Bibhuti Bhusan Chatterjee v. State of Bihar, 1960(1) SCR 935

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This landmark judgment, Bibhuti Bhusan Chatterjee v. State of Bihar, [1960(1) SCR 935] by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, settles a key interpretative dispute concerning the imposition of court fees on certified copies of criminal court orders submitted alongside criminal revision petitions under the Court Fees Act, 1870. The appellant contended that certified copies submitted to the High Court in criminal revision matters should be exempt from court fee requirements, arguing that such fees contradict the policy of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (applicable at that time), which ensures free access to certain case documents for the accused. The Hon’ble Court, however, ruled against this contention. The Bench clarified that Section 4 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, read with Article 9 of Schedule I, mandates the imposition of a fee on certified copies filed in judicial proceedings unless explicitly exempted. The Supreme Court upheld the consistent practice of the Patna High Court in levying such fees. The ruling further emphasized that legislative intent must prevail over equitable or policy arguments. This case stands out for its precise interpretation of a fiscal statute and for delineating the boundaries between procedural convenience and statutory compliance.

Keywords: Court Fees Act 1870, Article 9 Schedule I, Criminal Procedure Code, Judicial proceeding, Certified copy, Free document access, Criminal Revision, Section 4 Court Fees Act, Policy interpretation, Supreme Court of India

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Bibhuti Bhusan Chatterjee v. State of Bihar

ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 199 of 1957

iii) Judgement Date: October 6, 1959

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Hon’ble Mr. Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Subba Rao

vi) Author: Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar

vii) Citation: 1960(1) SCR 935

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case (if any): None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:

  • Procedural Law

  • Criminal Law

  • Fiscal Law

  • Interpretation of Statutes

  • Judicial Practice and Administration

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The dispute arose when the appellant, Bibhuti Bhusan Chatterjee, challenged the legality of the demand for court fees on certified copies filed along with a criminal revision application under Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The certified copies were filed in the High Court of Patna without affixing the required court fee stamps. The High Court ordered him to affix the requisite court fee based on prevailing practice and statutory requirement under Article 9 of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act, 1870. The appellant then obtained a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India, contending before the Supreme Court that no such fees were chargeable as per the legislative policy embedded in the criminal procedural laws, which prioritized free access to documents for accused persons.

The Supreme Court took this appeal as a test case to decide whether certified copies of criminal court orders attached to revision applications must bear court fee stamps. The decision rests on statutory construction principles, particularly on interpreting Article 9 of the Court Fees Act.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Proceedings were initially initiated against the appellant under Section 107 CrPC before the Magistrate at Bhagalpur. The Magistrate directed him to execute a bond of ₹5,000 with two sureties to maintain peace for a year. Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Additional Sessions Judge, who affirmed the Magistrate’s decision. Subsequently, the appellant filed a Criminal Revision in the High Court at Patna, submitting certified copies of the lower courts’ orders without court fee stamps.

The High Court’s Stamp Reporter raised objections and demanded payment of ₹52.75 and ₹50.75, respectively, for the two certified orders. The High Court upheld this demand, stating it was consistent with its longstanding practice and justified by the Court Fees Act, 1870. The appellant challenged this ruling by securing a certificate of appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether certified copies of criminal court orders filed with revision applications are chargeable under Article 9 of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act, 1870.

ii. Whether the legislative intent of the Criminal Procedure Code to provide free access to documents for accused persons overrides the statutory obligation to affix court fees under the Court Fees Act.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the Legislature, through various provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, ensures that accused persons receive necessary documents free of cost. Provisions like Sections 173(4), 207A(3), 210(2), 251A(1), 371(1), and 548 CrPC aim to safeguard the rights of the accused to free documentation. Therefore, requiring court fee payment on certified copies contradicts this policy.

They further contended that Article 9 of Schedule I should be liberally interpreted in favor of the litigant. They urged the Court to adopt a construction that avoids hardship for criminal defendants and aligns with the humanitarian and reformative objectives of the procedural law. The petitioner viewed the High Court’s practice as imposing a financial burden on accused persons seeking justice.

Additionally, the counsel argued that court fee provisions are fiscal impositions and must be construed strictly. No fee should be levied unless clearly mandated by law, citing the principle in James Paul Alexander v. James Arthur Edwards, I.L.R. 1953 T.C. 69, which did not favour such levies in absence of clarity.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the Court Fees Act, 1870, particularly Section 4 and Article 9 of Schedule I, explicitly impose court fee obligations for certified copies of judicial orders, even in criminal proceedings. They emphasized that once documents are to be filed before the court, Section 4 bars their admissibility without appropriate stamp duty.

They refuted the appellant’s claim that free document access under CrPC overrides court fee imposition. They contended that procedural policies of the CrPC cannot supersede express statutory mandates of the Court Fees Act. Equitable considerations or legislative policy theories should not overrule the clear language of fiscal statutes.

They supported the High Court’s prevailing practice, stating it has been consistently followed and legally justified under Article 9, and therefore not arbitrary or illegal.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 4, Court Fees Act, 1870 mandates that no document listed in the Schedule shall be accepted in any court without prescribed court fees.

ii. Article 9, Schedule I, Court Fees Act, 1870 applies to certified copies of judicial orders not otherwise provided for and mandates a charge per 360 words.

iii. Sections 173(4), 207A(3), 210(2), 251A(1), 371(1), and 548, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ensure that accused persons are entitled to free access to FIRs, judgments, charges, and related documents.

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Article 9 of Schedule I clearly mandates court fee imposition on certified copies of judicial orders filed in any criminal or civil proceeding unless otherwise exempted. The judgment clarified that legislative policy considerations in procedural laws (like CrPC) do not displace express provisions in fiscal laws. The Court Fees Act must be interpreted strictly, and the plain language of Article 9 cannot be ignored on hypothetical or equitable grounds.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i. The Court observed that while the Court Fee requirement may cause hardship to some accused persons, this concern cannot override express statutory language. It further suggested that such hardships, if any, must be addressed legislatively, not judicially. The Court cited the Madras Legislature’s amendment (Article 6-A) as an example of how specific local laws can moderate court fee burdens.

c. GUIDELINES 

  • Certified copies of criminal court orders must bear court fees as per Article 9 of Schedule I.

  • Legislative policy considerations from other enactments cannot override clear fiscal mandates.

  • Judicial practices consistently followed and based on correct statutory interpretations need not be disturbed.

  • State legislatures may amend laws (as done in Madras) to accommodate concerns regarding fee burdens.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This decision reaffirms the supremacy of statutory language in interpreting fiscal statutes, regardless of humanitarian or procedural policies. The Court emphasized that legislative clarity must prevail over equitable arguments. It reinforced the principle that judges cannot rewrite statutes to align with perceived fairness unless ambiguity exists. The case illustrates the constitutional boundaries of judicial interpretation when dealing with fiscal obligations, and also clarifies the interaction between criminal procedural policy and revenue legislation.

The Court’s reasoning is consistent with tax jurisprudence principles like in Coltness Iron Co. v. Black (1880–81) 6 AC 315, where it was held that fairness does not substitute for legislative clarity in tax matters. The call for legislative reform is tactfully balanced with the need to maintain consistency in judicial practice.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

  1. James Paul Alexander v. James Arthur Edwards, I.L.R. 1953 T.C. 69

  2. Coltness Iron Co. v. Black, (1880–81) 6 A.C. 315

b. Important Statutes Referred

  1. Court Fees Act, 1870 – Section 4, Article 9, Schedule I

  2. Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 – Sections 107, 173(4), 207A(3), 210(2), 251A(1), 371(1), 548

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