A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in Paritala Sudhakar v. State of Telangana set aside concurrent convictions under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, extending benefit of doubt due to material contradictions and a doubtful prosecution narrative surrounding demand and acceptance. The prosecution trap turned on an unusual mode of “acceptance” by placement of tainted currency inside a rexine bag affixed to the petrol tank of the accused officer’s motorcycle, with phenolphthalein (pH) hand-wash tests returning negative for the accused. The Court underscored that demand is sine qua non for the Section 20 presumption; where demand itself is unproven, the presumption does not arise.

The Bench drew strength from Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh on the treatment of contradictions, Krishnegowda v. State of Karnataka on trustworthiness of testimony, and Om Parkash v. State of Haryana on limits of the Section 20 presumption, while noting investigative deficits against the “triple test” often invoked in trap cases: prior verification, use of a shadow witness, and successful hand-wash test. The statements of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW7, and DW1 were assessed together, revealing inconsistencies about who saw what, when the notes were placed, and whether the accused was present. On this evidentiary canvas, the narrative failed to inspire confidence beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was allowed; convictions and sentences were quashed; fine, if deposited, directed to be refunded.

Keywords: Section 7 Prevention of Corruption Act; Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) Prevention of Corruption Act; Section 20 presumption; trap proceedings; phenolphthalein test; contradictions in evidence; demand and acceptance; rexine bag recovery; benefit of doubt.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arose from a conviction sustained by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court for the State of Telangana. The appellant, a Revenue Inspector at the Mandal Revenue Office, Gundala, Nalgonda, was alleged to have demanded illegal gratification from the complainant seeking compensation for trees dried due to drought. The MRO had forwarded the application to the appellant for inquiry. The prosecution case asserted an initial demand of ₹2,000 on 06.08.2003 and a reiteration on 07.08.2003, culminating in a scheduled payment on 11.08.2003 at the appellant’s residence.

The Anti-Corruption Bureau registered the case on 11.08.2003, organized pre-trap proceedings with independent mediators, and deployed a trap team led by PW7. Events then deviated from the expected trajectory: the appellant was not at home; parties moved to the MRO office and then to Ambala village; both the complainant and appellant went to the complainant’s house and to the fields for inspection; tea was served; and according to the prosecution, the appellant instructed the complainant to place the tainted currency inside the rexine bag attached to his motorcycle’s petrol tank. Crucially, the pH hand-wash tests on the appellant were negative. The money was found in the rexine bag, but the sequence of placement, visibility, and presence remained in conflict across testimonies.

The High Court still affirmed conviction, emphasizing recovery and inferred acceptance. The Supreme Court re-appraised contradictions, the presence of animus between parties per PW3, and the absence of the classic “triple test” attributes, concluding that demand and acceptance were not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The complainant applied on 06.08.2003 for drought compensation for dried trees. The MRO Gundala forwarded the inquiry to the appellant, then a Revenue Inspector. The prosecution alleged an immediate demand of ₹2,000 the same evening and a threat on 07.08.2003 that without payment the inspection would not occur. The complainant filed a written complaint to PW7 of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, which registered crime No.19/ACB-HR/2003 under Section 7 on 11.08.2003.

Pre-trap formalities were conducted with independent mediators (PW2 among them). The team first went to the appellant’s residence; neighbours indicated he was at the MRO office. The complainant and PW2 traveled there, met the appellant, and were told to rendezvous at Ambala village. Around 6 PM, the appellant arrived on his motorcycle; the complainant and appellant went to the complainant’s house, visited the garden for inspection, and returned home where tea was served by DW1 (the complainant’s wife). The prosecution version stated that the appellant asked the complainant to keep the tainted notes in the rexine bag attached to the motorcycle’s petrol tank. The complainant then signaled the trap party by removing and wiping his spectacles. The trap team confronted the appellant; pH tests on his hands were negative, suggesting he had not touched the notes.

The currency, however, was recovered from the rexine bag, and numbers matched the pre-trap inventory. Witness accounts diverged on whether the appellant was present when the notes were deposited, whether the team could see the act, and whether recovery occurred in his presence. PW3 noted prior “hot talk” between the complainant and the appellant; DW1 did not support any demand narrative inside the house. These features formed the crux of the appellant’s challenge.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED 

i. Whether the prosecution proved, beyond reasonable doubt, a conscious and unequivocal demand of illegal gratification by the appellant as required under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act?
ii. Whether alleged acceptance can be inferred from recovery of tainted currency from a rexine bag on the motorcycle when hand-wash tests on the accused were negative and presence was disputed?
iii. Whether the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act could validly operate absent proof of demand, particularly amid evidence of prior animus?
iv. Whether material contradictions across PW1, PW2, PW3, PW7, and DW1 fatally undermined the prosecution case per the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt?
v. Whether investigative lapses against the trap “triple test” (prior verification, shadow witness, successful pH test) eroded the evidentiary foundation for conviction?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellant submitted that the prosecution case failed the practical “triple test” in trap matters. There was no prior verification of demand by the investigator; no effective shadow witness account of the core demand and acceptance; and the pH hand-wash test was negative for the appellant. The alleged demand occurred in late evening within the complainant’s house without independent ears. The trap team did not hear the demand. PW3 spoke to a prior altercation, revealing animus against the appellant, a relevant factor that the High Court brushed aside without reasons.

The unusual instruction to deposit money into a rexine pouch on a petrol tank minimized contact, an improbability highlighted when the appellant’s hands tested clean. The recovery narrative shifted. PW1 contradicted himself on whether the appellant accompanied him to the motorcycle at the moment of placement; the Public Prosecutor’s re-examination “correction” did not cure the inconsistency. DW1 did not support a demand inside the house. The defence contended that demand is the heart of the offence; absent proof of demand, Section 20 cannot be triggered. They relied on Mir Mustafa Ali Hasmi v. State of A.P., emphasizing proper verification in trap cases; Rajesh Gupta v. State and K. Shantamma v. State of Telangana, where convictions failed due to inadequately proven demand; and Om Parkash v. State of Haryana, which limits the presumption when demand is not proved.

They further drew strength from Suresh Thipmppa Shetty v. State of Maharashtra on leaning toward the defence where reasonable doubt persists, and from Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh and Krishnegowda v. State of Karnataka for the principle that material contradictions that go to the root warrant acquittal.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the State submitted that corrupt demands are seldom voiced openly; absence of multiple direct witnesses does not negate demand. PW2 placed himself within hearing distance and affirmed that the appellant asked about the bribe and nodded, instructing a meeting at the crossroads. The recovery of marked currency from the appellant’s motorcycle pouch was urged as strong corroboration. The State argued that Section 20 presumption applies upon recovery linked to the accused’s domain, and the placement into the rexine bag was, on the prosecution story, at the appellant’s instructions.

The negative pH test on hands did not, by itself, undo acceptance because the manner of acceptance can be indirect; line of sight from the house to the motorcycle was said to exist; thus, even if the complainant alone placed the notes physically, it was at the appellant’s behest, completing acceptance. The State contended DW1’s inability to hear the conversation while preparing tea explained her neutrality; her testimony did not exculpate the appellant. The High Court, relying on overall circumstances, found demand and acceptance proved. The State urged affirmation of conviction under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2), emphasizing that the trap numbers matched and the recovery was immediate and untainted by interpolation.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Section 7, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — offence of public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration.
ii. Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — criminal misconduct by public servant; punishment.
iii. Section 20, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — statutory presumption as to motive or reward in certain offences.

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court re-assessed the prosecution’s sequence and found material contradictions that eroded confidence in the narrative. PW3’s testimony about prior “hot talk” and his reprimand to the appellant for quarrelling with the complainant was disbelieved by the High Court without reasons, a gap of reasoning that the Court noted. PW1’s deposition shifted on a crucial point—whether the appellant was with him when the tainted money was placed into the rexine bag on the motorcycle’s petrol tank. The Court juxtaposed this with the trap team’s proximity and the pre-arranged signal by removing and wiping spectacles; if events unfolded in plain view, the trap party would have seen the placement; yet the pH tests were conducted inside the house and were negative, a procedural choice the Court found inexplicable given the admitted absence of hand contact.

PW7’s account that the appellant, already astride the motorcycle, was escorted inside for the hand-wash, and only then the team learned that the complainant himself placed the notes directly in the pouch, did not cohere with a confident acceptance narrative. DW1 described movements inconsistent with continuous presence. On this composite view, the Court held that both the placement and recovery, and whether they occurred in the appellant’s presence and knowledge, did not stand proved beyond reasonable doubt. As demand was not established—especially against the backdrop of animus—the Section 20 presumption could not be invoked. The appeal was allowed; convictions under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) were set aside; fines ordered to be refunded; no costs.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio centers on two linked propositions in corruption prosecutions: first, that proof of demand is indispensable for offences under Section 7 and for activating the Section 20 presumption; second, that acceptance cannot be inferred merely from recovery when surrounding circumstances—negative pH tests, contested presence, and non-speaking reasons on prior animus—generate reasonable doubt.

The Court privileged trustworthiness over mechanical recovery, relying on the doctrinal instruction from Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh that serious contradictions and omissions, not minor discrepancies, disable the prosecution. Applying Krishnegowda v. State of Karnataka, the Bench reiterated the presumption of innocence and the imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt when witness accounts are improbable or inconsistent. For the presumption under Section 20, the Court invoked Om Parkash v. State of Haryana to hold that where demand is not proved, the presumption does not arise.

The investigative architecture failed in essentials: there was no reliable prior verification of demand; the shadow witness did not decisively confirm demand and acceptance; and the hand-wash test was negative for the accused. In such settings, recovery from a bag attached to the accused’s vehicle—without proof of knowledgeful receipt—is insufficient. The ratio thus underscores prosecutorial burdens in trap cases and the limits of inferential guilt.

b. OBITER DICTA

While the decision is anchored in evidentiary deficiencies, the Court’s observations guide investigative rigor in trap cases. The narrative suggests that investigators should verify demand credibly before laying a trap, reflecting the emphasis seen in Mir Mustafa Ali Hasmi v. State of A.P.. The mention of the “triple test”—prior verification, shadow witness utility, and successful pH test—although argued by the defence, indicates benchmarks that enhance evidentiary confidence. The Court’s comment on the High Court’s unexplained disregard of PW3’s animus evidence functions as a reminder that appellate affirmation must engage with material defence points.

The analytical treatment of line of sight and presence implicitly advises that traps should minimize blind zones, especially where acceptance is alleged through non-contact modes such as depositing money into a container or compartment. The negative pH test here is not treated as a mere irregularity; it becomes a substantive doubt-generator when the prosecution theory presupposes contact or control.

The Court’s reliance on Suresh Thipmppa Shetty v. State of Maharashtra gestures to a broader fairness principle: in a tie of two plausible narratives, criminal law leans toward the defence. These observations, though not the holding, encourage disciplined investigation and precise reasoning when courts confront contradictory testimonial mosaics.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. Demand must be proved as a fact; recovery alone is not enough. Absent a clear, consistent, and credible account of demand, the Section 20 presumption does not arise.
ii. Where acceptance is pleaded through non-contact placement, investigators must secure visual corroboration free of ambiguity; otherwise, mere discovery in the vicinity of the accused or on his vehicle is weak.
iii. Prior verification of demand should be documented with clarity; shadow witnesses should be positioned to hear and see key exchanges; pH tests should be purposively administered to those allegedly touching currency or containers.
iv. Courts must engage material defence points, including evidence of prior animus, and provide reasons when discounting such factors.
v. Contradictions that go to the root, particularly on presence, visibility, sequence of placement, and recovery, attract benefit of doubt; minor discrepancies do not.
vi. Appellate affirmation in corruption cases should not rest on recovery alone; it should address demand, acceptance, investigative integrity, and scientific test results.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision reiterates the centrality of demand to corruption offences and reins in an overbroad use of the Section 20 presumption. The Court’s scrutiny shows care for process integrity: when the narrative turns on an atypical mode of acceptance—deposit into a motorcycle’s rexine bag—hand-wash negatives and conflicting accounts become decisive. The approach respects the constitutional values of fair trial and the presumption of innocence. It also harmonizes with the evidentiary cautions in Yogesh Singh and Krishnegowda that courts must distinguish material contradictions from trivial ones. For investigators, the ruling is a roadmap: verify demand with rigor; place shadow witnesses strategically; ensure that scientific tests speak to the precise theory of acceptance; and record movements and visibility with contemporaneous detail.

For trial courts, the message is to reason transparently when discounting defence-favouring facts, including animus. For appellate courts, it counsels restraint from treating recovery as a proxy for demand plus acceptance. On these coordinates, the acquittal here is not an indulgence but a principled application of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It preserves the credibility of anti-corruption enforcement by insisting that convictions flow from coherent, corroborated, and contradiction-resistant evidence.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh, (2017) 11 SCC 195 — quoted on treatment of contradictions and trustworthiness of evidence.
ii. Krishnegowda v. State of Karnataka, (2017) 13 SCC 98 — relied on standard of proof and impact of contradictions.
iii. Om Parkash v. State of Haryana, (2006) 2 SCC 250 — on inapplicability of Section 20 where demand not proved.
iv. Mir Mustafa Ali Hasmi v. State of A.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1689 — referenced on the need for prior verification in trap cases.
v. Rajesh Gupta v. State, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1107 — referenced on failure to prove demand.
vi. K. Shantamma v. State of Telangana, (2022) 4 SCC 574 — referenced on inadequately proven demand.
vii. Suresh Thipmppa Shetty v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1038 — referenced on choosing defence version upon reasonable doubt.
viii. Rammi v. State of M.P., (1999) 8 SCC 649; Leela Ram v. State of Haryana, (1999) 9 SCC 525; Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh, (2004) 9 SCC 186; Vijay v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191; Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police, (2012) 4 SCC 124; Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646; Mritunjoy Biswas v. Pranab, (2013) 12 SCC 796 — cited within Yogesh Singh discussion on contradictions.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7; 13(1)(d) read with 13(2); 20.