A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
The Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey ([2025] 3 S.C.R. 469; 2025 INSC 348), arising from the Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court dated 15.03.2024, examines two interrelated legal themes:
(i) the strict applicability of the equitable doctrine of clean hands and non-suppression of material facts in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution; and
(ii) the statutory contours of the roles and powers of the Governing Board and the Residents’ Assembly under the Auroville Foundation Act, 1988 read with the Auroville Foundation Rules, 1997.
The respondent filed two successive writ petitions challenging the Standing Order No.1/2022 (Notification dated 01.06.2022) that reconstituted the Auroville Town Development Council (ATDC). The first petition (W.P. No. 22895/2022) was dismissed on 13.10.2022; without disclosing that outcome the respondent filed a second petition (W.P. No. 25882/2022) seeking substantially the same relief. The High Court allowed the second petition and set aside the Standing Order.
The Supreme Court on appeal held that the High Court erred in entertaining the second petition without dealing with the material non-disclosure; suppression of the earlier dismissal amounted to abuse of process and warranted dismissal. On substantive law, the Court held that neither the Act nor the Rules confer a statutory right on the Residents’ Assembly or any individual resident to be members of committees or councils constituted by the Governing Board; the Governing Board alone enjoys the general superintendence, direction and management of the Foundation and may co-opt persons under s.16(2) (without voting rights) and frame Standing Orders under s.11(3) and r.5. The Standing Order impugned did not suffer legal infirmity. Costs of Rs.50,000 were imposed on the respondent.
Keywords: clean hands, non-suppression of material facts, Auroville Foundation Act, 1988, Residents’ Assembly, Governing Board, Standing Orders, Auroville Town Development Council, abuse of process.
B) CASE DETAILS
| Particulars | Details |
|---|---|
| i) Judgement Cause Title | The Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey. |
| ii) Case Number | Civil Appeal No. 13651 of 2024 |
| iii) Judgement Date | 17 March 2025 |
| iv) Court | Supreme Court of India (Division Bench: Trivedi & Varale, JJ.) |
| v) Quorum | Two Judges |
| vi) Author | Bela M. Trivedi, J. |
| vii) Citation | [2025] 3 S.C.R. 469; 2025 INSC 348. |
| viii) Legal Provisions Involved | Auroville Foundation Act, 1988 — ss.10–19, 31; Auroville Foundation Rules, 1997 — r.5; Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act/Ordinance, 1980 (contextual). |
| ix) Judgments overruled by the Case | None reported. |
| x) Related Law Subjects | Constitutional Law (Art.226), Administrative Law, Statutory Interpretation, Principles of Equity/Procedure (abuse of process). |
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The Auroville Foundation is a statutory corpus created by Parliament by the Auroville Foundation Act, 1988 to manage the unique international township conceived in 1968. The Act establishes three statutory authorities: the Governing Board, the Residents’ Assembly, and the Auroville International Advisory Council. The proportional allocation of powers is critical: the statute vests general superintendence, direction and management in the Governing Board (s.11(3)) while the Residents’ Assembly has advisory and recommendation functions (s.19).
The Master Plan for Auroville prepared in consultation with the Residents’ Assembly and finally approved and notified by the Central Government (gazetted 28.08.2010) envisaged an implementing structure including the Auroville Town Development Council (ATDC). Over time the Governing Board issued Standing Orders to constitute/reconstitute ATDC (notably 2011, 2019, and 2022). A pattern of recurrent litigation by certain residents attacking Master Plan provisions and administrative acts resulted in multiple writ petitions before the Madras High Court.
Against this background the respondent filed two successive writ petitions challenging the Standing Order No.1/2022; the first was dismissed on 13.10.2022 yet the respondent did not disclose this fact when filing the second petition. The High Court allowed the second petition on 15.03.2024 and set aside the Standing Order, prompting the present appeal. The Supreme Court was thus required to examine both procedural propriety (non-disclosure/clean hands) and the statutory question whether the Residents’ Assembly or an individual resident has any enforceable right to membership of committees constituted by the Governing Board.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The Mother conceived Auroville in 1968; the Government enacted the A.F. Act, 1988 to secure long-term statutory governance. The Master Plan (approved 1999; TCPO approval 15.02.2001; Gazette notification 28.08.2010) mandated a Town Development Council for implementation. The Governing Board, pursuant to its statutory remit, issued Standing Orders in 2011, replaced in 2019 and later by Standing Order No.1/2022 (Notification 01.06.2022, gazetted 15.07.2022).
The respondent, Natasha Storey, challenged the office order by filing W.P. No. 22895/2022; that petition was dismissed on 13.10.2022, but the Court directed a corrigendum to the office order which the Foundation issued on 07.12.2022. Despite the dismissal, the respondent filed W.P. No. 25882/2022 seeking substantially identical reliefs and did not disclose the earlier dismissal. The Foundation raised preliminary objections asserting suppression of material facts and abuse of process; the High Court entertained and allowed the second petition and set aside the Standing Order.
The Foundation appealed to the Supreme Court. The record also shows a history of related petitions by other residents (e.g., M. Ayyanarappan, A. Suriya, Krishna Devanandan), many dismissed or withdrawn, evidencing sustained litigation activity by a small group of disgruntled residents.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i. Whether a writ petitioner invoking Article 226 must disclose earlier proceedings and the dismissal thereof, and whether suppression of that material fact disentitles the petitioner to relief?
ii. Whether the Auroville Foundation Act, 1988 or Auroville Foundation Rules, 1997 confer any legal right upon the Residents’ Assembly or an individual resident to be members of committees/councils constituted by the Governing Board?
iii. Whether Standing Order No.1/2022 and the reconstitution of ATDC are ultra vires the Act or Rules?
F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
The Appellant-Foundation argued that the respondent filed successive petitions to obstruct implementation of the Master Plan and that the second petition was filed without disclosing the prior dismissal a material suppression amounting to abuse.
It contended that statutory text (ss.11(3), 16(1), 17, read with r.5) vests comprehensive management powers in the Governing Board, empowers it to constitute committees and co-opt persons (without voting rights), and to issue Standing Orders; therefore no statutory right exists for Residents’ Assembly members to be automatically appointed to Governing Board committees.
The Standing Order was issued within the Regulation framework (Reg. No.AF/1/2011) and did not contravene the Act or Rules. The Appellant sought restoration of the Standing Order and costs.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
The respondent contended that the impugned Standing Order violated the participatory expectations created by s.19 (functions of the Residents’ Assembly, including assisting in formulating the Master Plan) and that nominees of the Residents’ Assembly ought to be represented on the ATDC. The respondent argued that the Standing Order diminished the Assembly’s role. The High Court accepted the contention and set aside the Notification. (The record, however, shows non-disclosure of the prior dismissal.)
H) JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. The Court underscored that the doctrine of clean hands and non-suppression of material facts applies with full force in writ proceedings under Article 226. The petitioner who invokes extraordinary jurisdiction must disclose all material and correct facts; failure to do so is an abuse of process and, by settled precedent (S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, General Manager, Haryana Roadways v. Jai Bhagwan, Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India), disentitles the petitioner to relief.
The Court found that the respondent had previously challenged the same Office Order and that the dismissal on 13.10.2022 was not disclosed when the second petition was filed. The High Court’s failure to address the suppression was a serious error. On statutory interpretation, the Court examined ss.10–19 and concluded the Act vests general superintendence, direction and management in the Governing Board (s.11(3)); s.16(1) authorises appointment of committees and s.16(2) permits co-option of non-members (without vote). s.17 lists Governing Board functions, including preparation and implementation of the Master Plan in consultation with the Residents’ Assembly (s.17(e)); s.19 confines the Assembly to advisory and recommendatory roles.
Rule 5 of the A.F. Rules, 1997 records that the Governing Board determines composition and functions of committees it constitutes. The Court held that neither the Act nor the Rules confer a right on the Assembly or any resident to be part of committees constituted by the Governing Board. The Master Plan had already been approved and gazetted; the Standing Orders issued for ATDC implementation were within statutory competence.
Consequently the High Court misinterpreted the Act and erred in setting aside the Standing Order. The appeal was allowed; costs of Rs.50,000 were imposed on the respondent to deter repetitive, obstructive litigation.
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
The core ratio is twofold:
(i) a litigant invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction must come with clean hands and fully disclose prior material proceedings suppression warrants dismissal irrespective of merits;
(ii) the A.F. Act and Rules vest management and committee-forming powers in the Governing Board; s.16 and r.5 enable the Governing Board to constitute committees and co-opt persons (sans vote), and s.19 confines the Residents’ Assembly to advisory functions therefore no enforceable right exists for residents to claim membership in committees constituted by the Governing Board.
b. OBITER DICTA
The Court observed (obiter) on the historical trajectory of Auroville and the care with which Parliament framed the governance architecture to balance resident participation with central supervision. It emphasized public interest in preventing repeated, unnecessary litigation that obstructs statutory development projects. The observations caution litigants and courts to curtail procedural abuses that frustrate administrative functions.
c. GUIDELINES
The judgment furnishes practical guidance:
(i) High Courts should scrutinize pleadings for disclosure of prior related proceedings and treat suppression as an abuse of process;
(ii) courts should avoid entertaining repetitious petitions without adjudicating preliminary objections on maintainability and suppression;
(iii) statutory bodies may frame Standing Orders under empowering provisions and such orders will be respected unless shown to be inconsistent with statute/rules. These guidelines reinforce procedural discipline and statutory primacy in institutional governance.
I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The decision restores statutory balance between the Governing Board and the Residents’ Assembly: while resident participation is legislatively recognised, it is not elevated into a proprietary or enforceable right to membership of Governing Board committees. Procedurally the Court reaffirms an uncompromising stance against suppression of material facts in writ litigation a principle of equity that safeguards judicial process and administrative efficacy.
The imposition of costs signals deterrence against tactical, repetitive petitions aimed at delaying public projects. For practitioners, the case is a reminder to canvass complete procedural history in writs and to raise preliminary objections promptly; for statutory bodies, it validates the use of Standing Orders and co-option mechanisms where authorised.
J) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
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S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 2421 (S.C.).
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General Manager, Haryana Roadways v. Jai Bhagwan & Anr., (2008) 4 SCC 127.
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Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India, (2007) 8 SCC 449.
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The Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 469; 2025 INSC 348 (S.C.).
b. Important Statutes Referred
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Auroville Foundation Act, 1988, Act No. 54 of 1988.
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Auroville Foundation Rules, 1997 (Ministry notification dated 10.11.1997).
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Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act/Ordinance, 1980 (contextual history).