A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Jothiragawan v. State Rep. By The Inspector of Police & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1434 of 2025 (Supreme Court of India, K. Vinod Chandran, J., 24 March 2025) examines whether criminal proceedings alleging rape and cheating should be quashed under the inherent powers of the High Court in Section 482, Cr.P.C..

The victim and accused were close relatives who admitted a prior relationship and three instances of sexual intercourse occurring after meetings and visits. The High Court refused quashing, relying on a precedent (Prithvirajan). On appeal the Supreme Court closely analysed the FIR and statements to determine whether the ingredients of Section 376, IPC were made out or whether proceedings would amount to an abuse of process.

The Court found no evidence that promise of marriage preceded the first intercourse and concluded the alleged promise, if any, was made after sexual intercourse; the victim repeatedly accompanied the accused willingly to hotel rooms; statements contained inconsistent contentions of both consent and force; and the sequence of events made inducement by prior promise improbable.

The Court held that where the complainant’s own statements show a consensual relationship and the promise of marriage (if asserted) arose after intercourse, continuation of prosecution would be an abuse of process. Exercising Section 482, Cr.P.C., the Court quashed the proceedings.

The decision emphasises careful scrutiny of preliminary statements where alleged consent and inducement overlap, and draws a limiting principle on invoking criminal process where material averments contradict each other and suggest abuse.

Keywords: promise of marriage; quashing; abuse of process; Section 482 Cr.P.C.; Section 376 IPC; consent; inducement; hotel room; close relatives.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The present appeal arises from an order of the High Court of Madras dismissing an application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of criminal proceedings in which the complainant alleged that the accused had coerced her into sexual intercourse on three occasions by promising marriage and thereafter refusing to solemnise it. The parties were young adults and closely related; a prior intimate relationship was admitted by both.

The High Court considered material relied upon by the prosecution and followed a recent decision in Prithvirajan to deny interference. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether, on the face of the FIR and statements made to police, the ingredients of Section 376, IPC (rape) are prima facie made out or whether continuation of trial would be an abuse of the court’s process.

The Court framed the issue around the sequencing and content of statements: whether a promise of marriage induced consent before intercourse (which could attract Section 90, IPC analysis) or whether the alleged promise came after intercourse and the victim’s own narrative reveals inconsistent averments of consent and force.

The background thus compels scrutiny of whether criminal law is being used where a consensual relationship later gives rise to complaint, and whether this jurisprudential line, developed in earlier cases, should permit quashing where records disclose no prima facie offence.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The complainant and accused met at a family function and exchanged phone numbers, after which conversations, messages and intermittent visits to the complainant’s grandmother’s residence took place. The parties engaged in sexual intercourse on three separate dates, each episode occurring after the accused requested the complainant accompany him to a movie and then to a hotel room.

The FIR and police statements record that on the first occasion the complainant became dizzy and alleges an “abrupt and unexpected” sexual act which she says was against her wish; thereafter the accused placed his hand on her head and promised to marry her. According to the complaint, subsequent meetings were held on the pretext of discussing marriage; the complainant willingly accompanied the accused twice more to the same hotel where she alleges the accused insisted that they defer talking of marriage until after intercourse and that he threatened not to marry her if she refused, coercing intercourse.

The complainant later ceased responding to calls; when contacted, the accused allegedly refused to marry. Both sides admitted a prior sexual relationship; the complainant also repeatedly returned with the accused to hotel rooms despite saying she was mentally upset after earlier incidents. The records therefore contain assertions of both resistance and repeated willing attendance at private meetings, creating material tension between the prosecution’s theory of inducement by promise and the narrative of consent.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the allegations as recorded in the FIR and statements disclose prima facie ingredients of Section 376, IPC so as to preclude quashing under Section 482, Cr.P.C.?
ii. Whether an alleged promise to marry, if made, preceded intercourse such that consent was vitiated by inducement under Section 90, IPC?
iii. Whether continuation of prosecution would amount to an abuse of process where the complainant’s statements contain mutually destructive contentions of consent and force?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The learned counsel for the appellant contended that multiple interactions and continued communications established consent; there was no material to show that a promise of marriage was made prior to sexual intercourse to induce consent; the victim herself accepted the relationship and willingly accompanied the accused on the occasions in question; and in the absence of ingredients of Section 376, IPC shown on the face of the record, further prosecution would be vexatious and an abuse of process. Reliance was placed on Prithvirajan v. State as authority where a consensual relationship and non-fabricated promise (or inability to fulfil it) warranted quashing.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The prosecution urged that the victim’s statements demonstrate coercion and inducement by promise of marriage bringing the matter within Section 90 and rape under Section 376, IPC; factual contradictions cannot be resolved at the quashing stage; trial is the appropriate forum to test credibility; and the High Court correctly declined to exercise inherent jurisdiction. The victim’s counsel emphasised explicit allegations that the accused threatened not to marry unless intercourse occurred and that the accused later refused to marry, evidencing fraudulent inducement and cheating.

H) JUDGMENT 

The Supreme Court examined the FIR and subsequent statements to police, focusing on chronology and the precise nature of averments. The Court observed that the complainant and accused were close relatives, admitted an ongoing relationship and that intercourse occurred three times.

The Court underscored that inducement by promise requires the promise to precede consent. On close reading, the Court found that the alleged marriage promise, if at all, was made only after the first intercourse and that later allegations alleged forceful intercourse without consent; there was no clear statement that the victim consented because of a prior promise.

The conflicting character of the complaint repeated willingness to attend hotel rooms versus allegations of coercion undermined the prosecution’s case on the face of the record. The Court analysed Prithvirajan and distinguished its ratio where the promise to marry was false from the present facts where the record did not show a prior false promise.

The Court held that if the only evidence, read together, points to a consensual relationship or contains materially inconsistent assertions, permitting a full trial would amount to abuse of process. The Court therefore exercised Section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings pending before the Sessions Judge (Mahila Court), Erode, in S.C. No. 49 of 2022. The appeal was allowed.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive reasoning is that where the FIR and statements, read as a whole, do not disclose that consent for intercourse was obtained by a promise of marriage made prior to the act, or where the materials show inconsistent contentions of consent and coercion such that no prima facie case under Section 376, IPC emerges, continuation of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of the court’s process and may be quashed under Section 482, Cr.P.C.. The Court emphasised temporal sequencing: inducement must precede consent to vitiate it under Section 90, IPC.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed that mere failure to marry after sexual relations or a subsequent refusal to marry does not automatically convert a consensual relationship into rape; context and contemporaneous statements matter.

The opinion suggested judicial vigilance against weaponising criminal law where family or consensual relationships sour and contradictions in the complainant’s narrative render prosecution unsustainable. The Court also reiterated that quashing is exceptional and fact-driven, not a substitute for trial when prima facie material exists.

c. GUIDELINES 

The judgment provides practical guideposts:

(i) courts should scrutinise FIR and contemporaneous police statements for the sequence of promise and intercourse;

(ii) alleged inducement by promise must be antecedent to act to vitiate consent post-hoc promises cannot sustain Section 90 based arguments;

(iii) where statements are mutually destructive (consent asserted at places and force alleged elsewhere) and the balance disfavors the prosecution on prima facie reading, Section 482, Cr.P.C. may be invoked to prevent abuse of process;

(iv) quashing remains exceptional and courts must take care not to short-circuit genuine prosecutions where material disputes of fact are present for trial.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision reinforces the principle that criminal litigation must be grounded in coherent prima facie material before consigning parties to the ordeal of trial. The Court’s focus on chronology whether a promise of marriage predates physical relations is analytically sound because Section 90, IPC and the notion of consent vitiated by inducement require causal sequencing.

This judgment also cautions against simplistic invocation of sexual offence provisions where interpersonal relationships, admitted intimacy and repeated voluntary meetings undermine the prosecution’s narrative. For prosecutors and victims, the ruling underscores the importance of precise, contemporaneous averments; for courts, it provides a calibrated test for exercising inherent powers without impeding legitimate trials.

The ruling does not, however, dilute the seriousness of sexual offences; it restricts quashing to cases where the record itself demonstrates that continuing prosecution would be an abuse. As jurisprudence, it aligns with the need for careful threshold scrutiny and stands as a reminder that criminal process must not be deployed as a late remedy for breached expectations where the evidentiary record contradicts the charge.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Prithvirajan v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police & Another, Criminal Appeal No. 282 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) No. 12663 of 2022 (referred).
2. Jothiragawan v. State Rep. By The Inspector of Police & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1434 of 2025, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 951 : 2025 INSC 386.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (provisions: Section 482).
2. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (provisions: Section 376; Section 90).