A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India clarified the scope of Section 2(wa) read with the proviso to Section 372, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) in Asian Paints Limited v. Ram Babu & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 2952 of 2025, by holding that a corporate entity whose intellectual property was counterfeited is a “victim” entitled to appeal against an acquittal without being the original complainant/informant, and without being constrained by Section 378 CrPC. The Court set aside the Rajasthan High Court’s dismissal of Asian Paints’ victim-appeal as non‑maintainable, emphasizing that the proviso to Section 372 is a stand‑alone, self‑contained right not subordinated to Section 378. It further held that the victim’s right of appeal attaches to any order of acquittal—whether by the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court—and, in the latter case, lies to the next higher forum in the judicial hierarchy, i.e., the High Court. The Bench relied on Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, and Mahabir v. State of Haryana, and invoked the U.N. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985) to reinforce a victim‑centric reading of appellate rights. The appeal was allowed; the High Court was directed to restore and decide Asian Paints’ victim-appeal on merits.

Keywords: Section 2(wa) CrPC; Proviso to Section 372 CrPC; Section 378 CrPC; victim’s right of appeal; counterfeit goods; intellectual property offences; corporate victim; Jagjeet Singh; Mallikarjun Kodagali; Mahabir; UN Victims’ Declaration.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The controversy was narrow yet recurring: whether a corporate proprietor of intellectual property injured by counterfeit/fake products qualifies as a “victim” under Section 2(wa) CrPC and, as such, may invoke the proviso to Section 372 CrPC to appeal against an acquittal—even when the acquittal arises for the first time before the First Appellate Court and even when the company was not the complainant/informant who lodged the FIR. The High Court at Jaipur had dismissed S.B. Criminal Appeal (SB) No. 2354/2022 as non‑maintainable, holding that the appeal under the proviso to Section 372 could not lie against an appellate acquittal and, in any event, that Asian Paints was neither the complainant nor treated as victim by the Trial Court. The Supreme Court reversed this, treating Section 372 as a self‑contained, stand‑alone grant of right to victims that is not regulated by Section 378; the latter, with its leave regime, applies to State/complainant appeals but does not dilute the statutory right newly conferred on victims by the 2009 amendment. The Bench underlined that the right accrues on the factum of acquittal itself, regardless of whether it is by the Trial Court or by the First Appellate Court; where the acquittal first emerges in appeal, the victim’s appeal lies to the next higher court, i.e., the High Court. In rooting this outcome, the Court relied on Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra for the expansive participatory rights of victims throughout proceedings, Mallikarjun Kodagali for the maintainability of victim appeals and the contrast between Section 372 and Section 378(4), and Mahabir for treating the proviso as a substantive creation of rights to avoid distortion of the justice system.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Asian Paints Limited, a public limited company headquartered in Mumbai and engaged in the paint business for around 73 years, authorized M/s Solution through a Power of Attorney to safeguard its IPR and take enforcement steps, including under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Copyright Act, 1957. M/s Solution deputed Pankaj Kumar Singh as field operative. On 06.02.2016, he reported to Tunga Police Station that counterfeit Asian Paints buckets were kept at Ganpati Traders, run by Ram Babu. The police accompanied him, checked the shop, and found 12 buckets bearing marks akin to Asian Paints: 4 Ace Emulsion 20L, 4 Ace Emulsion 10L, and 4 Tractor Emulsion 10L. The buckets allegedly lacked the company’s bottom mark. Genuine samples were provided for comparison. FIR No. 30/2016 was registered u/ss. 420/120B IPC and ss. 63/65 Copyright Act. The FSL report (28.07.2016) recorded a mismatch in size, spacing, and design of characters. The Trial Court (03.10.2019) convicted the accused under s. 420 IPC and ss. 63 & 65 Copyright Act with sentences of 3 years SI + fine (s. 420 IPC), 2 years SI + fine (s. 63), and 1 year SI + fine (s. 65). On the accused’s Criminal Appeal No. 1657/2019 under s. 374 CrPC, the First Appellate Court (16.02.2022) set aside the conviction and acquitted him. Asian Paints then preferred S.B. Criminal Appeal (SB) No. 2354/2022 under the proviso to s. 372 CrPC before the High Court, which held the appeal not maintainable. In the First Appellate proceedings, an order dated 10.02.2022 recorded that, with consent, the complainant’s counsel was heard to assist the APP. The Supreme Court granted leave and examined whether Asian Paints is a “victim” and whether s. 372 proviso permits an appeal from an appellate acquittal to the High Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED 

i) Whether a company suffering reputational and financial injury from counterfeiting qualifies as a “person” and hence a “victim” under Section 2(wa) CrPC, warranting standing to appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC?
ii) Whether the proviso to Section 372 CrPC confers a stand‑alone right enabling a victim to appeal against an acquittal of the First Appellate Court to the next higher forum, and is the proviso unaffected by the leave requirements of Section 378 CrPC?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the text of Section 2(wa) CrPC is plain; a “person” includes a company by virtue of Section 11 IPC; hence Asian Paints is a victim that suffered reputational and financial loss due to the counterfeit trade in its brand, especially as the FIR was predominantly under ss. 63/65 Copyright Act safeguarding its proprietary interests. They emphasized that victim participation and appellate locus are distinct from complainant/informant status, relying on Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra where the Court declared: “A ‘victim’ within the meaning of CrPC cannot be asked to await the commencement of trial… Such a ‘victim’ has unbridled participatory rights… ‘victim’ and ‘complainant/informant’ are two distinct connotations…”. They pressed that the proviso to Section 372 is an enabling, standalone provision that allows a victim to appeal against any order of acquittal, including one passed by the First Appellate Court; read thus, Section 372 is not constrained by Section 378, and revisional recourse u/ss. 397/401 CrPC is neither adequate nor apt given s. 401(3)’s bar on conversion of acquittal to conviction. Mallikarjun Kodagali was invoked to contrast Section 372 proviso with Section 378(4) and to affirm that the victim’s appeal lies to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against conviction.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is guided by Section 374 CrPC because the proviso identifies the forum with reference to where an appeal “ordinarily lies against conviction”. They argued that Section 374 contains no provision for appealing against an order passed in appeal by the First Appellate Court; hence a victim cannot leverage Section 372 to file a Second Appellate appeal. They also submitted that the State had not appealed the acquittal, and that Pankaj Kumar Singh—the investigator from M/s Solution—was neither an employee nor an authorised agent of Asian Paints; thus, the company lacked locus under Section 2(wa). Furthermore, they stressed that the impleadment application was practically rejected, with the company allowed only to assist the prosecution; the absence of a challenge to that order should defeat maintainability. The State urged that, if at all, the proper route was special leave under Section 378(4) CrPC or revision under Sections 397/401 CrPC.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i) Section 2(wa) CrPC (definition of “victim”)—“person who has suffered any loss or injury…”; includes guardian or legal heir.
ii) Proviso to Section 372 CrPC—victim’s right to prefer an appeal against acquittal/conviction for lesser offence/inadequate compensation to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against conviction.
iii) Sections 374 & 378 CrPC—appeals from convictions; appeal in case of acquittal with leave restrictions; contrasted by the Court with the stand‑alone nature of the proviso to s. 372.
iv) Sections 120B & 420 IPC; Sections 63 & 65 Copyright Act, 1957—substantive offences forming the substratum of the FIR and trial.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court held that Asian Paints is a victim within Section 2(wa) because the counterfeit activity directly injured its reputational and financial interests; the Court highlighted that the definition uses plain and expansive language, not a narrow or restricted meaning. In construing Section 372 vis‑à‑vis Section 378, the Court characterized Section 372 proviso as a self‑contained, stand‑alone grant of right to victims that should not be read conjointly with Section 378; to do so would “completely negate” the proviso. It rejected the High Court’s view that only the person who actually filed the written complaint can be a victim, reiterating that under Jagjeet Singh, victim and complainant/informant are distinct. The Court noted the procedural history: although no formal order allowed impleadment before the First Appellate Court, the order dated 10.02.2022 recorded that the complainant was heard with consent—an aspect erroneously appreciated by the High Court. On forum, the Court held that the victim’s right to appeal accrues upon acquittal, irrespective of whether it occurs at trial or in the first appeal; where the first acquittal occurs in appeal before a Sessions Court, the victim’s appeal lies to the High Court, the next higher level. Relying on Mallikarjun Kodagali, the Bench referenced the U.N. Victims’ Declaration (1985) to support a victim‑centric, liberal construction; Mahabir was cited to show that the proviso is a substantive enactment creating an enforceable right as a matter of text and object. Consequently, the impugned High Court order was set aside, and the victim‑appeal was restored to file with directions for expeditious hearing.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The controlling ratio is twofold and grounded in statutory text. First, Section 2(wa) CrPC defines victim broadly. A company is a “person” (by Section 11 IPC), and where counterfeiting of its branded goods occurs, the loss or injury—reputational and financial—is suffered by the company; hence, it squarely qualifies as victim. The High Court’s insistence that only the author of the written complaint can be a victim conflates complainant with victim, which Jagjeet Singh disapproved: the two roles are distinct, and a victim need not be the informant. Second, the proviso to Section 372 is a stand‑alone right that is not regulated by Section 378. The statutory trigger is “any order… acquitting the accused”; the proviso is agnostic to whether the acquittal is by the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court. The proper forum flows from the clause “such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court”; thus, when the first acquittal occurs before a Sessions Court sitting in appeal, the victim’s appeal lies to the High Court as the next tier. A contrary reading would negate the victim’s right and re‑subject it to the leave constraints of Section 378, impermissibly diluting the 2009 amendment’s objective. The ratio integrates Mallikarjun Kodagali’s articulation of the victim’s appellate entitlement and its contrast with Section 378(4)—further reinforced by the U.N. Victims’ Declaration, read as a contextual aid toward a liberal, progressive construction.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court’s observations on procedural participation and case‑management assume obiter character but carry persuasive weight. The Bench observed that mischaracterizing the 10.02.2022 order as a rejection of impleadment overlooks that the complainant was in fact heard; while “nothing much turns on this,” the point underscores a pragmatic approach to victim participation at appellate stages—consistent with Jagjeet Singh’s emphasis on the victim’s continuous right to be heard from investigation through appeal/revision. The Court also provided a clarificatory framework that the victim’s appeal right is not restricted by other provisions in Chapter XXIX, signaling an approach that decouples victim rights from State‑controlled appeals. Additionally, the reliance on the U.N. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985), including the passages about access to justice, timely redress, information rights, privacy/safety, and minimizing delay, functions as a broad policy lodestar encouraging victim‑sensitive criminal process. Though not dispositive to the forum question, these reflections forecast an institutional preference for expeditious scheduling and for keeping victims informed and heard at appropriate stages. Finally, by restoring the matter and confining its decision to the questions of law, the Court hinted that all defences on facts and law remain open on remand, thereby preserving adversarial balance while fortifying victim standing.

c. GUIDELINES

i) Victim status is injury‑centric, not complainant‑centric: Courts should identify victims by reference to loss or injury suffered from the offence; corporate entities may be victims where counterfeit or deception harms their reputation or finances. Section 2(wa) CrPC must receive an expansive construction.
ii) Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is stand‑alone: The victim’s appellate right is not regulated by Section 378 and should not be read conjointly with any other provision in Chapter XXIX; the proviso’s text governs.
iii) Forum determination follows the “ordinarily lies” clause: If the first acquittal occurs in an appeal before a Sessions Court, the victim’s appeal lies to the High Court as the next forum; if the Trial Court (Sessions) had acquitted, High Court could have been the first appellate court; neutrality to acquittal stage is integral.
iv) Victim ≠ complainant/informant: Courts must avoid conflating roles; per Jagjeet Singh, a victim need not be the informant, and vice versa; participatory rights endure across stages.
v) International victim‑rights norms as interpretive aids: The U.N. Victims’ Declaration (1985) may guide courts toward a liberal, progressive reading that enhances access, information rights, privacy/safety, and expedition.
vi) Remand protocol with expedition: On setting aside non‑maintainability orders, High Courts should restore the victim’s appeal to its original file and number and list expeditiously, preserving the accused’s full defences on merits.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision cements a victim‑centric appellate architecture envisioned by the 2009 amendment to Section 372 CrPC. By detaching the proviso from the leave fetters of Section 378, the Court rescued the statutory purpose: victims are the worst sufferers and must not be relegated to the margins of criminal process. For corporate victims of counterfeiting and IP crime, the ruling is pivotal: injury to brand reputation and financial interests suffices to trigger victim status and the right to appeal—even where the complaint was authored by an agent/investigator and even where acquittal first surfaces in appellate proceedings. The forum calculus is now clear: the appeal lies to the next higher court in the hierarchy. The Court’s use of Jagjeet Singh and Mallikarjun Kodagali consolidates doctrinal continuity; Mahabir supplies a textual‑purpose justification that the proviso is a substantive enactment creating enforceable rights. The allusion to the U.N. Victims’ Declaration aligns domestic law with international victimology principles, encouraging speedy, information‑rich, and safety‑conscious procedures. Practically, prosecutors and IP right‑holders should structure enforcement with clear documentation of injury, and High Courts should prioritize listing of restored victim‑appeals to avoid prejudice. The judgment’s careful caveat—decision confined to questions of law and defences on merits kept open—maintains procedural fairness while strengthening victim participation.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i) Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra alias Monu, (2022) 9 SCC 321 — quoted for victim’s participatory rights and distinction between victim and complainant/informant. “A ‘victim’… has unbridled participatory rights… ‘victim’ and ‘complainant/informant’ are two distinct connotations…”
ii) Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752 — relied on for liberal, victim‑friendly interpretation of proviso to Section 372 CrPC and contrast with Section 378(4) CrPC; includes reliance on the U.N. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985).
iii) Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 184 — cited for the proposition that the proviso is a substantive enactment conferring a right on victims as a matter of text and purpose.

b. Important Statutes Referred
i) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Section 2(wa); proviso to Section 372; Sections 374 & 378.
ii) Indian Penal Code, 1860—Sections 120B & 420.
iii) Copyright Act, 1957—Sections 63 & 65.
iv) Trade Marks Act, 1999—contextual enforcement authority referenced through PoA and investigative mandate.