A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Constitution Bench decision in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Ors. finally authoritatively settles the long-standing judicial conflict concerning the scope, temporal operation, and constitutional intent of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as substituted by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. The judgment resolves divergent interpretations rendered in Prakash v. Phulavati and Danamma v. Amar, clarifying whether a daughter’s right as a coparcener is contingent upon the father being alive on 09.09.2005.

The Court unequivocally holds that coparcenary is a right by birth, rooted in unobstructed heritage under Mitakshara law, and therefore the daughter acquires the status of a coparcener by virtue of birth, irrespective of whether the father was alive on the date of the amendment. The amendment is characterised as retroactive and not retrospective, since it operates prospectively but is founded on an antecedent fact, namely birth.

The Court further clarifies the limited scope of the statutory fiction of partition under the unamended proviso to Section 6 and rules that such fiction never resulted in an actual severance of coparcenary. Crucially, it also interprets Explanation to Section 6(5) to strictly confine recognised partitions to those evidenced by registered partition deeds or court decrees, while permitting oral partitions only in exceptional cases supported by unimpeachable contemporaneous public documents.

This judgment is a watershed in advancing gender justice, harmonising personal law with constitutional equality, and ensuring substantive parity for daughters within the Mitakshara coparcenary framework.

Keywords: Coparcenary, Daughter’s Rights, Hindu Succession Act, Mitakshara Law, Retroactive Legislation, Gender Justice

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The reference to a larger Bench arose due to a palpable doctrinal inconsistency in Supreme Court jurisprudence on the interpretation of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, post its substitution by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. While Prakash v. Phulavati confined the benefit of coparcenary rights only to daughters whose fathers were alive on 09.09.2005, Danamma v. Amar extended such rights even where the father had died prior to the amendment.

This inconsistency generated uncertainty in partition suits across India, particularly where preliminary decrees had been passed before 2005 but final decrees remained pending. The present batch of appeals, including connected SLPs, necessitated a comprehensive examination of Mitakshara coparcenary, the nature of unobstructed heritage, and the doctrinal distinction between retroactive and retrospective legislation.

The background also reflects India’s constitutional commitment to dismantling entrenched patriarchal norms embedded in personal laws. The Law Commission’s 174th Report, State amendments preceding the central amendment, and parliamentary debates formed the socio-legal backdrop against which Section 6 was amended. The Constitution Bench was thus called upon not merely to interpret a statutory provision, but to align personal law with Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India, while preserving transactional certainty.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, Vineeta Sharma, and the respondents were members of a Mitakshara joint Hindu family. The dispute concerned partition of ancestral coparcenary property. The father of the parties had died prior to the enforcement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. The respondents resisted the appellant’s claim to coparcenary rights on the ground that the father was not alive on 09.09.2005, relying upon Prakash v. Phulavati.

The trial court and High Court proceedings reflected conflicting approaches, culminating in appeals before the Supreme Court. Parallel matters from various High Courts raised identical questions, including whether daughters could reopen partitions, whether preliminary decrees barred redistribution, and whether oral partitions could defeat statutory rights.

Given the national importance of the issues and conflicting precedents, the matter was referred to a Constitution Bench. The Union of India intervened, emphasising the constitutional objective of gender equality and the discriminatory nature of the earlier Mitakshara regime.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a daughter’s right as a coparcener under Section 6 as amended in 2005 depends on the father being alive on 09.09.2005?
ii. Whether the 2005 Amendment is prospective, retrospective, or retroactive in operation?
iii. Whether a statutory fiction of partition under the unamended Section 6 resulted in actual severance of coparcenary?
iv. Whether oral partitions can defeat a daughter’s statutory coparcenary rights post-2005?
v. Whether pending partition suits and preliminary decrees must give effect to amended Section 6?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellant submitted that coparcenary rights are acquired by birth, forming part of unobstructed heritage, and are not contingent upon the death or survival of the father. It was argued that the interpretation in Prakash v. Phulavati misconstrued the nature of Mitakshara coparcenary and diluted the constitutional intent behind the 2005 amendment.

It was contended that the amendment is retroactive, operating prospectively but anchored in antecedent birth, and therefore daughters born prior to 2005 are entitled to enforce rights from 09.09.2005. The appellant further argued that the statutory fiction of partition under the old proviso was limited and never disrupted coparcenary.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondents relied upon Prakash v. Phulavati and Mangammal v. T.B. Raju, asserting that a daughter could become a coparcener only if both she and her father were alive on the date of commencement of the amendment. It was argued that reopening settled transactions would cause legal uncertainty and unsettle vested rights.

They also contended that oral partitions and family arrangements were recognised under traditional Hindu law and should not be invalidated by the amendment.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Constitution Bench decisively rejected the restrictive interpretation in Prakash v. Phulavati. The Court held that Section 6(1)(a) unequivocally confers coparcenary status on a daughter by birth, placing her on the same footing as a son. The right is unobstructed heritage, not dependent on death. Consequently, the survival of the father on 09.09.2005 is irrelevant.

The Court clarified that the amendment is retroactive. While it operates from 09.09.2005, it draws upon the antecedent fact of birth. The Court distinguished retroactivity from retrospectivity, noting that no vested rights are taken away, as liabilities also commence post-2005.

On partition, the Court held that the statutory fiction under the old proviso to Section 6 was limited to ascertaining the share of a deceased coparcener and never resulted in actual severance. Therefore, pending suits and even cases with preliminary decrees must apply amended Section 6 at the stage of final decree.

With respect to Explanation to Section 6(5), the Court imposed a stringent evidentiary threshold. Oral partitions are generally excluded and may be accepted only in exceptional cases supported by unimpeachable contemporaneous public documents.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio rests on the principle that coparcenary is a birthright under Mitakshara law, and the 2005 amendment merely removes gender-based exclusion. The daughter becomes a coparcener in her own right, irrespective of the father’s life status on the amendment date. The amendment is retroactive, constitutionally grounded in equality, and must be given full effect in pending proceedings.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that patriarchal exclusions under classical Hindu law were incompatible with constitutional morality. It emphasised that courts must be vigilant against sham defences such as fabricated oral partitions designed to defeat daughters’ rights.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Daughters are coparceners by birth, before or after 2005.
ii. Father’s survival on 09.09.2005 is immaterial.
iii. Preliminary decrees do not bar application of amended Section 6.
iv. Only registered partitions or court decrees prior to 20.12.2004 are protected.
v. Oral partitions require exceptional proof through public documents.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment marks a constitutional recalibration of Hindu personal law. It harmonises Mitakshara coparcenary with substantive equality, dismantles judicially created barriers, and ensures daughters are not relegated to contingent heirs. The ruling restores doctrinal clarity, prevents misuse of oral partition pleas, and strengthens the transformative promise of the Constitution within the domain of family law.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

• Prakash v. Phulavati, [2015] 12 SCR 579 (overruled)

• Danamma v. Amar, [2018] 2 SCR 553 (partly overruled)

• Ganduri Koteshwaramma v. Chakiri Yanadi, [2011] 12 SCR 968

• State Bank of India v. Ghamandi Ram, [1969] 3 SCR 681

b) Important Statutes Referred

• Hindu Succession Act, 1956

• Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005