A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 301–303 of 2025, concerns challenge to the appointment of the Chairperson of the National Commission for Homeopathy under Section 4(2) of the National Commission for Homeopathy Act, 2020. The statutory eligibility required a post-graduate degree in Homoeopathy, 20 years’ experience in the field, and at least 10 years as a “leader” explained as Head of a Department or Head of an Organisation. The Search Committee recommended the third respondent, then Director General, Central Council for Research in Homeopathy (CCRH), despite internal minutes recording doubt about whether he possessed ten years as Head.

A Departmental Order from the Secretary, GoI, asserted equivalence, and the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court upheld the appointment. The Single Judge had earlier quashed it. The Supreme Court, on review of the sealed file and office orders, held there was no cogent material before selectors to establish the required 10 years as Head, found the decision to treat lesser experience as equivalent to the statutory requirement unsupported by evidence, and characterised the departure as amounting to malice in law (legal malice) and a fraud on the public when mandatory eligibility is ignored.

The Court restored the Single Judge’s order, quashed the appointment, directed the third respondent to step down and ordered fresh selection in accordance with the statute.

Keywords: Chairperson, National Commission for Homeopathy; Eligibility criteria; Head of Department; Judicial review; Malice in law; Search Committee; Statutory equivalence; Fraud on the public; Article 16; Procedural fairness.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The NCH Act, 2020 prescribes the composition and mandatory qualifications for the Commission’s Chairperson. The statute’s express prescription that the Chairperson must possess 20 years’ experience with a minimum of 10 years as a “leader” (explained as Head of a Department or Head of an Organisation) made eligibility a threshold matter. A public notification (16.01.2021) mirrored the statutory criteria. Thirty-seven applicants applied; the third respondent serving at the CCRH was recommended by the Search Committee and appointed as the first Chairperson by Government notification dated 5 July 2021.

The appellant contested the appointment before the Karnataka High Court arguing non-compliance with the ten-year leadership requirement. The Single Judge quashed the appointment; on appeal the Division Bench reversed. The Supreme Court called for the sealed selection file, examined minutes, office orders and a Departmental Order of 6 May 2021 by the Secretary, GoI, which asserted verification of documents and equivalence. The sealed documents, however, did not demonstrate ten years as Head, and office orders instead showed the third respondent’s period as exercising Head-like functions beginning in 2011/2012 rendering him short of the statutory ten-year period at relevant cut-off dates.

The Court framed the issue as: whether selectors had lawful material to treat lesser service as equivalent and whether judicial intervention was warranted where statutory eligibility had been disregarded.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The Ministry of AYUSH advertised the Chairperson post on 16 January 2021 with eligibility mirroring Section 4(2) of the NCH Act. Among applicants, the third respondent claimed leadership since May 2008. The Search Committee meeting of 7 May 2021 recorded uncertainty: it noted it was “not clear” if the third respondent satisfied the ten-year leadership requirement and observed eligibility might be contingent upon submission and verification of documents. A Departmental Order dated 6 May 2021 by the Secretary, GoI, stated that after verification the third respondent was found to be “having the requisite experience of 10 years equivalent to Head of Department.”

The selection minutes made no reference to how this doubt was resolved. The sealed bundle produced to the Supreme Court contained office orders, work allocations, conference certificates and authored papers. Crucially, Office Order No. 906/2012-13 (11 July 2012) declared the third respondent as “Head of Office” while he was AD(H). Other orders show transfer of technical section charge on 5 Oct 2011 and reallocation on 22 Jan 2014 where another officer was made “Head of Office.” Counting from October 2011/July 2012, the third respondent fell short of ten years as Head at the material dates: he had 9 years, 3 months and 11 days on notification date, 9 years 4 months 10 days on application date, and 9 years 9 months on appointment date.

The Single Judge quashed appointment; Division Bench reversed; Supreme Court examined materials, found no credible basis for equivalence, and concluded the selection process violated mandatory statutory criteria.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the third respondent satisfied the mandatory eligibility of 10 years as a “leader” under Section 4(2) of the NCH Act, 2020?
ii. Whether selectors had lawful material to treat less than ten years’ service as equivalent to the statutory leadership requirement?
iii. Whether the Court may interfere with a Search Committee’s recommendation where statutory eligibility and procedural fairness are in apparent breach?
iv. Whether the act of appointing an ineligible candidate amounts to malice in law or a fraud on the public, permitting judicial interference?
v. Whether the appointing authority had power to relax mandatory eligibility in absence of statutory provision?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The appellant contended the third respondent did not possess ten years as Head and therefore was ineligible to be considered.
ii. The appellant asserted statutory criteria were mandatory and not subject to administrative re-writing; reliance on departmental assertions without documentary proof was impermissible.
iii. The appellant argued that selectors recorded reservations and the minutes omitted any credible resolution — demonstrating procedural unfairness and breach of the recruitment rules.
iv. The appellant maintained that allowing the appointment would be a fraud on the public and violate Article 16 principles of equality and fairness.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The Union of India and third respondent argued the Secretary’s D.O. of 6 May 2021 verified documents and equated the third respondent’s experience to that of a Head, making him eligible.
ii. It was submitted the Search Committee chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and comprising experts had examined the candidature and its decision should not be lightly set aside; judicial interference should be limited to proven malfeasance.
iii. The respondents contended organizational charts and functional responsibilities supported the claim that the third respondent acted in leadership capacity since 2008 and thus met the statutory requirement in substance.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court restored the Single Judge and quashed the appointment. The Court undertook statutory interpretation of “Head” and the Explanation defining “leader”, applying purposive construction in light of the NCH Act’s object to ensure high standards in homeopathy governance. The Court held eligibility clauses are mandatory; where statute prescribes essential qualifications and the advertisement mirrors them, administrative deviation is impermissible absent express power to relax. Examination of the sealed bundle showed absence of cogent material verifying ten years as Head. Office orders cumulatively demonstrated that the third respondent’s period as Head of Office commenced only in mid-2012 and that he was not the consistent Head prior to that.

The Secretary’s D.O. was an ipse dixit lacking supporting documents in the selection file and the Search Committee minutes conspicuously failed to record how doubts were cleared. The Court emphasised procedural fairness: if selectors harbour doubt, minutes must record resolution and material relied upon. Reliance on expert committees does not place recommendations beyond judicial scrutiny where statutory breach or legal malice appears. Applying precedents University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao, Mahesh Chandra Gupta, Distt. Collector v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi and others the Court reiterated the distinction between eligibility (objective, reviewable) and suitability (subjective, generally not reviewable).

Finding no power to relax the statutory criterion and noting the third respondent fell short by months, the Court concluded the appointment was unlawful. The Court further held the action amounted to malice in law because the authority knowingly acted without lawful excuse to depart from statute and advertisement; non-observance of mandatory requirements constituted a fraud on the public. Relief: appointment quashed; third respondent directed to step down within one week, with limited time to wind up routine work but barred from policy or financial decisions; benefits already received left intact subject to restrictions; fresh selection to be initiated.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The statutory qualification in Section 4(2) and its Explanation are mandatory; administrative authorities cannot treat non-compliance as cured by informal equivalence without documentary material. Where selectors record doubt and cannot point to credible material showing compliance, courts are obliged to enforce statutory prerequisites. Eligibility being objective is amenable to judicial review; recommendations of expert bodies are not immune from scrutiny where statutory rules are violated or legal malice appears.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed that expert committees’ opinions deserve respect but not “worship”; transparency in minutes and recording of resolutions is integral to procedural fairness. The Secretary’s assurance without documentary basis is unreliable. The Court commented on the need for public appointments to adhere scrupulously to advertised criteria to avoid fraud on the public.

c. GUIDELINES

i. Mandatory eligibility laid down by statute and advertisement must be strictly applied.
ii. If a Search Committee harbours doubt about eligibility, the minutes must state how doubts were resolved and what material was relied upon.
iii. Departures from statutory requirements require express power to relax; absent such power, deviation is unlawful.
iv. Courts will limit themselves to eligibility and procedural review, but interference is warranted where statutory breach, malice in law, or fraud on the public is shown.
v. Administrative determinations of equivalence must be anchored by documented material demonstrating functional equivalence and co-equal responsibility.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reinforces the primacy of statutory eligibility in public appointments and clarifies judicial scope: while merit review is generally excluded, objective eligibility questions are reviewable and must be supported by contemporaneous documentary material. The Court’s insistence on recorded reasons and accessible file materials strengthens administrative transparency. The classification of the appointment as malice in law and fraud on the public underscores that even short deviations from mandatory criteria cannot be regularised post facto on the basis of convenience or asserted equivalence.

Practically, selection committees and administrative officers must ensure minutes are complete, documents relied upon are on file, and any equivalence determinations are reasoned and evidenced. For future appointments under professional regulatory statutes, this decision will require strict compliance with eligibility clauses, careful drafting of advertisements, and clear record-keeping to withstand judicial scrutiny.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 15.

2. Mahesh Chandra Gupta v. Union of India, (2009) 8 SCC 273.

3. Distt. Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 655.

4. N.P. Verma v. Union of India, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 748.

5. Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437.

6. R.S. Garg v. State of U.P., (2006) 6 SCC 430.

7. Swaran Singh Chand v. Punjab SEB, (2009) 13 SCC 758.

8. Sushil Kumar Pandey v. High Court of Jharkhand, (2024) 6 SCC 162.

9. Tajvir Singh Sodhi v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 344.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. National Commission for Homeopathy Act, 2020 — Section 4(2) and Explanation to Section 4.

2. Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961.

3. Constitution of India — Articles 14 & 16.