A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This appeal arises from the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad’s revision setting aside a trial court order that had summoned two persons under Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to face trial for the murder of the deceased in a daylight firing. The FIR named four assailants and criminal proceedings were charge-sheeted only against two; a final report was filed in respect of the other two (the present respondent nos. 2 & 3).

During the trial the depositions of PW-1 (the complainant-son) and PW-2 (an eyewitness cousin) implicated those two persons. Relying on those testimonies the trial court exercised its power under Section 319 CrPC and summoned them. The High Court, on revision, set aside that summoning order giving weight to certain s.161 CrPC statements and perceived weaknesses in the witnesses’ credibility.

The Supreme Court restored the trial court order, holding that the scope of Section 319 CrPC is wide; once prima facie evidence surfaces in the course of trial that a person not charged appears to be involved, the court may summon such person and try him along with the accused already facing trial. The Court emphasized that challenges to credibility and contradictions that go to the root of the witnesses’ testimony are matters for full trial and cross-examination and should not obstruct exercise of Section 319 powers at the summoning stage.

The decision applied Rajesh v. State of Haryana and S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak and cautioned against giving undue weight to s.161 CrPC statements at the summoning stage.

Keywords: Section 319 CrPC; s.161 CrPC statements; summoning order; chargesheet vs. FIR; eyewitness testimony; credibility at summoning stage.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case tests the breadth of the trial court’s statutory power under Section 319 CrPC to proceed against persons not charge-sheeted when evidence surfaced during trial implicates them. The factual matrix is uncomplicated but legally salient: a daylight murder by firing arising from a land boundary dispute; four persons named in the FIR; two persons were charge-sheeted and two were exonerated by the police through a final report.

The complainant (son) and an eyewitness (a cousin) asserted before the trial court that the two persons who had been exonerated were present among the shooters. The trial court, persuaded by those statements in the examination-in-chief, summoned the two under Section 319, treating the recorded depositions as sufficient to show prima facie involvement. On revision, the High Court set aside that order, focusing on s.161 CrPC statements that suggested absence of the two at the spot (attendance at a funeral at the Shiv temple) and thus treated the trial court’s reliance on the examination-in-chief as misplaced.

The Supreme Court’s intervention resolved the legal tension by reiterating that at the summoning stage the court need not test testimony by cross-examination or finally resolve contradictions; rather, if evidence emerging in inquiry or trial indicates possible guilt of an uncharged person, Section 319 can be invoked to bring such person into the trial stream. The judgment thus restores the trial court order and frames the appropriate standard for interference by higher courts at the summoning stage.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The deceased was shot dead on 15.11.2021 in daylight; the Post-Mortem (dated 16.11.2021) records three entry and three corresponding exit gunshot wounds. The FIR (FIR No.349/2021) lodged by the appellant (son of the deceased) named four attackers: Gajendra, Mahendrapal, Krishnapal (respondent no.2) and Sanju (respondent no.3), alleging murder over a boundary quarrel. Police filed a chargesheet under Sections 302, 504, 506 IPC against Gajendra and Mahendrapal and filed a final report in respect of Krishnapal and Sanju, effectively exonerating them at investigation.

During trial the complainant (examined as PW-1) deposed that he witnessed from a distance the four persons, including respondent nos.2 & 3, surround and open fire on his father while the deceased returned on a motorcycle. PW-2 (cousin and described eyewitness in the FIR) corroborated that he saw all four fire on the deceased. The trial court treated these depositions as credible enough to exercise Section 319 CrPC powers and summoned respondent nos.2 & 3 to face trial.

The High Court in revision allowed challenge by those respondents, giving weight to earlier s.161 CrPC statements of some witnesses who purportedly placed those two at a village Shiv temple attending a funeral on the day of the incident; the High Court concluded that the trial court had erred in summoning them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that contradictions and credibility challenges are to be gone into at trial not at the prima facie summoning stage.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a trial court can summon under Section 319 CrPC persons named in FIR but not charge-sheeted when evidence in examination-in-chief implicates them?
ii. Whether contradictions between a witness’ s.161 CrPC statement and his trial deposition can, at the summoning stage, preclude exercise of Section 319 CrPC?
iii. What standard should appellate or revisional courts apply in reviewing a trial court’s order under Section 319 CrPC?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that PW-1 and PW-2 identified respondent nos.2 & 3 as being among the assailants; they were named in the FIR close in time to the incident and thus their non-inclusion in the chargesheet cannot bar the court from summoning them when evidence before the court during trial indicates involvement. Reliance was placed on precedents which endorse the trial court’s active role under Section 319 CrPC to prevent impunity for uncharged implicated persons. The petitioner urged that questions of credibility and minor contradictions (including s.161 inconsistencies) are matters for full trial and cross-examination and should not defeat the exercise of Section 319 at the prima facie stage.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for respondent nos.2 & 3 argued that police investigation had produced material exonerating them and that s.161 CrPC statements of witnesses placed them away from the scene (at a funeral at the Shiv temple). They urged that the trial court, by relying on examination-in-chief, had neglected the contradictions and that the High Court correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction to protect liberty until prima facie guilt is established. Stress was placed on the possibility of mistaken identification and the familial connection of PW-2 with the deceased as factors undermining reliability.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. Reviewing the statutory text and earlier precedents notably Rajesh v. State of Haryana (2019) 6 SCC 368 and S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak (2017) 16 SCC 226 the Court reiterated that Section 319 CrPC confers wide powers: if evidence during inquiry or trial points towards a person not before the Court who appears to have committed an offence triable with the accused, the court may proceed against that person; arrest or summons may follow and on attendance proceedings commence afresh though witnesses may be reheard.

The Court held that a trial court can act on testimony recorded in the examination-in-chief and need not await cross-examination or the testing of that testimony before summoning under Section 319. The Court found that PW-1 and PW-2’s depositions inspired confidence and were consistent with the FIR lodged within hours of the incident.

The trial court had noted contemporaneous FIR naming and eyewitness statements; it also recorded the police’s possible error in exonerating the two due to reliance on some s.161 statements mentioning absence. The Supreme Court emphasized that apparent contradictions and credibility attacks (including the fact that PW-2 was a relative) go to weight not admissibility and are matters for trial. The High Court erred in giving undue weight to s.161 CrPC statements and in revisional interference with the trial court’s reasoned exercise of Section 319. Consequently the summoning order was restored and the High Court order set aside; the Court clarified that observations made would not prejudice the trial.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The controlling ratio is that the power under Section 319 CrPC is plenary and may be exercised on the basis of examination-in-chief if that evidence, at the prima facie stage, shows that a person not formally charged appears to have committed an offence triable with the accused. Appellate/revisional courts should not substitute their view on credibility at the summoning stage; contradictions including s.161 discrepancies affect weight to be assigned and must be addressed in trial by cross-examination and evidence evaluation. Once depositions before the court inspire confidence and indicate involvement, the trial court’s summoning decision ordinarily should stand.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed (obiter) that rapid lodging of FIR and contemporaneity of eyewitness statements strengthen the reliability of testimony at the summoning stage. It also noted procedural prudence: while Section 319 empowers courts to act whenever evidence surfaces, courts must record reasoned satisfaction before summoning; arbitrary or cursory invocation of Section 319 is to be avoided. Further, the Court reiterated that trial courts may rehear witnesses when proceedings commence afresh against newly summoned persons as mandated by Section 319(4)(a).

c. GUIDELINES 

i. Trial courts may exercise Section 319 CrPC on the basis of examination-in-chief where depositions prima facie indicate involvement of an uncharged person.
ii. Contradictions between s.161 statements and trial testimony should not by themselves negate summoning; they bear on weight and credibility at trial.
iii. Higher courts should not lightly interfere in summoning orders unless there is manifest perversity, absence of any material suggesting involvement, or patent failure to apply mind.
iv. When Court proceeds against newly summoned persons, proceedings shall commence afresh and witnesses may be re-examined as per Section 319(4).
v. Contemporaneity of FIR and prompt eyewitness accounts strengthen the probative value of deposition at the summoning stage.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reaffirmed a pro-trial stance in criminal procedure: where prima facie material emerges during trial implicating a person not charge-sheeted, the trial court must be empowered to bring that person before it so that full adjudication can occur with the benefit of cross-examination and witness testing. This aligns with both the letter and policy of Section 319 CrPC, designed to prevent an accused’s escape from responsibility merely because a police investigation omitted or exonerated an implicated person.

The Supreme Court’s approach balances two competing imperatives protection of liberty by guarding against arbitrary summoning and the need to ensure comprehensive trial of all implicated persons by directing that substantive credibility challenges be left for trial, while permitting appellate correction only where summoning is wholly unsupported by evidence. For practitioners, the case stresses meticulous recording of reasons when invoking Section 319, and for prosecutors the importance of contemporaneous details in FIR and early collection of eyewitness statements.

The decision is practically significant in rural and violence contexts (land disputes, mob-style shootings) where witnesses may give inconsistent statements and initial police view may be incomplete; the judgment places the responsibility on the trial process to test testimony rather than on preliminary investigative outcomes.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Rajesh v. State of Haryana, [2019] 8 SCR 187 : (2019) 6 SCC 368.
ii. S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak, [2017] 10 SCR 29 : (2017) 16 SCC 226.

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 319 (Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence).
ii. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 504, 506 (as charged in original complaint).