A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment in Amish Devgan v. Union of India and Others addresses the constitutional and statutory boundaries of hate speech, freedom of speech and expression, and criminal process in the context of televised media debates. The case arose from allegedly offensive remarks made by the petitioner during a live news debate concerning The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, wherein references were made to Pir Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti, a revered Sufi saint. Multiple FIRs were registered across several States invoking Sections 153A, 295A and 505(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The petitioner sought quashing of FIRs, protection from arrest, and consolidation of proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court undertook an extensive doctrinal and comparative analysis of hate speech jurisprudence, identifying three determinative elements—content, intent, and harm. The Court clarified that Section 295A IPC criminalises only aggravated and malicious insults to religion and does not penalise mere offensive or careless speech. It emphasised that the evaluation of hate speech requires contextual and factual inquiry, rendering premature quashing inappropriate at the FIR stage.

The Court rejected the plea for quashing but granted interim protection from arrest, subject to cooperation with investigation. Applying the doctrine against multiplicity of FIRs, all subsequent FIRs were directed to be transferred and clubbed with the first FIR at Ajmer. The judgment reinforces constitutional balance between free speech and public order while preserving investigative autonomy.

Keywords: Hate Speech; Freedom of Expression; Section 295A IPC; Multiple FIRs; Media Trials; Article 19(1)(a); Religious Sentiments.

B) CASE DETAILS

 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case emerged against the backdrop of increasing public scrutiny over media debates and their role in shaping communal discourse. The petitioner, a television journalist, hosted a prime-time debate on the constitutional validity of The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991. During the broadcast, statements allegedly characterising Pir Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti as an invader and robber were aired. These remarks triggered widespread outrage, culminating in multiple FIRs lodged across different States invoking penal provisions concerning promotion of enmity and religious insult.

The petitioner approached the Supreme Court directly under Article 32, asserting violation of fundamental rights and abuse of criminal process. The petition raised significant questions regarding the threshold of criminality in speech-related offences, especially in the context of journalistic expression. The Court was called upon to balance the competing claims of free speech and protection of religious dignity while ensuring that criminal law is not weaponised to stifle dissent or expression.

The background also reflects the evolving jurisprudence on hate speech, both domestically and internationally. The Court noted the absence of a universal definition and stressed the contextual nature of hate speech adjudication. The judgment situates itself within earlier constitutional precedents that delineate the contours of reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), particularly concerning public order, decency, and morality.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 15 June 2020, the petitioner hosted a televised debate concerning challenges to The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991. During the discussion, he uttered phrases referring to “Aakrantak Chishti” and “Lootera Chishti”, which were translated to mean terrorist and robber. The remarks were alleged to have portrayed Pir Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti as a coercive converter of religion.

Following the broadcast, seven FIRs were registered in different States, primarily under Sections 153A, 295A, and 505(2) IPC. The FIRs alleged deliberate insult to religious beliefs and promotion of communal hatred. The petitioner contended that the remarks were inadvertent and that he had intended to refer to Alauddin Khilji. He issued a public apology and clarification after the telecast.

The petitioner also claimed to have received death threats post-broadcast and lodged a separate FIR seeking protection. He argued that the multiple FIRs amounted to harassment, lacked territorial jurisdiction, and infringed his freedom of speech. Interim protection from arrest was granted by the Supreme Court during the pendency of proceedings.

The respondents disputed the apology, contending that the remarks were repeated multiple times, indicating intent. They alleged that the edited upload of the debate amounted to evidence tampering. The States argued that investigation must proceed to ascertain intent, context, and impact of the speech.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the impugned remarks constitute hate speech under Sections 153A, 295A, and 505(2) IPC?
ii. Whether multiple FIRs arising from a single broadcast are legally sustainable?
iii. Whether FIRs can be quashed at the threshold stage under Article 32?
iv. Whether apology negates criminal intent under Section 295A IPC?
v. Whether territorial jurisdiction is vitiated under Section 179 CrPC?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the Petitioner submitted that the utterances lacked mens rea and were accidental. It was argued that Section 295A IPC penalises only deliberate and malicious acts, as clarified in Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P.. The petitioner asserted that isolated words cannot be divorced from the overall context of the debate.

Reliance was placed on Veeda Menez v. Yusuf Khan to argue applicability of Section 95 IPC concerning trivial harm. The petitioner further contended that registration of FIRs across States without cause of action violated Article 21 and amounted to abuse of process.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the Respondents submitted that repetition of the offensive words evidenced intent. They argued that apology was an afterthought and could not absolve criminal liability. The respondents relied on Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P. to emphasise the cumulative effect of content, context, and impact.

The States contended that investigation was essential to ascertain whether the speech crossed the threshold of criminality. It was argued that Article 19(1)(a) is subject to Article 19(2) and does not protect speech promoting communal disharmony.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2), Constitution of India
ii. Section 295A, Indian Penal Code, 1860
iii. Section 153A IPC
iv. Section 505(2) IPC
v. Sections 154, 156(1), 179, 162 CrPC

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court declined to quash the FIRs, holding that assessment of hate speech requires factual inquiry into content, intent, and harm. The Court observed that the petitioner was not a neutral host but an active participant. It held that apology alone cannot preclude investigation.

The Court granted interim protection from arrest, subject to cooperation. Applying T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, all FIRs were directed to be transferred to P.S. Dargah, Ajmer, treating subsequent FIRs as statements under Section 162 CrPC.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The Court crystallised the doctrine that Section 295A IPC targets only aggravated insults made with deliberate and malicious intent. Hate speech determination requires a conjunctive evaluation of content, intent, and harm. Premature quashing would undermine investigative process.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that long-term impact of hate speech on dignity and social cohesion must be considered beyond immediate public disorder. Comparative jurisprudence was discussed to contextualise Indian standards.

c. GUIDELINES

i. Hate speech assessment must consider content, intent, and impact cumulatively.
ii. Multiple FIRs for same incident should be consolidated.
iii. Apology does not automatically negate criminal intent.
iv. Investigation must not be stifled at FIR stage without exceptional circumstances.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment represents a nuanced constitutional balancing exercise. It safeguards free speech while affirming the State’s duty to protect dignity and communal harmony. The Court refrained from acting as a trial court, preserving investigative autonomy. The decision clarifies hate speech jurisprudence and reinforces procedural safeguards against misuse of criminal law without granting blanket immunity to media actors.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., [1957 SCR]
2. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P., [1997 SCR]
3. T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, [2001 SCR]
4. Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India, [2020 SCC Online SC]

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. The Constitution of India
2. Indian Penal Code, 1860
3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973