A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. addresses a foundational constitutional question concerning the permissibility of sub-classification within Scheduled Castes for the purpose of reservation in public employment. The case arose from a challenge to Section 4(5) of the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006, which earmarked 50% of Scheduled Caste reserved vacancies for Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs, identified as the most backward among Scheduled Castes in Punjab. The Punjab and Haryana High Court invalidated the provision by relying on E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, which held that Scheduled Castes constitute a homogenous class and cannot be further classified by States.

A Constitution Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court, while examining the constitutional validity of the impugned provision, undertook an extensive review of equality jurisprudence under Articles 14, 15, and 16, the scope of Article 16(4), and the nature of Articles 341 and 342. The Court critically analysed whether E.V. Chinnaiah correctly interpreted Indra Sawhney v. Union of India and whether the absolute prohibition on sub-classification within Scheduled Castes aligns with constitutional goals of substantive equality and distributive justice.

Recognising deep-rooted empirical disparities among Scheduled Castes and the failure of reservation benefits to percolate to the most deprived groups, the Court held that preferential treatment within the Scheduled Caste category, based on rational criteria, does not amount to tampering with the Presidential List. It concluded that the interpretation adopted in E.V. Chinnaiah requires reconsideration. Accordingly, the matter was referred to a larger Bench of seven Judges or more, underscoring the immense constitutional significance of the issues involved.

Keywords: Sub-classification, Scheduled Castes, Reservation in Services, Article 16(4), Distributive Justice, E.V. Chinnaiah

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The litigation traces its origins to a long-standing policy debate in Punjab concerning inequitable distribution of reservation benefits among Scheduled Castes. Historically, the State identified that Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs continued to remain at the bottom of socio-economic indicators despite decades of affirmative action. To address this imbalance, the Punjab Government issued a circular in 1975 reserving 50% of Scheduled Caste vacancies for these groups. The circular was invalidated by the High Court, and the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the Supreme Court led the State to enact a statutory provision through Section 4(5) of the Punjab Act, 2006.

The High Court once again struck down the provision by relying on E.V. Chinnaiah, which declared Scheduled Castes to be a homogenous class incapable of internal classification by States. The correctness of this position came under scrutiny when a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court expressed doubts about E.V. Chinnaiah, particularly in light of Indra Sawhney, Article 338, and evolving equality jurisprudence.

The reference to a Constitution Bench thus arose against the backdrop of conflicting interpretations of constitutional provisions, empirical realities of caste-based inequality, and the State’s obligation to ensure substantive equality. The case presented an opportunity to re-examine rigid notions of formal equality and to assess whether constitutional affirmative action must remain responsive to social realities rather than frozen legal constructs.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The State of Punjab historically observed that certain Scheduled Caste communities, particularly Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs, were grossly underrepresented in public services despite the existence of reservation policies. To remedy this, a 1975 circular earmarked 50% of reserved SC vacancies for these communities. This administrative measure was invalidated by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and the Supreme Court declined to interfere.

Subsequently, the Punjab Legislature enacted the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006. Section 4(5) of the Act statutorily incorporated the earlier policy by granting first preference to Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs within the Scheduled Caste quota. The provision did not exclude other Scheduled Castes but merely prioritised the most backward among them, subject to availability.

The High Court struck down Section 4(5), holding it unconstitutional on the ground that sub-classification within Scheduled Castes amounted to impermissible tampering with the Presidential List under Article 341, relying heavily on E.V. Chinnaiah.

The State appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court failed to appreciate the distinction between exclusion from the list and preferential distribution of reservation benefits. Given the constitutional importance of the issue, a three-Judge Bench referred the matter to a Constitution Bench to determine the validity of the provision and the correctness of E.V. Chinnaiah.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether Section 4(5) of the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006 is constitutionally valid?
ii. Whether the State Legislature has the competence to provide sub-classification within Scheduled Castes for reservation in services?
iii. Whether the judgment in E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P. requires reconsideration in light of Indra Sawhney and subsequent constitutional developments?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the State of Punjab submitted that Article 16(4) empowers the State to make provisions for backward classes, which undisputedly include Scheduled Castes. It was argued that Indra Sawhney clearly permits sub-classification among backward classes to ensure equitable distribution of benefits. The appellants contended that E.V. Chinnaiah erroneously treated Scheduled Castes as a monolithic group and failed to appreciate empirical evidence of internal disparities.

It was further submitted that preferential treatment does not amount to inclusion or exclusion from the Presidential List under Article 341. Reliance was placed on State of Maharashtra v. Milind to argue that only alteration of the list is prohibited, not rational distribution of benefits within it. The State emphasised that the impugned provision advances substantive equality under Article 14 by ensuring that reservation benefits reach the most deprived.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The respondents contended that Scheduled Castes, once notified under Article 341, constitute a single homogenous class and cannot be sub-divided by State legislation. Heavy reliance was placed on E.V. Chinnaiah, which held that any sub-classification would amount to impermissible tampering with the Presidential List.

It was argued that permitting States to create internal quotas would undermine national uniformity and open the door to political manipulation. The respondents maintained that the Constitution envisages special protection for Scheduled Castes as a whole and that any differentiation among them violates Articles 14 and 16.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Constitution Bench undertook an exhaustive examination of equality jurisprudence and reservation policy. The Court reaffirmed that Article 16(4) is an enabling provision aimed at achieving real equality. It emphasised that Scheduled Castes are unequals within the class and that treating them as homogenous ignores ground realities documented by multiple commissions.

The Court held that sub-classification based on rational criteria does not amount to exclusion from the Presidential List and therefore does not violate Articles 341 or 342. The Bench found that E.V. Chinnaiah failed to correctly apply Indra Sawhney, which explicitly permits sub-classification among backward classes to prevent the monopolisation of benefits by advanced sections.

Recognising the constitutional goal of distributive justice, the Court endorsed the view that States must have the flexibility to design affirmative action measures responsive to local realities. Given the far-reaching implications of the issue, the Court concluded that E.V. Chinnaiah requires reconsideration by a larger Bench.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The principal ratio of the judgment lies in the recognition that sub-classification within Scheduled Castes for the purpose of equitable distribution of reservation benefits is constitutionally permissible, provided it does not result in exclusion from the Presidential List. The Court clarified that Articles 14, 15, and 16 embody substantive equality and allow differential treatment among unequals to achieve real equality.

The Bench held that E.V. Chinnaiah adopted an overly formalistic approach that undermines the transformative mandate of the Constitution. By endorsing the reasoning in Indra Sawhney, the Court reaffirmed that backward classes are not static entities and that internal differentiation may be necessary to prevent perpetuation of inequality within reserved categories.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that rigid adherence to precedent cannot override constitutional morality and social realities. It remarked that the doctrine of stare decisis must yield when precedent obstructs the achievement of substantive justice. The Court also highlighted the need for empirical data in shaping reservation policies and cautioned against treating constitutional lists as immutable social constructs.

c) GUIDELINES 

i. States may provide preferential treatment within Scheduled Castes based on rational criteria and empirical data.
ii. Such measures must not result in total exclusion of any caste from reservation benefits.
iii. Alteration of the Presidential List remains the exclusive domain of Parliament.
iv. Reservation policies must advance substantive equality and distributive justice.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment marks a significant shift towards a dynamic and reality-oriented interpretation of equality and reservation. By questioning the correctness of E.V. Chinnaiah, the Supreme Court acknowledged that constitutional affirmative action cannot remain insulated from empirical social realities. The decision reinforces the idea that formal equality is insufficient to address entrenched inequalities and that the Constitution mandates proactive measures to uplift the most deprived.

The reference to a larger Bench underscores the Court’s recognition of the profound constitutional implications of sub-classification within Scheduled Castes. The outcome of this reconsideration has the potential to reshape reservation jurisprudence and to reaffirm the transformative vision of the Constitution as a living document committed to social justice.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

1. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, [1992] 2 Supp. SCR 454
2. E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P., [2005] 1 SCC 394
3. State of Maharashtra v. Milind, [2000] 5 Supp. SCR 65
4. Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta, [2018] 10 SCR 663

b) Important Statutes Referred

1. Constitution of India
2. Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006