A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment examines the legality of continued occupation of privately owned immovable property by the Union of India after the statutory lapse of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952. The appellants, successors-in-interest of the original landowner, challenged the refusal of the Karnataka High Court to direct restoration of possession despite categorical findings that the lands were never lawfully acquired. The Supreme Court scrutinized the legal character of requisition, emphasizing its inherently temporary nature and the impermissibility of its conversion into de facto acquisition without statutory sanction. The Court reaffirmed that although the right to property no longer enjoys the status of a fundamental right, it remains a valuable constitutional right under Article 300-A, deeply anchored in the rule of law. The judgment condemns executive lawlessness and judicial condonation thereof, holding that continued possession after 1987 was unconstitutional and illegal. It underscores the judiciary’s constitutional role as a protector of liberties and rejects the notion that public purpose or national defense can justify unlawful deprivation. The Court ordered restitution of possession within a fixed timeframe and permitted fresh arbitration for compensation for continued unlawful occupation. The ruling reinforces constitutional accountability of the State and decisively curtails indefinite executive possession without authority of law.

Keywords:
Right to Property, Requisition, Article 300-A, Rule of Law, State Accountability, Unlawful Occupation

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The litigation arose from prolonged State possession of private land initially requisitioned during a national emergency. The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952 was enacted as a temporary wartime measure enabling the Union to requisition property for public purposes. The Act contemplated deprivation of possession without transfer of title and strictly conditioned such deprivation upon payment of compensation and temporal limitation. The appellants’ predecessor surrendered possession under protest in 1963 pursuant to Section 30 of the Defence of India Act, 1962. Subsequent legislative amendments extended requisition periods but retained the temporary character of the regime.

Despite repeated arbitrations and judicial findings affirming that substantial portions of the land were never lawfully acquired, the Union continued in possession even after the statutory cessation of requisition powers in 1987. The Karnataka High Court acknowledged the illegality of the Union’s claim but declined restitution citing defense exigencies and surrounding acquisitions. This judicial reluctance crystallized the central constitutional question regarding the limits of State power and the enforceability of property rights post-44th Constitutional Amendment.

The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether executive necessity could override constitutional legality, and whether judicial inaction could legitimize prolonged unlawful occupation. The case thus implicated foundational doctrines of rule of law, constitutional supremacy, and non-arbitrariness, demanding a decisive constitutional response.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The suit lands comprising Survey Nos. 103/1, 103/2 and 104 situated in Byappanahalli, Bangalore South Taluk, belonged to late B.M. Krishnamurthy, predecessor of the appellants. In 1963, during the operation of the Defence of India Act, 1962, the lands were requisitioned for defense purposes. Possession was handed over under protest, and compensation was initially fixed in 1964, with delayed approval in 1968.

Following the lapse of the Defence of India Act in 1968, Section 25 of the Requisitioning Act created a deeming fiction continuing requisition. Multiple amendments extended the permissible duration, culminating in a statutory outer limit of 17 years. Arbitration proceedings ensued repeatedly between 1972 and 2000 to determine compensation and extent of land lawfully acquired. In successive arbitral awards and High Court judgments, it was consistently held that Survey Nos. 103/1 and 103/2 were never validly acquired, while only a portion of Survey No. 104 stood acquired.

Despite these findings attaining finality, and despite the statutory lapse of requisition authority in 1987, the Union refused to restore possession. The appellants instituted writ proceedings seeking restitution. The Karnataka High Court accepted that continued possession lacked legal basis but declined to direct restoration, granting the Union indefinite time to acquire the land. This refusal prompted the present appeal.

The Union defended its possession by invoking public purpose, historical acquisition claims, and strategic necessity. These contentions had been previously rejected factually and legally. The continued occupation thus rested solely on executive assertion devoid of statutory authority.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether continued possession of requisitioned land after statutory lapse constitutes unlawful deprivation of property?
ii. Whether requisition can legally continue indefinitely without acquisition?
iii. Whether judicial refusal to order restitution validates executive lawlessness?
iv. Whether Article 300-A protects against prolonged State occupation without authority of law?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellants submitted that once requisition powers ceased in 1987, continued possession became unconstitutional. It was argued that repeated arbitral and judicial determinations conclusively negated acquisition claims. Reliance was placed on Vidya Devi v. State of H.P. and State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar to assert that deprivation without law violates Article 300-A. The appellants contended that compensation fixation till 2000 could not legitimize possession thereafter and that escalating land value aggravated the illegality. The refusal of restitution despite admitted illegality was characterized as judicial abdication.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the Union submitted that writ jurisdiction was inappropriate and that factual disputes subsisted regarding acquisition. It was argued that requisition orders were never challenged contemporaneously. Defense necessity and integration with surrounding acquired lands were invoked to justify retention. The Union asserted implied authority arising from long possession and public purpose.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 3, 6, 7 and 8 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952
ii. Section 30 of the Defence of India Act, 1962
iii. Article 300-A of the Constitution of India

I) JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that requisition is inherently temporary. The Court ruled that State occupation ceased to be lawful with the lapse of the Act in 1987. Continued possession thereafter lacked authority of law. The High Court’s refusal to direct restitution was held erroneous. The Court directed restoration of possession within three months and permitted fresh arbitration for compensation for unlawful occupation over the preceding 20 years.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

Requisition cannot mature into acquisition by efflux of time. Continued possession without statutory authority violates Article 300-A. Judicial condonation of executive illegality undermines rule of law. The State cannot plead convenience or necessity to override constitutional mandates.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court invoked Justice Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu v. United States to caution against judicial validation of executive overreach. It observed that courts must act as “jealous protectors” of liberty and property.

c) GUIDELINES

i. State must restore possession upon lapse of requisition authority
ii. Compensation does not legitimize unlawful possession
iii. Courts must not grant indefinite time for acquisition
iv. Executive necessity cannot override constitutional legality

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

i. Grahak Sanstha Manch v. State of Maharashtra, [1994] 3 SCR 746
ii. Rajendra Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., [1997] 1 SCR 1056
iii. Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569
iv. D.B. Basnett v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2020) 4 SCC 572

b) Important Statutes Referred

i. Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952
ii. Defence of India Act, 1962
iii. Constitution of India – Article 300-A