A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in Hakim v. State of NCT of Delhi and Anr. (Criminal Appeal Nos. 5303–5304 of 2024) dealt with the conviction of two appellants under Section 326A IPC (voluntarily causing grievous hurt by acid). The prosecution alleged that the victim was accosted near a railway crossing, held by Accused No.1 and Accused No.3, while Accused No.2 poured acid on her. The Trial Court convicted all three, awarding life imprisonment to Accused Nos.1 and 2 and ten years’ imprisonment to Accused No.3. The Delhi High Court affirmed the conviction, reducing only Accused No.3’s sentence.

The appellants sought interference under Article 136 of the Constitution, contending that the prosecution failed to prove the injuries were caused by acid, there was no evidence of source procurement, and there was delay in witness statements. The Court rejected these arguments, relying on consistent medical testimony and ocular evidence, holding that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court clarified the scope of interference under Article 136, emphasizing that concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed unless perverse, unsupported by evidence, or contrary to natural justice. While affirming conviction, the Court modified the sentence of Accused No.1 considering his advanced age and ailments, reducing it to ten years rigorous imprisonment, at par with Accused No.3. However, it declined leniency for Accused No.2, noting that as an advocate he had betrayed his professional and social duty.

This judgment reiterates principles of sentencing proportionality, victim protection, and restricted appellate interference under Article 136, while balancing mitigating and aggravating circumstances.

Keywords: Acid attack, Section 326A IPC, Article 136 interference, Sentencing discretion, Medical evidence, Ocular testimony, Standard Operating Procedures, Victim compensation, Concurrent findings, Professional misconduct.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The judgment in Hakim v. State of NCT of Delhi arises from one of the most heinous forms of violent crime—acid attack—punishable under Section 326A IPC. Acid violence in India has been recognized as a distinct offense since the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, which introduced Sections 326A and 326B IPC after the Nirbhaya Committee recommendations. These provisions impose stringent punishment for causing permanent or partial damage, deformity, disfigurement, or disability by use of acid or corrosive substances. The present case therefore fits within a broader social and legal context where courts have been mandated to adopt a victim-centric approach, emphasizing deterrence, retribution, and compensation.

The incident in question dates back to June 2014 in Mathura, Uttar Pradesh. The victim, returning from a temple visit, was waylaid by her neighbours—the accused persons—who sought revenge for her prior police complaint. While two held her, acid was poured on her face, leaving severe chemical burns and permanent visual impairment. The case involved not only ocular testimony but also a battery of medical experts who confirmed the nature of injuries.

The Trial Court convicted all three accused, sentencing Hakim (Accused No.1) and Umesh (Accused No.2) to life imprisonment and Gyani (Accused No.3) to ten years. The Delhi High Court upheld conviction, granting partial leniency only to Accused No.3. Appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution were filed before the Supreme Court, raising issues of evidentiary reliability, procedural lapses, and sentencing proportionality.

The Supreme Court’s ruling assumes importance as it clarifies the ambit of appellate interference under Article 136, reaffirms reliance on medical and ocular evidence in acid attack cases, and redefines the sentencing policy by balancing aggravating and mitigating factors. The Court’s refusal to reduce the sentence of an advocate accused reflects professional accountability, while its modification of sentence for an elderly co-accused shows consideration of humanitarian factors within sentencing jurisprudence.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 08.06.2014, around 8:00 p.m., the respondent-victim, accompanied by her sister-in-law Rajjo Devi (PW-6), was returning home from Galteshwar Mahadev Temple. As she neared Govind Nagar railway crossing, she was confronted by her neighbours—Hakim (Accused No.1), Umesh (Accused No.2), and Gyani (Accused No.3). Motivated by retaliation for a prior police complaint lodged against them, the accused threatened her with consequences. Hakim and Gyani forcibly restrained her, while Umesh poured acid over her face. The victim cried in agony, and Rajjo Devi, being a few steps behind, rushed her to a hospital.

The victim sustained severe burns, permanent facial disfigurement, and 90% vision loss in her left eye. Her husband Bablu lodged FIR No. 130/2014 at Govind Nagar Police Station, Mathura, under Section 326A IPC. Investigation was conducted, statements under Section 161 CrPC were recorded, and a charge sheet was filed under Section 326A read with Section 34 IPC.

Subsequently, upon a transfer petition, the Supreme Court directed the trial to be conducted at Patiala House Courts, New Delhi. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses, including multiple doctors (PW-5, PW-8, PW-9, PW-10, PW-11, PW-12, and PW-14), who unanimously testified that injuries were consistent with chemical burns. The defence examined three witnesses, including DW-2 who alleged pre-existing eye defect in the victim.

The Trial Court convicted all three accused, awarding life imprisonment to Hakim and Umesh with fines of Rs. 1 lakh each, and ten years rigorous imprisonment to Gyani with fine of Rs. 50,000. Appeals before the Delhi High Court were dismissed except partial reduction of sentence for Gyani. Appeals to the Supreme Court challenged both conviction and sentence, primarily questioning the medical causation, delay in recording statements, and non-recovery of acid.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the victim’s injuries were caused by pouring of acid by Accused No.2 and facilitated by Accused Nos.1 and 3?
ii. Whether the delay in recording statements of key witnesses (PW-4 and PW-6) affected the credibility of prosecution evidence?
iii. Whether the absence of recovery of acid or its source procurement vitiated the conviction under Section 326A IPC?
iv. Whether failure to follow Standard Operating Procedures in acid attack investigations undermines the validity of prosecution?
v. Whether mitigating factors such as age, health, and professional status of accused justify reduction in sentence?
vi. What is the scope of Supreme Court’s interference under Article 136 in cases involving concurrent findings of fact by Trial and High Courts?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellants contended that the prosecution failed to conclusively establish the injury as a result of acid attack. They argued that the FIR and initial medical records did not mention eye injury, and the subsequent references to vision loss were fabricated. Reliance was placed on DW-2’s testimony suggesting that the victim’s eye was defective even prior to the incident. The appellants argued that referral to multiple hospitals was an attempt to manufacture a favourable medical report.

Further, it was submitted that the prosecution failed to trace the source of acid, nor was any sample recovered. The absence of such evidence, they argued, created a reasonable doubt as burns could have been caused by hot water or another substance. Reliance was placed on State of U.P. v. Wasif Haider (2019) 2 SCC 303, Kailash Gour v. State of Assam (2012) 2 SCC 34, and Sunil Kundu v. State of Jharkhand (2013) 4 SCC 422, where lapses in prosecution benefited the accused.

They also pointed to an 11-day delay in recording the victim’s statement, invoking Shahid Khan v. State of Rajasthan (2016) 4 SCC 96, which emphasized that unexplained delay weakens prosecution’s credibility. Contradictions between FIR, site plan, and witness depositions were highlighted to claim that PW-6 was not present at the spot.

Another contention was that SOPs in acid attack cases, akin to NDPS procedures, are mandatory. Relying on Noor Aga v. State of Punjab (2008) 16 SCC 417, they argued that deviation vitiates trial. Lastly, it was argued that Hakim, aged 70+, being a retired army man, could not have physically restrained the victim. Leniency was sought based on advanced age and ailments.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the State and victim submitted that medical evidence conclusively established that injuries were chemical burns, not hot water. Multiple doctors consistently testified that the nature of injuries was specific to acid. The Aadhaar photograph of the victim prior to the incident showed normal facial features, disproving pre-existing defect.

Delay in recording statements was explained by medical treatment and threats faced by the family. Witness testimony was credible, and PW-6, being ten steps behind, had clear view of the attack. Minor contradictions were natural and did not discredit substantive evidence, as held in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217.

The absence of recovery of acid was immaterial since the incident occurred in an open railway crossing, making recovery impossible. Conviction can be sustained on direct evidence of attack corroborated by medical testimony, as in Dayal Singh v. State of Uttaranchal (2012) 8 SCC 263. SOPs, they argued, were guidelines and not mandatory, and investigation followed due process.

On sentencing, the State argued that as an advocate, Accused No.2 owed higher responsibility to law and society, making his crime graver. Leniency on grounds of age was opposed for Hakim, though mitigation was ultimately left to the Court’s discretion.

H) JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court upheld conviction of both appellants under Section 326A read with 34 IPC. It relied on consistent testimony of doctors (PW-5, PW-8, PW-9, PW-10, PW-11, PW-12, and PW-14) confirming chemical burns and ocular testimony of PW-6 establishing direct involvement of accused. The Court rejected defence arguments on pre-existing eye defect, highlighting the Aadhaar photograph showing normal vision prior to attack.

On delay in witness statements, the Court accepted the explanation of medical treatment and threats forcing temporary relocation. The Court reiterated that minor discrepancies or procedural lapses cannot discredit substantive prosecution evidence. It clarified that SOPs in acid attack cases are procedural guidelines, not mandatory like NDPS procedures.

On sentencing, the Court distinguished between the appellants. For Hakim (Accused No.1), age (73 years), multiple ailments, and limited role (holding the victim) justified reduction of life imprisonment to ten years rigorous imprisonment with Rs. 50,000 fine, at par with Accused No.3. For Umesh (Accused No.2), being an advocate aggravated culpability. The Court held that his professional status demanded adherence to higher standards of conduct. Hence, his life imprisonment was affirmed.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The Court held that in acid attack cases, conviction can be sustained on the basis of consistent ocular and medical testimony, even in absence of recovery of acid. It reaffirmed that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts under Article 136 cannot be disturbed unless perverse or unsupported by evidence. The Court also emphasized proportionality in sentencing, where mitigating factors like age, health, and role in crime may justify reduction, while aggravating factors such as professional misconduct aggravate punishment.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that as officers of the court, advocates bear heightened responsibility towards law and society, and failure to uphold this duty warrants stricter sentencing. It also highlighted that SOPs in acid attack cases are not mandatory but directory, provided due process is followed. The judgment underscored that sentencing must balance deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation, and courts should individualize punishment while ensuring victim compensation.

c. GUIDELINES

i. Conviction under Section 326A IPC does not require recovery of acid if medical and ocular evidence prove chemical burns.
ii. Minor discrepancies or delays in witness statements, when explained, do not weaken prosecution.
iii. SOPs in acid attack investigations are procedural and directory, not mandatory.
iv. Sentencing must consider role, age, health, motive, professional status, and post-conduct of accused.
v. Advocates as accused will be held to higher standards due to their professional obligations.
vi. Victim compensation must be ensured, with state liability if convicts are unable to pay.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s ruling balances strict adherence to justice with compassionate consideration of mitigating factors. By affirming conviction while partly modifying sentence, it reinforces deterrence in acid attack cases while recognizing humanitarian concerns. The judgment is notable for its treatment of professional responsibility of advocates, emphasizing that lawyers, as custodians of law, face aggravated culpability when they themselves engage in criminality.

The decision harmonizes two competing strands in criminal jurisprudence: deference to concurrent findings under Article 136, and flexibility in sentencing to account for individualized justice. The Court’s approach reflects international instruments like UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime (1985), which emphasize compensation, dignity, and participation of victims.

This case contributes significantly to India’s evolving acid attack jurisprudence by clarifying evidentiary requirements, judicial standards under Article 136, and sentencing principles. It upholds victims’ rights without diluting due process for accused, demonstrating a balanced constitutional approach.

J) REFERENCES

Important Cases Referred

i. Mst Dalbir Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 158.
ii. Pritam Singh v. State, (1950) SCC 189.
iii. Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217.
iv. Murugan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2018) 16 SCC 96.
v. State of U.P. v. Wasif Haider, (2019) 2 SCC 303.
vi. Kailash Gour v. State of Assam, (2012) 2 SCC 34.
vii. Sunil Kundu v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 4 SCC 422.
viii. Karan Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 12 SCC 529.
ix. Dayal Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, (2012) 8 SCC 263.
x. Shahid Khan v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 4 SCC 96.
xi. Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417.
xii. Hem Chand v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 727.
xiii. State of Punjab v. Manjit Singh, (2009) 14 SCC 31.
xiv. Bavo alias Manubhai Thakore v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 2 SCC 684.
xv. Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257.
xvi. Yogendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019) 9 SCC 243.
xvii. Jameel v. State of U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 532.
xviii. Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana, (2009) 15 SCC 635.

Important Statutes Referred

i. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 326A, 34
ii. Constitution of India – Article 136
iii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 173, 313, 428
iv. U.P. Victim Compensation Scheme, 2014