A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This judgment considers whether the arrest of Vihaan Kumar was vitiated by non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the Constitution namely, that an arrested person must be informed, “as soon as may be,” of the grounds for arrest and related statutory obligations under Section 50 CrPC (and correlative Section 47 BNSS). The Court reiterates settled doctrine that the communication must be meaningful: sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds must be effectively imparted in a language the arrestee understands; mere notice of arrest or informing relatives does not satisfy the mandate.

The bench holds the burden to prove compliance lies squarely on the arresting agency and that contemporaneous written record (or delivery of written grounds to the arrestee) is the safest and preferred method. Where Article 22(1) is breached the arrest is rendered illegal and any remand orders flowing from that arrest are vitiated, though investigation and trial may proceed on merits. The Court applied these principles to the facts finding no proof that grounds of arrest were communicated to the appellant, noting that the police relied on after-the-fact diary entries and on informing the appellant’s wife and accordingly allowed the appeal, directed immediate release subject to trial attendance conditions, and issued directions to the State regarding handcuffing in hospital and strict compliance with Article 22 safeguards.

Keywords: Article 22(1); Section 50 CrPC; grounds of arrest; burden of proof; vitiated arrest.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal challenges the legality of arrest and subsequent custody of the appellant on grounds that the arresting agency failed to inform him of the grounds of arrest as required by Article 22(1) and Section 50 CrPC. The FIR alleged offences under ss. 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 r/w s.120-B IPC; arrest was effected on 10 June 2024 and remand sought on 11 June 2024. The High Court dismissed the challenge; this appeal revisits the core constitutional protection that an arrestee be informed of why he is deprived of liberty. The Court synthesises precedent notably Pankaj Bansal, Prabir Purkayastha and the Constitution-Bench line in Harikisan to restate that the communication must be meaningful and, ideally, in writing or reduced to a contemporaneous record to avoid “word-against-word” disputes.

The Court also emphasises the distinctness between mere information of arrest (name, time, sections) and grounds of arrest (basic facts constituting the police belief). On the factual plane, the police relied on diary entries and on informing the appellant’s wife; the Court found those insufficient to discharge the prosecution’s evidentiary burden and held the arrest unlawful and vitiated. The judgment also records grave indignities: while hospitalised the appellant was handcuffed and chained to the bed, prompting directions on custodial conduct.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The FIR (No.121/2023 dated 25 March 2023) alleged major economic/fraud offences. The appellant was arrested at his office on 10 June 2024 and taken to DLF Police Station, Gurugram; he was produced before a Judicial Magistrate on 11 June 2024. The appellant pleaded that he was not informed of the grounds of arrest and later was hospitalised at PGIMS, Rohtak where he was photographed handcuffed and chained to the hospital bed. The police response before the High Court omitted any statement that the grounds were communicated to the appellant; only his wife was said to have been informed.

In subsequent affidavits the police claimed diary entries and that the wife had been told the grounds and later shown documents, and for the first time in written submissions asserted that the remand report contained the grounds. The High Court treated the plea as “bald” and equated informing of arrest with informing of grounds; the Supreme Court disagreed and scrutinised whether contemporaneous evidence established that the appellant himself received the grounds. Finding no such proof, and rejecting reliance on after-the-fact diary entries or informing the wife, the Court held the arrest illegal and ordered immediate release subject to conditions.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether non-communication of the grounds of arrest to the arrested person vitiates the arrest under Article 22(1)?

2. What is the manner and standard for communicating the grounds so as to satisfy Article 22(1)?

3. On whom lies the burden to prove that the arrested person was informed of the grounds?

4. Whether informing relatives (e.g., wife) substitutes informing the arrested person?

5. What are the consequences of a breach of Article 22(1) for remand orders and continued custody?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellant asserted repeatedly in pleadings that he was not informed of the grounds of arrest and that therefore Section 50 CrPC and Article 22(1) were breached. Counsel relied on recent precedents (including Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha) that require meaningful communication and, where feasible, provision in writing; non-compliance renders arrest illegal and mandates release. The appellant also challenged the delay in production and the humiliating hospital restraint practice.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

State and investigating agency contended that:

(a) there was no requirement that grounds be communicated in writing;

(b) the arrest memo and case diary record details and a diary entry at 6:10 p.m. recorded that the grounds had been explained;

(c) the remand report contained the grounds; and

(d) appellant’s wife had been informed and shown documents thereby fulfilling duties under Section 50A. The respondents urged that subsequent remands and charge-sheet validated continued custody.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Court analysed constitutional text and precedent. It reaffirmed that Article 22(1) imposes a mandatory duty: an arrested person “shall be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds” of his arrest. The Court explained the functional purpose to enable legal advice, effective bail applications and testing of the police belief and linked it to Article 21 (liberty and dignity). Drawing on Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha, the Court held the communication must impart sufficient knowledge of basic facts constituting the grounds, in a language understood by the arrestee, and the mode must achieve the constitutional object.

Although Article 22(1) does not literally require written grounds, this Court endorsed the prior suggestion that furnishing written grounds is the advisable practical course to avoid later disputes. The burden to prove compliance lies on the Investigating Officer/Agency; mere diary entries without contemporaneous grounds or delivery to the arrestee are inadequate. Informing relatives or inclusion in remand reports is not a substitute for informing the arrested person. On fact, the police reply before the High Court did not deny non-communication; the later diary entry and assertion about the wife were afterthoughts.

The Court found the arrest illegal, ordered immediate release (subject to bond and trial attendance), and addressed the hospital restraint as a violation of Article 21, directing the State to issue guidelines to prevent handcuffing and chaining in hospitals and to ensure strict adherence to Article 22 safeguards. The Court clarified that an illegal arrest vitiates remand orders but does not extinguish investigation or the merits of charges.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The dispositive ratio: Non-communication of grounds of arrest to the arrestee violates Article 22(1) and Article 21; the burden of proving compliance rests on the police; contemporaneous written proof or delivery of written grounds to the arrestee is the pragmatic safeguard; informing relatives or mere arrest memos or remand reports cannot substitute for actual communication to the arrestee — and a breach vitiates the arrest and consequent remands (though not investigation/charges).

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed as guidance (obiter) that:

(i) furnishing written grounds should be standard practice to avoid disputes;

(ii) police must balance investigative needs and constitutional rights;

(iii) even if statutorily strict bail bars exist, a court may grant bail where Article 22/21 violations are established;

(iv) issues about re-arrest post-release were noted but left open.

The concurring judge emphasised Section 50A‘s purpose to inform nominated persons so that legal steps for release can be promptly taken and underlined dignity concerns about custodial restraints in hospitals.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. Police should, as a best practice, record and furnish written grounds of arrest to the arrestee in a language he understands.

2. Contemporaneous documentation of the grounds must be maintained in the case diary and/or arrest memo in sufficient detail to evidence what was communicated.

3. Informing relatives under Section 50A is complementary but cannot replace informing the arrested person.

4. Judicial Magistrates must satisfy themselves that Article 22 safeguards were complied with before granting remand.

5. Handcuffing and chaining to hospital beds to be prohibited; State to issue departmental directions and amend rules if necessary.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This judgment robustly restates constitutional safeguards against arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It balances police investigative imperatives with the arrested person’s right to know the factual basis for arrest so as to secure counsel and access remedies. Practically, the decision incentivises police to adopt transparent, contemporaneous written practices (furnishing grounds and recording delivery) thereby reducing litigation on “who said what.”

The Court’s willingness to release despite pending charges underscores the primacy of procedure in vindicating substantive fairness: procedural breaches that impair liberty are not cured by later process. The directions on humane custodial conduct in hospitals reaffirm dignity as an ineradicable component of Article 21. For practitioners, the ruling signals that challenges to arrest on Article 22(1) grounds must be met by police with documentary proof; for the State, institutional reform (guidelines, training, arrest forms with written grounds) is compelled.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 424 : 2025 INSC 162.
ii. Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576.
iii. Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254.
iv. Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra, [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 918.
v. Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 427.
vi. V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51.
vii. Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, (1969) 1 SCR 227.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Constitution of India, Arts. 21, 22(1), 22(2).
ii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 50, Section 50A (and Section 41 discussed).
iii. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Section 47, Section 35 (corresponding provisions).