A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This case tests the boundary between presence and shared criminal intention under Section 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860 where a senior police officer (Head Constable Jagdish Singh) fired the fatal shot while three subordinate constables were in the same vehicle. The trial court convicted only the shooter and acquitted the three co-occupants after finding absence of evidence of prior meeting of minds or mental participation. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the co-occupants under ss.302/34 IPC, treating their presence in the car as sufficient to infer common intention. The Supreme Court allowed appeals by the three constables, affirmed the trial court, and quashed the High Court’s conviction.

The Court reiterated settled principles: to fasten s.34 liability prosecution must prove pre-concert or prior meeting of minds and that the criminal act was in furtherance of that shared intention. Mere presence, rank relation, or following orders without evidence of shared plan or active participation cannot satisfy s.34 requirements. The Court also restated the narrow grounds on which an appellate court may disturb an acquittal patent perversity, misreading/omission of material evidence, or when only one view (guilt) is possible. The judgment relies on earlier authorities such as Ezajhussain Sabdarhussain v. State of Gujarat, Jasdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, Gadadhar Chandra v. State of West Bengal and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka to delineate the outer limits of collective liability.

Keywords: Common intention, Section 34 IPC, Acquittal interference, Patent perversity, Prior meeting of minds, Presence vs. participation.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The factual matrix arises from an interception of a Maruti car on suspicion of illegal liquor smuggling on 15 November 2004. Head Constable Jagdish Singh, accompanied by three subordinate police constables in an Indica car, attempted to stop the Maruti; when the Maruti did not halt, the Head Constable fired a single shot that struck and killed the front-seat female co-passenger. A First Information Report alleged murder by the occupants of the Indica and investigation led to separate charges: the shooter was charged and eventually convicted by the trial court; the three other occupants (appellants) were acquitted at trial on the basis that prosecution failed to prove their mental participation or common intention to commit murder. The State challenged the acquittals in the High Court, which reversed and convicted the three non-shooters under s.302 read with s.34 IPC, apparently inferring common intention from the fact of shared presence in a single vehicle operated by a superior officer.

The present appeals by the acquitted constables questioned the High Court’s inference, contending that mere presence and subordinate rank do not ground s.34 liability absent evidence of pre-concert, agreement or active facilitation. The Supreme Court’s task was twofold: assess whether the High Court could rightly disturb a reasoned acquittal, and re-examine whether the material on record established the prior meeting of minds necessary to invoke s.34. The Court analysed the evidentiary record, identification material, witness testimony, and relevant precedents to decide whether only one conclusion (guilt) was possible or whether the trial court’s acquittal remained a possible view.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 15 November 2004, police at Rishikesh received information about liquor smuggling in Maruti car DL2CR4766. At about 8:30–8:55 p.m., the Indica driven by Constable Ashad Singh and carrying Head Constable Jagdish Singh and two other constables overtook the Maruti near IDPL Gate and signalled it to stop. When the Maruti failed to stop, Head Constable Jagdish Singh fired a single shot from a 0.38 bore revolver which struck the front-seat female passenger (later identified as Manisha, wife of complainant Sanjeev Chauhan) in the temporal region; she died of cranio-cerebral injuries. The complainant, bystanders and later identification processes linked Jagdish Singh to the Indica. A FIR was registered against Jagdish and unknown constables; post-mortem confirmed bullet injury as cause of death.

Investigation led to charge sheets: one against all four accused under s.302/34 IPC, another specifically under the Arms Act against Jagdish. At trial, Jagdish was convicted and sentenced to life; the other three were acquitted because the trial court found insufficient ocular evidence, weak identification (only one identifying witness for one co-accused), reliance on G.D. entries for alibi and absence of evidence of pre-planning or shared intention. The High Court confirmed Jagdish’s conviction but overturned the acquittals, reasoning that the co-occupants’ presence in the same vehicle with the shooter sufficed to infer common intention. The State’s appeal thus raised whether such an inference could stand without proof of prior meeting of minds or active participation in the violent act.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether mere presence in the same vehicle with the shooter and subordinate rank constitute proof of a prior meeting of minds to sustain conviction under s.34 IPC?
ii. Whether the High Court was justified in disturbing the trial court’s acquittal absent patent perversity or misreading of material evidence?
iii. What is the scope of appellate interference in an appeal against acquittal under s.378 Cr.P.C.?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the trial judge conducted a thorough appraisal and justifiably acquitted the appellants due to absence of evidence showing common intention or active role in firing.
ii. It was argued that alleged assaults or other incriminating acts purportedly deposed to by PW-1 and PW-2 were first-time statements in court and lacked corroboration by independent witnesses.
iii. Reliance on general presence, subordination or the fact of being in the same vehicle cannot substitute the statutory requirement of prior meeting of minds under s.34 IPC.
iv. Interference with acquittal is permissible only if the trial court’s view is perverse; no such perversity exists here.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the High Court correctly re-appreciated evidence and drew permissible inferences to conclude that the three co-occupants had a common intention or at least played a facilitating role.
ii. The State urged that rank, conduct at scene and contemporaneous circumstances justified inferring shared intent and therefore sustain conviction under s.34.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Section 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860 — acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.
ii. Section 302, IPC — punishment for murder.
iii. Arms Act, 1959 — s.27(1), s.27(3) (use/possession of firearms in commission of offence).
iv. Sections 378 & 379, Cr.P.C. — appeal against acquittal; scope and interference.

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court’s reversal of the acquittals. The Court emphasized that s.34 requires evidence of prior meeting of minds, prearranged design or consensus to commit the specific criminal act; liability cannot rest on mere presence, rank relation, or passive accompaniment. The trial court’s findings that identification of co-accused was weak, that alibi entries existed in G.D., and that there was no material showing planning or active facilitation were reasoned and permissible. The High Court’s approach, which treated co-presence in the same vehicle as sufficient to attract s.34, was held to be legally untenable.

The Court reinforced appellate principles: an appellate court may re-appreciate evidence, but reversal of acquittal requires that the acquittal suffer from patent perversity, be based on misreading/omission of material evidence, or leave no room for any view other than guilt. On the record, two reasonable views were possible; hence interference was unjustified. Reliance on prior authorities (Ezajhussain Sabdarhussain, Jasdeep Singh, Gadadhar Chandra, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar) underpinned the decision to delineate the evidentiary threshold for collective liability. The appeals were allowed, the High Court order quashed, and the trial court’s acquittals affirmed.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal proposition is that to fasten s.34 liability the prosecution must prove that:

(i) accused persons had a common intention conceived prior to or at least contemporaneous with commission of the act;

(ii) there was a prior meeting of minds or pre-concert; and

(iii) the criminal act was done in furtherance of that common intention.

Mere presence, following orders, or being in the same vehicle with the perpetrator, without evidence of planning, encouragement, physical aiding, or mental participation, will not satisfy s.34. The appellate interference standard in acquittal appeals remains strict: reversal is permissible only in cases of patent perversity, omission/misreading of material evidence, or where only one conclusion (guilt) is possible on the evidence. These principles determine the result in favour of the appellants.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The judgment reiterates and clarifies earlier dicta that appellate courts have broad power to reappraise evidence but must respect the double presumption in favour of an acquitted accused the presumption of innocence and the reinforcement of that presumption by the trial court’s favorable view. The Court observed that labels like “substantial and compelling reasons” are rhetorical and cannot narrow appellate power; nonetheless, caution is required where two reasonable views exist. The Court also noted procedural observations about identification evidence and the need for independent corroboration where ocular testimony is equivocal.

c. GUIDELINES

i. Appellate courts should interfere with acquittal only if:

(a) the acquittal is patently perverse;
(b) there is misreading or omission of material evidence; or
(c) no two reasonable views are possible and only guilt follows.

ii. For s.34 convictions prosecution must prove pre-planning, consensus or such overt acts (encouragement, facilitation, joint acts) that demonstrate a shared intent.

iii. Presence, subordination, or mere accompaniment are insufficient to create joint liability; positive acts or clear mental participation must be established.

iv. Identification evidence must be scrutinised for reliability; single-witness identification of a co-accused requires careful corroboration before drawing inferences of common intention.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment is a measured reaffirmation of foundational criminal law norms: collective liability must be anchored in evidence of shared mens rea and not inferred from fortuitous presence or hierarchical relationships. The Court’s approach preserves the protective bias for acquitted persons while allowing reappraisal where material compels a single conclusion of guilt. For practitioners, the decision underscores two tactical strands: prosecutorial duty to collect positive evidence of prior concert or aiding acts when invoking s.34, and defence strategy to amplify evidentiary gaps (weak identification, lack of independent eyewitnesses, documentary alibi entries) to prevent impermissible inferential leaps. Academically, the case refines the jurisprudential balance between appellate reappraisal powers under Cr.P.C. and the double presumption in favour of the accused. The judgment aligns with precedents cited in the record and provides clear guidance for future prosecutions relying on s.34.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Constable 907 Surendra Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 239 : 2025 INSC 114.

2. Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, [2024] 5 S.C.R. 174 : (2024) 8 S.C.C. 149.

3. Gadadhar Chandra v. State of West Bengal, (2022) 6 S.C.C. 576.

4. Ezajhussain Sabdarhussain & Anr. v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 14 S.C.C. 339.

5. Jasdeep Singh alias Jassu v. State of Punjab, [2022] 2 S.C.R. 647 : (2022) 2 S.C.C. 545.

6. Madhusudan & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 S.C.C. OnLine S.C. 4035.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s.302, s.34.

2. Arms Act, 1959 — s.27(1), s.27(3).

3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — ss.378, 379 (appeal against acquittal).