A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The present case concerns the condonation of an extraordinary delay of 1116 days in filing an appeal under Order XLI Rule 3A read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 against an ex parte decree. The appellant, Thirunagalingam, sought specific performance of a sale agreement executed in 2015. Despite due service of summons and filing of written statements, the respondents ceased to appear before the Trial Court, resulting in an ex parte decree against them. The respondents later attempted to set aside the decree under Order IX Rule 13 CPC with applications for condonation of delay, which were rejected up to the Supreme Court in SLP Nos. 2054–55 of 2022.

Undeterred, the respondents initiated a second round of litigation by filing a delayed appeal accompanied by a condonation application of 1116 days. The First Appellate Court dismissed the condonation plea, but the High Court allowed it upon payment of Rs. 1 lakh. The Supreme Court, however, found that the respondents merely repeated the same grounds already dismissed earlier. The Court ruled that condonation of delay cannot be granted as an act of judicial generosity, especially where the explanation lacks bona fides and amounts to abuse of process.

The judgment clarified that N. Mohan v. R. Madhu was inapplicable since summons in the present case were duly served, unlike in N. Mohan. The Court reaffirmed principles laid down in Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar and Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, emphasizing that limitation laws, though harsh, must be strictly applied. The Court held that repeated pleas based on identical grounds previously rejected cannot be entertained. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and dismissed the condonation application, thereby restoring finality to the ex parte decree.

Keywords: Condonation of delay, abuse of process, ex parte decree, sufficient cause, limitation, specific performance.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case stems from a sale agreement executed on 17 August 2015 between the appellant, Thirunagalingam, and respondent no. 1, Lingeswaran. When the respondent failed to execute the sale deed, the appellant instituted O.S. No. 110/2015 for specific performance before the Sub Court, Paramakudi. During pendency, respondent no. 1 sold the property to respondent no. 2, triggering further litigation. Though the defendants initially appeared and filed their written statement, they absented themselves later, leading the trial court to decree the suit ex parte on 7 February 2017. The decree was executed, and the appellant obtained conveyance of title.

The respondents attempted to set aside the decree under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, accompanied by condonation applications citing delays of 467 and 712 days. The Trial Court allowed them, but the Madras High Court reversed, and the Supreme Court dismissed the respondents’ SLPs in February 2022, confirming the decree. After losing the first round, the respondents sought to reopen the matter through an appeal under Section 96(2) CPC, filed with an application seeking condonation of 1116 days’ delay. While the First Appellate Court rejected the condonation plea, the Madras High Court intervened, condoning the delay subject to payment of costs.

This judgment of the Supreme Court addresses whether condonation of such extraordinary delay was justified, and whether reliance on N. Mohan v. R. Madhu was appropriate in the factual context. The Court further examined whether the respondents’ repeated grounds amounted to abuse of process and whether principles of limitation law were correctly applied.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant and respondent no. 1 entered into a sale agreement on 17 August 2015 concerning property situated in Ramanathapuram district, for a consideration of Rs. 3 lakhs. When respondent no. 1 failed to honor the agreement, the appellant filed O.S. No. 110/2015 seeking specific performance. During pendency, respondent no. 1 sold the same property to respondent no. 2 on 26 November 2015. Both respondents filed their written statements but stopped appearing thereafter. Consequently, the Sub Court decreed the suit ex parte on 7 February 2017. In execution proceedings (E.P. No. 10/2017), the appellant obtained a sale deed in his favor.

Subsequently, the respondents filed applications under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex parte decree, with condonation applications citing delays of 467 and 712 days. The Trial Court allowed these applications, but the appellant’s revision before the High Court succeeded. On further appeal, the Supreme Court in February 2022 dismissed the respondents’ SLPs, thereby confirming the decree.

Despite finality, the respondents launched a second round of litigation by filing an appeal under Section 96(2) CPC, delayed by 1116 days. Alongside, they filed I.A. No. 1 of 2022 under Order XLI Rule 3A CPC for condonation of delay. The First Appellate Court dismissed the application on 8 February 2023. The High Court, however, condoned the delay on 25 April 2023 subject to payment of Rs. 1 lakh, reasoning that inconvenience caused to the appellant could be offset by compensation.

Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court misapplied precedents and allowed respondents to abuse the judicial process by reviving claims already decided conclusively.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the High Court was justified in condoning a delay of 1116 days in filing the appeal under Order XLI Rule 3A CPC without sufficient and bona fide explanation?

ii. Whether the respondents’ reliance on N. Mohan v. R. Madhu was correctly applied to the facts of this case, considering the distinction regarding service of summons?

iii. Whether grounds for condonation already dismissed by the Supreme Court in prior proceedings could be re-agitated under a different procedural provision?

iv. Whether the principle of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could be invoked to exclude time spent in earlier proceedings under Order IX Rule 13 CPC when those proceedings had already been held unsatisfactory?

v. Whether condonation of delay in such circumstances amounts to abuse of process of law and undermines the principle of finality of judgments?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellant submitted that the High Court committed a grave error in condoning an inordinate delay of 1116 days. It was contended that the respondents had already exhausted their remedies under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and suffered dismissal of their condonation petitions, affirmed by the Supreme Court in SLP (C) Nos. 2054–55 of 2022. The respondents could not be permitted to raise identical grounds once rejected by the Apex Court.

It was argued that the High Court wrongly relied upon N. Mohan v. R. Madhu (2020) 20 SCC 302. In N. Mohan, the defendant had not been duly served, but in the present case, summons had been properly served, and respondents had entered appearance, filed vakalatnama and written statement, thereby submitting to jurisdiction. Their subsequent absence was wilful, not inadvertent. Hence, the ratio of N. Mohan was inapplicable.

Counsel stressed that condonation of delay must rest on bona fide explanations and sufficient cause, not on sympathy or generosity. Reliance was placed on Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 10 SCC 765, which held that limitation laws must be strictly applied even if hardship results. The appellant further cited Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157, where the Court emphasized that condonation is permissible only upon sufficient cause, and equity cannot override statutory limitation.

The appellant argued that Section 14 of the Limitation Act had no application. Only delay attributable to bona fide pursuit of a remedy in a wrong forum can be excluded. Here, respondents had filed Order IX Rule 13 petitions which were decided on merits and dismissed for lack of sufficient cause. Hence, respondents cannot claim exclusion of such time.

It was urged that the High Court’s approach undermines judicial discipline, encourages abuse of process, and erodes the principle of finality. The appellant sought restoration of the First Appellate Court’s order dismissing the condonation petition.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondents argued that their absence before the Trial Court was not wilful or wanton. They claimed to have offered a plausible explanation for their inability to contest the proceedings, which the High Court rightly accepted as reasonable.

They strongly relied on N. Mohan v. R. Madhu (2020) 20 SCC 302, arguing that appeals under Section 96(2) CPC are maintainable against ex parte decrees and that courts must adopt a liberal approach to condonation, considering the importance of adjudicating matters on merits rather than dismissing them on technicalities.

They further relied on Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar (2005) 1 SCC 787, which clarified that while a defendant cannot re-litigate the grounds of non-appearance once rejected under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, he may nonetheless challenge the merits of the decree in a first appeal under Section 96(2) CPC. According to them, their appeal was independent of their earlier failed applications under Order IX Rule 13 CPC.

The respondents invoked Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, contending that the period spent bona fide pursuing remedies under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and subsequent revisions ought to be excluded in computing limitation for filing the appeal. They submitted that this interpretation would harmonize procedural rights with substantive justice.

They highlighted their bona fides by complying with the High Court’s order directing payment of Rs. 1 lakh compensation to the appellant. They further asserted that respondent no. 2, as a bona fide purchaser in possession since 2015, holds valid title and would suffer irreparable loss if the appeal were barred on technical grounds. They argued that the balance of convenience lay in their favour, and substantial justice required condonation of delay.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Order IX Rule 13 CPC – Setting aside ex parte decree.
ii. Order XLI Rule 3A CPC – Condonation of delay in appeals.
iii. Section 96(2) CPC – Right to appeal against ex parte decree.
iv. Section 151 CPC – Inherent powers of the court.
v. Section 5 Limitation Act, 1963 – Condonation of delay on sufficient cause.
vi. Section 14 Limitation Act, 1963 – Exclusion of time spent in bona fide proceedings.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s order condoning the delay of 1116 days. The Court held that the High Court misapplied N. Mohan v. R. Madhu, since the present case involved duly served summons and initial participation of the respondents, unlike in N. Mohan. The Court reiterated that condonation of delay must be grounded in bona fide explanation, not in repeated assertions already judicially rejected.

It observed that respondents had already raised identical grounds in earlier proceedings under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, which were dismissed by the High Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court. To reiterate the same reasons under a different provision amounted to abuse of process. The Court emphasized that condonation cannot be treated as an act of judicial generosity and must be exercised cautiously to prevent prejudice to the opposite party.

The Court further underscored that limitation statutes, though sometimes harsh, serve public policy by ensuring finality in litigation. Reiterating Popat Bahiru Goverdhane and Maniben Devraj Shah, it held that equitable considerations cannot override legislative mandates.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court restored the order of the First Appellate Court dismissing the condonation application and declared that the ex parte decree had attained finality.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The core ratio is that once a litigant’s grounds for condonation of delay have been judicially examined and rejected, they cannot be re-agitated under a different procedural provision unless supported by new or additional material. Repetition of grounds already adjudicated amounts to abuse of process.

The Court held that condonation of delay under Section 5 Limitation Act requires a bona fide and sufficient cause. Where summons were duly served, and parties initially participated but subsequently defaulted, their negligence cannot constitute sufficient cause. Reliance on precedents like N. Mohan is misplaced when factual distinctions exist.

The ratio further clarifies that while appeals under Section 96(2) CPC against ex parte decrees are maintainable, limitation law applies strictly. Equitable relief cannot be granted merely to ensure adjudication on merits when it causes prejudice to the opposite party and undermines finality.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that the first duty of a court while considering condonation is to assess the bona fides of the explanation offered. It stressed that delay should not be condoned as an act of generosity, for doing so would encourage indolence and disrespect for judicial timelines.

The Court noted that substantial justice cannot override statutory limitation, since such leniency would prejudice diligent litigants and erode confidence in the certainty of law. It emphasized that the law of limitation is founded on public policy, ensuring that disputes are brought to courts promptly and not kept perpetually alive.

The Court also clarified that equitable considerations like payment of compensation cannot substitute for absence of sufficient cause. Even where hardship may result, the judicial duty is to enforce limitation strictly.

c. GUIDELINES

The Court laid down guiding principles:

i. Condonation of delay must be based strictly on bona fide explanation and sufficient cause, not on sympathy or equity.

ii. Repetition of grounds already adjudicated and rejected cannot justify condonation under a different provision of law.

iii. High Courts must apply precedents contextually, ensuring factual similarity before reliance. Misapplication of precedents amounts to perversity.

iv. Courts must prioritize finality of litigation and avoid encouraging abuse of process through multiple and repetitive proceedings.

v. Delay condonation cannot be granted as an act of generosity; the pursuit of substantial justice must not prejudice the opposite party.

vi. Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies only to bona fide pursuit of remedy in a wrong forum; it cannot justify exclusion of time spent in proceedings already adjudged deficient in sufficient cause.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This case reaffirms the principle that limitation law, though technical, is central to the administration of justice. The Supreme Court clarified that procedural rights cannot be exploited to perpetuate litigation endlessly. The decision underscores that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretionary relief subject to strict scrutiny of bona fides.

The Court’s rejection of repeated grounds strengthens the principle of finality and deters abuse of process. It also narrows the scope of Section 14 Limitation Act, preventing litigants from misusing exclusion provisions after having failed on merits in earlier proceedings. By distinguishing N. Mohan v. R. Madhu, the Court highlighted the importance of contextual application of precedents.

This judgment will serve as a precedent in discouraging frivolous attempts to reopen concluded matters through successive condonation applications. It strikes a balance between ensuring justice and upholding judicial discipline by enforcing limitation laws strictly. It also reiterates that while appeals under Section 96(2) CPC are permissible, they remain subject to limitation rigour.

The decision harmonizes substantive justice with procedural discipline and fortifies the doctrine that abuse of process cannot be rewarded under the guise of liberal interpretation of limitation statutes.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. N. Mohan v. R. Madhu, (2020) 20 SCC 302.
ii. Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar, (2005) 1 SCC 787.
iii. Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765.
iv. Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
v. Rani Choudhury v. Lt. Col. Suraj Jit Choudhury, (1982) 2 SCC 596.
vi. P. Kiran Kumar v. A.S. Khadar, (2002) 5 SCC 161.
vii. Shyam Sundar Sarma v. Pannalal Jaiswal, (2005) 1 SCC 436.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order IX Rule 13, Order XLI Rule 3A, Section 96(2), Section 151.
ii. Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 5, Section 14.