A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court in The Project Director, Project Implementation Unit v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy & Ors. authoritatively examined the scope of legislative and executive competence of the Union of India under Articles 246, 248 and Entry 23 of List I of the Seventh Schedule concerning declaration and construction of national highways over green-field lands. The controversy arose from challenges to notifications issued under Sections 2(2) and 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 for acquisition of lands for the Chennai–Krishnagiri–Salem National Corridor under Bharatmala Pariyojana – Phase I. The Madras High Court had partially invalidated the acquisition on grounds of lack of legislative competence, arbitrariness in route realignment, and absence of prior environmental clearance.

The Supreme Court reversed these findings and held that the 1956 Act empowers the Central Government to declare any land, including non-existing roads and green-field lands, as national highways. The Court applied the doctrine of pith and substance to affirm Parliament’s exclusive domain over national highways and clarified that Entry 13 of List II does not dilute Entry 23 of List I. The Court further held that prior environmental or forest clearance is not a precondition for issuing notifications under Sections 2(2) or 3A, and such clearance is required only before commencement of actual construction.

The judgment also clarified judicial restraint in policy decisions, especially infrastructure planning, and laid down a crucial interpretative mechanism under Article 142 to exclude time spent in environmental clearance from the statutory lapse period under Section 3D(3). The decision reinforces federal balance, sustainable development jurisprudence, and limits of judicial review in land acquisition for national infrastructure projects.

Keywords: National Highways Act, Legislative Competence, Green-field Acquisition, Environmental Clearance, Judicial Review

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The litigation stemmed from large-scale opposition to the proposed Chennai–Krishnagiri–Salem (C-K-S) National Corridor, an eight-lane green-field highway project conceived under Bharatmala Pariyojana – Phase I. The Union Government, invoking Section 2(2) of the National Highways Act, 1956, declared the corridor as NH-179A and NH-179B, followed by acquisition notifications under Section 3A(1). Affected landowners and public interest litigants challenged these actions before the Madras High Court.

The High Court questioned the Union’s legislative competence to create a national highway over non-existing roads, doubted the policy decision replacing the earlier Chennai–Madurai corridor, and insisted on prior environmental clearance. This triggered appeals before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court’s intervention was significant as it addressed multiple constitutional doctrines, including federal distribution of legislative power, judicial review over policy decisions, and reconciliation between development imperatives and environmental safeguards. The judgment thus operates at the intersection of constitutional structure, infrastructure governance, and environmental jurisprudence, providing authoritative clarity on the statutory architecture governing national highways in India.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The Union Government approved Bharatmala Pariyojana – Phase I, envisaging construction of approximately 24,800 km of highways with an estimated outlay of ₹5.35 lakh crore. The project allowed substitution of up to 15% of corridor length based on feasibility considerations. Pursuant to a meeting dated 19 January 2018 chaired by the Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, the Chennai–Madurai Economic Corridor was substituted with the Chennai–Krishnagiri–Salem National Corridor.

Notifications under Section 2(2) declared the new corridor as national highways, followed by land acquisition notifications under Section 3A(1). These actions were challenged before the Madras High Court, which held that national highways could only be declared over existing roads, that environmental clearance was mandatory prior to acquisition, and that the policy shift lacked empirical justification.

The Union of India and NHAI appealed, asserting legislative competence under Entry 23 of List I, policy discretion under Bharatmala guidelines, and statutory compliance under the 1956 Act. The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme, constitutional provisions, and prior precedents to determine the legality of the acquisition process.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether Parliament has legislative competence to declare non-existing green-field land as a national highway?
ii. Whether prior environmental clearance is mandatory before issuing Section 3A notifications?
iii. Whether substitution of corridors under Bharatmala Pariyojana was arbitrary?
iv. Whether Section 3A notifications lapse due to delay caused by environmental clearance procedures?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellants submitted that Entry 23 of List I grants exclusive authority over national highways, including incidental matters such as acquisition. Reliance was placed on K.T. Plantation v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1 to affirm that incidental encroachment on State powers is constitutionally permissible. It was argued that Section 2(2) expressly empowers declaration of “any other highway”, not limited to existing roads.

Regarding environmental clearance, it was contended that the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 mandates clearance only prior to commencement of construction, not at the acquisition stage. The appellants also argued that the policy decision to substitute corridors was taken by an expert committee and thus immune from judicial interference.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondents argued that Entry 13 of List II reserves roads to States, limiting Union power. It was contended that acquisition without prior environmental clearance violated Articles 21, 48A, and 51A(g). The respondents further alleged arbitrariness and lack of empirical basis in altering the original corridor alignment, asserting mala fide intent and absence of public purpose.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court upheld the Union’s competence and reversed the High Court’s findings. It held that the 1956 Act, read with Articles 246 and 248, authorises Parliament to legislate comprehensively on national highways. Applying the doctrine of pith and substance, the Court ruled that Entry 23 of List I prevails and is not diluted by Entry 13 of List II.

The Court clarified that the term “any land” under Section 3A includes green-field lands and rejected the argument that national highways must be existing roads. On environmental clearance, the Court held that clearance is required only before commencement of actual construction, not at the acquisition stage.

Regarding policy substitution, the Court characterised the decision as a policy choice backed by expert deliberation and held that courts cannot sit in appeal over infrastructure planning unless manifest arbitrariness is shown.

Invoking Article 142, the Court directed that time spent obtaining environmental clearance be excluded from the Section 3D(3) lapse period, relying on Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board v. C. Kenchappa (2006) 6 SCC 371.

The appeals by the Union were partly allowed, while landowners’ appeals were dismissed.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The Parliament has exclusive legislative and executive competence under Entry 23 of List I to declare and construct national highways over any land, including green-field areas, and prior environmental clearance is not mandatory before issuing acquisition notifications under Section 3A.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that infrastructure development is essential for socio-economic growth and that excessive judicial interference in policy decisions may impede national development goals.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Environmental clearance must precede construction, not acquisition.
ii. Time spent obtaining statutory clearances shall be excluded for Section 3D(3) limitation.
iii. Courts must exercise restraint in reviewing infrastructure policy decisions.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment significantly strengthens Union authority over national infrastructure while maintaining environmental safeguards through staged compliance. It harmonises constitutional federalism with developmental imperatives and provides certainty to future highway projects. The Court’s interpretative use of Article 142 reflects pragmatic constitutional adjudication aimed at balancing public interest, environmental protection, and statutory timelines.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

1. K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka
2. Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board v. C. Kenchappa
3. Somawanti v. State of Punjab

b) Important Statutes Referred

1. Constitution of India
2. National Highways Act, 1956
3. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986