A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Ashok Saxena v. The State of Uttarakhand Etc., (2025) 1 S.C.R. 1454 : 2025 INSC 148, addresses the applicability of the doctrine of transfer of malice under Section 301, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the scope of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC in a case where the accused entered a house armed with a knife intending to attack one person but a third person (the informant’s wife) intervened and died of a stab wound. The Trial Court had acquitted the accused; the High Court convicted him under Section 302 IPC.

The Supreme Court, while accepting that the accused had no specific intention to kill the deceased, held that Section 301 IPC operates to transfer the culpable intention to the person accidentally killed and thus prima facie supports conviction for a higher offence. However, balancing the genesis of the occurrence and circumstances of sudden affray, the Court found the facts to fall within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC and accordingly modified the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I IPC.

Sentencing was reduced to the period already undergone, having regard to the long delay since the incident (1992) and the advanced age of the accused (74 years). The judgment applies established precedents on transfer of malice while simultaneously demonstrating mercy in sentence framing where sudden fight and lack of specific intent to kill are made out on facts. Keywords: murder; culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended; transfer of malice; exception 4 to Section 300 IPC; Section 301 IPC.

Keywords: murder; Section 301 IPC; Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC; culpable homicide; transfer of malice

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arises from an incident on 25 June 1992 when the appellant Ashok Saxena and co-accused Yashpal Singh are said to have threatened and then entered the house of PW-1 Hetram while armed Ashok with a knife and Yashpal with a hockey stick. An altercation between youths at a typing centre escalated into threats and a home intrusion. The deceased (Hetram’s wife) intervened to protect her husband and received a stab wound to the abdomen; she was declared dead on arrival at hospital. The Trial Court evaluated oral and documentary evidence and acquitted both accused (judgment dated 06.11.1996). The State appealed; the High Court, on rehearing, convicted the accused under Section 302 IPC (judgment dated 14.07.2010).

Procedural irregularities before the High Court led the Supreme Court to set aside the 2010 order and remand for fresh adjudication; on re-adjudication the High Court again convicted.

The appeal to the Supreme Court raised:

(i) challenge to upsetting a reasoned acquittal;

(ii) contention that the offence attracts Section 304 Part I not Section 302 because there was no intention to kill the deceased; and

(iii) mitigation on account of the long delay (1992 incident) and the appellant’s age.

The Supreme Court confined its review to whether the High Court erred in holding the appellant guilty of murder, examined the operation of Section 301 IPC (doctrine of transfer of malice), and assessed applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. The Court applied established precedents recognizing that where an assault intended for A results in death of C, the mens rea may transfer; yet, facts showing absence of premeditated intention to kill and genesis in a sudden fight can attract Exception 4, reducing culpability to Section 304 Part I. The appeal was partly allowed by modifying conviction to Section 304 Part I IPC and ordering sentence already undergone to suffice.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The immediate factual matrix began with a heated argument at a typing centre between PW-2 Joginder (son of the informant) and Surinder (son of Yashpal). Retaliation followed; the informant complained to authorities earlier. On 25 June 1992 the informant’s nephew and Joginder were intercepted by Ashok Saxena and Yashpal Singh who threatened them while on a scooter. The boys fled home and narrated events to their parents. Later the accused reached the informant’s residence and abused and threatened them; when Hetram intervened, Ashok is alleged to have had a knife while Yashpal had a hockey stick, they chased Hetram into his house, and both trespassed inside.

The informant’s wife attempted to rescue her husband and was allegedly stabbed in the abdomen by Ashok while Yashpal held her hands. The occurrence happened around 7:45 p.m.; there were candlelight conditions. The deceased was rushed in a rickshaw and declared brought dead at hospital. Post-mortem reported a 3 cm × ½ cm cut wound on the abdomen with liver laceration and substantial internal bleeding. Inquest and FSL processes were completed; investigation resulted in charge sheet for murder. Trial evidence included testimony of PW-1 (informant) and PW-2 (son), the investigating officer and the doctor who performed post-mortem. The Trial Court acquitted; State’s appeals led to High Court conviction; upon remand Supreme Court reviewed the legal conclusions and modified the conviction to Section 304 Part I.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether, on the facts, the appellant can be held guilty of murder under Section 302 IPC when the death was of a person other than the intended target?

ii. Whether Section 301 IPC (transfer of malice) applies where an accused intentionally commits an act likely to cause death to one person but another person dies?

iii. Whether the facts fall within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, thereby reducing culpability to culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 Part I IPC)?

iv. Whether interference with a reasoned acquittal by the Trial Court was legally sustainable?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for Petitioner/Appellant submitted that the Trial Court’s acquittal should not have been disturbed absent perversity since the Trial Judge had meticulously weighed oral and documentary evidence. It was argued that the appellant had no intention to harm the deceased; his grievance was against Hetram and the act was aimed at him, not the deceased. Therefore the correct charge at best was Section 304 Part I IPC, reflecting absence of intention to cause death. Counsel further urged mitigation on the ground of long delay (incident in 1992), the appellant’s advanced age (74 years), and that he had already undergone substantial custodial sentence; thus any conviction should attract lenient sentencing.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that ocular testimony of two primary witnesses (PW-1 and PW-2) was credible and clearly established that Ashok, armed with a knife, entered the house and stabbed the deceased. The State argued that Section 301 IPC applies and transfer of malice renders the appellant liable for murder under Section 302 IPC. It was contended that immediate facts show an intentional assault with a lethal weapon in a domestic setting, causing death; therefore no exception to murder applies. The prosecution opposed reduction of sentence and urged affirmation of conviction for murder.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court framed its determination narrowly: whether the High Court erred in convicting for murder. The Court accepted the legal principle that where an accused does an act he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, and death ensues to a person other than the intended target, Section 301 IPC applies and the mens rea attaches to the actual victim. The Court relied on precedents including Gyanendra Kumar v. State of U.P., AIR 1972 SC 502; Hari Shankar Sharma v. State of Mysore, 1979 UJ 659 (SC); Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 982; and Abdul Ise Suleman v. State of Gujarat, 1995 CrLJ 464 to explain the scope of transferred malice.

The Bench, however, recognized that the genesis of the occurrence an impromptu intrusion and scuffle arising from a sudden quarrel bore attributes of a sudden fight without premeditation, and thus Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC applied to the facts. Applying that exception, the Court held that culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC was the appropriate offence. Consequently the Supreme Court modified the High Court’s conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I IPC and reduced sentence to the period already undergone, taking into account elapsed time since 1992 and the appellant’s age (74). The Court expressly declined to re-analyse the credibility of ocular witnesses in depth, concentrating on the legal characterisation of the offence. The appeals were partly allowed and disposed accordingly.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal ratio is twofold:

1. Section 301 IPC (transfer of malice) binds an accused who intentionally or knowingly does an act likely to cause death to another person even if the death is of a different person, thereby permitting conviction for the more serious offence where mens rea can be legally attributed to the unintended victim.
2. Where the factual matrix demonstrates sudden fight or lack of premeditation and the killing happens in the course of an affray begun by the deceased or by mutual provocation, Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can operate to reduce murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, warranting conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC rather than Section 302 IPC. The Court balanced these principles and applied them to the facts to modify conviction and sentence.

b. OBITER DICTA

While not central to the outcome, the Court’s remarks reiterate that appellate courts should not disturb well-reasoned acquittals unless findings are perverse; yet procedural irregularities in representation before the High Court justified remand. The Bench also emphasized proportionality in sentencing considering delay and age, indicating judicial flexibility where long pendency and humanitarian considerations exist. These observations reinforce settled appellate restraint and equitable sentencing approaches in long-standing criminal matters.

c. GUIDELINES

The judgment furnishes practical points:

(i) where death occurs to a person other than the intended, courts must first examine applicability of Section 301 IPC before downgrading the offence;

(ii) factual inquiry into genesis whether the incident arose from sudden fight without premeditation remains crucial to application of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC;

(iii) appellate courts should avoid re-weighing evidence except where trial findings are perverse;

(iv) sentencing must account for delay, age, and period already served, and be calibrated to both the legal characterisation of offence and humanitarian considerations. These guide trial and appellate courts in analogous factual matrices.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The case illustrates disciplined application of doctrinal law to contested facts. The Supreme Court correctly applied the doctrine of transferred malice (as codified in Section 301 IPC) to acknowledge that an assault intended against one person which results in the death of another can, as a legal principle, sustain a charge ordinarily attracted against the intended victim. Simultaneously, the Court’s invocation of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC reflects doctrinal nuance: culpability must be calibrated to factual genesis—pre-existing enmity and deliberate intent support murder; a sudden affray or spontaneous fight militates for reduction.

The Court avoided minute reassessment of witness credibility, a proper appellate restraint, and focused on legal classification and proportional sentencing. The modification of conviction to Section 304 Part I IPC and reduction of sentence to the period already undergone embodies both legal correctness and humane discretion, especially given the 1992 occurrence and appellant’s age. For practitioners, the judgment is instructive on pleading, framing of intent where multiple actors and unintended victims exist, and on the interplay between Section 301 IPC and exceptions to Section 300 IPC. It also signals that appellate courts must respect trial findings unless perverse yet remain vigilant to correct legal mischaracterisation of offences.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Gyanendra Kumar v. State of U.P., AIR 1972 SC 502.

2. Hari Shankar Sharma v. State of Mysore, 1979 UJ 659 (SC).

3. Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 982.

4. Abdul Ise Suleman v. State of Gujarat, 1995 CrLJ 464.

5. Ashok Saxena v. The State of Uttarakhand Etc., (2025) 1 S.C.R. 1454 : 2025 INSC 148 (subject judgment).

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860: Sections 300, 301, 302, 304 Part I.

2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: (procedural provisions relevant to investigation, committal and appeal recorded in the record).