A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 110 : 2025 INSC 85 (Dipankar Datta & Manmohan, JJ.) examines whether the Supreme Court may expand the limited scope of notice issued when admitting a Special Leave Petition and, if satisfied on merits, entertain and decide points outside that limited notice including recording an acquittal under Article 136 and Article 142 of the Constitution read with Order LV Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. The Bench reviews precedents notably Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt v. State of Gujarat, Kutchi Lal Raeshwar Ashram Trust, Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Coop. Credit Society Ltd., and the older Spring Meadows Hospital and Taherakhatoon to articulate that where a limited notice was issued but later a patent infirmity or glaring procedural error affecting substantial justice is demonstrated, the Court retains discretion to enlarge scope at final hearing.

On facts, the appellant a Development Officer of LIC was convicted under various provisions of the IPC and under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court upheld convictions on available evidence (including the filling of six blank cheques and witness testimony) but modified the sentence in the exercise of mercy and discretion, setting the remainder of imprisonment to the period already served. The judgment thus balances procedural restraint with a justice-oriented, liberal approach to expansion of scope where necessary to avoid miscarriage of justice.

Keywords: limited notice, expansion of scope, Article 136, Article 142, Prevention of Corruption Act, concurrent findings, sentence modification.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The Court was called upon to resolve two discrete but interlinked concerns:

(i) doctrinally, whether a limited notice issued at the stage of admitting an SLP constrains the Court from later expanding the scope and deciding additional points including acquittal under its constitutional powers; and

(ii) factually, whether the appellant a Development Officer of Life Insurance Corporation of India was properly convicted under the charged sections of the IPC and the PC Act, and whether the sentence required modification. A coordinate Bench had issued limited notice confined to applicability of Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) PC Act and on sentence; leave was later granted. Counsel for appellant pressed for full-blown hearing on all errors in trial; the State relied on the limited notice.

The Bench engaged earlier authorities: Spring Meadows Hospital (restrictive stance), Taherakhatoon (discretion post-leave), the more liberal Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt and Kutchi Lal (endorsing expansion under Article 142 where justice requires). The Court recognised the tension among precedents and framed the guiding rule: where a patent infirmity or glaring procedural defect that affects substantial justice is shown, the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136, read with Article 142 and the Rules, permits enlargement of scope at final hearing to prevent miscarriage of justice. The judgment thus situates appellate discretion within a justice-centric framework while emphasising that expansion remains a judicial discretion, not an automatic entitlement.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, while serving as a Development Officer in the LICI, obtained two insurance claim settlements by projecting the insured as deceased though he was alive. Evidence included the insured’s testimony that policies had been taken to the appellant and a co-accused on promise of “upgrade”; the insured remained consistent under cross-examination. Crucially, six blank cheques filled by the appellant (Exs. 4–9) totaling Rs. 1,67,583 (sum paid to satisfy claims) could not be satisfactorily explained. Trial court convicted under multiple IPC provisions and under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) PC Act; sentences aggregated to 36 months for certain counts and 3 years for corruption offence. The High Court affirmed conviction. A coordinate Bench of the Supreme Court issued a limited notice confined to applicability of the PC Act provision and on sentence; leave was granted subsequently. On appeal the appellant relied on errors in trial findings and on precedent Manshankar Dwivedi to contend immunity; the State argued notice confined points but urged maintenance of conviction. The appellant had already undergone 22 months of custody before bail.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether this Court can expand the limited notice issued in an SLP and decide points not covered by the initial notice under Article 136 and Article 142?
ii. Whether the appellant, as a Development Officer of LICI, falls within the mischief of Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) PC Act?
iii. Whether concurrent findings of guilt under the IPC and PC Act were vitiated by legal or procedural infirmity?
iv. Whether the sentence imposed required interference or modification in the interest of justice?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The appellant urged that once leave was granted the Court retains full discretion under Article 136 and the SLP should be heard on all merits; limited notice should not bar consideration of acquittal grounds (relying on Taherakhatoon and other SLP jurisprudence).
ii. He contested applicability of the PC Act to his office by invoking State of Gujarat v. Manshankar Prabhashankar Dwivedi (distinguishing functional duty).
iii. He attacked trial findings as erroneous and urged reduction or set-aside of sentence.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The State relied on the limited order dated 3.1.2014 and submitted the Court ought not expand scope beyond the questions framed; contesting invocation of acquittal grounds not within notice.
ii. The respondent maintained that material on record (insured’s testimony; cheques) supported convictions under IPC and PC Act and that Manshankar Dwivedi was distinguishable.
iii. On sentence, the State noted statutory minima applicable at the relevant time.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Article 136, Constitution of India — special leave by the Supreme Court.
ii. Article 142, Constitution of India — powers to do “complete justice”.
iii. Order LV Rule 6, Supreme Court Rules, 2013 — procedure on SLP/appeal scope.
iv. Section 13(1)(d) & 13(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
v. Sections 120B, 465, 468, 271, 420 IPC — criminal offences charged.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Bench reconciled divergent precedents and held that issuance of a limited notice at admission is generally tentative and does not oust the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 or its power under Article 142 to pass such orders as necessary to do complete justice. The Court emphasised that expansion is not automatic: it is a judicial discretion to be exercised where a patent infirmity in the impugned judgment or a glaring procedural error affecting substantial justice is demonstrated, or where the justice of the case demands full consideration beyond initial limitation.

The Court examined Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt and Kutchi Lal as endorsing a liberal, justice-oriented approach; Spring Meadows was treated as distinguishable because it arose in a statutory consumer appeal context and pre-dated the later line of decisions. The Court applied this principle to the facts: evidence of the insured (PW-22), corroborated by the appellant’s unexplained filling of six blank cheques amounting to Rs. 1,67,583, furnished a reliable basis for the trial and High Court’s concurrent findings. The defence contention based on Manshankar Dwivedi was rejected as distinguishable there the public servant’s act did not arise from discharge of official duty in the same manner. The conviction under the IPC and PC Act was therefore upheld.

On sentence, the Court noted that the limited notice itself had invited consideration on quantum and that the appellant had already undergone 22 of 36 months’ imprisonment; the minimum sentence for the PC Act offence at the relevant time was one year. In the interest of justice and because the incident dated to 2004, the Court modified the sentence to the period already undergone and ordered discharge of remaining term; convictions remained. The appeal was thus partly allowed conviction sustained but remainder of sentence remitted.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The controlling ratio is twofold:

(i) a limited notice issued at admission does not, per se, deprive the Court of power under Article 136 and Article 142 to decide additional legal points when leave is granted; and

(ii) enlargement of scope is a judicial discretion to be exercised where doing so is necessary to prevent miscarriage of justice i.e., where patent infirmity or glaring procedural vitiation is shown. On facts, the concurrent findings supported conviction and the PC Act applied to a LICI Development Officer; sentence modification was justified by time served and justice concerns.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed that while Spring Meadows adopted a restrictive stance, later jurisprudence has shifted towards a more liberal, liberty-protective approach; nonetheless expansion of scope “cannot be a universal practice” and remains fact-sensitive. It also noted the evolving trend where a successful co-accused’s appeal may justify reopening of earlier dismissed SLPs for others similarly placed reflecting a justice-centric modern criminal jurisprudence.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. Limited notices are tentative; final benches must examine whether substantial justice requires enlargement.
ii. Enlargement should be exercised sparingly and only upon demonstration of patent infirmity or procedural vitiation affecting fairness.
iii. Where leave has been granted, all contentions may be open subject to judicial discretion and the primacy of avoiding injustice.
iv. Sentence review may be entertained where notice itself points to quantum and where custodial time served weighs on proportionality.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment strikes a pragmatic balance between procedural discipline and the Court’s constitutional duty to secure complete justice. It clarifies that limited notice at admission does not rigidly bind final resolution; discretion to expand is preserved where justice so demands. The Court’s factual treatment is careful: while upholding concurrent findings based on credible witness evidence and incriminating documentary conduct (six blank cheques), it exercised merciful moderation on sentencing given long delay and substantive custody already undergone. Practically, the decision reaffirms a liberal appellate posture in criminal matters without endorsing unfettered expansion thereby protecting both finality and liberty. For practitioners, the judgment is a pointer that counsel should preserve all meritorious points even if initial notice is limited, and that Courts will entertain enlargement only on demonstration of substantial injustice.

K) REFERENCES

1. Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 110 : 2025 INSC 85.

2. Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 6 SCC 312 (India).

3. Kutchi Lal Raeshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust v. Collector, Haridwar, (2017) 16 SCC 418 (India).

4. Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Coop. Credit Society Ltd., (2008) 12 SCC 541 (India).

5. Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat, (2023) 9 SCC 164 (India).

6. Taherakhatoon (D) by Lrs. v. Salambin Mohammad, (1999) 2 SCC 635 (India).

7. Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjol Ahluwalia, (1998) 4 SCC 39 (India).

8. State of Gujarat v. Manshankar Prabhashankar Dwivedi, (1972) 2 SCC 392 (India).

9. Constitution of India, arts. 136, 142.

10. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, §§ 13(1)(d), 13(2).

11. Indian Penal Code, 1860, §§ 120B, 465, 468, 271, 420.