A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appeal questions whether criminal proceedings under Sections 376, 384, 323, 504 and 506 IPC may be sustained where the complainant alleges long-standing sexual relations with the accused arising from an initial promise of marriage, but the parties continued an intimate relationship for about sixteen years and at times portrayed themselves as husband and wife.

The Supreme Court examined the credibility and temporal gaps in the complainant’s narrative, the conduct of the parties during the long period, and settled precedents distinguishing rape from consensual intercourse obtained by a mere breach of promise. Applying principles from Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra and Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court held that where the physical relationship is not shown to be directly and exclusively traceable to a false promise of marriage and continues over a prolonged period with apparent voluntary conduct, criminal liability for rape on the ground of misconception of fact is not made out.

Material contradictions in the FIR and subsequent statements, demonstrable co-habitation or conduct consistent with a live-in/marital relationship, and inordinate delay combined to render the allegations ex facie unbelievable. Allowing the prosecution to proceed would, the Court concluded, amount to an abuse of process and therefore quashed the FIR and all consequent proceedings.

Keywords: promise of marriage; vitiation of consent; prolonged consensual relationship; quashing under Section 482 CrPC; abuse of process.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arose from an application under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashment of FIR and subsequent prosecution for alleged repeated sexual assaults said to have occurred beginning in 2006 through about 2021, based on an asserted promise of marriage. The complainant, a qualified lecturer, alleged the appellant first entered her house at night and committed forcible intercourse, then continued to exploit her over years by threats, obscene video blackmail and forced abortion. The accused, who had worked earlier as a constable and later a bank clerk, contested criminality and pleaded that all intimacy was consensual and prolonged a private relationship or live-in arrangement that continued for years. The High Court dismissed the quash petition; the Supreme Court granted special leave.

Two competing contentions framed the contest: the State/complainant argued that initial deceit and subsequent coercion (including recording and blackmail) vitiated consent and thus attracted Section 376 IPC and allied offences; the appellant argued that repeated voluntary relations over sixteen years, instances where the complainant portrayed herself as the appellant’s wife, an agreement reached at a One-Stop Centre, and long delay in lodging FIR made the criminal case a manufactured attempt to punish a jilted partner.

The Supreme Court, applying doctrine from recent authority on misconception of fact and the limits of Section 90/rape jurisprudence, undertook a credibility and legal sufficiency examination at the quash stage, focusing on whether the sexual relations were directly traceable to a false promise of marriage and whether other circumstances qualified the complainant’s consent.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The complainant (Ms. A) alleged that in 2006 the appellant entered her home at night and raped her in the presence of her parents by gagging her; thereafter he promised marriage to silence her. The relationship, she said, continued intermittently when the appellant visited or invited her to his places of posting. In 2009 she alleged being drugged and filmed during a sexual assault; she later alleged the appellant caused her miscarriage by administering medicines; that he blackmailed her with intimate videos and extracted money and compliance.

In 2011 a cheque for Rs.94,000/ was allegedly taken. She made a complaint at a One-Stop Centre on 23 March 2022 and later lodged FIR dated 5 July 2022 after the appellant married another woman in April 2022. The police investigation deleted Section 313 IPC and charged the appellant under Sections 376, 384, 323, 504, 506 IPC. The appellant filed for quashment under Section 482 CrPC asserting the relationship was consensual and prolonged, that rituals akin to marriage had been performed between them, and that long delay plus the complainant’s prior conduct (describing herself as his wife) fatally undermined the prosecution case.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a long domestic/ intimate relationship continued over many years can be treated as rape where the complainant alleges an initial false promise of marriage?
ii. Whether consent given and continued over a prolonged period is vitiated by a promise of marriage, making the accused criminally liable under Section 376 IPC?
iii. Whether the High Court ought to have quashed proceedings under Section 482 CrPC given contradictions, delay and conduct of the complainant?
iv. When does allowing prosecution amount to an abuse of process at the threshold?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsel submitted the entire FIR is cooked up and the acts were consensual between two adults over about 16 years.
ii. The appellant intended to marry the complainant; rituals resembling marriage were performed; the complainant at times described herself as his wife and even filed an application before the SSP claiming marital status.
iii. Material delay and the complainant’s prolonged silence and voluntary travels to meet the appellant demonstrate absence of coercion or deception that would vitiate consent.
iv. Allowing criminal proceedings to continue in these circumstances would be a gross abuse of the process of law.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The State and the complainant submitted the appellant induced and then exploited the complainant by false assurances of marriage and later blackmailed her with obscene recordings.
ii. Repeated sexual exploitation, forced abortion and monetary extortion were pleaded as continuing crimes, thus justifying criminal proceedings.
iii. The High Court correctly rejected the quash petition because the allegations, if believed, disclosed serious offences and required trial for proper adjudication.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Section 376 IPC — Punishment for rape.
ii. Section 384 IPC — Punishment for extortion by threat of accusation.
iii. Section 323 IPC — Voluntarily causing hurt.
iv. Section 504 & 506 IPC — Insulting with intent to provoke, and criminal intimidation.
v. Section 482 CrPC — Inherent powers to prevent abuse of process and secure ends of justice.
vi. Section 90 IPC (conceptual relevance) — Consent given under fear or misconception of fact (as discussed in precedents).

I) JUDGMENT

The Court undertook a threshold legal sufficiency and credibility analysis required for quashment under Section 482 CrPC. It scrutinised the first alleged incident (2006) claimed to have occurred in the complainant’s house with her parents present and found it implausible that such an event would have occurred without any contemporaneous outcry.

The Court noted the prolonged delay (about 16 years) and that the complainant had repeatedly represented herself as the appellant’s wife at various times, even filing an application stating such status before the FIR. Material contradictions emerged between the FIR and earlier statements, and the police had not found reliable evidence to charge co-accused relatives; Section 313 was dropped by the Investigating Officer. The Court emphasised authorities that circumscribe criminal liability where sexual relations are traceable to sustained voluntary association.

Relying on Mahesh Damu Khare, the Court reiterated that to transform a broken promise of marriage into rape, the sexual relations must be directly and exclusively traceable to the false promise and not qualified by other motives or circumstances; prolonged consensual relations erode the plausibility of a continuing misconception of fact. Prashant was cited to observe the improbability of continued meetings absent voluntary consent.

Deepak Gulati was relied upon to underline that criminal liability requires proof of mala fide intention at the initial stage; mere breach does not suffice. On the facts, long-standing intimacy, conduct indicating voluntary cohabitation or acknowledgement as husband and wife, and delay in reporting persuaded the Court that the allegations were ex facie unbelievable and that continuing the prosecution would be an abuse of process. Consequently, the writ was allowed, the High Court’s dismissal set aside, and the FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive principle is that consent cannot be treated as vitiated by a promise of marriage where the physical relationship is not shown to be immediately and exclusively induced by that promise and where the parties continued to sustain voluntary relations over a long period. For criminal liability under Section 376 IPC based on misconception of fact, the false promise must exist at the inception and must be the proximate cause of the sexual act; prolonged consensual intimacy, admissions of marital status, conduct consistent with living together and unreasonable delay negate the required legal causation and credibility.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed that sexual relationships born out of love and passion are within the ambit of voluntary consent and that courts must carefully distinguish between private consensual relationships and criminal exploitation. It noted the societal sensitivities and cautioned against converting every failed romantic relationship into criminal proceedings. The judgment reiterated that facts which are prima facie inconsistent or implausible can justify quashment to prevent misuse of criminal law.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. At the quash stage, courts may examine credibility and prima facie veracity where delay, contradictions and conduct make allegations unbelievable.
ii. Courts should require demonstration that the sexual act was directly traceable to a false promise of marriage, without qualifying circumstances.
iii. Prolonged, voluntary cohabitation or representations by the complainant that she was the accused’s spouse weigh heavily against vitiation of consent.
iv. Where continuing prosecution serves no legitimate investigative or public interest and appears punitive or vexatious, quashment under Section 482 CrPC is appropriate to prevent abuse of process.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision reaffirms a cautious, evidence-sensitive approach to complaints alleging rape founded on promises of marriage. It balances protection of victims against the risk that criminal law may be weaponised in protracted consensual relationships that sour. The Court’s reliance on contemporaneous conduct and delay as strong indicators of voluntariness is consistent with prior precedent but also places a heavy weight on complainant behaviour; this invites careful judicial calibration in future cases to ensure genuine victims are not deterred by strictures against delay while preventing misuse.

Practitioners should note the strict causal test: to sustain rape on the ground of promise, the nexus between promise and the sexual act must be direct, proximate and unqualified. Where ancillary offences (blackmail, recordings, threats) are alleged, courts must still evaluate whether those offences stand independently of contested allegations about the origins of consent—and proceed to trial if credible independent evidence exists. On the present record, quashment was justified to prevent manifest abuse of the criminal process.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3471.

2. Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3375.

3. Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675.

4. Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204.

5. Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P. and Another, Criminal Appeal No. 1055 of 2025, Supreme Court of India; judgment dated 3 March 2025.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860: Sections 376, 384, 323, 504, 506; Section 90 (conceptual relevance).

2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 482 (inherent powers).