A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This analysis examines Santosh Devi v. Sunder, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 12658 of 2025, decided by a Bench of J. J.B. Pardiwala and J. R. Mahadevan on 2 May 2025, where the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP against concurrent findings of the trial and two appellate courts that the plaintiff’s suit for declaration, cancellation of sale deed No. 638 dated 26.05.2008 and rectification of mutation No. 5340 dated 29.08.2008 was barred by limitation.

The Court reaffirmed settled principles on onus of proof in cases attacking registered documents, the strict requirement of particulars when alleging fraud to invoke Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the procedural obligation under Order VII, Rule 6, CPC to plead the grounds of exemption from limitation with specificity.

The judgment underscores that mere general averments of fraud in the plaint are legally insufficient to attract the benefit of Section 17; the plaintiff must demonstrate that fraud kept her out of knowledge of the right to sue, not merely that the transactional fraud existed. The decision reiterates the presumption of authenticity of registered instruments (see Prem Singh v. Birbal), places the initial onus on challengers of registration, and clarifies that Order VII, Rule 6 is not a substantive remedy but a procedural mandate to plead exemption grounds.

The Court consequently found no error in the High Court’s dismissal of the second appeal and dismissed the SLP.

Keywords: Section 17 Limitation Act, Order VII Rule 6 CPC, registered document, fraud, onus of proof, cancellation of sale deed, limitation, mutation, presumption under Registration Act.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This case arises from a civil suit instituted in Civil Suit No. 310-RBT of 2012 before the Additional Civil Judge (SD), Ganaur, by Santosh Devi seeking declaration, mandatory and permanent injunctions to set aside sale deed No. 638 dated 26.05.2008 and mutation No. 5340 dated 29.08.2008 insofar as they recorded a ½ share in favor of the defendant Sunder.

The plaintiff pleaded that she had been defrauded into signing the sale deed and that she had paid the full sale consideration but the defendant managed to get his name recorded for half share by fraudulent means. The plaint asserted alternate points of cause of action: the date of execution/registration (26.05.2008), the date plaintiff allegedly learned of the wrong (March 2010), the date of legal notice (19.09.2012) and the last refusal by defendant (08.10.2012), framing the suit as time-barred unless exemption applied.

The trial court framed seven issues including maintainability, locus standi, clean hands, and crucially whether the suit was barred by limitation. Contested evidence showed that the plaintiff’s thumb impression/signature appeared on the registered sale deed, the deed writer and attesting witnesses testified that the contents were read over and accepted, and the endorsement by the Sub-Registrar carried the statutory presumption under Section 60(2) of the Registration Act that contents were read and explained.

The trial court therefore found that the plaintiff had contemporaneous knowledge of the execution and registration and dismissed the suit as barred by limitation. First appellate and High Court forums affirmed these findings, leading to the present SLP which primarily questioned the legal sufficiency of pleading and reliance on Section 17 read with Order VII, Rule 6 CPC. The Supreme Court, after considering the pleadings, evidence and settled precedents including Prem Singh v. Birbal and Walling Ford v. Mutual Society, examined onus, particularity in pleading fraud and the legal content of Section 17 as an exemption to start of limitation.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The transactional facts are straightforward yet legally consequential. The plaintiff and defendant reportedly acted as property brokers who collaborated in a purchase; the plaintiff claims to have paid the entire sale consideration but the registered sale deed No. 638 dated 26.05.2008 recorded ½ share each to the plaintiff and the defendant. The sale deed was registered and bears the Sub-Registrar’s endorsement that contents were read over and explained to parties.

In cross-examination the plaintiff admitted affixing his signature/thumb impression on the sale deed, conceding that he read only the “last one and a half lines” relating to payment of sale consideration, but was physically present at execution and registration and accepted the document. Attesting and executing witnesses including the deed-writer (PW.5) and vendor (PW.8) affirmed that the deed was prepared as per parties’ instructions and read over before signatures.

The plaintiff filed suit on 12.10.2012 seeking cancellation, alleging fraud in inducing his signature and claiming discovery of the wrong not earlier than March 2010, followed by legal notice in September 2012. The trial court observed that the presence of plaintiff at registration and his admission of thumb impression/signature, together with the Sub-Registrar’s endorsement, established notice of the registered instrument from its registration date; accordingly, the cause of action for cancellation accrued on registration (26.05.2008) and the suit filed in 2012 was beyond the three-year limitation period applicable to such actions.

The first appellate court reinforced that a registered deed enjoys prima facie validity and the onus to rebut that presumption lies on the challenger; it also held that the plaintiff’s remedy, if any, lay in monetary recovery or accounting rather than in cancellation since the registered instrument fairly recorded joint interest, and that Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act principles applied if one claimed to have paid entire consideration but registered another as co-owner.

The High Court, in the second appeal, examined the procedural requirement under Order VII, Rule 6 to plead specifics for exemption from limitation and agreed with earlier courts that the plaint failed to plead particulars showing that fraud kept the plaintiff out of knowledge of the right to sue—the core requirement under Section 17. The cumulative evidential picture showed contemporaneous knowledge of registration and no pleaded or proved concealment of the plaintiff’s right to sue.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether a registered sale deed executed in favour of two persons can be successfully impeached on the ground of alleged fraud without particularized pleading and sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of genuineness accorded to registered documents?

2. Whether mere general averments of fraud in the plaint are adequate to invoke the benefit of Section 17, Limitation Act, 1963, and thereby extend or postpone the running of the limitation period?

3. Whether Order VII, Rule 6, CPC imposes a procedural requirement that the plaint must show specific grounds on which exemption from the limitation law is claimed and, if so, whether failure to do so is fatal to the claim?

4. Whether fraud relating to the substance of a transaction (i.e., that the plaintiff paid the consideration but the defendant was recorded as co-owner) equates to fraud that kept the plaintiff out of knowledge of the right to sue under Section 17?

5. Whether the law of benami transactions (Section 4, Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988) affects the plaintiff’s claim to set aside a registered deed where the registered owners are not closely related and the plaintiff alleges he paid the entire consideration?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The petitioner advanced two primary contentions:

(i) that the plaint, though filed after the normal period of limitation, pleaded fraud which warranted the benefit of Section 17 of the Limitation Act because the plaintiff was kept in ignorance of his right to sue until March 2010,

(ii) that Order VII, Rule 6 CPC permits the court to permit reliance on grounds not specifically set out in the plaint where such grounds are consistent with those pleaded, thus the High Court erred in holding the plaint defective on procedural grounds.

Counsel emphasized that the plaintiff had a substantive right to have the sale deed cancelled since the entire sale consideration was allegedly paid by the plaintiff while the defendant wrongfully obtained registered title for ½ share; thus, the transaction was tainted by fraud and the limitation clock should run from discovery of fraud.

The petitioner also argued that the presumption in favour of registered documents is rebuttable by evidence of fraud and mala fide conduct and that the trial court’s reliance on Sub-Registrar’s endorsement and attesting witnesses did not erase the context of collusion and deceit.

Further, petitioner contended that the interplay between equitable relief and limitation law demands a pragmatic approach where equity demands cancellation to prevent unconscionability, technical defect in pleading should not be fatal when courts can allow amendment or permit the plaintiff to rely on additional grounds under the proviso to Order VII, Rule 6. The submission sought to distinguish authorities cited by respondents and to emphasize factual matrices which, the petitioner argued, made this case fit within Section 17 exceptions.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The respondent’s defence ran on the twin pillars of evidentiary fact and statutory prescript.

First, the respondent pointed to the registered nature of sale deed No. 638 with the Sub-Registrar’s endorsement that the document’s contents were read over and explained invoking the presumption of genuineness under Section 60(2) of the Registration Act and the principle explained in Prem Singh v. Birbal that a registered instrument is prima facie valid and the burden to rebut such presumption rests with the challenger.

Second, the respondent argued that the plaint lacked the necessary particularity to attract Section 17; mere assertions of fraud without specific facts showing concealment of the plaintiff’s right to sue is inadequate. Relying on established pleading principles, the respondent urged that Order VII, Rule 6 requires the plaint to show the grounds for exemption from limitation and that the proviso cannot be used to cure a complete absence of particularized pleading.

The respondent further contended that the plaintiff’s own admissions during cross-examination presence at registration, signature/thumb impression, and partial reading negated any claim of ignorance of the registered transaction, hence the cause of action accrued at registration and the suit filed in 2012 was hopelessly barred.

Finally, respondents relied on Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act principles to say that an allegation of payment alone cannot unsettle a registered title where parties are not closely related and proper statutory remedy to recover consideration may lie elsewhere, not in cancellation barred by limitation. Thus, the respondent urged dismissal on grounds of limitation and defective pleading.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

1. Order VII, Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — “Where the suit is instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of limitation, the plaint shall show the ground upon which exemption from such law is claimed…”; proviso allows court to permit reliance on additional consistent grounds not set out in the plaint.

2. Section 17, Limitation Act, 1963 — deals with effect of fraud or mistake; postpones commencement of limitation where the suit is based upon fraud or the knowledge of the right is concealed by fraud, or where documents necessary to establish right were fraudulently concealed; also contains provisos protecting bona fide purchasers for value.

3. Section 60, Registration Act, 1908 — endorsement by Sub-Registrar that contents were read and explained gives presumption of truth to that effect and supports the authenticity of the registered document.

4. Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 — Section 4 — addresses consequences where one claims beneficial ownership having paid consideration while registered title is in another’s name; statutory regime may affect remedy and claim structure.

5. Relevant precedent law: Prem Singh v. Birbal (2006) 5 SCC 353 (presumption of validity of registered documents), Walling Ford v. Mutual Society (1880) 5 A.C. 685 (on inadequacy of general allegations of fraud), and Janardhanam Prasad v. Ramdas (2007) 2 LJR 783 (on accrual of cause of action from registration) — all applied or discussed in the judgment.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, upholding concurrent findings of the trial, first appellate and High Courts that the suit was barred by limitation and that the plaintiff’s pleadings and proofs were insufficient to attract Section 17 exception. The Court began by noting the primary evidentiary posture: a registered sale deed existed with the plaintiff’s own signature/thumb impression and the Sub-Registrar’s endorsement that the deed had been read over and explained.

Under the settled doctrine reiterated from Prem Singh v. Birbal, such registration creates a prima facie presumption of lawful execution and veracity, placing the initial onus on the person who attacks the document to establish otherwise. The Court emphasised that where fraud is pleaded, particulars must be pleaded — general averments are insufficient; Lord Selborne’s observation in Walling Ford v. Mutual Society was followed: “general allegations however strong be the words in which they are stated, are insufficient…”

The Court examined Order VII, Rule 6 and underscored its plain language that the plaint shall show grounds on which exemption from the law of limitation is claimed; while the proviso allows the Court to permit additional grounds not set out in the plaint, this is confined to grounds not inconsistent with those pleaded and does not empower courts to permit belated reliance on wholly different exemptions absent even a foundational pleading.

Turning to Section 17, the Court parsed its four limbs and held that the statute postpones the running of limitation only where the plaintiff’s knowledge of the right to sue was kept concealed by fraud or the fraud itself prevents discovery of the cause of action. The Court found the pleaded fraud related to the transactional manner (i.e., who paid consideration and the allocation of shares) rather than concealment of the plaintiff’s right to sue; the plaintiff had signature and presence and hence contemporaneous access to knowledge of the registered title.

Therefore the plaintiff could not claim to have been kept in ignorance of the right to challenge registration. The Court also observed that even if the plaintiff had paid the entire consideration, the remedy against a co-registered owner who failed to contribute may be monetary or by account and is distinct from setting aside a registered title when the plaintiff had contemporaneous notice.

The High Court’s view that Order VII, Rule 6 is procedural and that the plaint failed to plead particular facts necessary to attract Section 17 was affirmed. Having found no error of law or perversity in the concurrent findings, the SLP was dismissed. The Court’s approach balanced evidentiary realities for registered documents against equitable doctrines, refusing to permit a broad reading of Section 17 that would allow time-barred challenges without strict pleading and proof of concealment of the right to sue.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal principle is twofold and interlinked: first, a registered document is prima facie valid and the challenger bears the initial onus to rebut that presumption; second, where fraud is pleaded to delay the commencement of limitation under Section 17, the pleadings must specify particulars demonstrating that the plaintiff was kept out of knowledge of the right to sue by fraud, not merely that the underlying transaction was tainted.

The Court held that Order VII, Rule 6 CPC requires the plaint to show the ground on which exemption from limitation is claimed and that general allegations of fraud without particularized facts are inadequate to invoke Section 17. In the facts of the case the plaintiff’s own admission of presence at execution and registration, his signature/thumb impression on the deed, and the Sub-Registrar’s endorsement meant that the cause of action for cancellation accrued from registration; the suit filed many years later was therefore barred.

Thus the ratio articulated: Section 17 operates to postpone limitation only where the fraud results in concealment of the plaintiff’s right to sue; absent such concealment and absent particularized pleading, the benefit of Section 17 cannot be invoked to defeat limitation against a registered instrument. This ratio harmonises evidentiary presumptions under the Registration Act with pleading rigour under CPC and exception rules in the Limitation Act.

b) OBITER DICTA

While the Court’s ruling rests on the above ratio, it offered obiter observations of guidance that are instructive for future property litigation. The Court noted that Order VII, Rule 6 is procedural in character; it does not create substantive relief but ensures the defendant and court are fairly apprised of the grounds relied upon to escape limitation, and the proviso cannot be used to circumvent the requirement of reasonable notice when the pleaded grounds are wholly absent.

The Court observed that where a plaintiff alleges payment of the entire consideration but the registered title is partly in another’s name, recourse to Benami law and accountancy remedies may be the appropriate remedy; cancellation of a deed recorded on registration is not always the correct remedial path if the challenger had contemporaneous knowledge or control.

The Court also remarked that courts should be cautious in allowing belated reliance on unpleaded grounds when prejudice to the defendant is likely; courts may exercise the proviso to Order VII, Rule 6 only within limits of fairness and consistency. These observations underscore judicial reluctance to expand equitable exceptions to limitation in the absence of cogent pleaded and proved facts that demonstrate concealment of the plaintiff’s right.

Such guidance, although obiter to the dispositional order, provides practical direction to litigants and trial courts on pleading, proof and remedies in disputes involving registered instruments and alleged transactional fraud.

c) GUIDELINES 

1. Plead Particulars When Relying on Fraud: Where a plaintiff seeks to invoke Section 17, Limitation Act, the plaint must set out specific facts showing how and when the fraud occurred and, crucially, how that fraud concealed the plaintiff’s knowledge of his right to sue; vague or general allegations of fraud will fail.

2. Registered Documents Carry Prima Facie Validity: Challengers of registered deeds must lead cogent evidence to rebut the presumption under Section 60(2), Registration Act; mere assertions without contemporaneous or corroborative proof are inadequate.

3. Order VII, Rule 6 is Procedural, Not Substantive: Parties must plead exemption grounds in the plaint; the proviso allows limited reliance on unpleaded but consistent grounds, not wholesale expansion of claim grounds after limitation has run.

4. Distinguish Transactional Fraud from Concealment of Right to Sue: Alleged transactional impropriety (who paid what) does not by itself demonstrate concealment of the right to challenge registration; courts should test whether the plaintiff had reasonable means to discover the fraud with diligent enquiry.

5. Appropriate Remedy Consideration: Where co-registration arises and parties claim payment disparities, plaintiffs should consider alternatives such as an account, recovery proceedings, or specific relief distinct from cancellation if limitation bars such relief; benami law may shape available remedies.

6. Trial Courts Should Scrutinise Admissions: Admissions in cross-examination about presence, signature, or reading of deed are weighty; courts must assess whether those admissions negate the very premise of concealment argued under Section 17.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This decision reaffirms doctrinal stability: registered instruments command a presumption of regularity and challengers bear a heavy initial burden particularly when alleging fraud to displace limitation. The Court’s insistence on particularity in pleading echoes classical principles of evidence and fair notice to defendants, thereby protecting title stability and procedural regularity.

Practically, litigants seeking to set aside registered conveyances must ensure early action or, if delay exists, must plead and be prepared to prove specific concealment of the right to sue that prevented discovery. The judgment also cautions receivers of equitable sympathy: a claim of having paid entire consideration will not automatically convert into a right to cancellation where the registered deed is contemporaneously known to the claimant; alternate remedies may be more apt.

For practitioners, the case is a reminder to draft plaints with precise dates, circumstances of concealment, documentary evidence of contemporaneous ignorance, and to preserve amendment opportunities early. For trial courts, the ruling provides a clear checklist: examine registration endorsements, cross-examination admissions, nature of pleaded fraud, and whether the fraud complained of pertains to transactional misdeeds or to concealment of legal right.

Finally, the judgment aligns with the policy that limitation law should not be easily evaded through vague allegations of fraud; where justice demands exception, it must be established by particularized pleading and credible proof. The SLP’s dismissal thus stands as a pragmatic reaffirmation of pleading discipline and evidentiary expectation in property litigation involving registered documents.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 S.C.C. 353.

2. Janardhanam Prasad v. Ramdas, (2007) 2 L.J.R. 783.

3. Walling Ford v. Mutual Society, (1880) 5 A.C. 685.

4. Manoj Arora v. Mamta Arora (citation relied upon in first appellate court; discussed comparatively in the judgment).

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order VII, Rule 6.

2. Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 17 (Effect of fraud or mistake).

3. Registration Act, 1908 — Section 60(2) (presumption from Registrar’s endorsement).

4. Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 — Section 4 (observed by appellate court on consequences of payment and registration).