A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Raju @ Umakant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 2377 of 2025, concerns conviction for Sections 366, 376(2)(g) and 342 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

The appellant was held guilty of abducting and wrongfully confining the prosecutrix and of participating in a gang-rape along with co-accused Jalandhar Kol. The Supreme Court, after reviewing ocular, medical and documentary material and the reasoning of the courts below, upheld convictions under Sections 366, 376(2)(g) and 342 IPC, but set aside the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act due to absence of evidence that caste identity was a ground for the offence.

The Court analysed the scope of Explanation 1 to Section 376(2)(g) and reiterated that in gang-rape prosecutions proof of common intention suffices to convict all participants even if direct proof that each individual completed the sexual act is absent. The Court relied on the prosecutrix’s credible and consistent testimony, dispensed with need for corroboration, and applied Section 114A, Evidence Act presumptions regarding absence of consent.

The judgment clarified the threshold for invoking Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act in the light of Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh and subsequent amendment to Section 3(2)(v) (2016), emphasizing that where there is no evidence that caste identity operated as one of the grounds for the crime, the special-act conviction cannot stand. Sentence was modified to equalise punishment under Section 376(2)(g) with the co-accused ten years’ rigorous imprisonment plus fine while other sentences were left undisturbed.

Keywords: Section 376(2)(g) IPC, Explanation 1, common intention, Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act, Section 114A Evidence Act, prosecutrix testimony, two-finger test, Patan Jamal Vali, abduction and wrongful confinement.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This appeal arises from convictions in Special Sessions trials where the appellant was found guilty for forcibly abducting a young woman, wrongfully confining her at multiple locations and, together with co-accused, participating in acts of sexual intercourse amounting to gang-rape under Section 376(2)(g) IPC.

The prosecutrix’s disappearance prompted a missing-person report and a subsequent recovery by police from the house of a woman associated with the appellant. The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 366, 376(2)(g) and 342 IPC, and under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act, imposing life sentence for the gang-rape offence among other punishments.

The High Court affirmed the convictions. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined primarily

(i) whether the evidence—chiefly the prosecutrix’s testimony and documentary records such as the recovery memo and FIR—sufficiently proved abduction, wrongful confinement and gang rape by a combination of acts that established common intention; 

(ii) whether special-act liability under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act was sustainable on the record. The Court also considered the role of statutory presumptions under Section 114A Evidence Act concerning consent in gang-rape prosecutions, and took the opportunity to reiterate earlier pronouncements condemning the two-finger test as a degrading practice even where the medical examination pre-dated judicial reprimands.

The background therefore blends classic issues of ocular versus medical evidence, the doctrine of common intention in multi-accused sexual offences and the intersection of general criminal law with protective caste/tribe legislation — all evaluated against the contemporaneous statutory amendments and judicial decisions such as Patan Jamal Vali and authorities on prosecutrix testimony.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The prosecutrix R and her friend attended a wedding in the night. On return, they halted and later as they walked home, R and her friend were intercepted at night. The prosecutrix deposed that two men the appellant Raju and Jalandhar Kol caught them from behind; the friend escaped while R was forcibly seized.

R stated that one accused gagged her mouth, both threatened to kill her if she cried out, and forced her onto a two-wheeler. She described being taken first to the appellant’s house situated in the fields, where she was locked in a room. She alleged that both accused sequentially committed penetrative sexual intercourse upon her  stating specifically that Jalandhar inserted his penis into her vagina and that Raju also put his penis into her vagina  and that, thereafter, she was taken to another house at Dair Salaiya and remained confined for two days.

R narrated being made to drink alcohol, being deprived of freedom, having undergarments torn, and being unable to escape due to threats. Her father promptly lodged a missing-person report; police recovered the prosecutrix from the house of LB, a woman associated with the appellant, and prepared a recovery memo signed by independent witnesses.

On giving her statement to police, an FIR was registered alleging abduction, rape, and wrongful confinement, and sections under the SC/ST Act were invoked. At trial the prosecution produced thirteen witnesses including the father, the independent witness to recovery, the investigating officer and the doctor who examined R. Defence witnesses attempted to portray the prosecutrix as a tenant at LB’s house or to suggest consensual relationship with one accused, but their testimony suffered credibility issues and contradictions with the recovery memo and other records.

The medical examiner gave no conclusive forensic injuries save a lip injury and recorded a per vaginum examination (the “two-finger test”) which later judicial pronouncements have deprecated. The trial court convicted and sentenced the appellant; the High Court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court closely scrutinised the direct testimony of the prosecutrix, the contemporaneous documentary records of recovery and FIR, the credibility of defence witnesses, and the lack of material indicating that caste identity operated as a ground for the offence under Section 3(2)(v).

The Court treated minor inconsistencies as not impairing the core narrative of abduction, confinement and forcible sexual intercourse and accepted that the accuseds acted in furtherance of a common intention to commit sexual assault.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the evidence—principally the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and the recovery memo—establishes beyond reasonable doubt the offences of abduction (Section 366 IPC), wrongful confinement (Section 342 IPC) and gang-rape (Section 376(2)(g) IPC)?

ii. Whether Explanation 1 to Section 376(2)(g) IPC permits conviction of all accused on the basis of a common intention where only some may have physically completed the sexual act?

iii. Whether the presumption in Section 114A, Evidence Act (as it stood in 2004) arises to negate consent and whether defence evidence sufficiently rebutted that presumption?

iv. Whether the ingredients of Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act are made out — i.e., was the offence committed “on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe” — given the jurisprudential evolution culminating in Patan Jamal Vali and subsequent amendment?

v. Whether the medical evidence (including the two-finger test) undermines the prosecution’s case or is susceptible to the settled rule that clear ocular testimony prevails over inconclusive medical findings?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the prosecution failed to prove that the prosecutrix was under eighteen years; that the FIR and the subsequent consent/medical forms were internally inconsistent and did not adequately implicate the appellant in the act of rape (the FIR principally named Jalandhar as the rapist); that the prosecutrix’s version contained contradictions and improvements; that defence witnesses (including DW-1 and DW-2 LB) provided alternative explanations of residence and consent; and that medico-legal evidence did not establish sexual assault.

It was contended that on the materials, at best the appellant aided or abetted and therefore could not be held guilty under the stringent rubric of Section 376(2)(g) without conclusive proof that he participated in the sexual act. The appellant challenged the invocation of the SC/ST Act on the ground that there was no causal link showing that caste identity was a ground for the offence. Lastly, the appellant argued that sentencing was harsh and deserved reconsideration in parity with co-accused.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the prosecutrix’s testimony was cogent, natural and unshaken on material particulars; that Section 114A presumption applied since the prosecutrix stated in evidence that she did not consent; that Explanation 1 to Section 376(2)(g) rendered each accused liable where acts were in furtherance of common intention and the sequence of abduction, wrongful confinement and sequential sexual assaults demonstrated such concerted action; that recovery documents and father’s missing-report established timely reporting and recovery, corroborating the prosecution narrative; that defence witnesses were interested, inconsistent and unreliable; and that medical evidence not showing definite injury did not negate the ocular testimony which takes primacy when reliable.

The State also urged that while SC/ST Act allegations were maintainable where caste infuses the offence, on the facts they relied primarily on the substantive offences under the IPC and asked the Court to uphold convictions and sentences.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 366, Indian Penal Code, 1860 — punishment for kidnapping or abducting a woman with intent that she may be compelled to marry or for forced sexual intercourse, etc.

ii. Section 376(2)(g), Indian Penal Code, 1860 — aggravated rape; Explanation 1 defining gang-rape liability where persons act in furtherance of common intention.

iii. Section 342, Indian Penal Code, 1860 — wrongful confinement.

iv. Section 3(2)(v), SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (unamended form applicable at the time of offence) — offences under IPC punishable with 10 years or more committed on the ground that the victim is an SC/ST. (Amendment 2016 later replaced the causal threshold with a knowledge standard.)

v. Section 114A, Evidence Act, 1872 (as in 2004) — presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape where the prosecutrix states lack of consent.

vi. Judicial dicta constraining use of invasive two-finger test and directing humane medico-legal protocols in sexual assault examinations.

I) JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court carefully evaluated the trial record, the prosecutrix’s testimony (PW-1), recovery memo (Exhibit P-1), FIR (Exhibit P-20), the father’s complaint (Exhibit P-3), the investigating officers’ depositions and defence witnesses.

The Court emphasised settled principles: a prosecutrix is not an accomplice; her evidence, if reliable, may be acted upon without corroboration; minor contradictions or omissions in FIR or subsequent statements do not automatically vitiate the prosecution’s case if the core testimony is trustworthy.

Applying these principles, the Court noted the prosecutrix’s consistent account of abduction, forcible confinement, threats and sequential sexual assaults by the accuseds. The occurrence of abduction and recovery from LB’s house were corroborated by the recovery memo witnessed by independent persons and by police records. The Court addressed the appellant’s reliance on the FIR’s initial emphasis on Jalandhar as the rapist and the consent form’s similar tenor, concluding that absence of explicit mention of the appellant in earlier documents did not negate his participating role once the ocular testimony established joint action.

Relying on Pramod Mahto and Ashok Kumar jurisprudence, the Court reiterated that Explanation 1 to Section 376(2)(g) embodies joint liability where a group acts in furtherance of common intention; it is not necessary that prosecution prove completed penetrative intercourse by each accused. The Court found that the abduction, confinement and forcible intercourse were tied together in a sequence revealing criminal concert and meeting of minds.

The Court invoked Section 114A to hold that, once sexual intercourse was proved and the prosecutrix stated absence of consent, the presumption of absence of consent applied; the defence failed to rebut the presumption by adducing credible evidence of a consensual relationship or prior intimate association sufficient to negate forcible assault. Concerning medical evidence, the Court observed that the doctor’s inability to give a definite opinion or presence of only minor injury did not undermine the ocular testimony; authoritative precedents uphold that clear ocular deposition prevails over inconclusive medical findings.

The Court also expressly condemned the two-finger test as degrading and reiterated directions that the practice should not be repeated and that appropriate medico-legal guidelines be observed in sexual assault examinations.

Finally, on the SC/ST Act charge under Section 3(2)(v), the Court found no evidence that caste identity was a ground for the commission of the offence in this case; relying on Dinesh alias Buddha, Asharfi and Patan Jamal Vali, the Court held that the unamended provision required a causal link (or at least caste identity as one of the grounds) and on these facts that threshold was not crossed.

Hence, while upholding the IPC convictions, the Court acquitted the appellant of Section 3(2)(v). On sentencing, the Court modified life sentence to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment for parity with co-accused for Section 376(2)(g), leaving other sentences undisturbed, and directed concurrent operation.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal conclusions are

(i) where multiple persons act in furtherance of a common intention to commit sexual assault, Explanation 1 to Section 376(2)(g) renders each participant criminally liable for gang-rape even if only some physically performed the sexual act; what is essential is proof of prior concert or concert evidenced by conduct during the commission. The Court applied this principle to the sequence of abduction, confinement and sequential intercourse established by the prosecutrix’s testimony and supporting recovery documents, thereby sustaining convictions under Sections 366, 342 and 376(2)(g) IPC.

(ii) Section 114A creates a statutory presumption of absence of consent where sexual intercourse is proved and the prosecutrix testifies that she did not consent; this presumption is rebuttable only by cogent material which was absent here.

(iii) Regarding the SC/ST Act, the authoritative test as articulated in Patan Jamal Vali and earlier precedents requires that caste identity be proven to have operated as a ground (in the pre-amendment period) for the offence; mere caste identity of the victim without evidence of discrimination or causation is insufficient to sustain Section 3(2)(v) conviction. The application of these principles to the facts mandated sustaining IPC convictions and setting aside the special-act conviction.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court took the occasion to reiterate emphatic censure of the two-finger test, describing it as “obnoxious, inhuman and degrading”, and re-urged compliance with prior directions that medical curricula, hospital protocols and training avoid the practice and ensure victims are treated with dignity.

The Court noted that even though the medical examination in this case pre-dated stricter judicial directions, the practice should not recur; any person conducting such tests contrary to directions may be guilty of misconduct. The Court also observed that treating prosecutrix testimony with automatic suspicion is inappropriate; instead courts should be conscious of interest but may rely on uncorroborated credible testimony.

Finally, the Court reflected on the evolution of Section 3(2)(v)  the 2016 amendment lowering the threshold to knowledge of caste identity  as a legislative response to the difficulty victims face in proving causation, and recognised Patan Jamal Vali’s interpretative guidance that the provision should be read to protect intersectional vulnerabilities. These remarks serve as strong guidance on medico-legal practice, judicial assessment of sexual assault testimony, and statutory interpretation of atrocity provisions.

c. GUIDELINES

i. Courts must treat prosecutrix testimony with care: do not treat her as an accomplice; if testimony is reliable and inspires confidence, conviction can follow without corroboration.

ii. In gang-rape prosecutions under Section 376(2)(g), the prosecution need not prove a completed sexual act by each accused; proof of acting in furtherance of common intention suffices. Look to sequence, conduct, threats, abduction and confinement to infer meeting of minds.

iii. Section 114A, Evidence Act, should be invoked where appropriate: once intercourse is proved and victim testifies she did not consent, absence of consent is presumed; defence must mount credible evidence to rebut.

iv. Medical evidence is important but not conclusive; where ocular testimony is clear and consistent, it will prevail over inconclusive medico-legal findings. Courts must, however, ensure medical examinations follow humane, scientific protocols and avoid invasive tests like the two-finger test.

v. For offences under Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act (pre-2016 text), prosecution must demonstrate that caste identity was a ground for the offence — mere caste identity is insufficient; post-2016 amendment the threshold is knowledge. Courts should examine evidence for causal or contributory role of caste identity, particularly in intersectional contexts.

vi. Sentencing parity between co-accused should be considered where roles are comparable; appellate courts may modify sentence for parity while keeping convictions intact.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision in Raju @ Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh is a reasoned application of well-settled criminal principles to a case where the prosecutrix’s direct testimony, recovery memo and contemporaneous complaints formed a cohesive evidentiary matrix establishing abduction, wrongful confinement and gang-rape.

The judgment reinforces that Explanation 1 to Section 376(2)(g) IPC serves to address the collective culpability of conspiratorial sexual violence; it underscores that courts should infer common intention from the sequence and manner of criminal conduct without unrealistically demanding independent proof of consummated penetration by each accused.

The Court’s reliance on Section 114A reflects a purposive approach to the statutory shield for victims in multi-perpetrator sexual offences. Simultaneously, the Court’s careful reversal of the SC/ST Act conviction is a salutary exercise in not importing protective legislation where the statutory threshold is unmet; by doing so the Court preserved doctrinal fidelity and avoided overreach.

The emphatic reproof of invasive medical practices like the two-finger test aligns judicial standards with human-rights sensitive medico-legal norms. Practically, the case provides guidance to trial courts to value credible ocular testimony, to police for prompt documentary recording of recoveries, and to appellate tribunals on sentencing parity.

The decision also illustrates how statutory amendments (post-offence) and recent interpretative jurisprudence such as Patan Jamal Vali should be factored in when considering special-act culpability. Taken together, the judgment balances victim-centric evidentiary presumptions with careful statutory construction — a measured approach that both strengthens conviction standards in sexual offence prosecutions and guards against unwarranted deployment of special-act labels absent clear evidentiary foundation.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2021) 16 SCC 225.

2. Pramod Mahto & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (1989) Supp. 2 SCC 672.

3. Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 2 SCC 143.

4. State of Rajasthan v. N.K. the Accused, (2000) 5 SCC 30.

5. Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC 1213.

6. State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384.

7. Dinesh alias Buddha v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 3 SCC 771.

8. Asharfi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2018) 1 SCC 742.

9. Lillu alias Rajesh & Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 643.

10. State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai alias Pandav Rai, (2022) 14 SCC 299.

11. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. v. Mohd. Parvez Abdul Kayuum & Ors., (2019) 12 SCC 1.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 366, 342, 376(2)(g) (Explanation 1).

2. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3(2)(v) (unamended text applicable to this offence) and the amended text (post-26 Jan 2016).

3. Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 114A (presumption as to absence of consent in certain rape prosecutions).