition, ruling it was not for a “public purpose.” The State appealed to the Supreme Court. The broader constitutional question concerned the interpretation of “public purpose” and its intersection with individual property rights under the Constitution. The judgment sits at the intersection of executive discretion and constitutional guarantees, and remains a significant precedent on requisition powers and the scope of judicial review in matters affecting public utility and administrative governance.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 12 May 1952, the Government of Bombay issued a requisition order under Section 5(1) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948. The stated purpose was to house an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation. The respondent, R.S. Nanji, challenged this order by filing a writ under Article 226 before the Bombay High Court, claiming the requisition lacked a public purpose and was thus ultra vires.

The High Court agreed, holding that housing one officer of a corporation did not qualify as a public purpose. The State, aggrieved by the ruling, sought redress before the Supreme Court by special leave. The main contention before the Apex Court was whether providing residential accommodation to an officer of a government-run public utility could be deemed a public purpose under requisition laws.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the requisition of premises for housing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation constitutes a “public purpose” under Section 5(1) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948?

ii) Whether the High Court erred in holding that individual housing needs of a public utility officer do not meet the threshold of public interest?

iii) To what extent can the judiciary review executive action premised on statutory terms like “public purpose”?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsel for the State contended that public purpose includes housing for employees of state instrumentalities like the SRTC, especially since such organizations serve vital public transportation needs. Relying on Section 19(1)(c) of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950, the State emphasized that the Corporation is empowered to ensure suitable service conditions, including residential accommodation, for its officers. The State argued that housing its employees directly impacts the operational efficiency of its services, and such requisitioning furthers the public interest [1].

The Attorney-General also relied upon precedents, notably Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary of State for India in Council, 1914 L.R. 42 I.A. 44, where housing schemes for government officers were upheld as “public purpose.” Similarly, in The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777 and The State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 867, the Court had upheld residential requisitions for officers under similar grounds [2].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The respondent, through counsel Mr. Andley, argued that requisitioning property to house one individual employee of a Corporation was not a public purpose. He contended that “public purpose” must relate to community welfare and not specific conveniences of employees. Further, it was argued that Hamabai’s case was distinguishable as it pertained to large-scale housing schemes, not individual requisitions. The respondent stressed the absence of direct community benefit or demonstrable necessity linking the officer’s housing to public interest [3].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 5(1), Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 – Enables the State Government to requisition property for a public purpose.
ii) Section 19(1)(c), Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 – Permits Corporations to provide living accommodations and amenities for their employees.
iii) Article 226, Constitution of India – Empowers High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of rights against administrative actions.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that “public purpose” must be interpreted broadly to accommodate contemporary needs. It emphasized that requisitioning property to house an officer of a public utility corporation like the SRTC serves public interest by maintaining operational efficiency. The Court reasoned that the housing of officers is integral to the delivery of services provided by the Corporation, which has a statutory mandate under Section 19(1)(c). It held that requisition for such a purpose is legally valid and constitutionally permissible [4].

b. OBITER DICTA

i) The Court commented that defining “public purpose” is context-specific and evolves with societal needs. Courts must give adequate deference to executive determinations unless palpably arbitrary. It observed that while individuals benefit from certain actions, the broader outcome must support societal good [5].

c. GUIDELINES

• Public purpose includes institutional requirements of public utilities.

• Judicial review of such matters must examine the objective link to public benefit.

• Mere individual benefit does not invalidate a requisition if the larger organization serves the public.

• Housing provisions for state employees are statutorily sanctioned and form part of public service infrastructure.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This case expanded the horizon of public purpose under requisition law. It underscored that public utility corporations operate within a public interest framework, and their institutional needs, including employee housing, qualify for constitutional protection. The judgment balances individual rights with public interest in a practical, forward-looking interpretation. It remains a pivotal reference for administrative law, especially on requisition and eminent domain.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

[1] Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary of State for India in Council, 1914 L.R. 42 I.A. 44
[2] The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777
[3] The State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 867

b. Important Statutes Referred

[4] Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, Section 5(1) – See provision on Indian Kanoon
[5] Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950, Section 19(1)(c) – See provision on Indian Kanoon
[6] Constitution of India, Article 226 – See provision on Indian Kanoon