A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
The Supreme Court of India adjudicated the matter of Mizaji and Another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh concerning a brutal murder linked with the unlawful assembly’s objective of forcible possession. The appellants, comprising close family and servants, orchestrated an armed venture to capture disputed agricultural land, leading to the fatal shooting of Rameshwar by Mizaji under the direction of his father Tej Singh. The Court meticulously analyzed the collective liability under Section 149 read with Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, establishing the extent of knowledge, preparation, and criminal intention shared by each participant of the assembly. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court and Sessions Court verdicts, affirming Mizaji’s death sentence and life imprisonment for the others. The judgment underscores the principles surrounding common object, knowledge of probable consequences, and vicarious criminal liability in unlawful assemblies under Indian criminal jurisprudence.
Keywords: Unlawful Assembly, Common Object, Criminal Liability, Section 149 IPC, Forcible Possession, Murder, Indian Penal Code, Supreme Court of India, Collective Responsibility, Homicide.
B) CASE DETAILS
i) Judgement Cause Title
Mizaji and Another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh
ii) Case Number
Criminal Appeals Nos. 81 and 82 of 1958
iii) Judgement Date
18th December 1958
iv) Court
Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum
Justice S.K. Das, Justice J.L. Kapur, Justice Syed Jafer Imam
vi) Author
Justice J.L. Kapur
vii) Citation
[1959] Supp. SCR 940
viii) Legal Provisions Involved
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Section 302 IPC – Punishment for murder
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Section 149 IPC – Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object
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Section 147 IPC – Punishment for rioting
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Section 148 IPC – Rioting armed with deadly weapon
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Sections 87 and 88 CrPC (1898) – Proclamation and attachment for absconding persons
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any)
None
x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Criminal Law, Indian Penal Code, Law of Evidence, Criminal Procedure
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The dispute revolved around forcible possession of agricultural land. The accused assembled with lethal weapons, reflecting their preparedness for violent resistance. Legal ownership disputes existed prior, but instead of awaiting lawful resolution, the accused adopted extralegal measures to claim possession. The incident presented crucial questions regarding common object liability under Section 149 IPC and the extent of knowledge required to invoke collective criminal responsibility. The Court revisited principles from historic decisions, reaffirming how collective intent and likelihood of severe consequences determine culpability of all members.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The field in question, Plot No. 1096 (Sukhna field), was in possession of Banwari who had mortgaged it to Lakhan Singh in 1949. By 1952, Rameshwar (deceased) and four others, including Ram Sarup, Jailal, Sita Ram, and Saddon, cultivated it. The mortgage got redeemed in 1953. Later entries reflected possession reverting briefly to Banwari before being corrected in 1956 back to Rameshwar and others.
In April 1957, Banwari sold the plot to Tej Singh (father of Mizaji), who applied for mutation. The matter was pending in the Revenue Court when, on July 27, 1957, Tej Singh, Mizaji, Subedar (nephew), Machal (cousin), and Maiku (servant) arrived at the field before sunrise, fully armed.
Tej Singh guarded with a spear, Maiku ploughed the jowar crop, and others cut sugarcane. Bateshwar (PW7) alerted Ram Sarup, who arrived unarmed with Rameshwar and others. On questioning, Tej Singh claimed ownership due to purchase and refused to stop.
At this stage, Mizaji, on Tej Singh’s command, pulled out a pistol concealed in his dhoti folds and fired at Rameshwar, killing him instantly. After the murder, all accused fled. Ram Sarup lodged an FIR at Nawabgunj police station at 7:30 AM. Initially absconding, the accused surrendered between August 3 and 14, 1957.
The trial ensued at Farrukhabad Sessions Court, culminating in convictions upheld by the Allahabad High Court, and finally challenged before the Supreme Court.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i) Whether all members of the assembly shared a common object of forcibly taking possession at any cost, even murder.
ii) Whether liability under Section 149 IPC attaches to each member despite not all committing the overt act.
iii) Whether knowledge of the firearm and its potential use was shared among the members.
iv) Whether Mizaji’s action warranted the death penalty, considering Tej Singh’s instigation.
F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the common object was only to secure possession, not to commit murder. They argued that Mizaji acted independently in firing the pistol, without knowledge or intention shared by the others. They cited Queen v. Sabid Ali (1873) 20 W.R. 5 Cr. to suggest absence of requisite knowledge among all assembly members regarding the murder likelihood[5].
ii) They emphasized that many accused carried lathis, not lethal weapons like pistols or spears, implying absence of preparation for murder.
iii) They submitted that mere presence in the field without prior design or express intention to kill could not attract Section 149 IPC liability for murder.
iv) They further argued that Mizaji only fired after his father Tej Singh’s command, suggesting absence of premeditated individual intent and seeking mitigation against death sentence.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that the unlawful assembly’s conduct, their weapons, and open threats demonstrated readiness for violence, including murder.
ii) They argued that collective threats of “finishing” the complainants implied clear intent to overpower even by lethal force if resisted.
iii) They stressed that all accused arrived together, heavily armed, showing premeditated planning rather than spontaneous action.
iv) They cited the trial court and High Court findings, emphasizing that Mizaji carried a pistol hidden in his dhoti folds, with other members being aware of its presence. The conduct of the group satisfied both prongs of Section 149 IPC[5].
H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i) Section 302 IPC: Punishment for Murder – https://indiankanoon.org/doc/327229/
ii) Section 149 IPC: Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object – https://indiankanoon.org/doc/460460/
iii) Section 147 IPC: Punishment for Rioting – https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1572056/
iv) Section 148 IPC: Rioting armed with deadly weapon – https://indiankanoon.org/doc/810137/
v) Sections 87 and 88 CrPC (1898): Proclamation and attachment for absconding persons – https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1856346/
I) JUDGEMENT
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i) The Court held that the common object extended to forcible possession even at the cost of murder if resisted.
ii) The accused assembled with clear knowledge of probable lethal consequences, evidenced by carrying firearms, spear, and lathis.
iii) The offence of murder directly flowed from the unlawful assembly’s objective, thus satisfying both first and second parts of Section 149 IPC[5].
iv) The accused’s prior division of roles and coordinated threats demonstrated premeditation.
v) Even absent express murder intention by all, collective knowledge that murder was likely sufficed to impose criminal liability under Section 149 IPC.
b. OBITER DICTA
i) The Court explained that under Section 149 IPC, the expression “know” signifies clear awareness of probable consequences, not mere possibilities.
ii) It agreed with the opinion of Couch, C.J., in Queen v. Sabid Ali (1873) 20 W.R. 5 Cr., clarifying that while not every unlawful assembly will foresee murder, preparedness and weaponry suggest intent and knowledge of likely violence[5].
iii) The Court distinguished its earlier ruling in Chikkarange Gowde v. State of Mysore AIR 1956 SC 731, emphasizing unique facts there concerning absence of prior knowledge and different charges[5].
c. GUIDELINES
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To invoke Section 149 IPC:
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Establish existence of an unlawful assembly.
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Prove common object and shared knowledge of probable serious offences.
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Evaluate weaponry, conduct, and premeditation to assess collective liability.
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Even absence of active participation doesn’t exempt members from vicarious liability if knowledge existed.
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J) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
i) Queen v. Sabid Ali (1873) 20 W.R. 5 Cr.
ii) Chikkarange Gowde v. State of Mysore, AIR 1956 SC 731
b. Important Statutes Referred
i) Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Sections 302, 149, 147, 148)
ii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Sections 87, 88)