Anil Bhardwaj v. The Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 9 SCR 442

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment examines the limits of judicial review over decisions taken by High Court Selection Committees concerning suitability for appointment to judicial service. The appellant, selected for the post of District Judge (Entry Level), had disclosed the pendency of a criminal case under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 IPC arising from a matrimonial dispute. Despite provisional selection, his candidature was cancelled following adverse character verification. The appellant was subsequently acquitted and sought reconsideration of his candidature on that basis.

The Supreme Court clarified that mere inclusion in a select list does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment. The Court emphasised the elevated standards of integrity, character, and public confidence expected from members of the judicial service. It upheld the authority of the Selection Committee to assess suitability based on circumstances prevailing at the time of consideration. Subsequent acquittal was held insufficient to reopen concluded selection decisions.

The Court distinguished precedents where acquittal pre-dated selection and relied heavily on settled principles from Mehar Singh, Avtar Singh, and Pradeep Kumar concerning employer discretion and antecedent verification. The judgment also interpreted Clause 6(viii) of the Madhya Pradesh Government guidelines on character verification, holding it applicable only where acquittal exists at the time of verification.

The decision reinforces institutional autonomy of High Courts in judicial appointments and affirms that standards for judicial office are necessarily stricter than ordinary public employment.

Keywords: Judicial service, character verification, suitability, pending criminal case, subsequent acquittal

B) CASE DETAILS

Particulars Details
Judgement Cause Title Anil Bhardwaj v. The Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
Case Number Civil Appeal No. 3419 of 2020
Judgement Date 13 October 2020
Court Supreme Court of India
Quorum Ashok Bhushan, J. and M.R. Shah, J.
Author Justice Ashok Bhushan
Citation [2020] 9 SCR 442
Legal Provisions Involved Articles 226 & 136 of the Constitution of India; Sections 498A, 406, 34 IPC
Judgments Overruled None
Related Law Subjects Service Law, Judicial Service, Constitutional Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The judgment arises from a challenge to the rejection of candidature for Higher Judicial Service following character verification. The recruitment was initiated pursuant to an advertisement issued by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for District Judge (Entry Level) posts under direct recruitment from the Bar. The appellant successfully cleared written examination and interview stages and was provisionally selected.

The recruitment process was governed by the Madhya Pradesh Uchchatar Nyayik Seva (Bharti Tatha Seva Sharten) Niyam, 1994, framed in compliance with timelines mandated by the Supreme Court in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3). Character verification constituted an integral stage of the selection.

During verification, it emerged that a criminal case under Sections 498A and 406 IPC was pending against the appellant on a complaint filed by his wife. The Selection Committee, considering the pendency of the case, declared him unsuitable. This decision was ratified by the State Government through formal deletion of his name from the select list.

The appellant initially challenged the decision through a writ petition. Subsequently, after his acquittal by the trial court, he withdrew the earlier petition and filed a fresh one incorporating subsequent events. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that subsequent acquittal did not invalidate the earlier decision.

The appeal before the Supreme Court thus centred on the scope of judicial review over suitability assessments and the legal effect of acquittal after rejection of candidature.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The High Court of Madhya Pradesh issued an advertisement dated 09.03.2017 inviting applications for appointment to the post of District Judge (Entry Level). The appellant applied and disclosed the pendency of FIR No. 852/2014 under Sections 498A, 406, 34 IPC in his application.

After clearing the written examination and interview, the appellant was placed at Serial No. 13 in the unreserved category of the select list. A communication dated 06.04.2018 informed him of provisional selection, subject to medical examination and character verification.

During verification, police reports confirmed pendency of the criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute. The matter was placed before a joint meeting of the Administrative Committee (Higher Judicial Service) and the Examination-cum-Selection and Appointment Committee on 18.07.2018. The Committee resolved that due to the pending case, the appellant was not suitable for appointment.

Consequently, the State Government issued an order dated 14.09.2018 declaring him ineligible and deleting his name from the select list. A Gazette notification followed.

The appellant filed a writ petition challenging the decision. During pendency, he was acquitted by judgment dated 18.09.2019. He sought amendment of pleadings but eventually withdrew the petition with liberty to file afresh. The subsequent writ petition incorporating the acquittal was dismissed by the High Court on 06.01.2020.

The present appeal challenged the High Court’s refusal to direct reconsideration despite acquittal.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a candidate acquitted after rejection of candidature is entitled to reconsideration for judicial appointment?
ii. Whether pendency of a criminal case at the time of character verification justifies declaring a candidate unsuitable?
iii. Whether Clause 6(viii) of the character verification guidelines applies to acquittals occurring after selection decisions?
iv. Whether the Selection Committee’s decision suffered from arbitrariness warranting judicial interference?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellant submitted that full disclosure of the pending FIR negated any allegation of suppression. It was argued that the appellant was selected purely on merit and that pendency alone could not justify rejection.

It was contended that subsequent acquittal erased the basis of unsuitability and required reconsideration. Reliance was placed on Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra to argue that judicial service appointments cannot be denied where acquittal exists and no adverse material remains.

The appellant further relied upon Clause 6(viii) of the 05.06.2003 Government Guidelines, asserting that acquittal on merits restores eligibility for government service.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondents argued that suitability must be assessed based on facts existing at the time of selection. Pendency of a serious criminal case involving moral allegations justified rejection.

It was submitted that judicial service requires impeccable integrity, and the Committee acted within its jurisdiction. Subsequent acquittal could not retrospectively invalidate a lawful decision.

Reliance was placed on Mehar Singh, Avtar Singh, and Pradeep Kumar to submit that acquittal does not confer automatic entitlement to appointment.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Article 226 of the Constitution of India
ii. Article 136 of the Constitution of India
iii. Sections 498A, 406, 34 of the Indian Penal Code
iv. Madhya Pradesh Uchchatar Nyayik Seva Niyam, 1994
v. Government of Madhya Pradesh Guidelines dated 05.06.2003

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that the Selection Committee considered relevant material and acted within its authority. The Court reiterated that selection does not create an indefeasible right to appointment.

The pendency of a criminal case under Sections 498A and 406 IPC was held to be a valid consideration, particularly given the standards expected of judicial officers. The Court emphasised that judicial service demands a higher threshold of moral credibility than other public employment.

The Court rejected the contention that subsequent acquittal necessitated reconsideration, observing that selection processes cannot be reopened after conclusion. The clock cannot be turned backward merely because circumstances change later.

On interpretation of Clause 6(viii), the Court held that it applies only when acquittal exists at the time of character verification. Since the appellant was acquitted more than a year later, the clause was inapplicable.

The Court distinguished Joginder Singh and Mohammed Imran on factual grounds, noting that in those cases acquittal preceded selection or consideration.

No arbitrariness or mala fide was found in the Committee’s decision.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio is that subsequent acquittal does not invalidate a lawful decision declaring a candidate unsuitable based on circumstances existing at the time of selection. Suitability for judicial service must be assessed contemporaneously. Employer discretion in assessing character is paramount and immune from interference unless shown to be arbitrary or mala fide.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that judicial officers must inspire public confidence and even the appearance of compromised integrity is sufficient to deny appointment. It further remarked that stigma arising from criminal proceedings stands washed away upon acquittal.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Selection Committees are entitled to assess suitability based on pending criminal cases.
ii. Subsequent acquittal does not mandate reopening concluded selections.
iii. Character verification guidelines apply prospectively at the time of verification.
iv. Judicial review is limited to testing arbitrariness or mala fide.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Commissioner of Police v. Mehar Singh, [2013] 13 SCR 432
ii. Avtar Singh v. Union of India, [2016] 7 SCR 445
iii. Union Territory v. Pradeep Kumar, [2018] 1 SCR 112
iv. Joginder Singh v. U.T. Chandigarh, [2014] 11 SCR 155
v. Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2018 SC 4895
vi. Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) v. UPSC, (2008) 17 SCC 703

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Constitution of India
ii. Indian Penal Code, 1860
iii. Madhya Pradesh Uchchatar Nyayik Seva Niyam, 1994
iv. Government of Madhya Pradesh Character Verification Guidelines, 2003

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