A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey (Civil Appeal No. 13651 of 2024; 2025 INSC 348; [2025] 3 S.C.R. 469) examines two intertwined questions:

(i) the applicability of the equitable doctrine of clean hands and non-suppression of material facts to writ petitions under Article 226,

(ii) the statutory scope of the Residents’ Assembly under the Auroville Foundation Act, 1988 specifically whether the Assembly or an individual resident has any vested right to membership of committees or councils that the Governing Board constitutionally forms for implementing the approved Master Plan.

The litigation history shows serial petitions by disgruntled residents that challenged Governing Board office orders reconstituting the Auroville Town Development Council (ATDC). The High Court allowed the respondent’s second writ petition without addressing preliminary objections about nondisclosure of an earlier dismissed petition. The Supreme Court reversed: it held that a litigant invoking extraordinary jurisdiction must come with clean hands and disclose material prior proceedings; suppression of that fact is an abuse of process warranting dismissal without examining merits.

On substance the Court analysed the Act and Rules and concluded that the Governing Board alone exercises general superintendence, direction and management of the Foundation and may constitute committees and determine their composition; neither the Act nor the Rules confer a statutory right on the Residents’ Assembly or on individual residents to be members of committees constituted by the Governing Board. The impugned Standing Order No.1/2022 was held valid; the High Court’s order was set aside and costs of ₹50,000 imposed on the respondent. 

Keywords: clean hands; non-suppression of material facts; Residents’ Assembly; Governing Board; Auroville Master Plan, abuse of process, Article 226, Standing Order No.1/2022.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The Auroville Foundation Act, 1988 created a tripartite statutory structure: Governing Board, Residents’ Assembly, and Auroville International Advisory Council. The Act vests general superintendence, direction and management in the Governing Board and empowers it to appoint committees (s.16(1)) and to prepare a Master Plan in consultation with the Residents’ Assembly (s.17(e)). The Master Plan for Auroville, prepared in consultation with the Assembly and approved by the Central Government, was notified in 2010 and prescribes a Town Development Council to implement the Plan. Over years the Governing Board has issued Standing Orders to constitute and reconstitute the ATDC; the latest being Standing Order No.1/2022 (notified 01.06.2022; Gazette publication 15.07.2022).

A subset of residents repeatedly litigated against implementation steps, spawning multiple writ petitions. The respondent, having earlier challenged the same Office Order and lost (Writ Petition No. 22895/2022, dismissed 13.10.2022), filed a materially similar petition (W.P. No.25882/2022) without disclosing the earlier dismissal. The High Court entertained and allowed the second petition but did not decide preliminary objections alleging suppression of material facts.

The Governing Board appealed, raising two axes of grievance:

(a) abuse of process due to nondisclosure,

(b) misinterpretation of the Act by the High Court in holding that the Residents’ Assembly had a right to nominate ATDC members.

The Supreme Court scrutinised statutory text, the governance purpose of the statute, the legislative scheme placing primary managerial authority with the Governing Board, and the long-standing equitable rule that a litigant seeking extraordinary relief must not suppress material facts.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The Master Plan for Auroville was prepared, approved and notified after consultation with the Residents’ Assembly; it prescribes the ATDC as implementation body. The Governing Board, under delegated power and Regulation No. AF/1/2011, issued Standing Orders (2011, 2019, and 2022) reconstituting the ATDC. A stream of writ petitions by certain residents challenged aspects of the Master Plan and later the Standing Orders. Mr. Ayyanarappan and his son filed successive petitions challenging the Master Plan clauses; several were dismissed or withdrawn.

Other petitions concerning the Register of Residents led to interim directions and appeals. Natasha Storey filed W.P. No. 22895/2022 challenging the Office Order dated 01.06.2022; that petition was dismissed on 13.10.2022 but the Court directed issuance of a corrigendum clarifying statutory source. The Foundation issued Corrigendum dated 07.12.2022. Undeterred, the respondent again filed W.P. No. 25882/2022, seeking substantially identical relief but omitted to disclose the earlier dismissed petition. The High Court allowed the second petition on 15.03.2024 and set aside the Standing Order; the Foundation appealed to the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Does the doctrine of clean hands and non-suppression of material facts apply with full force to writ petitions under Article 226, and can suppression of an earlier dismissal justify dismissal for abuse of process without examining merits?
ii. Whether the Auroville Foundation Act, 1988 or the Auroville Foundation Rules, 1997 confer any statutory right on the Residents’ Assembly or an individual resident to be appointed as member of committees/councils constituted by the Governing Board (specifically to the ATDC)?
iii. Whether the High Court misinterpreted the statutory scheme in setting aside Standing Order No.1/2022 and thereby usurped the role vested in the Governing Board?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The Appellant-Foundation contended that: the respondent suppressed the fact of an earlier dismissed writ petition and thereby abused the process of court; the Governing Board is statutorily vested with general superintendence, direction and management and with powers to constitute committees and co-opt persons (ss.11(3), 16(1), 17, r.5); the Standing Order was issued under valid regulations and prior Standing Orders; neither the Act nor Rules give a right to the Residents’ Assembly or individual residents to be members of Governing Board committees; the High Court wrongly interpreted s.19 to confer participatory rights that the statute does not provide.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The Respondent-Natasha Storey argued that: the Standing Order replaced nominees of the Residents’ Assembly with Governing Board nominees, thereby affecting rights of the Assembly; s.19 contemplates that the Residents’ Assembly may formulate the master plan and establish committees to represent it, implying a participatory role in implementation bodies; the High Court’s intervention was justified to protect the Assembly’s consultative and participatory functions. (Note: the respondent did not challenge the earlier dismissal and therefore did not invite Court’s attention to that material fact.)

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Auroville Foundation Act, 1988: s.11(3) (Governing Board’s powers and composition); s.16(1) (power to appoint committees); s.17 (powers and functions of Governing Board); s.19 (functions of Residents’ Assembly).
ii. Auroville Foundation Rules, 1997: r.5 (Committees; composition and functions).
iii. Regulation No. AF/1/2011 (Standing Orders: power to notify Standing Orders not inconsistent with Act/Rules).
iv. Equitable doctrine: clean hands; authorities including S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, General Manager, Haryana Roadways v. Jai Bhagwan, Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India (principles on suppression of material facts).

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Court proceeded in two strands: threshold equitable discipline and statutory construction. On the threshold, it reaffirmed the settled equitable principle that a petitioner seeking extraordinary relief under Article 226 must approach the court with clean hands, disclosing all material and relevant facts. Reliance was placed on precedents that suppression of a material fact disentitles a litigant from relief; such conduct is an abuse of judicial process and warrants dismissal without entering merits. The Court found that the respondent had in fact filed and lost W.P. No.22895/2022 and nonetheless filed W.P. No.25882/2022 without disclosure; the High Court failed to address this preliminary objection. The Supreme Court held that the High Court should have treated the omission as material and could have dismissed the petition for abuse of process.

On the substance, the Court engaged in textual and purposive interpretation of the Act and Rules. It emphasized the statutory allocation of general superintendence, direction and management to the Governing Board (s.11(3)) and the explicit authority to appoint committees (s.16(1)) and co-opt persons (with no voting rights) (s.16(2)). s.17 enumerates Governing Board functions and expressly contemplates consultation with the Residents’ Assembly for the Master Plan (s.17(e)). The Court observed that the consultative role in s.19—advisory functions, formulation of Master Plan recommendations and committee formation by the Assembly for its own functions does not translate into a statutory right for the Assembly or any resident to demand membership in committees constituted by the Governing Board. Rule 5 likewise empowers the Governing Board to determine composition and functions of committees constituted by it.

The Court concluded that Standing Order No.1/2022 falls squarely within the Governing Board’s statutory power and regulation-making, and is not legally infirm. The High Court was faulted for misinterpreting the Act and setting aside the Standing Order; the Supreme Court set aside that order, allowed the appeal and imposed costs of ₹50,000 on the respondent for litigative misconduct.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The controlling ratios are twofold. First, a petitioner invoking Article 226 is bound by the equitable duty to disclose prior material proceedings; suppression of such proceedings is an abuse of process and justifies dismissal without adjudication on merits. Second, on statutory construction, the Act vests managerial authority in the Governing Board; the Act and Rules empower the Board to constitute committees and determine their membership and functions; s.19 confers advisory and recommendatory roles on the Residents’ Assembly but does not create a vesting right to membership of committees formed by the Governing Board. These principles combined led to the result that the impugned Standing Order was valid and the High Court order erroneous.

b. OBITER DICTA

The judgment contains emphatic commentary on the history and purpose of Auroville and the legislative intent to provide a unitary management through the Governing Board to ensure implementation of the Master Plan. The Court observed with disapproval the pattern of serial litigation by a small cluster of residents aimed at obstructing developmental works—this contextual observation reinforces the equitable doctrine but functions as obiter guidance on litigative propriety in public bodies.

c. GUIDELINES

i. Courts must treat non-disclosure of prior material proceedings as a serious preliminary objection and may dismiss petitions for abuse of process.
ii. When construing statutory bodies, the Court will give effect to the scheme allocating managerial powers; advisory roles should not be transmuted into executive or veto rights absent express statutory language.
iii. Governing Boards of statutory foundations may co-opt persons to committees without conferring voting rights, in terms consistent with s.16(2).
iv. Repeated, mala fide litigation that obstructs public administration may attract costs to deter abuse.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey reinforces two enduring doctrines of public law: equity’s insistence on candour before courts and strict fidelity to statutory allocation of powers. The decision is a firm reminder that Article 226 is an extraordinary remedy and equitable precepts govern its exercise; litigants must disclose prior proceedings or risk dismissal for abuse. Statutorily, the judgment preserves the Governing Board’s primacy in Auroville governance and implementation of the Master Plan, limiting the Residents’ Assembly to advisory and recommendatory roles as expressed in s.19. The Court’s imposition of costs signals judicial intolerance for tactical litigation that impedes institutional functioning. For practitioners, the case underscores the tactical peril in re-litigating identical issues without full disclosure and the importance of principled statutory interpretation grounded in the scheme and object of enabling statutes.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. The Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 469 (Supreme Court of India).
ii. S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 2421.
iii. General Manager, Haryana Roadways v. Jai Bhagwan & Anr., (2008) 4 SCC 127.
iv. Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India, (2007) 8 SCC 449.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Auroville Foundation Act, 1988 (Act No. 54 of 1988) — ss. 10, 11(3), 16(1), 17, 19, 31.
ii. Auroville Foundation Rules, 1997 — r.5.
iii. Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980 / Ordinance, 1980.