A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 404 : 2025 INSC 149, concerns the correctness of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in setting aside earlier orders that had upheld dismissal of an employee following criminal conviction and later departmental enquiry. The respondent, an Assistant Engineer (Civil) with the Airports Authority of India, was criminally tried on charges under Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 34 IPC; convicted by the trial court, he was dismissed by the Disciplinary Authority.

The High Court later acquitted him on criminal appeal by giving benefit of doubt. Subsequent representations, departmental proceedings, and appellate administrative reviews led to repeated litigation; a Single Judge of the High Court ultimately upheld the disciplinary dismissal, but a later Division Bench set that aside.

This Court examined:

(i) whether the Division Bench could upset earlier concurrent findings that had attained finality;

(ii) whether non-examination of the original complainant/decoy fatally vitiated the departmental enquiry; and

(iii) the proper standard of proof and scope of intra-court writ appeals.

The Supreme Court held the Division Bench’s interference unsustainable: departmental authorities had applied the preponderance of probabilities standard, relied on admissible departmental evidence including trap-party testimony and confessional statements permissible in domestic enquiries, and the Division Bench impermissibly re-appreciated facts without concluding the Single Judge’s view was perverse or legally erroneous. The appeal was allowed and the Division Bench judgment set aside.

Keywords: Dismissal; Illegal gratification; Deemed suspension; De novo departmental enquiry; Standard of proof; Preponderance of probabilities; Trap evidence; Intra-court writ appeal.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgment Cause Title: Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee
ii) Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 8414 of 2017
iii) Judgment Date: 04 February 2025
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum: JJ. J.K. Maheshwari and Sandeep Mehta
vi) Author: Mehta, J.
vii) Citation: [2025] 2 S.C.R. 404 : 2025 INSC 149
viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Indian Penal Code, 1860 (s.34); Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (ss.25–26 referenced); Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (s.162 referenced); Airport Authority of India Employees (CDA) Regulations, 2003.
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any): None; Court set aside Division Bench order of Calcutta High Court dated 01.03.2012.
x) Related Law Subjects: Service Law; Administrative Law; Criminal Law; Evidence; Disciplinary Proceedings.

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The dispute traces to arrest and conviction of the respondent in a CBI prosecution alleging demand and acceptance of bribe. Following the trial court conviction (10.12.1999), the Disciplinary Authority dispensed with enquiry and dismissed the respondent (13.07.2000). The respondent successfully appealed in criminal court and obtained acquittal on 16.07.2004 by benefit of doubt. Administrative responses were fragmented: the Authority set aside the earlier dismissal but placed the respondent under deemed suspension and initiated fresh departmental proceedings (memorandum dated 07.09.2005).

Multiple writ petitions and intra-court appeals ensued in the Calcutta High Court, producing conflicting outcomes a Single Judge upheld dismissal based on departmental enquiry and appellate administrative orders, but a later Division Bench reversed that view on intra-court appeal (01.03.2012). This Court granted special leave, stayed the Division Bench order and examined whether the Division Bench’s re-appreciation of evidence and reliance on non-examination of the complainant were legally sustainable, while also revisiting settled principles governing departmental prosecutions, admissibility of confessional statements in domestic enquiry, and limits of intra-court appellate interference.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The respondent worked as Assistant Engineer (Civil) with the appellant-Authority. He and a Junior Engineer were arrested for offences under PC Act and s.34 IPC on allegations that the respondent demanded Rs.6,000 from a contractor’s representative and accepted Rs.3,000 as first instalment. The trial court convicted the respondent on 10.12.1999; the co-accused was acquitted. The Disciplinary Authority relied on that conviction to dismiss the respondent on 13.07.2000. The respondent filed criminal appeal and was acquitted by the High Court on 16.07.2004 on benefit of doubt.

Relying on a prior order (05.02.2001) the respondent sought reinstatement; the Authority initiated fresh disciplinary proceedings instead and placed him under deemed suspension. A writ petition quashed the memorandum and ordered reinstatement (23.02.2007), but the Authority’s intra-court appeal succeeded (06.08.2007), and this Court declined special leave (29.02.2008) directing expedition of departmental proceedings.

Enquiry was held: the Enquiry Officer found negligence, lack of integrity and that the respondent demanded and partly accepted bribe; disciplinary and appellate administrative fora confirmed dismissal. A Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court affirmed the disciplinary outcome (29.06.2011). Thereafter the Division Bench, via intra-court appeal, set aside the Single Judge’s order (01.03.2012), prompting the present special leave appeal. Key contested facts: admissibility/value of trap evidence; non-examination of original complainant/decoy in departmental enquiry; whether criminal acquittal amounted to honourable acquittal.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a Division Bench exercising intra-court writ appellate jurisdiction can re-appreciate evidence and overturn a Single Judge’s well-reasoned acceptance of concurrent departmental findings absent perversity or an error apparent on the face of the record?
ii. Whether non-examination of the original complainant/decoy in domestic disciplinary proceedings is fatal to the entire departmental enquiry?
iii. Whether confessional statements and trap-party testimony inadmissible/ignored in criminal trial can nonetheless sustain departmental findings on the preponderance of probabilities?
iv. Whether an acquittal by the criminal appellate court on benefit of doubt constitutes an honourable acquittal binding upon departmental authorities?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellant-Authority argued that departmental proceedings require proof on preponderance of probabilities and are not bound by criminal standards; the Division Bench wrongly re-evaluated evidence and substituted criminal standards. It contended that the High Court’s earlier Division Bench (06.08.2007) had already held departmental enquiry was permissible because the criminal acquittal was not honourable; that prior findings had attained finality, and the impugned Division Bench unlawfully overruled those concurrent findings. The Authority maintained that trap-party testimony including confessional statements (admissible in discipline) and corroborative departmental witnesses sufficed to sustain dismissal, and that the non-examination of the complainant was not fatal.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The respondent contended the original complainant/decoy was not even shown to be an authorised representative, and that the High Court’s criminal acquittal demanded respect. He argued the non-examination of the complainant rendered departmental findings unsafe. Counsel urged that findings in criminal appellate proceedings on identical evidence ought to be treated at a higher pedestal and should have constrained the disciplinary forum; thus Division Bench’s interference was justified.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — ss.7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d).
ii. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s.34 (common intention).
iii. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — ss.25–26 (confessions) referenced with respect to admissibility differences between criminal and departmental fora.
iv. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — s.162 (statements to police).
v. Airport Authority of India Employees (CDA) Regulations, 2003 — disciplinary framework; major penalty of dismissal.

I) JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench judgment dated 01.03.2012 and restored the Single Judge’s order affirming dismissal. The Court reasoned in stages:

first, earlier Division Bench findings (06.08.2007) and this Court’s dismissal of SLP (29.02.2008) crystallized that departmental enquiry could proceed because the criminal acquittal was not honourable; those findings attained finality inter se and could not be lightly reversed by subsequent intra-court re-appreciation.

Second, the Court rejected the proposition that non-examination of the complainant was automatically fatal: precedents hold that convictions or departmental findings may rest on trap-party and trap-witness testimony even where decoys turn hostile, and departmental enquiries follow relaxed evidentiary strictures. The Court relied on Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave and Commissioner of Police v. Narender Singh to confirm that confessions and trap statements may be considered in domestic enquiries.

Third, the Court underscored the distinct standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings preponderance of probabilities and held the Disciplinary Authority and appellate bodies had applied that standard by examining departmental evidence and arriving at reasoned conclusions. Reference to Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur and Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank buttressed the proposition that disciplinary authorities need not pen exhaustive reasons if they accept the enquiry report, so long as there is a reasoned conclusion.

Fourth, on intra-court appellate limits, the Court reiterated that a Division Bench must not disturb a Single Judge’s factual finding unless it is perverse or has an apparent legal error; relying on Management of Narendra & Co. v. Workmen, it found the impugned Division Bench engaged in prohibited re-appreciation without recording perversity.

Applying these controls, the Court concluded the disciplinary findings were sustainable: trap-party PW-2 and corroborative departmental witnesses provided adequate material; the representation of the respondent was considered; and administrative appellate mechanisms acted with mind applied. Consequently, the Division Bench had erred and its order was set aside. Appeal allowed; no costs.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The core ratio is threefold:

(1) departmental enquiries operate on preponderance of probabilities, not the criminal standard, permitting reliance on confessions/trap-party testimony otherwise excluded in criminal trials;

(2) non-examination of the complainant/decoy does not ipso facto vitiate domestic enquiry where other corroborative and reliable departmental evidence exists; and

(3) intra-court writ appellate interference is permissible only where the Single Judge’s findings are perverse or suffer an apparent legal error absent such a threshold, a Division Bench must not re-appreciate evidence to substitute its view.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court commented obiter on the permissibility of departmental authorities arriving at conclusions despite criminal courts taking different views an enquiry officer may reach estimations divergent from criminal courts as domestic proceedings assess evidence under different rules. The Court also observed that detailed reasons are not compulsory in punishment orders when the disciplinary authority accepts the enquiry report, although reasoned conclusion on preponderance must exist.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. In departmental enquiries, authorities must examine material placed on record and record a reasoned conclusion based on preponderance.
ii. Confessional statements and trap-party testimony may be considered in domestic enquiries notwithstanding criminal evidence law exclusions.
iii. Appellate courts in intra-court writ appeals must not re-appraise evidence unless the Single Judge’s view is perverse or legally erroneous; mere possibility of a better view does not justify interference.
iv. When criminal acquittal is on benefit of doubt, disciplinary authorities may still initiate enquiries; such acquittal is not necessarily honourable or conclusive for administrative purposes.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision restores the administrative and evidentiary separation between criminal prosecutions and employer disciplinary mechanisms. Practically, it affirms that departmental authorities retain autonomy to apply the civil standard of proof and to consider statements excluded in criminal trials, provided the enquiry objectively evaluates evidence and reaches a reasoned conclusion. The ruling also curtails appellate overreach within intra-court appeals: judges must respect the finality of previous coordinate-bench findings unless perversity or legal error is shown.

For practitioners, the case highlights tactical implications: employees acquitted criminally on benefit of doubt cannot assume automatic administrative exoneration; employers must nonetheless ensure procedural fairness, articulate reasoned acceptance of enquiry reports, and avoid arbitrariness for such orders will survive judicial scrutiny only if based on credible material and proper application of preponderance of probabilities.

The judgment also underscores judicial economy and consistency: once coordinate-bench positions have attained finality between parties, subsequent Benches must refrain from upsetting settled findings absent strong legal faultlines. This balancing protects both the integrity of criminal adjudication and the employer’s regulatory duty to maintain discipline.

K) REFERENCES

1. Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 404 : 2025 INSC 149.

2. G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446.

3. Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Narender Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 265.

4. Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave v. State of Gujarat, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 81.

5. Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank, (2021) 3 SCC 806.

6. Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618.

7. Management of Narendra & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Workmen of Narendra & Co., (2016) 3 SCC 340.

8. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (India).

9. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (India).

10. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (India).

11. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (India).

12. Airport Authority of India Employees (CDA) Regulations, 2003.