A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE 

In M/s Balaji Traders v. State of U.P. & Anr., the Supreme Court clarifies the architecture of Chapter XVII, Indian Penal Code, 1860 on extortion. It separates the completed offence under ss.383/384 and aggravated completion under s.386/388 from inchoate process crimes under ss.385/387/389. The Court holds that s.387 IPC punishes the act of putting or attempting to put any person in fear of death or grievous hurt in order to commit extortion, irrespective of delivery of property. Delivery is not a sine qua non for s.387. The Allahabad High Court had quashed a s.387 summoning order on the premise that, as no property was delivered, no extortion u/s.383 was made out and hence s.387 could not stand. Correcting this, the Supreme Court reinstates proceedings, identifying two pleaded essentials: threat at gunpoint creating fear of death and purpose of coercing payment of ₹5 lakhs per month. On quashing jurisprudence, the Court re-affirms that s.482 CrPC power is exceptional and must be used sparingly per State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, Neeharika Infrastructure, and B.N. John. The ratio: s.387 is an aggravated process offence akin to s.385, not an aggravated completion offence like s.386; thus, non-delivery does not defeat s.387.

Keywords: Extortion; s.387 IPC; fear of death or grievous hurt; delivery of property not required; quashing u/s.482 CrPC.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT 

The dispute turns on whether s.387 IPC requires a completed extortion u/s.383, or whether the prosecution lies where the accused puts or attempts to put a person in fear of death or grievous hurt in order to commit extortion, even if nothing is delivered. The background facts show a commercial acrimony over betel nut business and trademark/copyright disputes between the complainant’s firm M/s Balaji Traders and the accused’s enterprise of the same name. On 22 May 2022, the complainant alleges that the accused, with three armed associates carrying rifles, stopped him, threatened closure of his business, and demanded ₹5 lakhs per month to permit continuation. Upon refusal, they assaulted and attempted to kidnap him. After the police did not register an FIR, the complainant instituted a complaint u/s.200 CrPC. The Trial Court found a prima facie case under s.387 IPC and issued process. The accused invoked s.482 CrPC seeking quashing, and the High Court quashed, reasoning that as no property was delivered, the essential ingredient of extortion u/s.383 was absent; therefore, s.387 could not survive. The present criminal appeal by the complainant assails that approach. The Supreme Court, after setting out the statutory scheme of ss.383–389 IPC, places s.387 with s.385 as process crimes that criminalize putting a person in fear in order to commit extortion, distinct from s.386/388, which deal with completed extortion with aggravation. Under this framework, the High Court’s premise collapses: s.387 does not hinge on delivery of property. The Court also revisits quashing principles, emphasizing the sparingly used nature of inherent powers, and restores the complaint to the Trial Court.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE 

The complainant Prof. Manoj Kumar Agrawal, proprietor of M/s Balaji Traders engaged in the betel nut leaves trade, alleges that the accused Sanjay Gupta began operating with the same business name, leading to ongoing trademark and copyright litigation. On 22.05.2022, while the complainant was en route home, the accused with three unidentified men—each allegedly armed with rifles—intercepted him. The group threatened that he must shut the betel nut business, or alternately pay ₹5 lakhs per month to continue operations. Upon the complainant’s refusal, they allegedly beat him and attempted to kidnap him. The complainant claims that his effort to lodge an FIR failed; he then filed a complaint under s.200 CrPC. The Trial Court assessed the complainant’s statement and witnesses, found a prima facie case under s.387 IPC, and issued summons. The accused approached the High Court u/s.482 CrPC, arguing that in the absence of delivery of money or property, the essential element of extortion is missing. The High Court accepted that contention, holding that since s.383 IPC elements were not satisfied, s.387 IPC could not be invoked, and thus quashed the summoning order and the complaint proceedings (Complaint Case No.58 of 2022). The complainant appealed, urging that s.387 IPC only requires proof of putting or attempting to put a person in fear of death or grievous hurt in order to commit extortion, and not actual delivery. The Supreme Court takes cognizance of the statutory text and precedent and ultimately sets aside the High Court’s quashing order, restoring the proceedings and scheduling appearance before the Trial Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether, for an offence under s.387 IPC, the prosecution must prove actual delivery of property as required by s.383 IPC?
ii. Whether the High Court correctly exercised jurisdiction u/s.482 CrPC to quash the summoning order when the complaint disclosed fear of death and a coercive demand?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the Trial Court rightly issued process u/s.387 IPC because the complaint and statements disclose the twin essentials: putting the complainant in fear of death by pointing a gun and doing so in order to coerce delivery of ₹5 lakhs per month. They emphasized that s.387 is framed as a process offence that penalizes the act of putting or attempting to put in fear, not the completed extortion; hence, delivery of property is not required. In support, counsel relied on the internal statutory structure: s.385/s.387/s.389 all use the phrase “in order to commit extortion”, marking a preparatory or inchoate step; whereas s.386/s.388 penalize completed extortion with aggravation. They urged that the High Court’s conflation of s.387 with s.383 is legally unsustainable. They also invoked R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay to restate the ingredients of s.383 and contrasted them with s.387. They cited Radha Ballabh v. State of U.P., Gursharan Singh v. State of Punjab, and Somasundaram v. State to demonstrate convictions u/s.387 even where no money changed hands, reinforcing that delivery is not sine qua non. On the quashing standard, counsel pressed the Bhajan Lal categories and Neeharika Infrastructure to argue that the complaint, on its face, disclosed cognizable offences, and thus quashing was impermissible.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that delivery is an essential ingredient of extortion, and absent delivery, no offence under s.383 exists; consequently, s.387, being aggravated extortion, could not stand. They relied on Dhananjay @ Dhandhanjay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar and invoked strict construction of penal statutes, drawing on Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay, Motibhai Fulabhai Patel & Co. v. R. Prasad, and Dilip Kumar Sharma v. State of M.P., to resist any reading that would stretch the language of s.387 to cover mere threats without delivery. The respondents also alleged mala fides, contending that the complaint is a counterblast to the respondent’s IPR enforcement, and that criminal process ought not be an instrument of harassment, invoking State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal. They urged that the High Court lawfully exercised s.482 CrPC power to prevent abuse of process given the civil overlay from trademark/copyright disputes and the asserted lack of extortion’s core ingredient.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. s.383 IPC (definition of extortion) and s.384 IPC (punishment).
ii. s.385 IPC and s.387 IPC (process offences—putting or attempting to put in fear in order to commit extortion, with s.387 aggravated by fear of death/grievous hurt).
iii. s.386 IPC and s.388 IPC (aggravated completed extortion).
iv. s.389 IPC (putting in fear of accusation in order to commit extortion).
v. s.200 CrPC (complaint procedure); s.482 CrPC (inherent powers and quashing).

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court delineates a careful taxonomy of extortion offences. It underscores that s.383 defines the completed offence: intentional putting in fear of injury coupled with dishonest inducement leading to delivery of property or valuable security. The essentials as restated from R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay remain binding. But the Court then contrasts s.387: the text criminalizes putting or attempting to put in fear of death or grievous hurt in order to commit extortion, and thus operates earlier in the causal chain. It is an aggravated process provision akin to s.385 and structurally distinct from s.386, which punishes completed extortion with the aggravating element of fear of death or grievous hurt as the means by which delivery was achieved. On this reading, delivery is not required for s.387. The Court supports the reading by dictionary definitions of the phrase “in order to” as denoting purpose and a stage toward commission. Precedent reinforces the point: Radha Ballabh and Gursharan Singh recognize s.387 convictions even absent payment; Somasundaram treats s.387 as a heightened form triggered by fear of death/grievous hurt. Turning to quashing, the Court reiterates Bhajan Lal’s categories, Neeharika Infrastructure’s restraint, and B.N. John’s restatement that quashing is for the rarest of rare and not an ordinary remedy when the FIR/complaint discloses a cognizable offence. Applying the law, the complaint alleges that on 22.05.2022, the accused with armed associates pointed a gun, created fear of death, and coerced a ₹5-lakh-per-month demand. Those allegations, if taken at face value, satisfy the two essentials of s.387: fear of death/grievous hurt and purpose of committing extortion. Hence, the High Court’s insistence on delivery misassigned an element of s.383 to s.387. The Supreme Court therefore sets aside the quashing order and restores the complaint for trial.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI 

The ratio is two-fold. First, textual and structural interpretation of ss.383–389 IPC yields that s.387 IPC is a process offence punishing putting or attempting to put a person in fear of death or grievous hurt in order to commit extortion. It does not import the delivery requirement from s.383. The architecture divides completion (s.383/384; s.386/388) from preparatory/inchoate purpose crimes (s.385/387/389). The phrase “in order to” connotes purpose and proximate preparatory conduct, not consummation. Therefore, delivery of property is not necessary to constitute an offence u/s.387. Secondly, applying quashing doctrine, when the complaint/FIR discloses prima facie the ingredients of the offence—here, fear of death at gunpoint and coercive demand of ₹5 lakhs per month—the High Court must refrain from quashing under s.482 CrPC, as such power is exceptional and to be exercised sparingly. The High Court’s approach—conditioning s.387 on s.383’s element of delivery—errs in law by assigning essential ingredients across distinct offences with distinct punishments. Consequently, the Supreme Court sets aside the quashing and restores the proceedings, making it clear that allegations of counterblast or civil overlay do not, by themselves, justify quashing when the statutory elements are prima facie met.

b. OBITER DICTA 

While the core holding turns on s.387’s independence from delivery, the Court’s reiteration of strict interpretation of penal statutes functions as persuasive guidance for future cases. The judgment reviews Tolaram Relumal, M. Narayanan Nambiar, Dilip Kumar Sharma, and R. Kalyani, not to dilute s.387, but to emphasize that courts must not stretch penal language, nor read in elements the Legislature did not enact. The obiter confirms that once the thing charged falls within both the words and the spirit of the enactment, a penal statute is to be construed according to its fair, common-sense meaning. This approach explains why the Court refuses to graft delivery into s.387: the words and structure do not support such grafting. Further, the Court’s restatement of Neeharika Infrastructure—that quashing is to be rare and exceptional, and that courts should not weigh evidence on merits at the s.482 stage—serves as guidance beyond s.387 cases, re-anchoring High Courts to prima facie disclosure tests and institutional restraint. The discussion that allegations of counterblast or civil disputes cannot, ipso facto, extinguish criminal process when statutory ingredients are pleaded, also carries generalizable value. Read together, these strands advise that penal text controls, process crimes are real crimes, and inherent powers are not proxies for trial.

c. GUIDELINES

i. For offences under s.387 IPC, courts should test for two essentials only: (a) putting or attempting to put a person in fear of death or grievous hurt; and (b) doing so in order to commit extortion. Delivery of property is not required.

ii. In construing Chapter XVII, maintain the act/process distinction: ss.386/388 address completed extortion with aggravation; ss.385/387/389 criminalize purpose-driven fear creation before completion. Do not transpose elements across these classes.

iii. Quashing under s.482 CrPC must be sparingly exercised: If the complaint/FIR, taken at face value, discloses the ingredients of an offence, courts must allow investigation/trial to proceed and avoid merits adjudication. Apply Bhajan Lal categories and Neeharika Infrastructure with institutional restraint.

iv. Strict interpretation governs penal statutes, but strictness is not license to dilute text: Courts should neither stretch language to impose liability nor import conditions not present. Equally, where words and purpose align, give effect to the fair, common-sense meaning.

v. Allegations of civil overlay or counterblast are not a stand-alone ground for quashing: Where the pleaded criminal ingredients are present, such collateral considerations cannot preempt a trial.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment meaningfully clarifies s.387 IPC and re-centers criminal process on statutory elements. By pronouncing that delivery is not integral to s.387, it closes a recurrent misconception that had allowed accused persons to seek quashing whenever no money changed hands. The Court reads Chapter XVII cohesively: s.385/387/389 punish the purpose-laden infliction of fear, preserving societal condemnation of violent coercion even before property is obtained. That reading aligns with the language, the structure, and the mischief the Legislature targeted. On procedure, the verdict also restrains expansive use of s.482 CrPC, insisting on the discipline that where ingredients are pleaded, trial should proceed. The facts alleged here—gunpoint threat, group intimidation, ₹5-lakh-per-month demand, assault, attempted kidnapping, the failure of FIR, and the complaint u/s.200 CrPC—squarely fit the s.387 matrix because the fear of death is alleged and the purpose of extortion is specified. The Court’s reliance on Radha Ballabh, Gursharan Singh, and Somasundaram situates the present case within stable doctrine that recognizes s.387 liability even without delivery. For trial courts and High Courts, the judgment serves both as interpretive lodestar and procedural reminder: do not blend offences, do not import alien elements, and do not quash when pleadings meet the prima facie threshold. Practically, it fortifies protection for business owners and citizens against firearm-backed coercion, while preserving the accused’s protections at trial where proof will be tested.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1986) 2 SCC 716 (ingredients of s.383 IPC) (quoted).
ii. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335 (s.482 CrPC categories) (reiterated through B.N. John).
iii. Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401 (quashing is rarest of rare).
iv. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 (principles of quashing extracted).
v. Radha Ballabh v. State of U.P., (1995) Supp. 3 SCC 119 (s.387 conviction despite no ransom paid).
vi. Gursharan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1996) 10 SCC 190 (s.387 upheld without payment).
vii. Somasundaram v. State, (2020) 7 SCC 722 (s.387 as heightened form; no delivery required).
viii. Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay, (1954) 1 SCC 961 (strict construction of penal statutes).
ix. M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 85 (penal construction principles).
x. R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta, (2009) 1 SCC 516 (strict construction; criminal procedure).
xi. Dhananjay @ Dhandhanjay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2007) 14 SCC 768 (distinguished; concerned s.384).

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Indian Penal Code, 1860, ss.383–389 (extortion and cognate offences).
ii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s.200 (complaints to Magistrate) and s.482 (inherent powers; quashing).