A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This Supreme Court judgment in M/s Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan & Others (1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 836 provides a pivotal interpretation of Section 33 and Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The dispute arose from the suspension and proposed dismissal of 48 workmen by the management for allegedly engaging in a deliberate and unjustified go-slow during conciliation proceedings. The management had sought permission from the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33 for dismissals, while the workmen filed a counterclaim under Section 33A alleging wrongful punishment. The Industrial Tribunal permitted only limited suspension and rejected the dismissal request. On appeal, the Labour Appellate Tribunal erroneously treated the suspension as substantive punishment, contrary to its own record, and denied the management’s appeal. The Supreme Court clarified that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to modify the punishment proposed by the employer and ruled the findings regarding lack of evidence against 16 workmen as perverse. Ultimately, it granted the employer permission to dismiss all 48 workmen, subject to payment of back wages during suspension. The case reaffirms that go-slow constitutes serious misconduct and affirms management’s rights, provided due procedure under Section 33 is followed.

Keywords: Industrial Disputes Act, Go-slow, Suspension, Section 33, Section 33A, Misconduct, Labour Tribunal, Supreme Court

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
M/s Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan & Others

ii) Case Number:
Civil Appeals Nos. 746 and 747 of 1957

iii) Judgement Date:
April 29, 1959

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
Justice B.P. Sinha, Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, Justice J.C. Shah, Justice N. Wanchoo

vi) Author:
Justice N. Wanchoo

vii) Citation:
(1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 836

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:
Section 33 and Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case:
None explicitly overruled

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:
Labour Law, Industrial Relations, Employment Law, Constitutional Labour Protections

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This dispute traces its genesis to longstanding labor unrest in the appellant’s factory dating back to 1942. Several industrial disputes had previously been adjudicated, mostly favoring reinstatement of union leaders like Shams-ud-din. A tenuous peace eventually broke again in 1952, with the union issuing a 40-point demand and threatening passive resistance through go-slow. Despite attempts at conciliation by Labour authorities, including the Deputy Commissioner and Labour Commissioner, the go-slow intensified and continued in defiance of instructions. Consequently, the management suspended 48 employees who allegedly led the protest. While adjudication was pending on other issues, the management filed for permission to dismiss the suspended workers under Section 33, and the workmen filed a cross-complaint under Section 33A alleging that their suspension amounted to punishment without Tribunal approval. This judgment interprets the scope and power of Tribunals under Section 33 in such industrial scenarios, offering critical jurisprudence on management’s rights in industrial misconduct cases.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

M/s Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd., a sugar factory in Bihar, had a history of industrial discord. The dispute in question arose in January 1952 when the factory’s union issued a 40-point demand and threatened a go-slow from January 9. Despite the Labour Commissioner’s request to maintain status quo due to ongoing elections and the start of conciliation proceedings, the workers engaged in a go-slow from January 9 to 12, resumed normalcy briefly, and restarted the go-slow on January 24. The Labour Officer, reporting ongoing disruption, advised the management to take action with the Tribunal’s approval.

The management suspended 33 workmen on January 31, and 15 more between February 6 and 7, citing their role in orchestrating the go-slow. Applications for permission to dismiss these workers were filed under Section 33 on February 6 and 11, respectively. The workmen, alleging punitive suspension, filed a counterclaim under Section 33A. The Industrial Tribunal found evidence of unjustified go-slow but denied dismissal, permitting only a seven-day suspension for 32 workers and rejecting action against 16 for lack of evidence. The management and workmen both appealed to the Appellate Tribunal, which erroneously concluded that the suspension was punitive and the dismissal applications were mala fide.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the suspension of workers amounted to punitive action without Tribunal’s approval under Section 33, thus violating the provision.

ii. Whether the Industrial Tribunal could lawfully substitute a lesser punishment (suspension) instead of deciding on the request for dismissal under Section 33.

iii. Whether the Appellate Tribunal erred in treating the suspension as substantive punishment despite no appeal against that finding by the workers.

iv. Whether there was adequate and equal evidence against all 48 workmen to justify dismissal for go-slow.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for M/s Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. submitted that the go-slow constituted serious and unjustified misconduct. They argued that the Industrial Tribunal erred in denying dismissal and instead authorizing suspension, a punishment not sought by the management. It was contended that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to modify the punishment proposed under Section 33, which only empowers it to approve or reject dismissal based on merit. The management also pointed out that the finding of “no evidence” against 16 workmen was incorrect, as evidence against all 48 was materially similar. They highlighted that the suspension notices clearly indicated it was pending further orders and hence interim, not punitive. This interpretation was confirmed by the Industrial Tribunal and became final when the workers withdrew their appeal under Section 33A.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for the workmen (though they eventually did not appear in Supreme Court) had initially argued before the lower forums that their suspension was in breach of Section 33, as no prior approval was taken. They contended that the go-slow was a legitimate response to unmet demands and not misconduct. Additionally, the withdrawal of the appeal under Section 33A should not be interpreted as an acceptance of the Tribunal’s findings regarding interim suspension. The workers also sought to establish that the management acted mala fide, especially given the timing and procedural lapses.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: Restricts the employer from altering conditions of service or punishing workmen during pendency of industrial proceedings without express Tribunal permission. Read here

ii. Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: Allows workers to directly file complaints before the Tribunal if there is a violation of Section 33.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. The Supreme Court held that the Industrial Tribunal’s discretion under Section 33 does not extend to prescribing or substituting penalties. It must solely determine whether the proposed dismissal is justified based on misconduct. If proven, it must grant permission to dismiss. The Tribunal’s imposition of a seven-day suspension was thus ultra vires.

ii. The finding of “no evidence” against 16 workmen was perverse. All 48 were subject to the same evidentiary basis, including testimonies and incident records. Hence, the Tribunal ought to have uniformly applied its reasoning to all.

iii. The Appellate Tribunal’s treatment of suspension as punitive was legally flawed. It contradicted the established finding from the Tribunal, which stood unchallenged due to withdrawal of the workmen’s appeal under Section 33A.

b. OBITER DICTA

i. The Court strongly reiterated that go-slow is a serious, insidious form of misconduct that undermines industrial discipline and disrupts production in a concealed manner, making it more dangerous than overt strikes.

ii. The management must pay suspended workmen full wages till the Tribunal decision since it did not conduct a domestic enquiry before invoking Section 33.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Tribunals cannot modify the punishment proposed in an application under Section 33.

• Interim suspensions pending permission applications do not constitute punishment if clearly indicated.

• Uniform evidentiary standards must apply across similarly placed employees.

• Employers must pay wages for suspension periods if no internal inquiry was held.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Management of Ranipur Colliery v. Bhuban Singh, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 719 – on payment of wages during suspension without inquiry.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Sections 33 and 33A