A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment in Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab authoritatively settles the law concerning default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as modified by Section 43-D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The Supreme Court examined the interplay between the CrPC, the UAPA, and the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, particularly on the question of jurisdiction to extend the statutory period of investigation from ninety days to one hundred eighty days. The case arose from a terrorist attack involving a hand grenade at a religious congregation, resulting in multiple deaths and serious injuries. The appellant sought default bail upon expiry of ninety days, which was rejected by the Magistrate on the basis of an extension order passed without jurisdiction.

The Court clarified that once a Special Court under the NIA Act is designated, it alone has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters under the UAPA, including extension of time for investigation. It further reaffirmed that the right to default bail is an indefeasible right, forming an integral component of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court held that if an accused applies for default bail upon expiry of the statutory period and before filing of the charge sheet, such right crystallizes and cannot be defeated by subsequent filing of the charge sheet or erroneous judicial orders.

The judgment strengthens constitutional safeguards against prolonged pre-trial detention, underscores procedural discipline in anti-terror prosecutions, and reiterates that statutory safeguards cannot be diluted even in cases involving grave offences.

Keywords: Default Bail, Article 21, UAPA, Special Court Jurisdiction, Indefeasible Right, Section 167 CrPC

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The present judgment arises from the evolving jurisprudence on statutory bail, particularly in cases involving special legislations such as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The Court was called upon to resolve conflicting interpretations regarding the jurisdiction of Magistrates and Special Courts in extending the period of investigation beyond ninety days. The background reflects a recurring tension between national security legislations and constitutional guarantees of personal liberty.

The legislative scheme of Section 167(2) CrPC provides a temporal limit on investigative detention. This safeguard, though procedural in form, has been consistently recognized as a substantive guarantee flowing from Article 21. The UAPA modifies this scheme by permitting extension of the investigation period to one hundred eighty days, but only subject to strict compliance and judicial oversight.

The confusion arose due to overlapping statutory frameworks under the CrPC, UAPA, and NIA Act. While State Police retained investigative authority under Section 10 of the NIA Act, the jurisdiction to try scheduled offences stood transferred to Special Courts. The erroneous assumption that investigation by State Police preserved the Magistrate’s jurisdiction formed the basis of the impugned orders.

This judgment situates itself within a long line of precedents affirming that procedural lapses by courts cannot extinguish fundamental rights. The decision therefore has far-reaching implications for undertrial rights, judicial competence, and institutional accountability.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

An FIR dated 18.11.2018 was registered following a hand grenade attack at Nirankari Bhawan, Rajasansi, Amritsar, during a religious congregation attended by approximately two hundred persons. The explosion resulted in twenty-two serious injuries and three deaths. The FIR invoked Sections 302, 307, 452, 427, 341, 34 IPC, Section 25 Arms Act, Sections 3–6 Explosive Substances Act, and Section 13 UAPA.

The appellant, Bikramjit Singh, aged twenty-six, was arrested on 22.11.2018 and remanded to judicial custody by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Upon expiry of ninety days on 21.02.2019, an application for default bail was filed. Prior to this, on 13.02.2019, the Magistrate purportedly extended the investigation period to one hundred eighty days.

The default bail application was dismissed on 25.02.2019 solely on the basis of this extension order. A revision petition was filed, and on 25.03.2019, the Special Court under the NIA Act set aside the Magistrate’s extension order, holding that it lacked jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on 26.03.2019, the prosecution filed a charge sheet invoking additional UAPA provisions. Subsequent applications for default bail were rejected, and the High Court upheld the denial, erroneously holding that the charge sheet preceded the bail application. This led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a Magistrate has jurisdiction to extend the investigation period under Section 43-D(2) UAPA?
ii. Whether filing of a charge sheet after expiry of ninety days extinguishes the right to default bail?
iii. Whether default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC forms part of Article 21 of the Constitution?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the Appellant submitted that once Special Courts under the NIA Act were notified, they alone possessed jurisdiction over all UAPA-related matters, including extension of investigation time. It was argued that the Magistrate’s order dated 13.02.2019 was void ab initio.

Reliance was placed on Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, Sanjay Dutt, and Uday Mohanlal Acharya to contend that the right to default bail crystallizes upon filing of an application after expiry of the statutory period. The Appellant emphasized that the right could not be defeated by a subsequent charge sheet or judicial error.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the Respondent State argued that since the investigation was conducted by State Police, the Magistrate retained jurisdiction under Section 167 CrPC. Reliance was placed on Section 10 of the NIA Act to assert that State powers remained unaffected.

It was further argued that once the charge sheet was filed, the right to default bail stood extinguished, and that subsequent applications could not revive a dismissed claim.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court categorically rejected the reasoning adopted by the High Court. It held that the High Court had committed a fundamental factual error regarding dates, which vitiated its conclusion. The Court clarified that the default bail application was filed prior to the filing of the charge sheet.

On jurisdiction, the Court undertook a detailed statutory analysis of Sections 2(1)(d) and 43-D(2) UAPA read with Sections 13, 16, and 22 of the NIA Act. It held that once a Special Court is designated, it alone constitutes “the Court” for purposes of extending investigation time.

The Magistrate’s extension order was therefore held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, the appellant’s right to default bail crystallized upon expiry of ninety days and filing of the bail application.

The Court reaffirmed that default bail is not a mere statutory concession but a constitutional safeguard under Article 21. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was directed to be released on default bail.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The Supreme Court held that only a Special Court under the NIA Act has jurisdiction to extend the investigation period under Section 43-D(2) of the UAPA. Any extension granted by a Magistrate is void.

It was further held that the right to default bail becomes enforceable the moment an application is filed after expiry of the statutory period and before filing of the charge sheet. Subsequent filing of the charge sheet does not defeat this right.

The Court reaffirmed that default bail is an indefeasible right forming part of the procedure established by law under Article 21.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that personal liberty cannot be sacrificed at the altar of procedural confusion or prosecutorial delay. It emphasized that courts must act as sentinels against illegal detention, especially under stringent legislations like the UAPA.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Extension of investigation under Section 43-D(2) UAPA can only be granted by a Special Court.
ii. Default bail applications must be decided with reference to the date of expiry of statutory period.
iii. Judicial errors cannot extinguish fundamental rights.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment represents a reaffirmation of constitutional primacy over procedural deviations. It harmonizes anti-terror legislation with civil liberties and restores clarity on jurisdictional competence. The decision will significantly influence bail jurisprudence under special statutes and reinforce judicial accountability in pre-trial detention matters.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

1. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, [1994] 1 Supp. SCR 360
2. Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI, [1994] 3 Supp. SCR 263
3. Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, [2001] 2 SCR 878
4. Union of India v. Nirala Yadav, [2014] 6 SCR 148
5. Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, [2017] 8 SCR 785

b) Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
2. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
3. National Investigation Agency Act, 2008