SHAMBU NATH MEHRA vs. THE STATE OF AJMER.

Case Analysis

SHAMBU NATH MEHRA vs. THE STATE OF AJMER.

April 23, 2025

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The landmark judgment of Shambu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, reported in [1956 SCR 199], has emerged as a pivotal authority on the interpretation and application of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The case delineated the extent to which the burden of proof can shift in criminal trials, especially in scenarios involving alleged offences under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The appellant, a government servant, was accused of claiming travel allowance (T.A.) for journeys without having paid for second-class tickets. The prosecution relied on Illustration (b) to Section 106 to shift the burden to the accused to prove that he had indeed paid the fare. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, per Justice Vivian Bose, held that the burden of proof in criminal cases primarily lies with the prosecution, and Section 106 applies only in exceptional circumstances. The judgment harmonizes evidentiary presumptions with constitutional guarantees of fair trial and presumption of innocence. This precedent remains a cornerstone in criminal jurisprudence concerning evidentiary burden.

Keywords: Burden of Proof, Section 106 Evidence Act, Criminal Jurisprudence, Corruption, Travel Allowance Fraud

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Shambu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer

ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 65 of 1954

iii) Judgement Date: 12th March 1956

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Justice Vivian Bose and Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar

vi) Author: Justice Vivian Bose

vii) Citation: [1956] SCR 199; AIR 1956 SC 404

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947
Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None explicitly overruled.

x) Case is Related to Law Subjects:
Criminal Law, Law of Evidence, Anti-Corruption Law, Administrative Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case originated from allegations against a public servant for dishonestly claiming T.A. without having purchased the requisite railway tickets. Initially convicted by the Special Judge under Section 420 IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the matter reached the apex court post a series of appeals. The central question turned on whether the burden of proof could shift to the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act when facts are within his special knowledge. The ruling drew a fine distinction between ordinary evidentiary rules and exceptional scenarios, thereby refining the application of Section 106 in Indian criminal law.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, Shambu Nath Mehra, served as a Camp Clerk in the office of the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, at Ajmer. He was prosecuted for fraudulently claiming Rs. 23-12-0 as T.A. for two second-class railway journeys allegedly undertaken on 8th and 15th September 1948 from Ajmer to Abu Road and Reengus. The prosecution’s case was that railway records showed no issuance of second-class tickets from Ajmer to those destinations on the said dates. The appellant, however, contended that he did undertake the journeys and may have paid the fare onboard. Notably, the railway procedures allowed passengers to pay fares on the train in specific situations, such as lack of second-class ticket availability. The Judicial Commissioner reversed the initial acquittal and remanded the case for retrial before a Special Judge. The Supreme Court then examined whether conviction could be sustained on the evidence led and addressed the misuse of Section 106 by the prosecution.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the prosecution could shift the burden of proof to the accused under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in the context of travel allowance claims?

ii) Whether the prosecution’s failure to exhaust available evidence rendered reliance on Section 106 untenable?

iii) Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the accused of offences under Section 420 IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the charges themselves assumed the fact of travel, thereby rendering irrelevant the prosecution’s attempt to argue otherwise at the stage of appeal. This was critical because the charge read as: “cheated the Government by dishonestly inducing it to pay Rs. 62-9-0 on account of T.A. for journeys performed.” This language presumes that the travel did occur.

They argued that the prosecution failed to prove that the second-class fare was not paid by him, particularly when railway rules allowed payment on board if second-class tickets were unavailable. It was also pointed out that prosecution could easily have verified from railway registers whether any on-board payments were recorded. This made the burden equally accessible and not “especially within the knowledge of the accused.”

The appellant also invoked Attygalle v. Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 169 and Seneviratne v. R., [1936] 3 All ER 36, where the Privy Council held that merely being in a position to explain facts does not shift the burden from prosecution.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the Respondent submitted that since no second-class tickets were issued from Ajmer to the said destinations on the relevant dates, the burden of proof lay on the accused to establish that he had travelled and paid the requisite fare. They relied on Illustration (b) to Section 106, which reads: “A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.”

It was further asserted that only the accused could explain how he came to be on the journey and whether he paid the fare, and therefore facts of such nature were within his special knowledge. Hence, he must furnish proof to counter the accusation.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 420, Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property
ii) Section 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 – Criminal misconduct by a public servant
iii) Section 106, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Burden of proving facts especially within knowledge

Click here to view Section 106 on Indian Kanoon

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be interpreted to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It applies only in exceptional situations where facts are pre-eminently and exceptionally within the accused’s knowledge, and prosecution cannot access them despite due diligence.

The Court ruled that in the present case, the railway records were accessible to the prosecution, and they could have verified whether the accused paid on board. As such, the facts were not exclusively within the accused’s knowledge, thereby making reliance on Section 106 erroneous.

It was emphasized that illustrations do not expand the ambit of a section, and the purpose of Section 106 is not to undermine the presumption of innocence. The Court reinstated the acquittal and dismissed the prosecution’s case for lack of substantive evidence.

b. OBITER DICTA

i) Justice Bose remarked that interpreting Section 106 too broadly would lead to a “startling conclusion” where the burden of disproving guilt in every case would shift to the accused, which is contrary to the criminal law principle of presumption of innocence.

The Court cautioned against using evidentiary presumptions to undermine fundamental rights and stated that fairness in procedure must guide judicial approach, especially in criminal cases.

c. GUIDELINES

Section 106 applies only when prosecution cannot access facts even with diligence.
Illustration (b) to Section 106 is applicable only in specific railway-related cases under Sections 112 and 113 of the Indian Railways Act.
Charges admitted by prosecution cannot be later denied to gain procedural advantage.
The burden on the accused arises only when the prosecution discharges its primary burden.
Illustrations under Section 106 do not control or expand the statutory text.