A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appeal concerns whether recovery proceedings initiated under section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 against licensees for arrears of revised licence fees were barred by limitation, and whether an acknowledgment in writing extended limitation under section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The New Mangalore Port Trust (NMPT) issued retrospective tariff notifications (effective 20.02.2007 by TAMP Order dated 23.07.2010) and thereafter served demand notices for arrears. Licensees challenged retrospective application before a Single Judge (dismissed) and filed intra-court appeals that were admitted and remained pending. NMPT issued fresh demands (15.01.2015) and statutory show-cause notices under s.7(3) (12.08.2015); Estate Officer passed an order under s.7(1) (21.07.2016). The District Judge quashed recovery proceedings as time-barred; the High Court affirmed.

Before the Supreme Court the core questions were:

(a) whether the Limitation Act applies to PP Act proceedings (answer: yes, following New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram),

(b) whether the licensees’ written replies amounted to acknowledgments under s.18 thereby resetting limitation.

The Court held that s.18 applied: the licensees’ communication of 04.02.2015 (and subsequent replies) effectively acknowledged the claim insofar as they admitted the tariff and only disputed retrospective effect because of pending intra-court appeals. Given that acknowledgment, limitation was extended and the High Court order was set aside; the writ petitions were restored to be heard after decision of the pending intra-court appeals.

Keywords: Limitation Act, 1963; Public Premises (Eviction) Act, 1971; Section 18 acknowledgment; retrospective tariff; TAMP notification; Kalu Ram; demand notice.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The dispute arises from NMPT’s statutory tariff revisions implemented by the Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP) and the Port’s attempts to recover retrospective differences in licence fees from private licensees who occupied port land for cargo operations. NMPT’s notification dated 23.07.2010 purported to revise licence fees with retrospective effect from 20.02.2007. Licencees challenged retrospective revision in writ petitions before a Single Judge; the Single Judge upheld the retrospective revision on 28.06.2013. The licensees filed intra-court appeals which were admitted by the Division Bench and remained pending without interim stay.

After substantial gap NMPT issued demand notices (notably 15.01.2015) and statutory notices under s.7(3) of the PP Act in August 2015, culminating in an order under s.7(1). The District Judge quashed the recovery as time-barred, a finding affirmed by the High Court. NMPT appealed to this Court principally on two thrusts: that the licensees’ written replies constituted acknowledgments under s.18 of the Limitation Act, thereby extending limitation; and that the licensees could not resist recovery merely because intra-court appeals were pending. The Supreme Court framed the problem as interplay between statutory recovery procedure under the PP Act and the extension of limitation by written acknowledgment within the Limitation Act.

The Court accepted that the Limitation Act applies to PP Act proceedings (following Kalu Ram), examined the content and legal effect of the communications of 04.02.2015, 07.09.2015 and 25.02.2016, and addressed procedural propriety of proceeding while intra-court appeals remained pending.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

NMPT allotted port land to licensees in 2003 for cargo operations subject to licence fees revised periodically with TAMP approval. TAMP’s order G No.184 dated 23.07.2010 declared revised Scale of Rates effective 20.02.2007. NMPT thereafter sought arrears for the period 20.02.2007 to 23.07.2010; Assistant Estate Manager issued a demand letter dated 15.01.2015 notifying specific sums due and threatening penal interest and recovery. Licensees replied on 04.02.2015 stating that the TAMP order was under challenge in writ appeals and in intra-court appeals already admitted on 10.11.2014, arguing that enforcement during pendency would prejudice their rights.

Thereafter the Estate Officer (who was the Assistant Estate Manager Grade-1) served a statutory show-cause notice under s.7(3) on 12.08.2015; licensees reiterated the same defence by replies dated 07.09.2015 and 25.02.2016. The Estate Officer proceeded to pass an order under s.7(1) granting one month for payment and warning recovery as land revenue.

Licensees appealed under s.9 to the District Judge who consolidated appeals and quashed NMPT’s proceedings on limitation grounds (taking cause of action as 23.07.2010 and excluding an interim period), a decision affirmed by the Karnataka High Court. NMPT challenged the High Court order in the present appeals. Facts and documentary correspondence were admitted and undisputed before the Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies in full to proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 including extension provisions such as s.18?

ii. Whether the correspondence of the licensees (notably 04.02.2015) amounted to an acknowledgement in writing under s.18 so as to compute a fresh period of limitation?

iii. Whether recovery proceedings initiated by NMPT after the period prescribed by Article 52 are barred where the licensees had not sought interim relief but had filed intra-court appeals?

iv. Whether the High Court erred procedurally in dismissing NMPT’s writ petitions without awaiting the outcome of pending intra-court appeals which directly affected the issue of retrospective tariff?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellants argued that the licensees’ replies constituted written acknowledgment under s.18 and therefore restarted the limitation clock from the date of the acknowledgment, extending limitation to 03.02.2018 in relation to the 15.01.2015 demand. NMPT contended that the PP Act proceedings attracted the Limitation Act (as held in Kalu Ram) and that admitted documentary material allowed the Court to grant s.18 benefit even if not argued below. Appellant further urged that licensees’ lone defence pendency of intra-court appeals was merely dilatory and could not defeat recovery; were the court to stay or remand, both matters could be heard together and justice done without permitting unjust enrichment. NMPT insisted that notices issued prior to statutory show-cause were bona fide demands by the lessor and, in law, should be treated for acknowledging liability.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The licensees argued that s.18 could not be invoked by NMPT since the acknowledgment point was never pleaded or raised before the Estate Officer, District Judge or High Court, and it was improper to raise it for the first time in appeal. They maintained that correspondence expressly denied retrospective liability and, therefore, did not constitute an admission; the thrust of replies was that the matter was sub judice and should not be enforced. Respondents further emphasized that statutory show-cause and order under s.7 were first issued after limitation had run and, therefore, proceedings were time-barred irrespective of extra-statutory demands. They contended that any retrospectivity would be subject to judicial determination and that until reversal by a higher court there was arguable denial of retrospective effect not an admission of liability.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court first accepted that the Limitation Act applies comprehensively to proceedings under the PP Act, citing New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram as good law. The Court then examined the undisputed written correspondence. Section 18 provides that where liability is acknowledged in writing before expiry of prescribed period, a fresh limitation runs from the date of acknowledgment. The Court analyzed the explanation to s.18 specifically clause (a) which permits an acknowledgment that avers that the time for payment has not yet come and held that the licensees’ replies fell squarely within this limb. The Court noted that licensees did not deny the revised tariff; they only sought deferment pending intra-court appeals.

Since the admission that the tariff existed and payment was only being deferred was clear, the correspondence constituted acknowledgment and reset limitation. The Court rejected the technical objection that s.18 was not pleaded earlier because the facts and documents were admitted and the question was one of law arising from those admitted documents; hence the point could be considered.

The Court further reproached the High Court for proceeding with the writ petitions without awaiting intra-court appeals outcome which directly bore upon the remedial demand; the Court held it would be prudent to restore NMPT’s writ petitions to be heard after the Division Bench disposes the intra-court appeals. The Supreme Court therefore allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court order, and restored the writ petitions to be heard post disposal of the intra-court appeals.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is twofold. First, the Limitation Act applies to proceedings under the PP Act, and therefore s.18 is available to extend limitation where there exists a writing acknowledging liability. Second, a written reply which accepts the operative tariff but seeks deferment of payment because of pending appeals without denying the tariff’s validity qualifies as an acknowledgment under the explanation to s.18 (clause (a)), thereby computing a fresh limitation period from the date of such acknowledgment. Where admitted documentary material establishes acknowledgment, courts may apply s.18 even if the point was not formally pleaded below. Consequently, the mere pendency of intra-court appeals does not automatically defeat the effect of an acknowledgment and cannot be used by respondents to claim limitation where they had themselves conceded the substantive liability subject only to appeal.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed by way of obiter that tribunals and courts should exercise procedural common sense: if intra-court appeals are pending which directly determine the legal basis of a writ petition or demand, it may be appropriate to await their outcome before final adjudication, to avoid multiplicity and contradictory orders. The Court also remarked that an authority who doubles as Estate Officer must ensure statutory forms and timelines are observed; extra-statutory demands and correspondence, if relied upon to invoke limitation benefits, should be clear and coherent. The observations underscore caution against tactical delay and the abuse of the process by both parties.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. Where documentary correspondence is admitted by both sides, courts may consider s.18 consequences notwithstanding absence of specific pleading below; parties must not use form over substance to defeat limitation.

ii. An acknowledgment “averring that time for payment has not yet come” is sufficient under s.18; drafting of replies should therefore be precise if parties intend to deny liability.

iii. Authorities issuing demands under the PP Act should, where possible, use formal statutory procedures early to avoid limitation pitfalls; extraneous notices may operate as acknowledgments but may also be contested on form-and-substance grounds.

iv. High Courts and tribunals should consider staying or deferring fresh adjudication when intra-court appeals that directly affect substantive legal questions are pending, to promote judicial economy and consistency.

v. A party cannot plea laches or limitation when the same party’s conduct (admission or delay) has contributed to the timeline; equitable considerations may influence application of limitation rules.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision carefully balances the textual strictures of limitation law with practical commercial reality. By vindicating the operative scope of s.18 in the PP Act context, the Court prevents defendants from converting procedural pendency into absolute immunity where their own writings demonstrate acquiescence to the substantive claim. Simultaneously the Court protects litigational fairness by directing that the writs be heard only after intra-court appeals are decided so that the central legal question of retrospective tariff application is finally resolved.

The judgment serves as a practical lesson for public authorities: adopt clear statutory processes early; and for licensees/occupiers: be careful in correspondence a letter seeking deferment can legally operate as an acknowledgment with substantial consequence. The ruling affirms Kalu Ram’s principle that general limitation law permeates special recovery statutes unless expressly excluded and underscores the substantive over procedural approach to limitation where admitted documents reveal the parties’ real stance. The order restores the writ petitions for rehearing after the Division Bench disposes the intra-court appeals and thereby preserves coherent adjudication of the tariff question without allowing technical pleas to defeat substantive claims.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram, (1976) 3 SCC 407 (AIR 1976 SC 1637).
ii. New Mangalore Port Trust & Anr. v. Clifford D Souza Etc. Etc., Civil Appeal Nos. 1796–1828 of 2024, Supreme Court Judgment dated 03.04.2025, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 177 : 2025 INSC 440.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Limitation Act, 1963 (sections 3, 18; Article 52 of Schedule).
ii. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (sections 7(1), 7(3), 9).