A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The case revolves around the constitutional guarantee under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India concerning the right of an arrested person to be informed of the grounds of arrest. The appellant, Kasireddy Upender Reddy, challenged the arrest of his son, Kessireddy Raja Shekhar Reddy, by the Andhra Pradesh CID, arguing that the arrest was per se illegal as the grounds provided were vague, incomplete, and non-compliant with the requirements of Article 22 and Sections 47 and 48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).

The Supreme Court analyzed the scope of constitutional safeguards and relied heavily on Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana (2025) and earlier precedents like State of Bombay v. Atma Ram (1951) and Christie v. Leachinsky (1947 AC 573) to affirm that while informing the arrestee of the grounds of arrest is mandatory, the sufficiency test lies in whether the communication enables the accused to understand the allegations and prepare legal recourse. The Court found that in the instant case, the CID did provide meaningful grounds of arrest detailing the conspiracy and economic offences involving wrongful gain of over Rs. 3,200 crores, thereby satisfying constitutional and statutory requirements.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Court upheld the High Court’s decision that the arrest was not illegal. The judgment reaffirms that while constitutional safeguards must be rigorously followed, meaningful disclosure of facts constituting the offence is sufficient to meet the mandate of Article 22.

Keywords: Article 22(1), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, Habeas Corpus, Grounds of Arrest, Vihaan Kumar Case, Constitutional Safeguards, Wrongful Detention, Prevention of Corruption Act, CrPC Section 41.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The present case arose in the backdrop of allegations of a massive liquor excise scam in Andhra Pradesh, wherein the CID alleged conspiracy, cheating, criminal breach of trust, and corruption amounting to wrongful gain exceeding ₹3200 crores. The appellant’s son, Kessireddy Raja Shekhar Reddy, an IT advisor, was implicated as the key conspirator. He was arrested on 21 April 2025 under Sections 420, 409, 120-B IPC (corresponding provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023).

The arrest was challenged by the appellant before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh through a writ of habeas corpus, contending that (i) his son was initially treated as a witness under Section 179 BNSS but later abruptly made an accused through a case diary entry without public disclosure, (ii) the arrest lacked proper sanction under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and (iii) the grounds of arrest were vague, containing only offence sections without factual particulars.

The High Court rejected the habeas corpus petition, holding that the accused was duly served with the grounds of arrest, notices under Sections 47 and 48 BNSS, and the remand report, all of which satisfied constitutional requirements.

Aggrieved, the appellant moved the Supreme Court. The apex court examined whether the arrest was illegal for want of appropriate and meaningful grounds of arrest, thereby violating Article 22(1) and Article 21.

The Court juxtaposed the factual matrix against its earlier ruling in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana (2025 SCC OnLine SC 269), where failure to provide grounds of arrest was held unconstitutional. The Court clarified that unlike Vihaan Kumar, in the present case grounds were indeed supplied and were sufficiently detailed to convey the basis of allegations.

The case thus raised an important question on the extent and sufficiency of compliance required under Article 22(1) and statutory provisions of BNSS and CrPC.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

• A complaint regarding manipulation in liquor procurement was lodged by the Principal Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh, citing wrongful loss to the state exchequer. Based on the committee’s inquiry, FIR No. 21 of 2024 was registered under Sections 420, 409, 120-B IPC.

• The appellant’s son, Kessireddy Raja Shekhar Reddy, was initially served notices under Section 179 BNSS as a witness. On 19 April 2025, he was made Accused No. 1 through an entry in the case diary.

• On 21 April 2025, while returning from Goa and landing at Hyderabad Airport, he was arrested at 6 PM by CID. At the time of arrest, the grounds were supplied to him in writing and later to his father.

• He was produced before the Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases, Vijayawada, within 24 hours, on 22 April 2025. The remand was granted under Section 187 BNSS, and he was lodged in judicial custody.

• Grounds of arrest detailed his alleged role in organizing a kickback-driven liquor trade, suppression of popular brands, manipulation of procurement orders, floating shell companies, channeling proceeds into real estate and industries, and wrongful gain of over ₹3200 crores.

• The appellant challenged the arrest before the High Court under Article 226 seeking habeas corpus, contending that grounds lacked material particulars and were served belatedly through a remand report. The High Court dismissed the petition.

• The Supreme Court was approached in appeal to determine the legality of the arrest. 

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the arrest of Kessireddy Raja Shekhar Reddy was per se illegal for want of supply of appropriate and meaningful grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Sections 47–48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023?

ii) Whether the belated service of a remand report containing additional offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 amounted to violation of the constitutional mandate of furnishing grounds “as soon as may be” under Article 22(1)?

iii) Whether the inclusion of the appellant’s son as an accused via case diary entry without prior public disclosure through FIR violated the procedural fairness implicit in Article 21 and the doctrine of natural justice?

iv) Whether the arrest and subsequent remand were vitiated due to the absence of sanction under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in respect of the appellant’s son?

v) Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the habeas corpus petition by equating service of the remand report with sufficient compliance of Article 22 and BNSS provisions?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the petitioner, led by Senior Advocate Mahesh Jethmalani, contended that the arrest was mala fide, illegal, and violative of constitutional and statutory guarantees.

Firstly, it was argued that the appellant’s son had been treated as a witness under Section 179 BNSS until 21 April 2025, when he voluntarily intimated his willingness to appear before the Investigating Officer. Despite this, he was arrested at Hyderabad Airport without any prior intimation of his changed status to an accused. Reliance was placed on Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260, where the Supreme Court held that arrest cannot be mechanical and must be justified by necessity. Here, the conversion from witness to accused via a private case diary entry, undisclosed until after his arrest, was argued to be arbitrary and violative of Article 21.

Secondly, the appellant’s counsel argued that the grounds of arrest served on 21 April 2025 were vague, merely listing Sections 409 and 420 IPC without disclosing factual particulars like the entrustment of property, deception, inducement, or loss caused. It was submitted that the Supreme Court in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254, emphasized that grounds must enable the arrestee to understand and challenge the allegations meaningfully. By failing to include ingredients of the offences, the grounds became an eyewash, violating Article 22(1).

Thirdly, it was argued that the remand report dated 22 April 2025 introduced Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 offences (Sections 7, 7A, 8, 13(1)(b), 13(2)) which were not mentioned in the original arrest memo. Under Section 47 BNSS, grounds must be communicated “forthwith”, and under Article 22, “as soon as may be.” Reliance was placed on Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269, where the Court held that failure to promptly communicate grounds renders arrest unconstitutional. The delayed inclusion of corruption offences was therefore argued to be a violation of both Article 22 and Section 47 BNSS.

Fourthly, the appellant argued that sanction under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was mandatory before proceeding against any public servant. Though sanction was sought against a co-accused, Dodda Venkat Satya Prasad, no sanction existed against the appellant’s son. Reliance was placed on Nair Service Society v. State of Kerala, (2007) 4 SCC 1, and Ministry of Personnel SOP dated 17 September 2021, which required separate sanction for each public servant. Therefore, invocation of PC Act offences was illegal and vitiated the arrest.

Finally, mala fides were alleged, as mediators were present during interrogation, and pressure was exerted to implicate former Chief Minister Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy. The refusal to sign the confession indicated coercion. Reliance was placed on D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416, which laid down custodial safeguards. It was argued that the arrest was politically motivated, lacking bona fide investigative purpose.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondent–State, led by Senior Advocate Sidharth Luthra, argued that the arrest was lawful, justified, and in compliance with constitutional safeguards.

Firstly, the State contended that Crime No. 21 of 2024 was registered on 23 September 2024, and by 19 April 2025, the appellant’s son was already made Accused No. 1 by a valid entry in the case diary. The arrest on 21 April 2025 was thus not abrupt or illegal. Reliance was placed on State of U.P. v. Abdul Samad, AIR 1962 SC 1506, and Chaganti Satyanarayan v. State of A.P., (1986) 3 SCC 141, to emphasize that entries in investigation records constitute valid evidence of procedural compliance.

Secondly, the State submitted that the grounds of arrest were supplied in writing both to the accused and to his father, explicitly stating his role in orchestrating a ₹3200 crore liquor scam. This included suppression of popular liquor brands, promotion of favoured suppliers, creation of shell companies, and channeling kickbacks. Such particulars went beyond mere citation of sections and satisfied the test in Vihaan Kumar, which required communication of “sufficient knowledge of the basic facts.”

Thirdly, on the issue of the remand report, it was argued that additional charges under the PC Act, 1988 were introduced once sanction under Section 17A was obtained in respect of a co-accused. Since the appellant’s son was not a public servant but only an IT Advisor, sanction was not necessary for him. Reliance was placed on Gautam Navlakha v. NIA, (2022) 13 SCC 542, where the Supreme Court held that sanction requirements apply strictly to public servants acting in official capacity, not to private individuals or advisors.

Fourthly, the State argued that all procedural safeguards were followed. The accused was produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours as mandated under Article 22(2) and Section 187 BNSS. He acknowledged receipt of the remand report, signed it, and admitted in court that he was not ill-treated. Thus, habeas corpus relief was unavailable since custody was under valid judicial remand. Reliance was placed on Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling, (1973) 2 SCC 674, where the Court held that habeas corpus cannot be granted if detention is by a valid judicial order.

Finally, the State dismissed allegations of mala fide political motivation as speculative. The Court was urged to focus on legal compliance rather than political conjecture.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Article 21, Constitution of India – Protection of life and personal liberty.

ii) Article 22(1) & (2), Constitution of India – Right to be informed of grounds of arrest and produced before Magistrate within 24 hours.

iii) Section 35 BNSS, 2023 – Arrest without warrant.

iv) Section 47 BNSS, 2023 – Obligation to communicate full particulars of offence forthwith.

v) Section 48 BNSS, 2023 – Duty to inform relatives of arrest.

vi) Section 187 BNSS, 2023 (formerly Section 167 CrPC) – Remand procedure.

vii) Section 41(1) CrPC, 1973 – Grounds for arrest without warrant.

viii) Sections 7, 7A, 8, 13(1)(b), 13(2) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

ix) Section 17A, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sanction for inquiry/investigation against public servants.

I) JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice J.B. Pardiwala with Justice R. Mahadevan concurring, dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court’s ruling. The Court examined the constitutional mandate under Article 22(1), statutory safeguards under BNSS, and precedents such as Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana (2025), State of Bombay v. Atma Ram (1951), and Christie v. Leachinsky (1947 AC 573). It concluded that while informing the arrestee of the grounds of arrest is a mandatory safeguard, in this case, the CID had indeed furnished sufficient factual particulars to enable the accused to understand the allegations and prepare legal recourse.

The Court held that the arrest of Kessireddy Raja Shekhar Reddy was not illegal, as:

1. Grounds of arrest were served in writing at the time of arrest and again upon his father.

2. The remand report was also served before remand proceedings, satisfying both constitutional and statutory requirements.

3. The grounds were not vague or a mere formality but contained specific allegations of conspiracy, manipulation of liquor procurement, coercion of industry players, floating of shell companies, and wrongful gain exceeding ₹3200 crores.

4. Habeas corpus was not maintainable once judicial custody commenced under valid remand orders (Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling, 1973).

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio decidendi of the case is that the constitutional requirement under Article 22(1) to inform an arrestee of the grounds of arrest is satisfied if the arresting authority provides meaningful, sufficient, and precise factual particulars of the alleged offence at the time of arrest, or contemporaneously through supporting documents such as arrest memos and remand reports, in a language the arrestee understands.

The Court clarified that:

• The “grounds of arrest” must not be an empty ritual but must impart sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the offence (Vihaan Kumar case principle).

• However, full evidentiary details or complete particulars are not required at the arrest stage; what is required is sufficient disclosure to enable the accused to apply for bail or challenge detention. This standard aligns with State of Bombay v. Atma Ram (1951 SCR 167), where sufficiency was measured by whether the accused could make an early representation.

• The service of grounds on the accused’s family further strengthens compliance, as laid down in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576.

• Non-communication or vague disclosure renders arrest unconstitutional under Articles 21 and 22, but in this case, detailed grounds were indeed furnished.

Thus, the arrest was valid, and habeas corpus was not available once judicial custody commenced.

b) OBITER DICTA

In obiter, the Court made critical clarifications:

1. On remand proceedings: Even if grounds of arrest are communicated later through a remand report, it may suffice provided they are meaningful and the accused can contest them before the Magistrate. However, delay in communication cannot be routine, as it risks violating Article 22(1).

2. On sanction under Section 17A PC Act: The Court observed that sanction is required only for acts relatable to official duties of public servants. Since the appellant’s son was not a public servant, sanction was unnecessary in his case. However, it emphasized that sanction must be specific and individual, reaffirming Nair Service Society v. State of Kerala (2007).

3. On habeas corpus in custody: The Court reiterated that once a person is in judicial custody following remand, habeas corpus is generally unavailable (Kanu Sanyal, 1973). However, if the arrest itself was unconstitutional, custody too may be vitiated, as reaffirmed in Vihaan Kumar. This balance ensures constitutional safeguards without disrupting judicial processes.

4. International perspective: The Court echoed Christie v. Leachinsky (1947 AC 573) and U.S. precedents (McNabb v. United States, 318 US 332; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 US 542), stressing that informing the accused of grounds of arrest is a universal safeguard against arbitrary detention.

These observations will guide future cases concerning the interplay of arrest powers, Article 22 rights, and BNSS provisions.

c) GUIDELINES

The Court, while upholding the arrest, reiterated and consolidated guidelines from Vihaan Kumar (2025) and prior jurisprudence:

i. The obligation under Article 22(1) is mandatory—grounds of arrest must be informed to the accused “as soon as may be.”

ii. Grounds must contain sufficient factual particulars (not merely sections of law) so that the accused can seek bail, consult counsel, and prepare defense.

iii. Communication must be in a language understood by the arrestee; mode must be effective and meaningful.

iv. Grounds must be furnished not only to the arrestee but also to relatives/family members, as per Section 48 BNSS and Pankaj Bansal.

v. Delay in furnishing grounds, unless justified, vitiates the arrest (Prabir Purkayastha).

vi. Burden lies on the arresting authority/police to prove compliance with Article 22(1) safeguards.

vii. Magistrates must independently verify whether the accused was duly informed of the grounds at remand stage; otherwise, remand itself may be illegal.

viii. While sanction under Section 17A PC Act is mandatory for public servants, it is not required for private individuals implicated in corruption cases.

These guidelines reaffirm the judiciary’s role as the guardian of liberty, ensuring balance between individual rights and investigative powers.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment in Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh is a significant affirmation of constitutional safeguards under Article 22(1). While the appellant argued that grounds of arrest were vague and politically motivated, the Court held that the particulars provided—including conspiracy, coercion of liquor companies, manipulation of procurement orders, and wrongful gain of ₹3200 crores—were sufficiently detailed to meet the constitutional test.

The decision harmonizes Article 22 with practical policing realities, ensuring that the safeguard is meaningful but not so onerous as to paralyze investigations. The Court distinguished between absence of grounds (as in Vihaan Kumar) and sufficiency of grounds (as in the present case). It made clear that the requirement is not exhaustive disclosure of evidence but communication of core factual allegations.

From a rights perspective, the judgment underscores the continuing relevance of Article 21 and 22 as bulwarks against arbitrary detention. The Court’s reliance on comparative jurisprudence from England and the United States reflects a broader international alignment on due process rights. At the same time, its refusal to entertain habeas corpus post-judicial remand emphasizes judicial custody as a valid constitutional safeguard.

Critically, the case reveals the challenges of applying Section 17A of the PC Act in multi-accused corruption cases. By clarifying that sanction is person-specific and limited to public servants, the Court set boundaries for prosecutorial discretion while protecting investigative efficacy.

This judgment thus strikes a careful balance: it upholds the rights of arrestees while preserving the State’s ability to investigate large-scale corruption and economic offences. Going forward, it will guide both law enforcement and courts in maintaining fidelity to constitutional mandates while ensuring accountability in criminal investigations.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269.
ii. State of Bombay v. Atma Ram, [1951] 1 SCR 167 : AIR 1951 SC 157.
iii. Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254.
iv. Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576.
v. Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260.
vi. Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling, (1973) 2 SCC 674.
vii. D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416.
viii. Gautam Navlakha v. NIA, (2022) 13 SCC 542.
ix. Nair Service Society v. State of Kerala, (2007) 4 SCC 1.
x. Christie v. Leachinsky, (1947) AC 573 (HL).
xi. Hooper v. Lane, (1857) 6 HLC 443 : 10 ER 1368.
xii. McNabb v. United States, 318 US 332 (1943).
xiii. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 US 542 (1876).

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Constitution of India – Articles 21, 22.
ii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 41(1).
iii. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Sections 35, 47, 48, 187.
iv. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – Sections 318, 316(5), 61(2).
v. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 420, 409, 120-B.
vi. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 7, 7A, 8, 13(1)(b), 13(2), 17A.