A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment in Samir Agrawal v. Competition Commission of India & Ors. marks a significant doctrinal development in Indian competition jurisprudence concerning the locus standi of informants under the Competition Act, 2002. The Supreme Court decisively rejected the restrictive interpretation adopted by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal which confined access to the Competition Commission of India only to persons who had suffered direct legal injury. The Court clarified that proceedings under the Act are in rem and driven by public interest, thereby permitting any person to furnish information regarding alleged anti-competitive conduct irrespective of personal harm.

The Court undertook a purposive interpretation of Sections 19, 26, 35, 53B and 53T of the Act, read with the Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009, to hold that the legislative intent post the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007 was to replace adversarial complaint-based mechanisms with an inquisitorial information-based regime. The judgment also examined allegations of cartelisation and price fixing in the context of algorithmic pricing employed by digital cab aggregators Ola and Uber. Affirming concurrent findings of the CCI and NCLAT, the Court held that algorithmic fare determination did not amount to a hub-and-spoke cartel nor satisfied the statutory requirement of an agreement or meeting of minds under Section 3.

The ruling strengthens access to competition enforcement mechanisms while simultaneously safeguarding enterprises through statutory deterrents against frivolous or mala fide information.

Keywords:
Competition Act, Locus Standi, In Rem Proceedings, Algorithmic Pricing, Cartelisation, Public Interest

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The Competition Act, 2002 was enacted to replace the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act with a modern competition framework aligned with liberalised market conditions. The statute consciously empowers the Competition Commission of India to act as an expert inquisitorial body addressing market distortions affecting consumer welfare and economic efficiency. The legislative shift achieved through the 2007 Amendment substituted the adversarial concept of “complaint” with “information”, signalling Parliament’s intention to widen participation in competition enforcement.

The present judgment arose from conflicting interpretations regarding who may invoke the jurisdiction of the CCI. While the Commission itself had consistently entertained information from non-affected persons, the NCLAT adopted a restrictive approach rooted in traditional notions of locus standi, requiring demonstrable legal injury. This divergence necessitated authoritative clarification.

Additionally, the case emerged against the backdrop of rapid digitisation of markets, particularly platform-based services employing algorithmic pricing. Allegations of cartelisation through algorithms posed novel questions concerning the applicability of classical antitrust doctrines such as hub-and-spoke cartels to digital markets. The Court was therefore required to reconcile established competition principles with evolving technological realities, while also safeguarding procedural openness and preventing abuse of regulatory processes.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, Samir Agrawal, an independent legal practitioner, filed information under Section 19(1)(a) before the CCI alleging contravention of Section 3 of the Act by Ola and Uber. The information asserted that algorithmic pricing employed by cab aggregators facilitated price fixing among drivers, constituting a cartel under Section 3(3)(a), and amounted to resale price maintenance under Section 3(4)(e).

It was alleged that drivers, though independent contractors, were compelled to accept fares determined unilaterally by algorithms without scope for negotiation, thereby eliminating price competition. The appellant contended that the platforms operated as a trade association coordinating driver behaviour and artificially manipulating demand-supply dynamics.

The CCI, by order dated 06.11.2018 under Section 26(2), closed the matter holding that no prima facie case existed. It found absence of any agreement or meeting of minds among drivers or between drivers and aggregators. Dynamic pricing was held to vary per transaction and lacked the uniformity essential for cartelisation.

The appellant challenged the order before the NCLAT. The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal primarily on the ground that the appellant lacked locus standi as he had not suffered any legal injury as a consumer. On merits also, it upheld the CCI’s conclusions.

Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, challenging both the locus standi finding and the merits determination.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether any person can provide information to the CCI under Section 19 without demonstrating personal legal injury?
ii. Whether such an informant qualifies as a person aggrieved under Sections 53B and 53T for appellate purposes?
iii. Whether algorithmic pricing by cab aggregators constitutes cartelisation or price fixing under Section 3 of the Act?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the substitution of “complaint” with “information” by the 2007 Amendment reflected legislative intent to permit access irrespective of personal harm. Reliance was placed on Sections 19 and 35 to demonstrate that proceedings were inquisitorial and public interest driven.

It was argued that algorithmic pricing eliminated independent decision-making by drivers, thereby amounting to a hub-and-spoke cartel. Reference was made to foreign antitrust jurisprudence to support the contention that algorithmic coordination could substitute human collusion.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that unrestricted locus would encourage motivated and frivolous filings. Reliance was placed on Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai to argue that only persons suffering legal injury could appeal.

On merits, it was contended that drivers retained autonomy, lacked inter se communication, and that fare algorithms responded dynamically to market conditions rather than fixing prices.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 3 – Anti-competitive agreements
ii. Section 19 – Inquiry into anti-competitive conduct
iii. Section 26 – Procedure for inquiry
iv. Section 35 – Appearance before Commission
v. Section 45 – Penalty for false information

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT’s restrictive interpretation of locus standi. It held that any person could provide information to the CCI, and such person would be aggrieved if the information was rejected. The Court emphasised that proceedings under the Act are in rem, affecting markets and consumers at large.

On merits, the Court upheld concurrent factual findings that Ola and Uber did not facilitate cartelisation. It accepted that algorithmic pricing lacked the essential element of agreement or collusion required under Section 3. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio of the judgment lies in the recognition that competition law enforcement is a public law function. The Court held that the expression “any person” in Sections 19, 53B and 53T must be interpreted expansively to advance statutory objectives. The Act deliberately distances itself from private injury models and adopts a market-corrective framework.

The Court further held that algorithmic pricing, absent agreement or meeting of minds, does not per se violate Section 3.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that Section 45 and imposition of heavy costs are sufficient safeguards against abuse of process. It cautioned against importing foreign antitrust doctrines without contextual adaptation.

c) GUIDELINES

i. CCI must permit access to informants irrespective of personal injury
ii. Locus standi must be assessed in light of public interest
iii. Algorithmic pricing requires evidence of agreement for Section 3 violations
iv. Frivolous filings must be deterred through statutory penalties

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reinforces procedural openness in Indian competition law while maintaining substantive thresholds for establishing anti-competitive conduct. It balances market vigilance with enterprise protection, ensuring that the CCI remains accessible without degenerating into a forum for vexatious litigation.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

i. Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India, [2010] 11 SCR 112
ii. A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P., [2011] 9 SCR 453
iii. Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, [1971] 1 SCR 863

b) Important Statutes Referred

i. Competition Act, 2002
ii. Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009