A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment in Sanjai Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. decisively examines the contours of locus standi in criminal proceedings, particularly in the context of petitions filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether a third party, styling himself as a social activist and advocate, could invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to seek expeditious disposal of a pending criminal trial under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. While reaffirming the settled principle that trials relating to corruption offences must be concluded expeditiously owing to their deleterious impact on public administration and societal confidence, the Court simultaneously underscored that such procedural directions cannot be sought by strangers to the prosecution under the guise of public interest. The ruling harmonises two competing considerations. One relates to the constitutional and statutory obligation of courts to ensure speedy trials, especially in corruption cases. The other concerns the sanctity of criminal process, which restricts participation to the State, the accused, and legitimately aggrieved parties. By setting aside the High Court’s order, the Supreme Court clarified that inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be converted into a forum for unsolicited third-party interventions. The judgment draws authoritative support from Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, reinforcing that criminal law cannot be piloted by self-appointed public watchdogs. At the same time, the Court carefully preserved the trial court’s discretion to independently expedite proceedings, thereby maintaining institutional balance between efficiency and procedural propriety.

Keywords :
Section 482 Cr.P.C.; Locus Standi; Prevention of Corruption Act; Speedy Trial; Public Interest Litigation

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The decision arose from a prolonged criminal prosecution involving allegations of corruption and allied offences under the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The appellant, an accused public servant, had faced investigation and litigation spanning over a decade, marked by vigilance inquiries, writ petitions, interim stays, and eventual filing of a charge-sheet. Against this backdrop, a third party advocate, claiming the mantle of a social activist, approached the Allahabad High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking directions for expeditious conclusion of the trial.

The High Court, without issuing notice to the accused, directed the Special Judge to conduct the trial on a day-to-day basis. This triggered the present appeal. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to address a narrow yet significant procedural issue. The question was not whether corruption trials should be expedited, a proposition already well entrenched in criminal jurisprudence. The real question concerned who could legitimately invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to seek such relief.

The judgment situates itself within the larger jurisprudential framework governing public interest litigation in criminal matters. Unlike constitutional remedies under Articles 32 and 226, criminal procedure traditionally limits participation to defined stakeholders. The Court revisited earlier precedents to reiterate that criminal trials cannot be commandeered by third parties under a moral or civic pretext. The background reveals a careful judicial attempt to prevent dilution of procedural discipline while remaining conscious of systemic delays that plague corruption trials.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant was named as an accused in FIR No. 02 of 2006 registered by the Vigilance Department, Lucknow, for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 477A and 120B IPC along with Sections 13(1)(c), 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The genesis of the proceedings lay in a complaint that prompted a vigilance inquiry. The appellant challenged the inquiry before the High Court, which initially restrained further action until the complainant was examined.

Subsequently, an FIR was directed to be lodged by the Vigilance Department in December 2005. This order and the consequential proceedings were again subjected to judicial scrutiny, resulting in interim stays that effectively stalled the investigation for several years. Parallel proceedings, including a public interest litigation seeking CBI investigation, further complicated the procedural timeline. Ultimately, the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed for non-prosecution in January 2020.

Following dismissal of the writ petition, the Vigilance Department filed a charge-sheet on 23 May 2020 before the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Gorakhpur, leading to registration of Special Trial No. 520 of 2020. At this stage, a third party advocate, respondent no. 2, filed an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. asserting that despite the passage of fourteen years, the accused continued to delay the trial. He claimed no personal interest and projected himself as a socially concerned citizen.

The High Court accepted the plea and directed expeditious disposal without unnecessary adjournments. Aggrieved, the accused approached the Supreme Court, contending lack of locus standi, violation of natural justice, and suppression of material facts relating to prior judicial stays.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a third party, unconnected with the prosecution, has locus standi to invoke Section 482 Cr.P.C. to seek expeditious disposal of a criminal trial?
ii. Whether the High Court can entertain such an application without notice to the accused?
iii. Whether inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised at the instance of a public-spirited individual in criminal proceedings?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellant submitted that the application before the High Court was fundamentally misconceived as respondent no. 2 had no legal standing in the criminal case. Reliance was placed on the settled principle that criminal proceedings are between the State and the accused, and strangers cannot intervene unless statutorily permitted.

It was argued that the High Court passed the impugned order without issuing notice to the accused, thereby violating basic principles of natural justice. The appellant further contended that the delay in investigation and trial was largely attributable to judicial orders of stay granted by competent courts, a material fact not disclosed by respondent no. 2.

The appellant emphasised that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is meant to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice, not to facilitate publicity-driven interventions. The decision in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1993) 1 SCC 756 was cited to reinforce the bar on third-party interference in criminal proceedings.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the State supported the general proposition that trials under the Prevention of Corruption Act should be conducted expeditiously and on a day-to-day basis. It was contended that no prejudice was caused to the accused by a mere direction to expedite proceedings.

Respondent no. 2, though initially represented, later chose not to appear. His written pleadings before the High Court asserted that prolonged pendency eroded public confidence and that his intervention was guided purely by societal interest, without personal gain.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
ii. Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 477A, 120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860
iii. Sections 13(1)(c), 13(1)(d) read with 13(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s order. The Court reiterated that while expeditious disposal of corruption cases is imperative, the process by which such directions are sought must conform to established procedural norms. The Court held that respondent no. 2 had no connection with the criminal proceedings and therefore lacked locus standi to invoke Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The judgment carefully distinguished between the power of the High Court and the maintainability of the application. It affirmed that High Courts possess ample authority to issue directions for speedy trials in appropriate cases. However, the trigger for such exercise must come from legitimate stakeholders such as the prosecution, the accused, or the employer department.

Relying heavily on Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, the Court emphasised that even issues of grave public importance cannot justify third-party participation in criminal proceedings. Criminal law, unlike public law remedies, does not permit representation by self-appointed custodians of public interest.

At the same time, the Court clarified that its observations would not preclude the trial court from independently expediting the trial, given the nature of the offences. This balanced approach ensured that the objective of speedy justice was not sacrificed at the altar of procedural rectitude.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio of the judgment lies in the categorical holding that a third party has no locus standi to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for seeking directions in a pending criminal trial. The Court reasoned that criminal proceedings are governed by a structured procedural code that identifies specific participants and prescribes defined remedies.

The reliance on Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary was pivotal. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that criminal trials cannot be steered by public interest litigants, irrespective of the gravity of allegations. The inherent powers of the High Court are corrective in nature and cannot be activated by strangers to supervise trial timelines.

The ratio also clarifies that while speedy trial is an integral facet of fair procedure, the responsibility to seek such relief rests with parties directly affected. This preserves the integrity of criminal adjudication and prevents misuse of judicial process.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 impact society at large and therefore merit expeditious adjudication. It noted that delays in such cases erode public confidence in governance and rule of law.

The Court also remarked that High Courts, in appropriate circumstances, may suo motu or on proper application direct speedy trials. These observations, though not forming the basis of the decision, underscore judicial concern over systemic delays in corruption prosecutions.

c) GUIDELINES 

i. Applications under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be filed only by persons having a direct nexus with the criminal proceedings.
ii. Third-party interventions in criminal trials are impermissible under the guise of public interest.
iii. High Courts must ensure notice to affected parties before issuing procedural directions impacting trial rights.
iv. Trial courts retain independent authority to expedite corruption trials in accordance with law.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reinforces procedural discipline in criminal jurisprudence while acknowledging the societal imperative of speedy corruption trials. It prevents dilution of locus standi principles and curbs the expansion of public interest litigation into criminal process. By doing so, the Court preserves the adversarial structure mandated by the Criminal Procedure Code.

At the same time, the decision does not trivialise the issue of delay. Instead, it places responsibility squarely on institutional actors such as the prosecution and trial courts. The ruling thus achieves a calibrated balance between efficiency and legality, ensuring that criminal justice is neither hijacked by outsiders nor paralysed by delay.

K) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred
i. Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1993) 1 SCC 756

b) Important Statutes Referred
i. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
ii. Indian Penal Code, 1860
iii. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988