A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in Ramji Prasad Jaiswal @ Ramjee Prasad Jaiswal and Ors. v. State of Bihar (Criminal Appeal No. 490 of 2025, decided on 20 May 2025) examined whether the appellants’ trial stood vitiated due to a breach of Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The appellants were convicted under Sections 420, 468, 471, and 120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The prosecution alleged that they conspired with a bank manager and others to cause wrongful loss to the State Bank of India by presenting forged bills and transport receipts.

The crux of the appeal rested upon the improper and mechanical examination of the accused under Section 313, CrPC, wherein only four general questions were asked without bringing to their notice the incriminating circumstances recorded in evidence. The Court held that such omission constituted a breach of audi alteram partem and caused serious prejudice. The trial was declared vitiated as the evidence used for conviction had not been put to the appellants for explanation. Additionally, the third appellant was found to be a juvenile at the time of the offence; thus, his conviction was set aside under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. The Court relied upon precedents such as Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, Dharnidhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Raj Kumar Singh alias Raju v. State of Rajasthan, and Raj Kumar alias Suman v. State (NCT of Delhi) to emphasize that incriminating material must be specifically put to the accused.

Ultimately, the conviction and sentence of all appellants were set aside, and they were acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt due to the procedural lapses.

Keywords: Section 313 CrPC, Audi alteram partem, Mechanical questioning, Incriminating circumstances, Juvenility, Trial vitiated, Prejudice, Benefit of doubt, Prevention of Corruption Act, Indian Penal Code.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case originates from allegations of fraudulent transactions committed in 1982 by certain businessmen in conspiracy with a branch manager of the State Bank of India, Mohania. The conspiracy was said to involve presenting fake transport receipts purportedly issued by M/s Rohtas Carriers, leading to wrongful disbursement of funds. The CBI initiated investigation, registered FIRs in 1983, and filed a charge sheet in 1984. Trial commenced in 1986, and in 2006, the Special Judge convicted the accused. The High Court of Patna affirmed the conviction in 2011.

The appellants, however, raised crucial issues before the Supreme Court. First, they contended that their examination under Section 313, CrPC was perfunctory and failed to bring specific incriminating evidence to their attention, thereby violating their right to a fair trial and the principle of audi alteram partem. Second, appellant Bal Mukund Jaiswal raised the plea of juvenility, supported by documentary evidence including his matriculation certificate.

The Court was thus tasked with determining whether the irregularity under Section 313, CrPC vitiated the trial and whether the plea of juvenility could be entertained at this belated stage. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the object of Section 313, CrPC is not a formality but a substantive safeguard allowing the accused to personally explain adverse evidence. The failure to put incriminating material to the appellants in detail was considered a grave procedural defect causing prejudice, particularly when such evidence was relied upon for conviction.

This judgment is significant as it reinforces the binding duty of trial courts to ensure compliance with Section 313, CrPC, emphasizes the curative scope of procedural irregularities, and upholds the protective umbrella of juvenile justice principles even decades after the offence.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Between September and December 1982, the branch manager of the State Bank of India at Mohania, Ajay Kumar Srivastava (since deceased), conspired with businessmen including Chetharu Singh (proprietor of M/s Bishnujee Bhandar), Shiv Narayan Bansal (proprietor of M/s Bansal Stores), and the appellants—Ramji Prasad Jaiswal and his sons Bal Mukund Jaiswal and Ashok Kumar Jaiswal. The allegation was that fake transport receipts purportedly issued by M/s Rohtas Carriers were produced to secure payments against fraudulent bills. These documents suggested consignment of grains, though the transport agency neither had vehicles nor operated in Mohania.

Through this conspiracy, wrongful payments of Rs. 71,456 to Chetharu Singh and Rs. 12,57,810 to Shiv Narayan Bansal were made, causing a total loss of Rs. 13,29,266 to SBI. It was alleged that the appellants, running M/s Rohtas Carriers, issued the fake consignment notes forming the basis of the fraudulent claims.

The CBI registered FIRs on 23 June 1983, filed its charge sheet on 31 December 1984, and charges were framed on 2 September 1986 under Sections 420, 468, 471, 120B IPC read with Sections 5(2), 5(1)(d), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.

The trial continued for two decades, and on 29 May 2006, the Special Judge convicted the appellants, sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment for three years under Sections 420 and 468 IPC, two years under Section 471 IPC, and one year under the PC Act, with fines imposed. Sentences were to run concurrently.

On appeal, the Patna High Court dismissed the challenge in 2011, upholding the conviction. The appellants approached the Supreme Court. By order dated 21 September 2012, the Court considered the plea of juvenility of appellant Bal Mukund Jaiswal, directed an inquiry under Section 7A, Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, and granted bail. The inquiry confirmed that he was under 18 at the time of the offence. Meanwhile, appellants Ramji Prasad and Ashok Jaiswal raised the argument that the examination under Section 313, CrPC was inadequate, thereby nullifying the trial.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the failure of the trial court to put specific incriminating evidence to the appellants during their examination under Section 313, CrPC constituted a violation of natural justice and vitiated the trial.

ii. Whether appellant Bal Mukund Jaiswal, having been found to be a juvenile at the time of the offence, was entitled to protection under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

iii. Whether the procedural irregularity under Section 313, CrPC could be cured by remand to the trial court after decades of delay.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellants, led by Senior Advocate Mukta Gupta, argued that the trial court failed to comply with the mandate of Section 313, CrPC. Only four general questions were asked, and the appellants were not confronted with the specific incriminating evidence adduced by 27 prosecution witnesses. This omission deprived them of an opportunity to explain adverse circumstances, violating audi alteram partem and prejudicing their defence. Reliance was placed on Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793, which held that every inculpatory material must be specifically put to the accused.

Further, it was argued that since two decades had lapsed, a remand to the trial court was neither feasible nor just. Hence, the conviction must be set aside.

On behalf of appellant Bal Mukund Jaiswal, it was submitted that his date of birth as per the matriculation certificate was 24 December 1965, making him around 17 years old at the time of the offence. The plea of juvenility could be raised at any stage under Section 7A of the JJ Act, 2000, as recognized in Rajinder Chandra v. State of Chhattisgarh (2002) 2 SCC 287. Since the inquiry confirmed his juvenility, his conviction was unsustainable.

The appellants also contended that they did not personally gain from the fraudulent transactions; rather, the major share of the misappropriated funds was appropriated by co-accused Shiv Narayan Bansal and another deceased accused. Thus, they sought acquittal.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The Additional Solicitor General, Vikramjit Banerjee, representing the State, argued that the involvement of appellants Ramji Prasad and Ashok Jaiswal was proven beyond doubt through oral and documentary evidence. Their signatures and consignment notes linked them to the fraudulent scheme. It was contended that there was substantial compliance with Section 313, CrPC, as the gist of the case was put to the appellants, and any omission was at best a curable irregularity not fatal to the trial.

He further argued that acquitting the appellants on a mere technicality would undermine justice since the prosecution had proved its case. Regarding appellant Bal Mukund Jaiswal, the State conceded that juvenility was established, leaving it to the Court to pass appropriate orders under the JJ Act.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Power to examine the accused.
ii. Sections 420, 468, 471, 120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Cheating, forgery, using forged documents, conspiracy.
iii. Sections 5(2), 5(1)(d), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 – Criminal misconduct by public servants.
iv. Section 7A, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 – Claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage.
v. Audi alteram partem – Principle of natural justice ensuring the right to be heard.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial was vitiated due to non-compliance with Section 313, CrPC. The appellants were asked four identical, general questions without being confronted with specific incriminating circumstances. The Court emphasized that failure to put such evidence to the accused violated their right to defend themselves and rendered reliance on such evidence impermissible.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The Court held that compliance with Section 313, CrPC is mandatory, and material circumstances must be distinctly put to the accused. Reliance was placed on Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade (1973), Dharnidhar (2010), Raj Kumar Singh (2013), Raj Kumar alias Suman (2023), and Ashok v. State of UP (2025). Since the incriminating evidence was not properly put, the trial stood vitiated, and the appellants were entitled to the benefit of doubt.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that although ordinarily omission under Section 313, CrPC could be cured by remanding the case to the trial court, the long passage of time—over four decades since the offence—made such a course impracticable. It further noted that the plea of juvenility can be raised at any stage, and once established, conviction cannot stand, even if the accused has crossed the age of majority.

c. GUIDELINES

• Trial courts must ensure that every material circumstance emerging from evidence is specifically put to the accused in clear terms under Section 313, CrPC.

• General or mechanical questioning is impermissible.

• Courts must exclude from consideration any incriminating material not put to the accused.

• In cases of procedural irregularities, appellate courts must consider whether remand would serve justice or cause further miscarriage.

• Plea of juvenility may be raised at any stage of proceedings and must be duly inquired into under Section 7A, JJ Act, 2000.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision reaffirms the centrality of fair trial principles in criminal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court underscored that the examination under Section 313, CrPC is not a formality but a crucial stage providing the accused a chance to answer incriminating evidence. The failure of the trial court to adhere to this safeguard fundamentally undermined the integrity of the conviction. The Court rightly prioritized substantive justice over technicality, recognizing that after decades, remand would only perpetuate injustice.

The ruling also highlights the judiciary’s commitment to juvenile justice. Even though appellant Bal Mukund Jaiswal had crossed majority by the time his appeal was heard, the Court upheld his right under the JJ Act, 2000, reflecting the protective ethos of the statute and international conventions such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.

By setting aside the convictions, the judgment serves as a cautionary reminder to trial courts about scrupulous compliance with procedural safeguards. It also balances accountability in corruption cases with constitutional guarantees of fair trial.

K) REFERENCES

Important Cases Referred
i. Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793.
ii. Dharnidhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 7 SCC 759.
iii. Raj Kumar Singh alias Raju alias Batya v. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 5 SCC 722.
iv. Raj Kumar alias Suman v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 17 SCC 95.
v. Ashok v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 2 SCC 381.
vi. Rajinder Chandra v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2002) 2 SCC 287.

Important Statutes Referred
i. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 313.
ii. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 420, 468, 471, 120B.
iii. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 – Sections 5(2), 5(1)(d).
iv. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 – Section 7A.
v. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.