A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This analysis examines Om Prakash Gupta Alias Lalloowa (Now Deceased) & Ors. v. Satish Chandra (Now Deceased), [2025] 2 S.C.R. 937 : 2025 INSC 183, decided by Dipankar Datta and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.

The core questions were:

(i) whether the High Court rightly dismissed applications for condonation of delay in substitution and thereby treated the second appeals as abated; and

(ii) the correct procedural sequence and consequences under Order XXII CPC read with Articles 120–121 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Supreme Court applied the principles in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma to emphasize a justice-oriented, pragmatic approach in condoning delay and setting aside abatement. The Court held that applications for substitution filed by the legal representatives of a deceased party are legally permissible even if not filed by the opposite party, and that a prayer for substitution may, in substance, import a prayer for setting aside abatement (relying on Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini).

The Court construed Order XXII Rule 10-A as imposing a duty on pleaders to inform the court of a party’s death and on courts to notify the other side, but stressed that mere oblique mention of death in an unrelated affidavit is not adequate compliance. Applying these principles, the Court set aside the High Court’s orders dismissing substitution/condonation applications, restored both second appeals to their original file and number, directed amendment of cause-titles and substitution of heirs, and urged prompt hearing by the High Court.

The judgment reinforces a liberal approach to abatement/condonation to secure adjudication on merits, while preserving the strict time-frame sequence under Articles 120–121 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Keywords: substitution of legal representatives; abatement; condonation of delay; Order XXII CPC; Limitation Act, 1963; Rule 10-A Order XXII; set aside abatement.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The disputes arise from very long-running suits (1972–1973) for specific performance where interlocutory proceedings and appeals stretched across decades. The procedural history records trial court dismissal, first appellate reversal (decree), and second appeals before the Allahabad High Court where stays were granted in 1977. Deaths of principal parties (respondent Satish Chandra in 1996; plaintiff Rooprani in 1991; appellant Om Prakash in 2001) generated substitution applications at different times and by different parties. Administrative/clerical omissions at the High Court failure to notice or act on substitution applications, dismissals for non-prosecution, and later execution proceedings in 2017 exposed competing claims about whether appeals had abated and whether delays in seeking substitution or setting aside abatement were excusable.

The Supreme Court, exercising Article 136 powers and applying settled precedents, examined:

(i) the scope of Order XXII and Rule 10-A;

(ii) what constitutes “sufficient cause” under Section 5 Limitation Act in the context of setting aside abatement; and

(iii) the proper chronological sequence substitution within 90 days (Article 120), then setting aside abatement within 60 days (Article 121), and only thereafter condonation under Section 5 if the 150-day window elapsed.

The Court foregrounded the need to protect substantive rights and avoid forfeiture of lis by hyper-technicality, while still enforcing the statutory time-frame logic.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The matrix includes two connected second appeals: SA No.885 of 1977 (Satish Chandra v. Om Prakash) and SA No.884 of 1977 (Rooprani v. Om Prakash). In SA-885, Satish Chandra instituted suit (Civil Suit No.264/1972) which after appeal proceedings produced a decree; Satish Chandra died on 2.12.1996, whereupon his heirs filed Civil Misc. Substitution Application No.211 of 1997 on 2.1.1997 to substitute three sons. Om Prakash died later on 8.12.2001. The High Court, however, observed lack of substitution by Om Prakash’s heirs and on 2.1.2007 recorded abatement and dismissed the second appeal. In 2017 the heirs of the deceased respondents pursued execution, prompting the heirs of appellants to apply for recall/restoration, substitution and condonation in 2018.

The High Court restored and then recalled restoration on technical grounds, ultimately dismissing the substitution/condonation applications on 27.2.2019. Parallel factual complexity existed in SA-884 concerning oblique disclosure of death in an affidavit by Anil Kumar (son) in 1992, which the Court found did not comply with Rule 10-A because date of death and clear intimation were missing. Both sets of heirs filed appeals to the Supreme Court challenging the High Court orders. The Supreme Court granted leave, permitted substitution subject to exceptions and, following fuller hearing, allowed both appeals and restored the second appeals to file and number.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the High Court rightly dismissed condonation applications and thereby treated the second appeal(s) as abated?
ii. Whether an application for substitution filed by the legal representatives of the deceased defendant/respondent suffices or must always be filed by the opposite party?
iii. Whether a prayer for substitution can be construed as a prayer for setting aside abatement when not expressly prayed?
iv. What is the correct procedural sequence under Order XXII CPC and Articles 120–121 of the Limitation Act and when does Section 5 apply?
v. Whether Rule 10-A of Order XXII has been complied with by an oblique statement in an affidavit?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellants contended that the High Court’s approach was excessively technical and denied substantive justice. They argued that the heirs of Satish Chandra had validly filed a substitution application in 1997 which put the Court on notice and that therefore the appellants were not obliged to file a fresh substitution application.

They urged that the inadvertent failure of the High Court to notice the earlier substitution application cannot be allowed to extinguish a long-standing right and that condonation should have been granted in light of the principles in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom to advance merits over procedure. They further submitted that the oblique reference to death in an unrelated affidavit ought to be read in a liberal manner for compliance with Rule 10-A, and relied on Mithailal to contend that substitution prays may inherently include setting aside abatement.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The respondents emphasized lack of diligence by Om Prakash and his heirs, pointing to instances where opportunities were given to file substitution yet none were taken; they maintained that appellant’s long inaction disentitled them from relief and that Rule 10-A and limitation rules were not complied with. They argued that permitting substitution after such prolonged lapse would prejudice the legal representatives who had acquired rights during abatement and that Article 136 relief was not warranted as the High Court’s orders were not manifestly illegal. The respondents urged the Court to respect statutory timelines and to leave execution rights open.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Court applied principles in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma to adopt a pragmatic, liberal approach for applications to set aside abatement and condone delay, stressing that “sufficient cause” must be construed reasonably, particularly where delay does not reflect mala fide or gross negligence. The Court explained the statutory chronology: substitution must be moved within 90 days from date of death under Article 120; if not, Article 121 allows 60 days to apply to set aside abatement; after 150 days in total an application to set aside abatement must be supported by a Section 5 condonation petition.

The Court held that substitution applications by heirs of the deceased defendant are legally permissible and an applica­tion filed by them in 1997 constituted a valid substitution application which the High Court failed to notice; dismissal of second appeal as abated (order dated 2.1.2007) was therefore unsustainable. The Court rejected the narrow argument that only the plaintiff/appellant can move substitution (relying on Union of India v. Ram Charan), and reiterated that a justice-oriented approach under Chinnammal v. P. Arumugham demands remediation where procedures unduly defeat substantive rights.

On Rule 10-A, the Court observed that the rule imposes a mandatory duty on pleaders to inform the court of death and on the court to give notice, but an oblique mention of death without date in an unrelated affidavit does not satisfy the rule; thus, in SA-884 the disclosure by Anil Kumar was insufficient. Still, the Court held that prayer for substitution can be read as implicitly seeking setting aside abatement (following Mithailal), and accordingly set aside abatement in both appeals, ordered substitution of heirs, restored appeals to original file and number, and directed the High Court to prioritize hearing.

The Court exercised its power under Article 136 to cure manifest illegality and avoid a travesty of justice, relying on A. Subash Babu to justify moulding relief in absence of a direct challenge to the defective orders. There was no order as to costs.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal ratios are:

(1) an application for substitution by heirs/representatives of a deceased defendant is valid even if not filed by the plaintiff/appellant;

(2) a prayer for substitution may implicitly include a prayer for setting aside abatement;

(3) the time-frame under Articles 120–121 and the proper sequence for substitution/setting-aside/condonation must be respected but applied liberally where justice demands; and

(4) Rule 10-A requires clear, unambiguous intimation to the court and to the opposite party; mere oblique references do not suffice.

These points govern how courts balance procedural strictures with the need to adjudicate causes on merits.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed obiter that when appeals lie dormant in High Courts for years, litigants are not expected to vigilantly track the status or the life events of opposite parties; greater leniency is warranted where delays arise from systemic non-listing or inadvertent non-notice. The Court also commented that Rule 10-A’s object is to prevent parties losing rights through procedural lacunae and that courts should not adopt unduly pedantic postures. Additionally, the Court indicated that Article 136 can be invoked to correct manifest illegality and mould relief to prevent travesty of justice.

c. GUIDELINES

i. Sequence: substitution within 90 days (Article 120), application to set aside abatement within next 60 days (Article 121), and only thereafter a Section 5 condonation application if >150 days.
ii. Who may apply: heirs/legal representatives may apply for substitution; the law does not mandate application by one side only.
iii. Construction of prayer: a prayer for substitution can be read as implicitly seeking to set aside abatement; courts must interpret liberally.
iv. Rule 10-A compliance: pleaders must clearly inform the court of death with date; the court must give notice unless notification is recorded in presence of opposing counsel. Oblique disclosures are inadequate.
v. Approach to condonation: apply Perumon factors liberal construction of “sufficient cause”, examine whether delay arose from system-driven dormancy, counsel’s lapse vs litigant’s, and absence of mala fides.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment marks an authoritative restatement balancing procedural certainty and substantive justice in abatement/substitution jurisprudence. By insisting on the statutory sequence under Articles 120–121 and Section 5 while reading substitution and setting aside requests liberally, the Court curbed pedantry that frustrates adjudication on merits but preserved the rule-based architecture of limitation. The decision underscores the mandatory character of Rule 10-A while clarifying what constitutes compliance, signaling that courts must be alert to ministerial omissions which may unfairly extinguish rights.

Practitioners should note:

(a) the necessity to file clear substitution/setting-aside applications within prescribed windows,

(b) that heirs can themselves move substitution, and

(c) that courts will lean towards remediating procedural lapses absent gross negligence or mala fide.

The Court’s direction for priority hearing recognizes litigational realities where decades-old suits concern specific performance and changing parties. This judgment will be a touchstone for future disputes on abatement and substitution and reaffirms the judiciary’s role in preventing procedural time-bars from supplanting substantive adjudication.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Om Prakash Gupta Alias Lalloowa (Now Deceased) & Ors. v. Satish Chandra (Now Deceased), [2025] 2 S.C.R. 937 : 2025 INSC 183.

2. Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma, [2008] 11 SCR 1 : (2008) 8 SCC 321.

3. Union of India v. Ram Charan, [1964] SCR 467 : AIR 1964 SC 215.

4. Chinnammal v. P. Arumugham, (1990) 1 SCC 513; 1 SCR 78.

5. A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P., [2011] 9 SCR 453 : (2011) 7 SCC 616.

6. Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini, (2003) 10 SCC 691; Supp. 3 SCR 822.

7. Gangadhar v. Raj Kumar, (1984) 1 SCC 121.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXII (Rules 1, 3, 4, 10-A).

2. Limitation Act, 1963 — Articles 120 & 121; Section 5.

3. Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 136.