A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appeal challenges the Delhi High Court’s order setting aside the Sessions Court’s discharge of the appellant in FIR No. 281/2021 (registered at PS Sagarpur) alleging offences under Section 376 and Section 506, Indian Penal Code, 1860. The complainant asserted that she entered into a sexual relationship with the appellant on his promise to marry and to take care of her children, thereafter obtaining divorce from her husband in reliance on those assurances; when the appellant allegedly refused to marry and threatened her children she lodged the FIR. The Sessions Court discharged the accused under Section 227, CrPC, treating the relationship as consensual and finding no material showing dishonest inducement or criminal intimidation. The High Court reversed and ordered framing of charge. The Supreme Court, relying heavily on Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT) of Delhi and related precedents, confined its review to the narrow question whether material on record at the stage of Section 227 warranted discharge. Holding that a “mini-trial” is impermissible at the charge-framing stage and that mere breach of a marriage promise does not necessarily convert consensual sex into rape, the Court found no prima facie material to sustain Sections 376/506 and reinstated the Sessions Court order, terminating criminal proceedings. Emphasis was placed on: (i) distinction between false promise (made from outset to procure consent) and breach of promise; (ii) prolonged consensual relationship as evidencing absence of force or deceit; and (iii) limited scope of appellate/revisional interference at charge-framing stage.

Keywords: promise to marry; consensual physical relationship; Section 376 IPC; Section 227 CrPC (discharge); revisional jurisdiction.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The criminal proceedings originate from a complaint by the prosecutrix (Respondent No.2) that the appellant induced her into a sexual relationship by promising marriage and maintenance of her two children, and that she subsequently divorced her husband relying on those assurances. The prosecution charged the appellant under Section 376 (rape) and Section 506 (criminal intimidation) IPC; investigation resulted in a charge-sheet dated 15.05.2022. The trial court (Additional Sessions Judge) allowed the appellant’s Section 227 CrPC application and discharged him, concluding consent was informed and not obtained by misconception of fact. On revision, the Delhi High Court set aside the discharge order, finding prima facie material for framing charges. The narrow legal locus of the appeal to the Supreme Court was whether, on the prosecution material then available, the Sessions Court legitimately exercised its discretion to discharge or whether the High Court’s interference was justified. The Supreme Court approached the controversy through settled doctrine: charge-framing is not the occasion for a mini trial; the court must take prosecution material at face value and decide if ingredients of the offence prima facie arise. The Court imported the ratio of Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT) of Delhi (2023) to distinguish between false promise (inducement from the beginning) and an honest promise later breached — a legal distinction crucial to whether consent was vitiated by misconception of fact. The Court also noted facts like prolonged duration of the relationship, admission of physical relations by the appellant, and conduct (e.g., mangalsutra with initials) as relevant indicia pointing away from dishonest inducement.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The prosecutrix and appellant knew each other pre-2011; their relations rekindled in 2016 when both marital lives were strained. The prosecutrix alleges first physical contact on 05.02.2017 at the appellant’s brother’s rented house in Dwarka, “on promise that he will marry her after obtaining divorce from his first wife.” The appellant allegedly stayed at the prosecutrix’s house for twenty-five days, threatened not to marry if she refused sex, and persuaded her to obtain divorce from her husband (which she did in 2019). The prosecutrix contends that the appellant later refused to marry on 20.05.2021 and threatened to kill her children, prompting her to file the FIR on 05.06.2021 when he failed to appear for counselling. During investigation the appellant admitted physical relations and purchased a mangalsutra bearing the prosecutrix’s initials “Jas”. The charge-sheet (15.05.2022) charged Sections 376/506 IPC; the appellant sought discharge under Section 227 CrPC which was allowed by the Sessions Court; that order was set aside by the High Court. The Supreme Court summarizes these materials and places emphasis on the prolonged consensual nature of the relationship, admissions recorded during investigation, and absence of independent material showing dishonest inducement at the initial stage.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the facts and material on record, taken at face value at the Section 227 CrPC stage, disclose ingredients of Section 376 IPC (rape) where consent is alleged to have been obtained by promise to marry?
ii. Whether the material discloses Section 506 IPC (criminal intimidation) by the appellant?
iii. Whether the High Court, in revisional jurisdiction, was justified in setting aside the Sessions Court discharge order by undertaking detailed analysis amounting to a mini-trial?
iv. How is the distinction between a false promise and mere breach of promise to be applied at the charge-framing stage?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The sexual relationship was purely consensual; there is no evidence of coercion, force, or dishonest inducement.
ii. The prosecutrix had long knowledge of the appellant (since 2011) and the relationship continued from 2016; she was mature and aware — this defeats the premise of misconception of fact.
iii. Mere breach of a promise to marry does not convert consensual intercourse into rape under Section 375/376 IPC.
iv. The criminal prosecution is a misuse of process; at the Section 227 stage the material does not prima facie disclose the offences charged.

(The above arguments are taken from appellant’s submissions and material in the record).

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The prosecutrix entered into sexual relations solely because the appellant promised marriage and to care for her children; absent that promise she would not have consented.
ii. The appellant actively induced the prosecutrix and her family and even assured her first husband; those acts show dishonest inducement negating consent.
iii. Promise followed by refusal and threats to the children (allegedly on 20.05.2021) demonstrate criminal intimidation and vitiate consent, calling for framing of charges.

H) JUDGMENT 

The Supreme Court confined itself to the limited appellate question: whether the Sessions Court rightly exercised Section 227 CrPC powers to discharge. Citing Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT) of Delhi (2023) and other precedents, the Court reiterated that not every promise to marry which is subsequently breached converts sexual intercourse into rape under Section 375 IPC. The critical test is whether the promise was false from the very outset — i.e., made with no intention to marry merely to procure consent — and whether that false promise had direct causal bearing on the consent given. On close reading of the FIR and charge-sheet, the Court found: (a) admission of consensual relations; (b) no independent material showing dishonest inducement at the inception; (c) indicia (prolonged relationship, mangalsutra with initials, appellant’s conduct towards fulfilling promise) consistent with bona fide promise rather than premeditated deceit; and (d) absence of contemporaneous material proving criminal intimidation beyond the prosecutrix’s allegation. The Court held that the High Court over-reached by conducting an exhaustive analysis reserved for trial rather than performing the limited test at the charge-framing stage. Consequently, the Sessions Court’s discharge was upheld and criminal proceedings terminated. The Court emphasized that revisional interference is appropriate only where the order is grossly erroneous or unsupported by record; that threshold was not met.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative legal principle: At the stage of framing or discharge under Section 227 CrPC the court must take prosecution material at face value and decide only whether such material, if accepted, discloses the ingredients of the charged offence. A mere breach of promise to marry does not ipso facto vitiate consent; only where promise was false ab initio and directly induced consent can Section 375 be made out. The Court applied this ratio to facts— prolonged consensual intimacy and admissions militated against a prima facie inference of dishonest inducement or intimidation.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The judgment reiterates the prudential limits on revisional jurisdiction and cautions against converting charge-framing into a mini-trial. It underscores the evidentiary distinction between false promise and breach of promise, and implies judicial sensitivity to prosecutorial overreach where consensual adult relationships later sour. The Court also observed that conduct such as purchasing a mangalsutra bearing initials is relevant to intention and may be probative in deciding bona fides at later stages.

c. GUIDELINES

1. Trial courts must not undertake elaborate fact-finding at Section 227 stage; the test is prima facie disclosure from prosecution material alone.

2. Distinguish false promise (inducement ab initio) from breach of promise (possible later disappointment), and require proximate causal link between promise and consent for Section 375 to apply.

3. Revisional or appellate courts should exercise restraint and interfere only where trial court’s order is grossly erroneous or unsupported by record.

4. Prolonged consensual relations, admissions, and corroborative conduct (e.g., matrimonial-type gestures) are relevant indicia against imputing dishonest inducement at prima facie stage.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision reaffirms established contours of charge-framing law and preserves the safeguard that criminal prosecution should not become a forum for adjudicating disputed fact at a prima facie stage. The judgment balances protection of victims with prevention of misuse of criminal process where the available material does not remotely satisfy the threshold for rape by false promise or criminal intimidation. For practitioners, the decision is a reminder to: (a) plead and adduce contemporaneous, objective material when alleging deceitful inducement; (b) avoid converting civil/relationship disputes into criminal complaints without substantiation; and (c) deploy Section 227 effectively where facts point to prolonged consensual conduct rather than inducement. The ruling will be influential in cases where promise to marry is central, clarifying that context, duration, and corroborative acts are critical in the prima facie assessment.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
Jaspal Singh Kaural v. The State of NCT of Delhi & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1841 of 2025, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 23 : 2025 INSC 457.
Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT) of Delhi, (2023) 15 SCC 385.
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608.
State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 709.
State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 314.
Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471.

b. Important Statutes Referred
Indian Penal Code, 1860: Sections 375, 376, 506.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 227 (Discharge at framing stage).