A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment in Ganesan v. State represented by its Inspector of Police examines the evidentiary value of the sole testimony of a child victim under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The Supreme Court was called upon to consider whether conviction under Section 7 read with Section 8 of the POCSO Act could be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, particularly when one of the material witnesses, namely the mother of the victim, had turned hostile. The appellant further questioned the fairness of appellate proceedings before the High Court on the ground that the legal aid counsel was appointed only a few days prior to disposal of the appeal, allegedly rendering the hearing illusory. The Court reaffirmed the settled position that the testimony of a victim of sexual offences stands on a higher pedestal and does not require corroboration if it is found to be trustworthy and of sterling quality. The judgment also clarifies the scope of meaningful legal aid and holds that mere shortness of time does not ipso facto establish denial of fair hearing. The Court further endorsed the High Court’s approach in modifying the compensation order by directing the State to pay compensation in the first instance, with liberty to recover the same from the accused if he possesses sufficient means. The decision strengthens victim-centric jurisprudence under the POCSO framework and reiterates that procedural objections cannot override substantive justice when evidence inspires confidence.

Keywords: POCSO Act, sole testimony, sterling witness, child victim, legal aid

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The POCSO Act was enacted to address the growing concern of sexual offences against children and to provide a robust legal framework ensuring child-friendly procedures and stringent punishment. The present case arose from a conviction under this special legislation, where the accused was found guilty of sexual assault on a minor girl aged thirteen years. The trial court relied primarily on the testimony of the victim, treating it as credible and sufficient for conviction. The defence strategy throughout the appellate process sought to undermine this reliance by highlighting the hostility of the victim’s mother and alleged procedural infirmities before the High Court.

The High Court, while affirming the conviction and sentence, modified the compensation aspect by shifting the immediate liability to the State, thereby balancing victim welfare with the accused’s claimed inability to pay. Dissatisfied, the accused approached the Supreme Court, invoking principles of fair trial and due process, and contending that the appellate hearing was rendered ineffective due to the late appointment of legal aid counsel.

The background of this judgment is also shaped by evolving jurisprudence on the evidentiary value of victim testimony in sexual offences. Indian courts have consistently moved away from the archaic insistence on corroboration, recognising the unique trauma associated with such crimes. This case thus provided the Supreme Court an opportunity to reaffirm doctrinal clarity on “sterling witness” theory while situating the discussion within the child-centric objectives of the POCSO Act.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant was tried before the Fast Track Mahila Court, Dharmapuri, for committing sexual assault on a minor girl studying in the fifth standard. The prosecution alleged that the victim was subjected to inappropriate sexual touching by the accused, an act falling squarely within the definition of sexual assault under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. At the time of the incident, the victim was about thirteen years old.

During trial, the prosecution examined the father of the victim as PW1, the mother as PW2, and the victim herself as PW3. While PW1 supported the prosecution version, PW2 turned hostile and did not fully corroborate the allegations. The defence attempted to capitalise on this hostility and also pointed to alleged previous enmity between the parties.

The victim, however, gave a consistent and detailed account of the incident. She withstood extensive cross-examination and remained firm on material particulars. The trial court found her testimony natural, cogent, and free from embellishment. Relying on her evidence, the court convicted the accused under Section 7 and sentenced him to the minimum punishment of three years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. Additionally, compensation of one lakh rupees was awarded to the victim under Rule 7(2) of the POCSO Rules.

On appeal, the High Court noted the absence of representation for the accused and appointed a legal aid counsel. The appeal was disposed of within a short span, during which the legal aid counsel confined submissions primarily to the issue of compensation. The High Court modified the compensation direction but affirmed the conviction and sentence. This led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether conviction under the POCSO Act can be sustained solely on the testimony of the child victim?
ii. Whether hostility of a material witness vitiates the prosecution case?
iii. Whether disposal of an appeal shortly after appointment of legal aid counsel amounts to denial of fair hearing?
iv. Whether the High Court was justified in modifying the compensation order?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court failed to afford a meaningful opportunity of hearing, as the legal aid counsel was appointed merely four days prior to disposal of the appeal. Reliance was placed on Anokhilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, emphasising that legal aid must be effective and not a mere formality.

On merits, it was argued that the trial court erred in convicting the accused based solely on the testimony of PW3 when PW2, the mother, had turned hostile. The defence highlighted alleged inconsistencies and prior enmity, contending that the benefit of doubt ought to have been extended to the accused.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for the State contended that there was no material to show that the legal aid counsel lacked access to case records. The mere shortness of time could not establish prejudice. It was further argued that the High Court had, in fact, granted partial relief by modifying the compensation order.

On merits, the State submitted that the testimony of the victim was reliable and of sterling quality, sufficient by itself for conviction. The hostility of PW2 was immaterial as she was not an eyewitness. Reliance was placed on authoritative precedents recognising conviction on sole testimony in sexual offence cases.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 7, POCSO Act, 2012
ii. Section 8, POCSO Act, 2012
iii. Rule 7(2), POCSO Rules, 2012
iv. Order XLI Rule 31, CPC

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court undertook an independent evaluation of the evidence on record. It held that the victim’s testimony was consistent, natural, and unblemished. The Court reiterated that even in cases where a related witness turns hostile, the testimony of the victim does not lose its probative value if it inspires confidence.

On the issue of fair hearing, the Court distinguished the facts from Anokhilal, observing that there was no material to show that the legal aid counsel was unprepared. Considering that substantial sentence had already been undergone, the Court decided to hear the appeal on merits instead of remanding the matter.

The Court upheld the High Court’s modification of compensation, noting that victim compensation is a statutory obligation and the State can recover the amount from the accused if he has sufficient means. The appeal was dismissed in entirety.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio of the judgment lies in reaffirming that conviction under the POCSO Act can be based on the sole testimony of the child victim if such testimony is trustworthy and of sterling quality. The Court applied the principles laid down in Vijay alias Chinee, Krishan Kumar Malik, and Rai Sandeep, holding that corroboration is not a rule of law but of prudence.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that offences proved against children strike at the conscience of society and demand strict enforcement of protective legislation. It also remarked that minimum sentences under the POCSO Act reflect legislative intent to deter such crimes.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Courts must assess victim testimony with sensitivity.
ii. Hostility of non-eyewitnesses is not fatal.
iii. Legal aid must be meaningful but prejudice must be shown.
iv. Compensation mechanisms under POCSO must prioritise victim welfare.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred
i. Vijay alias Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2010] 8 SCR 1150
ii. Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, [2011] 8 SCR 774
iii. Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi), [2012] 6 SCR 1153
iv. Anokhilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2020 SC 232

b) Important Statutes Referred
i. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
ii. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules, 2012