A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. & Anr., Civil Appeal Nos. 4761–4762 of 2025 (3 Apr. 2025) addresses two connected questions:

(i) whether an Office Memorandum dated 29.03.2013 (which extended the age of superannuation from 58 to 60 years) that on its face applied to the visually impaired category could be read down to benefit all benchmark disabilities listed under the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016;

(ii) whether the State could validly withdraw that OM by another OM dated 04.11.2019, and if so, what effect that rescission would have on a person already claiming the benefit. The Supreme Court held that the question of extension to other disabilities was settled by Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab (the Court endorsed the High Court’s view that confining extension solely to visually-impaired employees would be discriminatory and that equivalent benefit ought to be available to other benchmark disabilities under the 1995/2016 enactments).

However, the Court also held that change in service conditions which has not been incorporated into service rules/regulations can be rescinded by the competent authority invoking the power (and in light of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act). Because no judicial order had by then vested a right in the appellant, the rescission dated 04.11.2019 removed entitlement beyond that date. The appellant was therefore entitled to continuation only up to 04.11.2019 along with wages and consequential pensionary impacts for the period 01.10.2018–04.11.2019.

Keywords: Retirement age; Persons with disabilities; Visual impairment; Office Memorandum; Rescission; Section 21 General Clauses Act; Article 14; Article 311(2).

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The present appeals arise from a writ in which the appellant, a long-served Government electrician with a permanent locomotor disability (60%), challenged his retirement on superannuation at age 58 (effective 30.09.2018) and relied upon a State OM dated 29.03.2013 that had extended retirement age to 60 for “physically handicapped (visually impaired)” employees. The appellant’s core contention was twofold: first, that confining the benefit to the visually-impaired alone breached Article 14 because the 1995 and 2016 disability statutes treat benchmark disabilities as a coherent class for the purpose of workplace benefits; second, that once the executive had granted the extension, the right could not be taken away (the OM having been withdrawn later on 04.11.2019).

The State resisted on the basis that the OM expressly applied only to the visually-impaired, that no vested right arose before withdrawal, and that rescission was within executive competence; alternatively, even if extended, the benefit could not survive a timely lawful withdrawal. There were prior judicial touchstones: the High Court of Punjab & Haryana and this Court in Bhupinder Singh (2014 order) had accepted extension to other disability categories; Devendra Kumar Pant (2009) informed the contours of equality where fitness for higher duties was in issue. The Supreme Court was thus asked to reconcile equality under the disability statutes with administrative competence to alter service conditions by OM, and to decide the temporal effect of a later withdrawal.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant was appointed 13.03.1985 as an Electrician and possessed 60% locomotor disability (documented). Service rules then provided superannuation at 58 years (last date being end of month of birthday), so the appellant was to retire on 30.09.2018 (DOB 19.09.1960). The State issued OM 29.03.2013 extending retirement from 58 to 60 for physically handicapped (visually impaired) employees. The appellant represented for extension asserting parity with other benchmark disabilities under the 1995 Act and 2016 Act and filed an Original Application before the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal (OA (M) 508/2018) seeking extension.

While proceedings were pending, the State issued OM 04.11.2019 withdrawing the 2013 OM with immediate effect. The initial OA was dismissed as withdrawn on transfer; the appellant filed CWP No.146/2020 in the High Court, which dismissed it (28.07.2021) and later refused review (22.06.2022). The Supreme Court granted leave and heard appeals. No service-rule amendment incorporating the age extension was placed on record by the State. Prior litigation in the State involving similarly situated employees produced orders applying Bhupinder Singh, and the State’s SLP against one such Division Bench order had been dismissed on 13.09.2019, events which partly motivated the rescission in November 2019.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the benefit of OM 29.03.2013 could lawfully be confined to the visually impaired category, or whether it must be extended to other benchmark disabilities recognised under the 1995 Act and 2016 Act?

ii. Whether the State could validly withdraw the 29.03.2013 OM by issuing OM 04.11.2019, and if valid, what is the legal effect of that withdrawal on the appellant’s entitlement?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The appellant argued that confining the benefit to visually-impaired employees violated Article 14 because the 1995 Act and 2016 Act recognise a set of benchmark disabilities (including locomotor disability) as a homogeneous class entitled to measures for equal opportunity; therefore parity of treatment in age extension was required.

ii. Reliance was placed upon the Bhupinder Singh line of decisions and on legislative intent that the 2016 Act amplifies, not curtails, disability rights, so the OM should be construed (or applied) to include other specified disabilities.

iii. Once the executive conferred the benefit and similar tribunals/High Courts had given relief to others, withdrawal could not retrospectively defeat vested rights for those already entitled or in course of litigation.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The State maintained the OM expressly covered only the visually-impaired and thus the appellant (locomotor disability) had no right thereunder; no vested right accrued before formal amendment of service rules.

ii. In the alternative, the State argued that even if entitlement arose, the executive had power to rescind non-statutory OMs and there was no constitutional bar to adjusting retirement age; therefore withdrawal on 04.11.2019 removed any entitlement beyond that date.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Court resolved Issue I by following and endorsing Bhupinder Singh: there was no intelligible or constitutionally permissible basis to award age-extension to only the visually-impaired when other benchmark disabilities (including locomotor disability) appear in Section 33 of the 1995 Act and are retained in the 2016 Act. The Court distinguished Devendra Kumar Pant (promotion/fitness context) because that decision dealt with fitness for higher duties and safety concerns; here incumbents were already performing duties on the posts concerned, so parity of treatment was reasonable and administratively feasible. Thus, in principle the benefit could not have been confined to the visually-impaired alone.

On Issue II the Court examined competency to make and rescind executive instructions. Noting absence of any service-rule amendment incorporating the extended retirement age, the Court applied the principle in Section 21/212 General Clauses Act that a power to issue includes power to rescind. The Court observed that an employee has no fundamental right to a particular age of retirement; termination on superannuation does not equal removal under Article 311(2). Precedent such as K. Nagaraj was cited to show executive/legislative latitude in fixing/altering retirement policy so long as rationality and nexus are preserved. The Court therefore held OM 04.11.2019 was within competence and validly withdrew the earlier OM; however, because while the earlier OM was operative the appellant fell within disabilities covered by the Acts he was entitled to continue in service up to the date of withdrawal. The Court accordingly allowed the appeals in part, set aside the High Court order, and directed the appellant be continued in service up to 04.11.2019 with wages from 01.10.2018–04.11.2019 and consequential pensionary adjustments.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The binding rationales are twofold:

(1) statutory-text and equality: where the disability statutes designate benchmark categories for employment/equal opportunity, an executive benefit extended to one such category cannot, without intelligible justification, be confined to that category alone; parity follows statutory recognition.

(2) administrative competence: absent incorporation into service rules or statutory amendment, non-statutory executive orders remain revocable under general statutory powers (General Clauses Act), and rescission does not amount to unconstitutional deprivation so long as process/power is lawful.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court reiterated that Devendra Kumar Pant remains applicable in promotion/fitness contexts where disability may impair performance or safety; the present case is distinguishable because incumbents were performing their posts. The Court underscored that superannuation is not removal within Article 311(2). It also emphasized the administrative need to incorporate permanent service-condition changes into rules/regs to create non-revocable expectations.

c. GUIDELINES

i. Where executive directives alter service conditions for a class of employees, the State should, if permanence is intended, amend the relevant service rules/regulations to avoid uncertainty.
ii. Benefits provided to a benchmark disability class under disability statutes should be extended to other benchmark disabilities absent demonstrable administrative or performance-based reasons for differentiation.
iii. Rescission of non-statutory OMs is permissible; courts will assess validity by reference to competence, rationality, and whether any vested right had crystallised by judicial order or rule amendment.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision balances equality for persons with benchmark disabilities with administrative prerogative to modify non-statutory service concessions. Practically, it confirms that executive benefits that conflict with statutory equality norms risk being read expansively (to avoid discrimination), but also that employees cannot rely indefinitely on an OM unless it is entrenched in service rules or upheld by a judicial order. For litigators, the ruling highlights two strategic points: (a) where an OM confers benefit selectively, challenge under Article 14 should stress statutory classes and administrative feasibility, drawing on Bhupinder Singh; (b) to obtain a binding, non-revocable entitlement, applicants must either secure an amendment of service rules or obtain a judicial declaration prior to administrative rescission. The Court’s direction to give wages and pensionary consequences for the operative period is a pragmatic remedy aligning rights-recognition with the legal limits of executive power.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab and Others, Civil Appeal No. 8855 of 2014 (order dated 16 Sept. 2014).
ii. Union of India v. Devendra Kumar Pant, (2009) 14 SCC 546.
iii. K. Nagaraj & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1985) 1 SCC 523.

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (India).
ii. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (India).
iii. General Clauses Act, Section 21 (power includes rescind/amend) — relied on by Court (referred to in judgment as s.212 in context).