A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
The judgment in Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra and Others represents a significant reaffirmation of the constitutional protection accorded to property rights under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, even after the deletion of the right to property as a fundamental right. The Supreme Court examined the legality of an erroneous vesting of a privately owned internal road in favour of a municipal corporation under a Town Planning Scheme framed under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. The case arose from a long-standing factual dispute where a strip of land recorded as a private internal road, never acquired through statutory means, was mistakenly shown as vested in the Pune Municipal Corporation.
The Court undertook a meticulous statutory analysis of the scheme of the 1966 Act, particularly Sections 59 to 65, 71, 72, 88, 91 and 125–129, and clarified that Section 88 dealing with vesting cannot operate independently of acquisition provisions. The judgment emphasized that vesting under a planning statute does not amount to acquisition unless accompanied by authority of law and compensation. The Supreme Court strongly deprecated administrative arbitrariness and held that statutory authorities have a public duty to correct manifest errors under Section 91 where an error, irregularity, or informality is demonstrated.
The decision also reinforces the constitutional obligation of High Courts under Article 226 to exercise writ jurisdiction effectively where public authorities abdicate statutory duties. The ruling is a robust exposition of the doctrine of eminent domain, procedural fairness in town planning law, and the inviolability of property rights absent lawful acquisition.
Keywords:
Property rights; Article 300-A; Town Planning Scheme; Vesting of land; Statutory acquisition; Mandamus; Public duty
B) CASE DETAILS
| Particulars | Details |
|---|---|
| i) Judgment Cause Title | Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra and Others |
| ii) Case Number | Civil Appeal No. 6156 of 2013 |
| iii) Judgment Date | 07 August 2020 |
| iv) Court | Supreme Court of India |
| v) Quorum | Indu Malhotra, J. and Indira Banerjee, J. |
| vi) Author | Justice Indira Banerjee |
| vii) Citation | [2020] 13 SCR 318 |
| viii) Legal Provisions Involved | Articles 226, 300-A of the Constitution of India; Sections 59–65, 71–74, 88, 91, 125–129 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 |
| ix) Judgments Overruled | None |
| x) Related Law Subjects | Constitutional Law; Property Law; Town Planning Law; Administrative Law |
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The dispute in the present case traces its origins to the implementation of a Town Planning Scheme under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, a comprehensive legislation enacted to regulate planned urban development while balancing public interest and private property rights. The judgment arose in a factual matrix where historical ownership records, municipal actions, and statutory planning mechanisms intersected, resulting in an erroneous deprivation of private property without acquisition.
The land in question formed part of Final Plot No. 473 at Bhamburda, Pune, which was originally owned by private individuals and subsequently subdivided in 1970. A portion of the land was consistently recorded as a private internal road jointly held by adjacent plot owners. Despite this, when the Town Planning Scheme was sanctioned in 1979, the road was mistakenly shown as owned by the Pune Municipal Corporation. Crucially, there was no acquisition proceeding under Chapter VII of the 1966 Act, nor was compensation ever paid.
Over the years, multiple official communications and resolutions, including those of the Municipal Corporation itself, acknowledged that the road was never acquired and that its recording in municipal ownership was erroneous. Nevertheless, the State Government refused to sanction a modification under Section 91, prompting the appellant trust to seek judicial review. The Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition by narrowly construing Section 88 and holding that the land had vested in the municipal authority.
The Supreme Court was thus called upon to determine whether statutory vesting could override constitutional guarantees, whether an admitted clerical or statutory error could be perpetuated, and whether public authorities could divest private property without following acquisition procedures mandated by law.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The land forming the subject matter of the dispute originally belonged to the Thorat family and was sold in 1956 to Swami Dilip Kumar Roy and Smt. Indira Devi, whose ownership was duly recorded in revenue records in 1959. In 1970, Plot No. 473 was subdivided by an official order of the Pune Municipal Corporation into four plots and one vacant strip shown as a private internal road measuring 444.14 square metres. The internal road was recorded as being in joint possession of the owners of the adjoining plots and not in the ownership of the municipal corporation.
Subsequently, a Town Planning Scheme was proposed under the 1966 Act, and an arbitrator was appointed under Section 72. The arbitrator’s award dated 16 May 1972 categorically directed that the area and ownership of plots be maintained as per existing property records. This award attained finality and was never challenged.
When the Town Planning Scheme came into force in 1979, an unexplained deviation occurred. The scheme recorded the internal road as owned by the Pune Municipal Corporation. Over the years, multiple official letters issued by municipal and state authorities admitted that the road was never acquired, never existed on site as a public road, and was wrongly recorded.
In 1997, Smt. Indira Devi executed a trust deed transferring her interests, including the internal road, to the appellant trust. The trust repeatedly sought correction of records. While the Municipal Corporation passed resolutions agreeing to deletion of its name, the State Government rejected the proposal for modification under Section 91 in 2006. This rejection led to a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court, culminating in the present appeal.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i. Whether land shown as vested under Section 88 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 can vest without acquisition proceedings under Sections 125–129?
ii. Whether an admitted erroneous entry in a Town Planning Scheme can be corrected under Section 91?
iii. Whether deprivation of private property without compensation violates Article 300-A of the Constitution of India?
iv. Whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226?
F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
The counsels for the appellant submitted that the internal road was private property consistently reflected as such in revenue records and affirmed by the arbitrator’s award under Section 72. It was contended that no acquisition proceedings were ever initiated under Chapter VII of the Act, nor was compensation paid, rendering any vesting unconstitutional.
It was argued that Section 88 could not be read in isolation and that vesting presupposes lawful acquisition. The rejection of modification under Section 91 was termed arbitrary, especially in light of admissions by the Pune Municipal Corporation that the road never belonged to it. Reliance was placed on K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka to assert that property rights under Article 300-A cannot be defeated by executive fiat.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
The counsels for the respondents contended that upon sanction of the Town Planning Scheme, the land vested in the municipal authority under Section 88. It was argued that deletion of a road would amount to a substantial variation impermissible under Section 91. The State further asserted that planning norms require access roads for plots and that modification was impractical.
H) JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court categorically rejected the reasoning adopted by the Bombay High Court and held that the interpretation of Section 88 was legally unsustainable. The Court emphasized that statutory vesting does not operate independently of acquisition provisions and that Sections 125–129 are integral to lawful divestment of property.
The Court undertook a detailed examination of the scheme of the Act and observed that none of its provisions authorize expropriation without consent or compensation. The arbitrator’s award, having attained finality, was binding and could not be nullified by administrative error. The Court further held that Section 91 is specifically designed to correct errors, irregularities, or infirmities, and deletion of an erroneous ownership entry does not constitute a substantial variation.
The Supreme Court also reaffirmed that Article 300-A embodies the doctrine of eminent domain, requiring public purpose and compensation. In the absence of acquisition, the appellant trust could not be deprived of its property. The Court further held that the High Court abdicated its constitutional duty under Article 226 by failing to issue mandamus despite clear statutory violations.
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
The ratio decidendi of the judgment is that statutory vesting under a Town Planning Scheme does not amount to lawful acquisition unless accompanied by authority of law and compensation, and that Section 88 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 must be read harmoniously with Sections 125–129. Any deprivation of property without following acquisition procedure violates Article 300-A of the Constitution.
The Court further held that Section 91 imposes a public duty on authorities to correct manifest errors in planning schemes, and refusal to do so despite admitted mistakes is arbitrary and unconstitutional.
b. OBITER DICTA
The Court observed that the right to property, though no longer fundamental, remains a human right and a constitutional right. It cautioned that urban planning objectives, however laudable, cannot override constitutional safeguards. The Court also emphasized that High Courts must not adopt a hyper-technical approach when statutory authorities commit manifest illegality affecting civil rights.
c. GUIDELINES
i. Planning authorities must ensure that vesting of land is preceded by lawful acquisition.
ii. Erroneous entries in planning schemes must be corrected under Section 91 when brought to notice.
iii. Arbitrator awards under Section 72 must be treated as binding unless set aside by competent courts.
iv. Compensation is mandatory for any deprivation of property.
I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The judgment stands as a strong reaffirmation of constitutional property jurisprudence and administrative accountability. It restores balance between urban development and individual rights and clarifies the limits of statutory vesting. The decision strengthens judicial oversight over town planning authorities and reinforces the obligation of courts to protect citizens against unlawful deprivation of property. It serves as a critical precedent in land use and planning disputes, ensuring that procedural safeguards are not sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience.
J) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
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Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel, (2008) 4 SCC 649
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State of Bihar v. Project Uchcha Vidya Sikshak Sangh, (2006) 2 SCC 545
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K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1
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Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., (1982) 1 SCC 39
b. Important Statutes Referred
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Constitution of India, Articles 226 and 300-A
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Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966