A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1417 : 2025 INSC 532, considers whether land transferred within a family-division context remains ancestral or becomes self-acquired when subsequently purchased by one brother from another and later alienated to a stranger.

The dispute arose after a registered partition deed dated 09.05.1986 among three brothers, followed by a sale deed dated 16.10.1989 by which the share allotted to C. Thippeswamy (the A-schedule plot) was sold to C. Jayaramappa (Defendant No.1), and a later sale deed dated 11.03.1993 transferring that same land to the appellant (Defendant No.2). Plaintiffs (children of Defendant No.1) sued for partition and separate possession asserting the property was effectively joint/ancestral because it was acquired out of nucleus/joint family funds or blended with the family stock.

The trial Court decreed plaintiffs; the First Appellate Court reversed; the High Court in second appeal set aside the First Appellate Court and restored the trial decree; the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the First Appellate Court. The Court held that the High Court improperly re-appreciated evidence under Section 100 CPC and mis-applied Section 103 CPC and the doctrine of blending.

Where partition had lawfully converted joint family lands into separate shares, the share so allotted became self-acquired for the allottee unless the plaintiffs proved the existence of an income-yielding nucleus from which the later purchase was made. On the record, the evidence supported the conclusion that Defendant No.1 purchased the suit land from his brother using his own funds and a loan from DW3, not from joint family nucleus; the High Court’s factual re-appraisal therefore could not stand.

Keywords: partition deed, self-acquired property, ancestral property, doctrine of blending, Section 100 CPC, Section 103 CPC, nucleus, re-appreciation of evidence.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The litigation flows from a clear chronological chain: an inter-se registered partition deed dated 09.05.1986 distributed ancestral lands among three brothers; subsequently, C. Thippeswamy’s A-schedule plot (7 acres 20 guntas) was sold by him to Defendant No.1 by sale deed dated 16.10.1989 for ₹15,000; later Defendant No.1 sold the same land to the appellant by sale deed dated 11.03.1993 for ₹20,000.

The plaintiffs sons and daughters of Defendant No.1 sued for partition and separate possession claiming the suit land was ancestral/joint because its acquisition derived from nucleus or blended with family property; they sought recovery, alleging lack of consent and improper alienation.

Trial evidence included affidavits and oral testimony for both sides, documentary partition and sale deeds, and witnesses for loans and repayments. The trial Court found for plaintiffs; the First Appellate Court reversed; the High Court in second appeal overturned the First Appellate Court via framing a substantial question of law and re-appreciating evidence; the Supreme Court granted leave and examined whether the High Court had exceeded its Section 100 CPC/Section 103 CPC jurisdiction and whether the suit property was rightly characterized as self-acquired.

The impugned High Court order was challenged chiefly on the ground that it engaged in impermissible factual re-evaluation and misapplied the doctrine of blending without requisite proof of an income-yielding nucleus or clear intention to abandon separate title.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Defendant No.1 (C. Jayaramappa) and his brothers executed a registered partition deed dated 09.05.1986 allocating A, B, C and D schedule properties among them; A-schedule (7a 20g) went to C. Thippeswamy, C-schedule to Defendant No.1 (10 acres different from dispute land).

On 16.10.1989 Thippeswamy sold the A-schedule plot to Defendant No.1 for ₹15,000; on 11.03.1993 Defendant No.1 sold to appellant for ₹20,000. Plaintiffs (children of Defendant No.1) alleged the acquisition by Defendant No.1 was out of nucleus/joint family funds various sources were pleaded: income from lands allotted at partition; coolie work income; alleged ₹10,000 cash at partition; sale proceeds from grandmother Mallamma.

Defendants relied on oral testimony (DW1–DW4) and documents (Exs. D1–D10) to establish that Defendant No.1 raised a loan from DW3 Narasimhamurthy to purchase the property, repaid it later by sale of a 4-acre parcel (Ex. D1), and used remaining funds for family obligations.

The partition deed itself (Ex. P1) contained express recital that each allotted sharer may sell, lease, gift, encumber etc. and there was no recital of ₹10,000 cash allotments. Trial Court accepted plaintiffs’ contention; First Appellate Court analyzed evidence and held purchase was self-acquired; High Court framed a substantial question and set aside that conclusion leading to appeal in this Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the High Court, in a Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC, could re-appreciate factual evidence and set aside a finding of the First Appellate Court absent a proper substantial question of law?
ii. Whether a property purchased by one brother from another after a lawful partition (i.e., property allotted to the vendor in partition) becomes ancestral for the purchaser’s children by reason of nucleus or blending absent strict proof?
iii. Whether plaintiffs discharged the onus to show existence of an income-yielding nucleus from which the suit property was purchased, shifting burden on Defendant No.1?
iv. Whether doctrine of blending applied to the suit facts so as to convert Defendant No.1’s separate purchase into joint family property?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for appellant (buyer, Defendant No.2) submitted that the High Court erroneously framed a factual controversy as a substantial question of law and impermissibly re-appreciated evidence in a second appeal; that the partition deed dated 09.05.1986 had converted joint property into separate shares, and the disputed plot was allotted to Thippeswamy (not to Defendant No.1) and later sold to Defendant No.1 by an express sale deed; that Defendant No.1 purchased using his own funds and a loan from DW3, which was proved by DW testimony and repayment deed (sale of 4 acres to DW3); and that plaintiffs never sought cancellation of the sale deed in their partition suit (no prayer for setting aside the sale), relying on precedent that cancellation must be specifically pleaded. Counsel argued the doctrine of blending did not apply because there was no demonstration of voluntary throwing of separate property into family pool with clear intention to abandon separate rights.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The plaintiffs contended that although a partition occurred in 1986, the character of ancestral property persists for male issue; that the suit land was in substance acquired by Defendant No.1 from joint family nucleus alleged sources included income from allotted lands, coolie work, ₹10,000 at partition, and sale by grandmother Mallamma; that within three years it was improbable Defendant No.1 amassed ₹15,000 by individual labour and that loan evidence was unconvincing; and that the sale to Defendant No.2 was therefore voidable and plaintiffs retained rights as coparceners. Reliance was placed on principles that if a nucleus exists and is sufficient, presumption shifts and the acquirer must prove self-acquisition.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court analysed the scope of Section 100 CPC and Section 103 CPC through precedents (Jaichand v. Sahnulal, Chandrabhan v. Saraswati, Navaneethammal, Kondira Dagadu Kadam) and reiterated that a second appeal admits interference only on substantial questions of law; factual re-appreciation by a High Court is permissible under Section 103 only when:

(a) the lower court(s) failed to determine a crucial fact despite evidence or

(b) a substantial question of law is decided requiring re-application of facts.

Applying these principles, the Court held the High Court had not framed a legitimate substantial question but had re-appreciated evidence and misidentified the property and timeline (partition 1986; purchase 1989). The First Appellate Court had considered all evidence and rendered a plausible finding that Defendant No.1 purchased with external loan and own resources.

On the character of property, the Court reiterated settled Hindu law: after a lawful partition, the allottee’s share becomes self-acquired; a presumption of jointness arises only when a sufficient income-yielding nucleus is proved. Because plaintiffs failed to produce documentary proof of the alleged nucleus (no sale deed by Mallamma, no records of income from allotted lands, no recital of ₹10,000 in partition deed), and the defendants’ witnesses directly supported a loan and its repayment, the balance of probabilities favored self-acquisition.

The Court further observed that doctrine of blending requires clear intention to abandon separate claim mere use by others or generosity does not suffice. Consequently the High Court erred in applying blending and re-appraising facts; the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and restored the First Appellate Court decision, holding the sale to the appellant valid and property self-acquired. The appeal was allowed; parties to bear own costs.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

Section 100 CPC limits High Court interference in second appeals to substantial questions of law; Section 103 CPC permits factual re-determination only in narrow situations (undetermined crucial fact or facts requiring re-application after deciding a substantial legal question).

When the First Appellate Court has considered evidence and its conclusion is plausible and not vitiated by illegality or absence of evidence, the High Court cannot substitute its view merely because another view is possible.

Where partition converts joint property into separate shares, those shares are self-acquired for the allottee; a plaintiff alleging ancestral character must prove existence of an income-yielding nucleus sufficient to have financed the acquisition this is a strict evidentiary burden. The doctrine of blending requires express proof of intention to waive separate title.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court criticized casual invocation of Section 100 CPC and cautioned High Courts against converting second appeals into fact-finding exercises; it reiterated that contents of documents prevail over oral testimony and that customary paternal duties (e.g., using sale proceeds for marriage) constitute lawful necessity, not evidence of concealment or misappropriation.

The Court emphasized careful application of blending doctrine and stressed verification of timelines when invoking will/recitals in partition deeds.

c. GUIDELINES 

• High Courts must frame only genuine substantial questions of law before exercising second appeal jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.

• Re-appreciation of facts under Section 103 CPC is exceptional and may follow only when lower courts have failed to consider material evidence or legal principles.

• Plaintiffs alleging nucleus must produce documentary proof (sale deeds, accounts, income records) demonstrating availability of income sufficient to acquire the disputed property.

• The doctrine of blending applies only on clear proof of voluntary abandonment of separate title; generosity, joint use, or lack of separate accounts is insufficient.

• Where partition expressly confers rights to sell, lease, gift, encumber, the allottee’s share ordinarily becomes self-acquired unless contrary evidence is solid.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision reinforces strict limits on High Court re-examination of factual findings in second appeals and reiterates the rigorous evidentiary threshold for establishing nucleus or invoking blending under Hindu family law. Practitioners should note the Court’s insistence on documentary proof when advancing nucleus-based claims and the primacy of partition recitals converting joint holdings into self-acquired shares.

The judgment aligns with precedents emphasizing that factual credibility findings by a first appellate court should not be lightly displaced absent legal infirmity. In family property disputes, parties asserting jointness must ensure contemporaneous records or clear documentary chains to shift presumptions; mere assertions of inadequate means or moral contentions will not suffice.

The case thus serves as a practical template for litigating character of property after partition and clarifies procedural limits of second appeal jurisdiction.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred 

• Chandrabhan (Deceased) through L.Rs. & Ors. v. Saraswati & Ors., 2022 INSC 997 : [2022] 7 SCR 295.

• Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel & Ors. v. Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai, (2020) 16 SCC 255.

• Jaichand (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. Sahnulal & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864.

• Gurnam Singh (Dead) by LRs & Ors. v. Lehna Singh (Dead) by LRs, (2019) 7 SCC 641.

• Murugan & Ors. v. Kesava Gounder (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors., (2019) 20 SCC 633.

• Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai & Anr. v. Desai Mallappa alias Mallesappa & Anr., [1961] 3 SCR 779.

• Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddi & Ors. v. Lakkireddi Lakshmama, [1964] 2 SCR 172.

• Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, (1987) 1 SCC 204.

• K.V. Narayanan v. K.V. Ranganandhan & Ors., (1977) 1 SCC 244.

• R. Deivanai Ammal (Died) v. G. Meenakshi Ammal, AIR 2004 Madras 529.

• Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh & Ors., (2013) 9 SCC 419.

• Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty, AIR 1996 S.C. 3521.

• Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545.
  (References list reflects cases as cited in the judgment document.)

b. Important Statutes Referred

• Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Sections 96, 100, 103.